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by Lesley Margaret Hunt 
 
When the New Zealand Government restructured the system of the public funding of 
research (1990-1992) it created Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) as companies 
operating in a global, market-led economy. One CRI, AgResearch, responded to this 
environment by corporatisation and instituted a normative system of control of 
workers which, through strategic plans, vision and mission statements, and 
performance appraisal processes, encouraged workers to adhere to company goals. 
This thesis, reporting on an ethnographic study of this CRI, shows how most 
scientific workers (technical workers and scientists alike) experienced insecurity 
through estrangement because the contributions they wished to make were less 
valued both in society and in their work organisation. They were excluded from 
participation in both organisational and Government policy-making, and felt they did 
not ‘belong’ anymore. Scientists in particular were also experiencing alienation (in 
the Marxist sense), as they were losing autonomy over the production of their work 
and its end use. Scientific workers developed tactics of compliance in order to resist 
these experiences and ostensibly comply with organisational goals while maintaining 
and protecting their self-identities, and making their work meaningful. Meanwhile, to 
outward appearances, the work of the CRI continued. 
 
This thesis adds to the sociology of work literature by extending the understanding of 
the concepts of compliance and resistance in white-collar work, particularly under 
normative control, by developing two models of resistance. It adds to the stories of 
the impact on public sector workers of the restructuring of this sector in New 
Zealand’s recent history, and develops implications for science policy and practice.  
 
Keywords: compliance; resistance; identity; work; science practice; restructuring; 
corporatisation; normative control. 
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Prologue 
This thesis aims to provide an understanding of scientists and scientific technicians 
and their work in a particular context and period in New Zealand’s history, and to 
add to the theoretical understanding of resistance in the sociology of work.   
 
The fieldwork for this research was undertaken in the years 1999 to 2000 in the 
Crown Research Institute (CRI), AgResearch, and as such involved the work of 
agricultural science researchers.  That this fieldwork was carried out in this 
organisation was incidental, and came about through the researcher having worked 
there since its creation in 1992.  Although the study was of AgResearch, the 
corporatisation of science in New Zealand and the ‘new managerialism’ more 
widely, has impacted on public good science and the public service across the board.  
To read this thesis purely as a critical examination of a single institution ‘doing’ 
science would be to miss the point completely. 
 
All participants in this study have been given pseudonyms when quoted except 
where material is available through publications.  The organisation and the science 
groups studied were not given pseudonyms as it was felt that the nature of their work 
was such that it was not easy to disguise.  Hence when someone is quoted in this 
work their science group is not given to protect confidentiality.  
 
Lesley Hunt 




When I started this study I wished the consequences of it to intrude and impact as 
little as possible on the everyday lives of those closest to me. I felt it was a very self-
indulgent pursuit at a time in my life when I should have been contributing to saving 
for retirement. I thank AgResearch for three years on a generous scholarship and 
Lincoln University for a ten month scholarship. Their contributions meant that I was 
not a drain on the family finances until this last year. I am grateful for the Lincoln 
University Human Sciences Division’s postgraduate funding system which enabled 
me to interview participants and go to conferences with limited personal expense. 
 
My desire not to intrude PhD work into the lives of my nearest and dearest was 
rather wishful thinking. I thank John for his continuing interest, support and 
tolerance of a partner with a PhD on her mind. He has seen me at my worst and most 
vulnerable in recent years and still hangs in there! I wish to express my gratitude to 
him for living a more restrained social life over the past few years than is his natural 
inclination. Tim, our eldest son, has been a great listening ear in telephone 
conversations to Melbourne. He has been able to reflect on his own experiences at 
work in organisations. Rob has welcomed me to Wellington and made me feel 
special. James was prepared to engage in adversarial debate without prompting. My 
dear friend Maureen has encouraged me to talk PhD and has been alongside me 
through this journey. Many special friends have provided me with hospitality and 
listening ears – Paul and Kate in Palmerston North, Margaret in Wellington, Carolyn 
and David, and Gilbert and Cushla in Dunedin, and Sue and Neil at Lake 
Alexandrina.  Marion, Lucy, Jason, Maria, Andrew, and Wayne of the ‘tin shed’ for 
gave their valuable time to listen patiently to my latest inspiration.  Thanks to Chrys 
Horn for her proof reading and subtle suggestions. 
 
I am grateful to Mum and Dad, Joyce and Graham Herbison, who somewhere along 
the way gave me a love of learning, a concern for others, and believed in me.  
 
I am thankful to John Hay and John Lancashire, past AgResearch general managers. 
It is through Lanc’s support of a woman of ‘mature years’ who was mad enough to 
think that she deserved an AgResearch PhD Scholarship, that this work happened at 
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all. John Hay acknowledged and expressed interest in my three monthly PhD reports 
– not a common feature of management as I describe later in this thesis! 
 
This research could not have happened without the involvement of my former 
colleagues in AgResearch who became participants in this study. One person in 
particular kept me up to date with the gossip and tales about science and its 
relationships with the world outside AgResearch. The technical staff in the Wool and 
Skin Biology Group found themselves sharing an office with a social science student 
doing Master’s level papers at Lincoln University. Suddenly they were expected to 
discuss the ideas of Foucault and other luminaries of this new world. They rose to the 
occasion well and I think we were all enriched. I appreciated the way in which this 
group in particular ‘adopted’ me, inviting me to attend special group occasions, and 
allowing me to follow their pursuits on the Winchmore Farm. The members of my 
other case study groups were generous in giving me such privileged access to their 
time and thoughts and I had a great time with them in my interviews. I appreciate the 
efforts of Viv Shortt, who I am sure often quietly smoothed the way for me, and 
enabled me to make the most of my time as a worker on study leave on the campus.  
  
Last but far from least, I thank my supervisors. Bob Gidlow has been a dedicated 
supervisor. His encouragement of me through regular meetings and his insistence on 
written contributions which he turned around with remarkable alacrity made me 
aware of how fortunate I was to be in his care. His belief and confidence in my topic 
when I was filled with doubts was a great support. John Fairweather, probably 
unknown to him, delivered me challenges at points when I needed them. First there 
was his doubt that I could change from a quantitative to a qualitative perspective, and 
I thought, “I’ll show him!” More recently he said, “This is a very good PhD. It would 
be an excellent PhD if you could spend another four weeks on it.” I thought, “I want 
excellent.” I think it was amazing the way Harvey Perkins often popped in to see 
Bob when I was there. He added his enthusiasm and gut feelings to my awareness 
that I was on to something. All of these people had a belief in me – that I could 
complete this task I had set myself. 
 
I dedicate this thesis to John for his love, support and courage in being with a woman 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
It’s actually quite good because 99% of the people in AgResearch hate 
AgResearch - meaning hate corporate - can’t see any sense in what’s going on. 
It’s not just AgResearch. It’s basically all the CRIs. You see any scientists in 
New Zealand and they’ll bitch about their organisations. It’s a great way to start 
a conversation! It’s good because with the new corporate image we are 
supposed to talk about loyalty and loyalty isn’t generated - you don’t demand it 
- it’s earned. And no-one’s been around [long enough] to have earned anything. 
And they won’t be. They will be gone in 5 years. So yeah, it’s a good 
interacting point (Wade, scientist). 
 
The past histories and traditions that practicing scientists carry with them as 
they move through changing research environments are creating the need for re-
assessments of what it means to be working as a scientist in the 1990s … This 
cultural perspective of the meaning of work presents both an historical and 
political story, but it is also a story of interaction (and power) between 
individuals and the institutions in which their work is embedded (Turpin & Hill, 
1995: 182).  
 
From 1990 to 1992 I worked as a biometrician in MAF Tech and then continued in 
that same capacity in AgResearch till 1998. (AgResearch, a Crown Research Institute 
(CRI), was formed in 1992 to service the research needs of the pastoral agricultural 
sector as part of the Government restructuring of the public funding of science, 
research and technology.) I was delighted when an opportunity arose for me to study 
AgResearch for my PhD. I had become fascinated by how the scientists and technical 
workers I worked with insisted that they loved their work yet complained about it so 
much. I had observed how dedicated they were to their work, how they gave it 
priority over all other activities in the workplace, and how it frequently dominated 
their lives. At the same time they said they were not happy. Tea breaks were 
frequently spent grizzling about the organisation they worked for. Why did these 
workers do nothing about their unhappiness? I was bewildered by this behaviour. I 
could not see what had changed for them since the advent of AgResearch - they 
appeared to be doing the same work they had always done, yet they had become 
unhappier about it. Ken (scientist) spoke of the change:  
In the system we were in, the system in the past [Department of Scientific and 
Industrial Research (DSIR)], it was a competition for added resources, now it’s 
a competition to be allowed to continue to work in the science. So the stakes are 
much higher. 
 
The desire to investigate these questions has grown into this research: a study of the 
continuing impact of the restructuring of publicly funded science and technology 
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research on those who practice agricultural science research in New Zealand. The 
people under study are the scientific workers, both scientists and technical workers, 
in four science groups of AgResearch over the years 1999 to 2000 inclusive.  
 
I wanted to concentrate my research on the ‘ordinary’ workers in the organisation 
who practise science, rather than the managers. The ‘scientific workers’ are the 
technicians, research associates, scientific officers, the scientists who may or may not 
be group leaders, and their next-in-line managers, the Science Platform Leaders 
(SPLs). I had become aware since 1997 that workers were being told to be 
‘innovative’ through the strategic plan communications and in-house training 
courses, but from my own experience I thought they were already innovative. In my 
view, this demonstrated a lack of knowledge on the part of management about those 
who worked for them, which I, in my naïve enthusiasm, wished to correct! I also 
wished to study scientific workers and how they made their work meaningful - in 
keeping with Turpin and Hill (1995), quoted earlier - rather than studying scientific 
practice and the production of knowledge, which would have required more of a 
social studies of science and technology approach, such as Actor Network Theory 
(ANT). I also did not want to follow the Foucauldian technique of deconstruction 
which would have entailed embarking “on a project of estrangement from that 
identity by rendering visible the various costs involved in how we become ‘who we 
are’ ” (Knights and Vurdubakis, 1994: 188). I wanted to study people as subjects, not 
objects - as acting, not just being acted upon. I was mindful, here, of a review of a 
book on medical ethics (Zussman, 1992) in which the reviewer, Gershon (1993: 
225), made the point that medical ethics have been argued in the abstract but no-one 
had studied how doctors actually make such decisions. Likewise, I wished to 
understand the meanings that these workers gave to their work, not the meanings 
senior managers gave to the work of science. 
 
New Zealand Governments have restructured the public sector in order to encourage 
efficiency and accountability. In their science funding, Governments encouraged a 
private sector culture in which knowledge and information are seen as commodities 
for sale in the market place. These two developments have wide implications. A 
consideration of their impact on the scientific practitioners (who are supposed to be 
the source of the new knowledge and innovation on which New Zealand’s future 
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depends), is timely. As unhappy workers are unlikely to be productive, one would 
expect policy makers and managers to be interested in the causes of worker stress 
and dissatisfaction. There has been little attempt to pursue this (Lancashire, 2001: 9). 
 
New Zealand is being observed with interest by other countries as it implements this 
private/business policy model on a previously ‘public good’ system of agricultural 
science research funding (e.g., Anderson, 1992; Pockley, 1995; Devine, 1995). I 
hope that in contributing to an understanding of the impact of this model on scientific 
workers and the practice of science, this research will be of international interest.  
1.1 The research objectives 
What is the purpose of this research? Is it merely to describe what I think is 
occurring or do I aim to change the way scientific research is organised in New 
Zealand? This dilemma is summarised by Michael Rose, and is recognised across the 
social sciences.  
The social sciences always have been regarded as relevant to the problems of 
control. Social scientists themselves disagree whether they should intervene to 
further managerial control, or to produce a new social order, or simply log what 
events seem to be occurring (Rose, 1988: 14-15).  
 
Out of my interests and with a concern for the above issues, I developed three 
objectives.  
 
To identify, by focusing on observations of scientific workers and their descriptions 
of their experiences:             
• The continuing impact on scientific workers (agricultural scientists and other 
related employees) of the 1990-1992 restructuring of the public funding of 
science research. 
• How scientific workers make their work meaningful through this period of 
change in order to continue the practice of science. 
• The ways in which a research organisation can assist scientists and related 
workers to practise science.  
 Within the confines of my approach an emergent objective became: 
• To further the theoretical understanding of ‘resistance’ and ‘compliance’ in the 
workplace.  
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These research objectives will be achieved by an ethnographic analysis of four 
science groups in an agricultural science research organisation. This analysis 
involves: 
• Interviews with workers associated with each science group, focusing on their 
work. 
• Observations of meetings within the organisation, and collection of documents 
such as public statements, annual reports and company policy.  
1.2 The structure of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into four parts (see Figure 1.1). Part A sets the scene for the 
current research. In Chapter 2, I tell my story prior to this research to explain to the 
reader how I became interested in this topic and how I had such privileged access to 
the subjects of this study. Chapter 3 positions the research within the context of New 
Zealand’s restructuring of the public sector, the agricultural scene, the system for the 
public funding of science, and studies of science practice. Chapter 4 describes the 
method used, the perspective brought to this study, the research process, and the 
organisation and groups involved in the study.  
 
In Part B, I explore the meaning that work has for these workers (Chapter 5) and 
their responses to the changes caused by restructuring (Chapter 6), based on the data. 
Chapter 5 describes how scientific work produces opportunities for workers to 
belong to many different social groupings. This belonging and the accumulated 
feedback they get from it and from their actual work reinforces their ideas of 
themselves as doing useful, good quality, scientific research and helps them to see 
themselves as valuable and contributing parts of particular science groups, the 
science community and/or society. This feedback is a way of negotiating, reinforcing 
and protecting their self-identity in the social sense (e.g., Knights and Willmott, 
1999; Giddens, 1991; Goffman, 1961a).  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the ways in which these workers have responded to the changes 
in science policy and its implementation by their work organisation. The organisation 
has reacted to changing Government policy and its implementation through the 
Foundation for Research Science and Technology (FRST) by developing an 
organisational strategy. This strategy imposes claims on workers that are at odds with  
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Part B: Description and preliminary analysis of data 
• Meaning of work (Chapter 5) 
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and valuing them. They attempt to resist the changes that challenge the good things 
about their work and the positive reinforcement work gives to their sense of self in 
order to continue to maintain and protect this self-identity. Resistance includes 
strategies that distance these workers from the claims of the organisation and the 
feeling that they are not valued by the organisation. 
 
By emphasising their belonging to groups both within and outside the organisation 
that value them and their contributions, the workers gain strength to maintain a 
different identity from that claimed by the organisation. They are also able to place 
more importance on the work they do and seek ways of maintaining their work of 
science or getting more science done because that contributes to a part of their self-
identity which they value. 
 
Certain themes emerged from the exploration of the data in Part B. In following up 
these themes (Chapter 7, the first chapter of Part C), I focus on the sociology of work 
literature, rather than science and technology studies, or the management literature. 
The sociology of work literature seems more relevant because it deals with the way 
work is controlled and worker responses to these forms of control. It relates more to 
how workers make work meaningful and the relationships between work and 
identity. In contrast science and technology studies are concerned with how 
knowledge is produced, while the management literature focuses on how to manage 
workers whereas I am interested in the impact of management on workers. The 
sociology of work literature introduced me to a system of work control called 
‘normative control’ whereby organisations try to shape the beliefs and identities of 
those who work for them. This fits my observations in AgResearch. The success of 
this management system has been challenged mainly in the Labour Process literature 
with accounts of worker resistance to such systems of control. Several writers have 
also contributed models of workers’ responses to different forms of control. I am 
encouraged to place these issues of work and identity in a global context by this 
study of the literature. What is happening in the world of work? How does this relate 
to the practice of science? How does this reflect changes in society?  
 
In Chapter 8 I discuss how, by bringing together the literature and the broader 
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can be pictured as engaged in a boundary struggle over identity: what it means to 
them to be scientific workers is in conflict with these ‘market-place’ values. To 
survive in this context they develop a system of compliance which enables them to 
continue in work that has meaning for them, while the organisation continues. (See 
Figure 1.2.) 
 
Part D summarises the findings and, mindful of the research objectives, considers the 
implications of this thesis for theory in the sociology of work, and for Government 
policy on science and research in New Zealand.  
1.3 Some conventions 
Throughout this thesis I conform to the practice of using ‘they’, ‘their’ or ‘them’ with 
a singular meaning to avoid the use of ‘she/he’, or ‘her/his’, or ‘her/him’. I use a 
generic expression,’ scientific worker’ or ‘worker’, to cover anyone in the 
organisation who works in science and I have differentiated between scientists and 
technical workers when necessary to my argument. I do not use the word ‘technician’ 
because most of the technical workers I interviewed were actually of a higher grade 
than technician. They had the occupational labels of ‘scientific officer’ or ‘research 
associate’. The word ‘technician’ was regarded as a somewhat derogatory 
expression, symbolising a more menial occupation. ‘Staff’ is used to apply to any 
employee in the organisation, not necessarily a scientific worker. 
 
In quotations I have used the author’s spelling of certain words which may not be 
consistent with mine. For example, the word ‘organisation’ may appear as 
‘organization’ in many of the quotes and ‘behaviour’ will be spelt as ‘behavior’ if it 
is from an American source. Italics used in quotations are those of the author/s. I 
sometimes use a quotation at the beginning of a section to set the scene or at the end 
to summarise it. All abbreviations used are listed at the beginning of the thesis. 
1.4 Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has briefly situated this thesis in the context of the 
restructuring of public funding of scientific research in New Zealand and stated the 
research objectives. I have outlined the structure of the thesis and some of the 
conventions I follow. 
 9
PART A: SETTING THE SCENE 
In the next three chapters I paint a picture of the setting of this thesis to facilitate the 
reader’s understanding of the rest of the thesis while making my own position clear. 
In Chapter 2 I explain how I was able to have access to the agricultural research 
organisation AgResearch to undertake this research. Chapter 3 situates the research 
in the New Zealand context by describing the restructuring of the public sector 
undertaken from the mid 1980s through to the early 1990s, the agricultural scene 
through this period to the present, and the changes in the system of allocation of 
public funding to scientific research. To this I add a brief consideration of the science 
scene. Chapter 4 outlines the ethnographic method and how this methodological 
approach fits with my perspective and the aims of this research. It also describes the 
research process in greater detail and provides information on the organisational 




PART A: SETTING THE SCENE 
Chapter 2: My story 
I wish to tell my personal story of the changes in this Crown Research Institute 
(CRI), AgResearch, the organisation in which I was previously employed. This 
account may explain why the behaviour of scientific workers started to intrigue me 
and became the basis for this study. As successive Governments embraced the desire 
for a ‘knowledge economy’ I could see the relevance of this interest in scientific 
workers. If research organisations and their employees are supposed to lead the way 
in the implementation of this policy, their well-being and productivity would surely 
be of interest to the organisation, Government and the science community. 
 
In 1990 I joined the staff of the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Technology 
section (MAF Tech) on its Lincoln Campus as a part-time biometrician. In July 1992 
it was confirmed that I had become part of the newly formed AgResearch, one of the 
three CRIs formed to service the primary sector’s research needs as part of the 
Government’s restructuring of the public sector.  
 
In early 1997 AgResearch decided to put all workers through an ‘Invitation to 
Innovation’ (I to I) programme conducted by two Australian academics and 
consultants, Drs John Edwards and Jim Butler. The focus was “on professional 
growth and innovation within a constantly changing environment”1 and it was to last 
for three years. Phase I introduced participants to the ideas of the ‘6 hats’ (de Bono, 
1990), ‘learning organisations’ (Senge, 1990), and the ‘7 habits of highly effective 
people’ (Covey, 1989), etc. At the first three-day workshop the attendance faded as 
workers said they were too busy, and many workers listed as attending did not make 
an appearance. The main comments from participants afterwards were about how 
good it was to get to know people on the campus from other science groups, which 
illustrated their relative isolation. Some found the personality typing interesting, 
particularly when those present were divided into the four main personality types 
according to the Myer’s Briggs Inventory (Keirsey & Bates, 1986). When the lab  
                                                 
1 Handout before the Phase I programme in 1997. 
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staff looked across the room they saw their bosses – scientists and group leaders - on 
the opposite side. The other two groups had very few people in them.2 This drew 
attention to the essential dichotomy of the types of people who worked in 
AgResearch. The lab and technical workers tended to be interested in accuracy, 
thoroughness and order. They were practical and conscientious. The scientists on the 
other hand tended to be sceptical, critical, independent and interested in ideas – often 
arguing for the enjoyment of it. 
 
There was a noticeable change in the information handed out prior to Phase II in 
1998 compared to 1997. The aim was “to be the best via our people”. It was to be a 
way of assisting employees to see where they fitted in the company and  
to align themselves better to the latest developments in the AgResearch 
strategy. Business opportunities and benefits are generated from innovative 
thinking and are much more likely to occur given a supportive work 
environment. I to I assists the organisation to provide a positive environment 
where ideas and creativity can flourish …. Our company will look very 
different in five years with the evolutionary shift from science achievement to 
science for technology and so the capabilities of our people must also evolve. If 
we are to be successful in changing our practice … then we need to allow time 
and support for our people to grow. Guidance and direction from senior levels 
of the organisation has an important role in allowing this growth. This would 
ensure that we build capabilities through targeted professional development that 
will meet the changing needs of our business.3  
 
By this stage the participation rate had dropped away even more with the senior 
scientists in the major campus groups not attending and not encouraging their 
workers to attend. Scientific workers seemed to feel that it had nothing to do with 
their core activity, the practice of science. This puzzled me very much at the time. It 
seemed that there was no acknowledgement by workers that good personal 
relationships, being self-reflective, or problem solving using different methods than 
usual, were at all relevant to their work. I was in no doubt that the methods 
introduced in the course would work. Workers were just not motivated to learn or use 
them. (This was also possibly the fault of the course because the skills concerned 
were taught out of context. Perhaps it would have been more effective if workers had 
worked on real issues within their work-related groups.) It seemed to me, however, 
                                                 
2 The lab staff fell in the ‘SJ’ group and the scientists in the ‘NT’ group. There were a few ‘NF’s and 
only two ‘SP’s in a group of about 30 people. The ratios for an average population are SJ: SP: NT: NF 
– 3:3:1:1 (Keirsey and Bates, 1986). 
3 Handout before the Phase II programme in 1998. 
 12
that the main reason for the low participation was the lack of buy-in by the high 
profile scientists on campus. This then allowed other workers to opt out because 
covertly their bosses did not support their attendance.  
 
Around the time of the first ‘I to I’ courses, I remember a campus meeting at which 
the Board Chairperson, and the General Manager of the Sustainable Production 
Division, made a great show of the ‘chappiness’ between them, while Dr Kain, the 
CEO, appeared to be excluded. Soon after it was announced that Dr Kain was 
‘retiring’ while remaining on the AgResearch Board as a director.4 In mid 1997 a 
new CEO, Dr Keith Steele, was appointed. He had worked for the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) earlier in his career but more recently had been 
managing research institutions in Australia. Soon after his arrival he travelled the 
AgResearch campuses presenting the strategic plan. This was news to workers. We 
were unaware that AgResearch had a strategic plan, but as the ‘Statement of 
Corporate Intent’ it had been part of the Government requirements of CRIs since 
their inception (New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited, 1992, 
1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999). (The shareholding Ministers of the 
Crown have to approve it each year – see Section 3.3 later.) Up till then it had been 
regarded as unnecessary to involve workers in its compilation or to tell workers 
about it. At this presentation the CEO announced that he did not want to be a ‘power 
and control’ manager. He wanted workers’ involvement in organisational decisions. 
With this in mind he asked for volunteers to be part of the strategy implementation. 
 
I thought that this was a great idea. Here I was working in an organisation full of 
recognisably intelligent people. (CRIs must have the largest proportion of PhD-
qualified workers of any organisation in New Zealand.) I felt it was important that 
this source of talent was tapped by the organisation. So with great enthusiasm I 
signed up and was surprised to find that very few other people had done so. Those 
who had volunteered on the Lincoln campus were brought together and two were 
selected to go to a national meeting to form this Strategic Implementation Network 
(SIN). I was somewhat bemused to find that the Human Resource staff member 
decided who these two were. I was not one of them. The agenda was not transparent, 
                                                 
4 He then worked for Lincoln University so obviously did not wish to ‘retire’ from working altogether. 
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but I expect that science staff were a first priority and biometricians, though 
classified as scientists, did not really fit, though this was never stated. However, at 
the last minute the scientist chosen could not go and I went in his place. The other 
representative from Lincoln alternated between a research associate and the business 
manager. The other people who had expressed an interest were members of the 
support staff. There was a significant lack of interest from science staff. 
 
A young woman was seconded from her position as a business manager to facilitate 
this network. An Auckland consultancy company was employed to assist her. 
Considerable company resources were set aside for this network as it involved flying 
campus representatives to regular meetings as well as paying consultancy fees. 
 
The network meetings were a revelation to me. The aim was to set up campus 
meetings to work out how to implement the strategic plan and to get ready for 
preparation for the next year’s strategic plan, but I could not understand what was 
going on and why it seemed to take so much time and energy to do what, to me, 
seemed to be so little. The consultant talked in a jargon I could not understand and I 
have never come across so many acronyms – before or since. He produced complex 
flow charts to express how decisions were to be made and all the processes which 
were to be followed. Of the representatives from the five major campuses, two were 
MBA qualified scientists and one a business manager. These three gentlemen would 
frequently be in competition over who was going to draw complex diagrams all over 
the white board. Our facilitator was able to join in these discussions but the rest of us 
were completely disenfranchised. Our team on the Lincoln campus duly set up 
discussions with various speakers. The organisation of these events was to be 
documented in such a way that we were accountable and able to reflect and learn 
from what we had done, so a remarkable number of forms were created to facilitate 
this purpose. They had to be completed before and after each event and sent off to 
the national facilitator (never to be seen or heard of again). 
 
Over several meetings there were long discussions on what the network should be 
called. A group on the Ruakura campus had objected to the acronym SIN on 
religious grounds. It was finally decided to call the group Green to Gold, with the 
implication that we were turning green pastures into money. This became the 
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accepted name in spite of the objections of the pastorally-minded science staff on the 
network. To them the name implied green grass being replaced by yellow grass, 
which meant either drought or not enough nitrogen! It was interesting to note that 
this perception was not considered important by the other members of the group in 
what was supposedly an agricultural science oriented organisation. This motto was 
used as a feature in the annual report and the strategic plan of the following year. It 
featured a sun just rising over a dark green hill. There was considerable debate about 
whether the sun was rising or setting, particularly as pastoral, commodity producing, 
industries were being described as ‘sunset industries’ at the time!5 
 
Though the Green to Gold network faded away after a time it did achieve several 
things. First, everyone knew about the strategic plan. Second, it was suggested that 
campuses would appreciate more contact with corporate staff and more knowledge 
about what was going on in the organisation. As a result each campus was to receive 
monthly visits, when someone from corporate reported on the Senior Executive 
Management meeting (SEM). This campus meeting was called the Team Brief.6 
Third, the CEO instituted a newsletter called the CEO’s Update, which he distributed 
by email whenever there was something he wished to inform staff about.  
 
After a while my part in the network seemed to be to keep the committee informed of 
what the ‘man on the ground’ was thinking about the organisation, and this role was 
respected by the national facilitator who acted as the one person on whom the CEO 
could rely for information about the grassroots of the organisation. (It is noticeable 
that he no longer has anyone in this capacity.) Another role I had was that of the go-
between with one of the GMs7 to try to make the organisation into ‘One AgResearch’ 
as we called it. This never really eventuated because the GM concerned was too 
busy! I had many ideas but felt it was no use pursuing them on my own without 
support, nor putting myself at risk by not doing the work I was paid to do. 
 
                                                 
5 These comments by scientific workers are a good example of the way they ridiculed corporate 
decisions and hence were able to distance themselves from the organisation (see Chapter 6). 
6 In 2001 these visits to the Lincoln campus ceased as staff told corporate unless presentations 
improved they were a waste of time. In 2002 there have been fewer CEO Updates as well, so the 
Lincoln campus now has little direct communication with corporate management, apart from the 
annual strategic plan presentation.  
7 The organisational structure of AgResearch will be discussed later (Figure 4.1). 
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The local campus committee, for which I became the organiser for lack of other 
volunteers, conscientiously tried to run campus meetings to discuss aspects of the 
strategic plan. We worked hard to get key people on campus involved but it never  
became an accepted part of campus life. AgResearch as a whole ran a ‘virtual 
conference’ on the email system to get ideas about the next strategic plan but there 
was a very low participation rate. Staff said they were too busy. I was beginning to 
develop an awareness that I was working on a dead issue and spending time on it 
when I should be doing other work. By this stage (mid 1998) I had commenced pre-
requisite study to my PhD, and was no longer in paid employment, but had been 
awarded an AgResearch PhD scholarship. I indicated that unless I was paid to do this 
work I would not continue. This was not agreed to and the campus committee ceased 
as no-one else on campus really owned it enough to make sure it happened. The 
national coordinator’s job ran out and she went back to her work as a business 
manager. 
 
The MBA qualified scientists and business manager who were part of the Green to 
Gold Network have since left the organisation for richer pastures. Even though 
AgResearch did give them short-term work there was probably no place for them as 
there were few positions in the organisation outside science-related ones at the level 
to which they would have aspired. (See Figure 4.1: Organisational structure.)  
 
I could not understand why scientific workers were not embracing what I felt were 
good workable ideas. What was going on here? As can be seen above, I developed 
various explanations for this behaviour. 
 
More questions were to come as I observed how cynical workers were about the 
strategic plan. They considered that if they did contribute, no-one would take any 
notice anyway. I wondered why so many groups of workers did not attend the Team 
Brief meetings. Why did they prefer to continue their research work rather than learn 
about what was going on in their organisation? Why were they so passive about 
presenting their views, continuing to grizzle rather than doing anything about their 
perceived grievances? Was this cynicism just part of being involved in science and 
related to the scepticism seen as a valued quality for those in science? The more I 
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thought about it the more my questions grew and have continued to grow throughout 
this research. 
 
At the beginning of my study I thought the major concern of scientific workers 
would be intellectual property and the commodification of knowledge. When I 
started talking to people I quickly discovered that this was not an issue at all. Staff 
were worried about something much more mundane but of much more consequence 
– their survival. They were not only concerned about losing their jobs but also about 
how their work would change in the future to fit the organisation’s strategic 
direction. Would they still want to do it? This was of particular concern because they 
felt their jobs were important and it was work that they loved. Even interest in career 
advancement was not a primary concern. There was no interest in progressing in a 
job that might not exist in the future.  
 
From mid 1998 I became an ‘employee on study leave’. As the recipient of an 
AgResearch scholarship I was allocated office space on the Lincoln campus and I 
was free to become a participant-observer within the organisation. In early 2000 I 
became aware that I was not going to complete the PhD in two years and asked for 
an extension of the scholarship for a year. Towards the end of the year I was told that 
this was not possible and that AgResearch wished to break the scholarship 
agreement, an agreement which had incorporated the promise of employment. All 
those who had supported me in my PhD study had now left the organisation, and 
there was little I could do but accept this arrangement, leaving at the end of January 
2001. In a sense this outcome was a gift to me. It made ‘exit’ from my research site 
easier than I had anticipated based upon the literature (Shaffir and Stebbins, 1991: 
207-255).  
 
In conclusion, I remain immensely grateful to AgResearch for giving me this 
opportunity, as a mature student, to conduct this study, which gave me such 
privileged access to a particular organisational environment. 
 
 17
PART A: SETTING THE SCENE 
Chapter 3: Context 
In this chapter the contexts of this research are outlined in order to situate this work 
in a particular time and place in New Zealand’s history, and in the history of science. 
I describe the restructuring of the public sector within New Zealand, the role that 
agriculture has played within the national culture, the restructuring of the public 
funding of research, particularly the establishment and development of the CRI, 
AgResearch, and, finally, the practice and organisational context of science. 
 
All research is situated in an actual context. This has a powerful impact on what is 
being observed, described and analysed. As Rose (1988: 5) states:  
… by looking at how people have explained work behaviour over the last 
hundred years we are led to consider the dynamic relationship between 
economic conditions, events in workplaces (their politics), and powerful ideas 
…. It also highlights the danger of assuming that there may be any simple 
explanation, good for all times and all places, to apply to social behaviour.  
 
The relationship of actions to context is often unacknowledged by observers 
(particularly those technocratic thinkers who claim impartiality) according to Rose 
(1988: 36; 1978[1975]: 42) and helps account for the complexity of action and 
actors’ interpretations of their actions. Giddens (1989[1984]) also acknowledges the 
importance of taking account of context.8 
3.1 Context 1: Restructuring in New Zealand 
The 1984 Labour Government embarked on a process of restructuring the public 
sector in its second term (1987). The incoming National Government continued this 
after 1990. This restructuring process aimed, broadly speaking, to separate funding, 
delivery of services and provision of policy advice to Government. It was believed 
that this would encourage efficiency through competition, and provide more freedom 
of choice to consumers of products or services formerly provided by Government 
departments. ‘The New Zealand Experiment’ (Kelsey, 1995), as this reform has 
become known, has seen New Zealand change from one of the most highly regulated 
                                                 
8 This acknowledgement may be indicative of a change in attitude by social researchers. Rose does not 
mention it in his 1978 edition of the same book. 
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and socially integrated democratic systems in the world, to one of the most highly 
de-regulated and market-led (Boston, Martin, Pallot & Walsh, 1991).  
 
New Zealand’s public sector reforms were designed by economists and policy 
analysts and took a radical form (Nagel, 1997: 349), described as the “New Public 
Management” (ibid.: 350).9 Observers saw this as “another manifestation of New 
Right, free market ideology”, with origins in such ideologies as public choice theory 
(ibid.: 354). Since 1993 there has been a movement from ‘outputs’ towards 
‘outcomes’.10 Hill and Turpin (1994) imply that the ‘new managerialism’ is not just 
about efficiency and accountability but aligns with a shift in the decision making 
structure and hence in “the very culture of knowledge production” (ibid.: 348). This  
… ‘enterprise’ culture has come to mean the managerialist culture that emerged 
[in Britain under Margaret Thatcher] as public institutions were constrained to 
reorganize to abide by market conditions. At a structural level this has meant 
de-differentiation of previously distinct modes of organization, introduction of 
more ‘corporate’ management structures, flexible employment contracts, new 
forms of financial control, strategic planning and so on (ibid.: 350).  
 
It marks a change from results which could be organisationally controlled to an 
emphasis on supposed social values and strategic management based on central 
government policies (Boston & Pallot, 1997).  
 
Australia has followed a similar path to New Zealand, but differs in an important 
way: New Zealand relies on formal contracts11 as accountability mechanisms, 
whereas Australia has put more emphasis on trust and consensual relationships 
(Campus & Pradhan, 1997). From his thinking about ‘The New Zealand Experiment’ 
Nagel (1997: 355) concludes by asking two questions:  
Does the New Zealand system’s promotion of unequivocal goals, clear feedback 
about performance, and reinforcement of achievement with material rewards 
provide the preconditions that enable strong leaders to create purposive, 
cohesive organizational cultures? Or does its distrustful view of human nature, 
overemphasis on formal contracts, and creation of transient relationships, 
detract from the long-run maintenance of a responsible, committed public 
service? 12 
                                                 
9 This was of sufficient interest internationally for the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management to 
produce a volume in 1997 dedicated to a discussion of these reforms in a global context.  
10 When ‘relevance’ started being a feature in FRST policy.  
11 For example, FRST makes contractual arrangements with research organisations after a competitive 
bidding process. 
12 There is a question here about whom he is talking. Is it managers or workers? With the emphasis on 
‘material rewards’ it would imply that it is managers but this is contradicted later. Workers have not 
benefited materially from the implementation of this restructuring. 
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Much has been written about this period in New Zealand’s history. I have 
given only a very brief summary of the available literature in order to set the 
scene. Now I move on to a similarly brief consideration of the place of 
agriculture in New Zealand. 
3.2 Context 2: The agricultural scene 
In New Zealand’s recent past, agricultural primary products have been acknowledged 
to be the source of the country’s wealth and security (Brooking, 1996), and those 
associated with agriculture used to play an important part in New Zealand society. 
To be ‘helping’ agriculture was to be ‘helping’ the nation.13 It was accepted that the 
knowledge gained from agricultural research should be freely available to farmers. In 
1984, when the Labour Government came to power, this attitude to agriculture 
changed and subsidies were quickly removed (Hawke, 1992: 441). Later, the work 
formerly carried out by MAF extension officers became subject to ‘user pays’,14 
under the auspices of ‘Agriculture New Zealand’, a Government owned company 
expected to be financially viable through its own commercial revenue. Final 
privatisation occurred in 199515 with the purchase of Agriculture New Zealand by 
Wrightson Limited (Journeaux, 1998). As MAF reported in 2000:  
Over the past 15 years farmers have had to adjust to the removal of subsidies 
and the deregulation of the economy. Sheep and cattle numbers have fallen 24% 
from the peak in the early 1980s. This indicates the extent to which farmers 
were “farming for subsidies”, often unsustainably, rather than producing the 
type and amount of product that the market required (MAF, 2000: 25). 
 
The impact of these changes can be seen by examining New Zealand’s exports by 
trade sector. There has been an enormous drop in the relative importance of 
agricultural products and a rise in the basic manufacturing sector. Land-based 
                                                 
13 “... the notion of farmers as the ‘backbone of the country’ dies hard” (Hawke, 1992: 420).  
14 According to Simpson and Craig (1997: 71) this system was “ill-conceived” because “there was 
little incentive to succeed … since any revenues generated were returned to the consolidated fund 
rather than to the area of science involved.” Also there was “the mounting inability of users to pay” 
because of the economic stagnation at the time. Later they say (ibid.: 76), “The ‘user pays’ system of 
cost recovery actually served to increase the distance between science providers and industrial end-
users rather than bringing them together in productive collaborations”. They do not say exactly how 
this occurred but imply that it was because of the market principles of neo-classical economics. 
15 1994 according to Paine (1997). 
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products that made up around 80% of exports in 1973 made up 53% in 1996 and the 
range of such products has broadened (Le Heron & Pawson, 1996: 136).16  
 
There has been a strong message to the research community accompanying these 
changes. Agriculture is no longer central to Government thinking. For example, the 
last National Government (1996-1999) had a ‘Minister of Food and Fibre’ rather 
than a ‘Minister of Agriculture’. Ironically, the present Labour Government, which 
has traditionally represented the urban members of society, resurrected the ‘Minister 
of Agriculture’ title. The future of New Zealand’s economic health is seen to lie in 
the ‘knowledge society’ and agriculture is not promoted as an important part of this, 
except as a spin-off for biotechnology (Maharey, 2000; Hodgson, 2000a, b, c, d and 
3).17 With its link to research and development, science is seen as the way forward 
for New Zealand’s economy.18 The Minister of Research, Science and Technology 
indicated his Government’s policy in a speech which included the following:  
Transformation means moving New Zealand beyond its traditional dependence 
on the primary industries for the generation of wealth. We are extremely good 
at primary production and processing. It is a vital part of our future and we 
continue to post remarkable productivity increases. But it’s not enough …. 
wealth is increasingly taking the form of knowledge rather than stuff (Hodgson, 
2000a: 1-2). 
 
The allocation of public research funding reflects this declining emphasis (e.g., 
Science Priorities Review Panel, 1995: 22). FRST states in its Investment Approach 
for Economic Innovation and FRST Investment Change Process document:  
The Foundation will progressively shift its research portfolios from mature 
areas of commodity cost-reduction activities towards RS&T that underpins high 
value-added export industries (FRST, 2000: Section 1, p.2).  
 
Where research primarily underpins the achievement of efficiency gains in 
undifferentiated commodities … [it] will be targeted for disinvestments … 
(ibid.: Section 2, p.3).19  
                                                 
16 In 1999 agriculturally based exports accounted for 54% of total exports and 15% of GDP (MAF, 
2000: 6). 
17 ACRI (2002: 13) stress the need for research to build on New Zealand’s “existing strengths [which] 
lie in the nation’s human capabilities and competencies, the natural advantages of industry and land-
based activity …”.  
18 The incoming Minister of Research, Science and Technology stated: “I want to assure you that, at 
last, you have a Government that is on the side of science. We understand that science and technology 
are crucial to our economic future” (Hodgson 2000e: 1). 
19 Jessop, in his 19 September 2001, lecture at the University of Canterbury, Restructuring of the 
Welfare State, said that in Germany the State supports R&D that makes sure its most internationally 
competitive industries remain that way. (This compares unfavourably with New Zealand where 
support is going into areas in which New Zealand does not have such expertise already.) 
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Research organisations are developing new strategies to maintain or increase their 
research capabilities and their funding. Scientists within these organisations are 
asked to focus research on commercial products or processes that preferably can be  
patented and licensed, and have an international as well as a national market. There 
is a general movement away from an emphasis on primary production and the use of 
the word agriculture because it is seen as limiting the possibilities for future research. 
The emphasis is on research being able to make a contribution to any part of the eco-
commodity chain or agri-food sector.20 Hence words like ‘commodity’ and 
‘production’ have disappeared from research proposals as researchers attempt to 
indicate that their work no longer has the aims of increasing efficiency and 
productivity in the primary sector. In order to align itself with this trend, AgResearch 
stated that it is serving “New Zealand’s food and fibre industries” (AgResearch 
Science, No.16: 2), omitting the words, ‘agriculture’ and ‘science’. It is no longer an 
‘agricultural research institute’ but a ‘life sciences company’ (AgResearch Strategic 
Plan 2000-2003; 1999).21  
 
The irony of these moves is that the agricultural industry had a boom year in 2000 to 
2001, demonstrating how important it continues to be to New Zealand’s economic 
wellbeing (INFOS Database, Statistics NZ, 2001).  
3.3 Context 3: The restructuring of publicly funded science  
A perception that scientific research lacked accountability was reflected in New 
Zealand from the 1970s on by Governments’ increasing emphasis on encouraging 
private sector involvement in R&D (Palmer, 1994: 8). New Zealand does not have a 
good record of such involvement compared with other first world countries (MoRST, 
2002; McKinsey, 2002).22 Governments wanted to restructure the way public 
research funding was to be allocated (Palmer, 1994) in line with the restructuring of 
the public sector described earlier. The 1990 National Government implemented the 
                                                 
20 This is also seen in Australia and Canada (Falvey et al., 1995). 
21 The Association of Crown Research Institutes (ACRI, 2002: 13) uses the word “agbiotech”.  
22 Lancashire (2001: 2) in his paper at the Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ) sponsored Bio-
science to bio-enterprise to bio-business (B2B2B) conference, thinks it is time the heat was turned up 
on New Zealand’s private sector. They should be asked why they do not invest in R&D. He points out 
that there has not been a great attendance from this sector at the many meetings around the country to 
work out how to get business and science working together. The latest statistics (MoRST, 2002) 
indicate that New Zealand’s expenditure on R&D actually deteriorated between 1998 and 2000. The 
business sector’s expenditure fell to 20% of the OECD average when compared with GDP. 
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final separation of what it felt to be conflicting interests by forming in 1990 the 
Ministry for Research, Science and Technology (MoRST) and the Foundation for 
Research, Science and Technology (FRST) to provide policy and be responsible for 
the allocation of the Public Good Science Fund (PGSF), respectively. They were 
followed by the formation of ten Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) in 1992.23 Each 
CRI was to represent a particular sector of the economy and was able to act as a 
company under the CRI Act 1992, with their shareholder, the Government, 
represented by the Minister of CRIs and the Minister of Finance. Governance was to 
be carried out by Government selected Boards of Directors.24 Each CRI was to 
contract research from FRST according to Government approved priorities 
formulated by MoRST. This “corporate model gives CRIs legitimacy in an 
environment where accountability and market responsiveness are highly valued” 
(Simpson and Craig, 1997: 76). CRIs are expected to demonstrate “... an adequate 
rate of return on shareholders funds” (CRI Act 1992, Section 5.3(a)). The Statements 
of Corporate Intent (New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited, 
1993 – 2000) assert that it is left to the discretion of the shareholding ministers 
whether the profit left after tax is returned for reinvestment within the CRI or 
whether there is a dividend paid to the shareholders.25 
 
Lancashire (2001: 3) argues that since the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research (DSIR) was founded there has been a strong message that “government 
funded science was to serve the country’s economy” but “despite these economic 
imperatives basic, curiosity driven long term research was carried out” (ibid.: 4). 
This was probably because DSIR was founded on what was known as the ‘Haldane 
Principle’ or “the separation of research from administrative departmental control” 
already “enshrined in British governmental practice” (Galbreath, 1998: 19). Such 
opinions about the purpose of science research continue to be voiced: “The driving 
                                                 
23 The tenth CRI was the New Zealand Institute for Social Science Research and Development Ltd, 
which was disestablished in 1994 (Simpson and Craig, 1997: 77). 
24 This “design reflects the corporate governance model with management held accountable to 
shareholders” (Simpson and Craig, 1997: 75).  
25 The Government called on this dividend for the first time in 2001 to set up a venture capital fund. 
One of the shareholding Ministers, Pete Hodgson, the Minister of CRIs, said he had become aware 
that some of the CRIs had invested in Government bonds and not in any risky ventures with their own 
science R&D (Radio NZ, National Programme, Sunday AM, 26 May, 2002). What he did not say was 
that AgResearch, for example, had been unable to use this money for high risk investment because the 
shareholding Ministers (via Treasury) would only allow investment in R&D that produced good 
returns within three years (Meeting with AgResearch Board Chair, Brent Layton, Lincoln, 24-3-00). 
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force behind the changes is the belief that properly directed science can prop up the 
New Zealand economy …. The Government calls it “public good research” ” 
(Anderson, 1992: 12). 
 
In the past, scientists did not have to worry about management or business. Simpson 
and Craig (1997: 71) describe the traditional model of scientific inquiry as one in 
which scientific workers are “free to explore questions that stimulate their curiosity” 
though they do admit later that in New Zealand, the “DSIR and other agencies were 
responding to some of the country’s needs for scientific innovation (for example in 
the agricultural industry). They were not driven purely by curiosity…” (ibid.: 74).  
 
The CRIs were to be responsible for the intellectual property they produced, with an 
understanding that this was to be commercialised by the private sector except in 
special circumstances: “before any overseas sale of intellectual property occurred, 
New Zealand industry must be offered the first right of refusal and decline to uptake 
the property” (Palmer, 1994: 40). Each CRI has had to make the decision whether to 
remain dependent on public funding for its work or whether to complement this by 
seeking funding elsewhere. These extra resources could come from commercial 
contracts, by gaining income from the licensing of products or processes in the local 
or international market place, and/or by the sale of such products or processes. Such 
decisions may come into conflict with Palmer’s assertion above. AgResearch, for 
example, has decided that in order to retain present workers, and to develop further 
capabilities as a quality research organisation, it needs to become increasingly 
funded from commercial sources. Its aim is to have 33 percent of its revenue 
originating from the PGSF by the year 2003 (AgResearch Annual Report 1998: 33). 
This is also seen as freeing it from its research directions being dominated by 
Government policy, via MoRST.26      
 
When the CRIs were first formed, scientists expressed a great concern about the lack 
of consultation concerning the form restructuring was to take (Evison, 1993; Lovett, 
1994). In 1994 the New Zealand Association of Scientists (NZAS) carried out a large 
                                                 
26 AgResearch CEO, Keith Steele in the Lincoln campus presentation of the 1998/99 Strategic Plan, 
30 June, 1998. This was endorsed by the Board Chairperson, Brent Layton, at meetings on 24-3-00, 
when he said, “We can devote all our time to reading the tea leaves. We want to build independence.” 
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survey on the state of science in New Zealand. Results indicated that the main 
concerns of scientists were job security and lack of a clear career path. This had led 
to a decrease in job satisfaction. Half of those surveyed felt that there was a decrease 
in the amount of ‘good science’ being carried out (Kirton, Ross & Mercer, 1995). 
Many others expressed personal thoughts about the situation, bringing up points of 
interest to the present research. These included: the focus on management efficiency 
and the achievement of objectives by a certain date; the shift from basic to applied 
research27 (Falvey, Forno & Srivastava, 1995; Kirton et al., 1995) and to outcomes in 
which the benefits can be captured by means such as patenting (Falvey et al., 1995); 
whether this environment is conducive to innovation or creativity (Anderson, 1992); 
and the impact of competition on relationships between CRIs (Lovett, 1994; Kirton 
et al., 1995).  
 
Nevertheless, according to official sources, the restructuring of science has been a 
success. Sean Devine, former Programme Manager for FRST and at the time 
Executive Director of the Association of Crown Research Institutes (ACRI) believed 
that the “[s]cience reforms are already delivering many of the benefits expected of 
them” (Devine, 1995: 9). Simon Upton, Minister of Science and Technology at the 
time of restructuring into CRIs, wrote in 1995, that “the contestability ... has brought 
much greater discipline and transparency into the way public science resources are 
deployed” (Upton, 1995: 4).  
 
The lack of consultation between MoRST, FRST, the CRIs and staff within the CRIs, 
has continued on the grounds that “as the primary beneficiaries of the PGSF, their 
self-serving interests might subvert the strategy process. This view is a direct 
derivative of neo-classical agency and public choice theories” (Simpson and Craig, 
1997: 75). According to Simpson and Craig (1997: 75) this has changed and there is 
now “open debate”. Others would disagree: 
There is definitely a feeling amongst many working scientists that they are 
rarely consulted about policy and management issues. This was best summed up 
                                                 
27 An underlying aim of Government policy has been to change New Zealand’s business/industry 
culture and its lack of support for R&D. This may take a generation to correct (Upton, 1995) and 
ultimately may mean that public funds would only be invested in “blue skies” or basic, curiosity-
driven research (Lovett, 1994), as industry picked up the rest. This proposed shift seems to be 
contradictory to what is happening in practice as the present Government (2002) moves more and 
more to support R&D with its ‘knowledge society’ goal, while basic research is to be carried out 
under the auspices of the Marsden Fund (e.g., Budget, May, 2002).  
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by one eminent local scientist saying ‘it’s like being an All Black who spends 
all his time on the reserves bench’ (Lancashire, 2001: 11).  
 
Another change experienced by employees in CRIs is the loss of the ‘public servant 
tradition’, at the heart of which was a guarantee of a lifetime career and a pension 
(Martin, 1991: 367). The nature of the ‘loyalty’ demanded by an elected government 
of its public servants has changed, as has what it means to say that something is ‘in  
the public interest’ or ‘of service to the community’. Managerialism and its concern 
with ‘efficiency’ or ‘achieving more with less’ (and making a profit), and with 
cutting the size of the public sector to promote efficiency gains, can be seen as being 
in conflict with the public service tradition (ibid.: 368-70).  
 
Through the auspices of the Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ), Jack Sommer, 
an eminent American with an interest in science policy, conducted two surveys of the 
New Zealand science community (1996, 2000) to measure the impact of the science 
reforms (Sommer & Sommer, 1997; Sommer, 2000). Sommer’s comparison of the 
two surveys, Voices from the Grassroots of Science: Tales of Hope and Woe 
“indicate[s] a stunning level of dissonance over New Zealand science and technology 
policy reforms” (Sommer, 2001: 7). Scientists in CRIs were more unwilling in 2000 
to recommend a career in science or engineering than they were in 1996 (67% 
compared with 56%) (ibid.: 5). As a university-based sociologist said to me, it is very 
unusual, when such levels of unhappiness have been revealed amongst scientists, for 
nothing to have been done about it by policy makers over the four year period 
between surveys.28 Peter Gluckman, former Dean of Auckland University’s Faculty 
of Medical and Health Sciences, now the foundation director of the Liggin’s 
Institute, has been quoted in the press as saying, “I would not see a scientific career 
as compatible with human existence, at the present time. Scientists lead a bloody 
miserable life” (Gluckman, 2001).  
 
John Lancashire (2001), now a policy strategist after a science management career in 
DSIR then AgResearch, presented his opinion on the science reforms to a Royal 
Society of New Zealand (RSNZ) conference, Bio-science to bio-enterprise to bio-
business. He saw four major problems to be overcome if science was to make a 
                                                 
28 Pers. comm. Geoff Fougere, 8-3-02. 
 26
stronger contribution to New Zealand: the role of government and the private sector 
in science was confused; behaviour had become too competitive; there was too much 
managerialism in science; and the voice of the science community had been “stilled”. 
He felt that Government policy has changed too often over the past decade, there was 
too much focus on business from FRST, and MoRST had lost touch with the science 
community.29 
  
Ironically, there are several reports from Government funded agencies that echo 
similar concerns about the competing interests within CRIs to be both providers of 
publicly funded research and commercial entities. In 1998 a FRST report 
Technological Learning and Knowledge Application Review was released. Five 
hundred end users of research were interviewed and 666 replied to a questionnaire.30 
The end users were quite clear that some CRIs have a “cost recovery mentality” 
(Hodgson, Howe, Saunders & Winsley, 1998: 26) and (quoting from the report) they 
were concerned about:  
the extent to which the commercial objectives of CRIs are perceived to be 
overriding their objectives of achieving benefits for New Zealand. Many users 
argue that CRIs are restricting access to the results of PGSF research in an 
endeavour to commercialise it and capture the benefits from it for themselves 
.… CRIs are given the commercial powers and structures to enable them to be 
financially viable businesses so that they are able to continue to deliver PGSF 
outcomes in the long-term. The Foundation’s investment policy accommodates 
the commercial returns that underpin this. However, CRI profits and 
commercial returns are seen as a condition of staying in business in the long-
term, not as the purpose of the business, and this is what distinguishes CRIs 
from private for-profit enterprises. CRIs are there to do what the market cannot 
do, not what it can do. The CRI Act makes clear that the primary purpose of 
CRIs is to deliver benefits for New Zealand, and that their commercial 
objectives are secondary to this (ibid.). 
 
Some of these issues were echoed three years later in a discussion document on the 
state of the biotechnology industry in New Zealand, commissioned by Industry New 
Zealand (Randall, 2001). This document asserts that too much intellectual property 
(IP) is locked up in the CRIs and there should be a process in publicly funded 
research for IP to be auctioned off in some way at a certain point in its development.  
                                                 
29Lancashire was the first New Zealand science voice following the ‘knowledge economy’ rhetoric of 
the present Government that I have heard speaking up for science and expressing a concern about the 
business focus of science policy. 
30 The report does not say who these end users were. It only indicates that they covered “a very wide 
range of user sectors” (Hodgson et al., 1998: 1). 
 27
This backlash to the way the CRIs are developing is seen by CRIs as a response by 
industry to Government restructuring and its drive for the CRIs to survive financially 
and grow.  
 
A MoRST (2000) report considered that CRIs need to balance their interests better 
over their different responsibilities: short-term financial viability and long-term 
research viability; the Government’s ownership interest and purchase interest; the 
interests of purchasers and users of research between existing sectors and new 
sectors; and finally, the needs of researchers to both conduct basic research and apply 
their research. According to this report, the slant is too much towards short-term 
financial viability and the Government’s ownership interest, and the application of 
research to existing sectors (MoRST, 2000: 8). Lancashire (2001) goes further and 
argues that by virtue of the Government’s requirement that the CRIs be successful 
businesses, the work of research is now compromised because the CRIs compete 
with the business sector for IP and business (ibid.: 9); scientists compete for funding, 
which means they are less likely to collaborate both within their institutions and 
between and beyond them; and the voice of science has been replaced by that of 
management (ibid.: 10). Even MoRST had to admit that within the CRIs staff morale 
was low and distrust of management was common (MoRST, 2000: 12). 
 
Having discussed the broad context of the restructuring of the public funding of 
science I will briefly describe how AgResearch, as one of the CRIs formed in 1992, 
fits into this context. (A fuller description will be given later in Chapter 4.) 
3.4 AgResearch 
Before 1992, publicly funded agricultural research in New Zealand was carried out 
primarily by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), or the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (MAF) through its organisation, MAF Tech. 
AgResearch is one of the four CRIs set up in 1992 to serve the primary sector.31 Its 
original full title was the New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Ltd. 
and it was known as AgResearch, but in late 2000 it became AgResearch Limited as 
part of a re-branding exercise. It is slowly achieving an aim of increasing its  
                                                 
31 HortResearch, Forest Research (FRI) and Crop and Food Research are the other three. 
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commercial revenue as a percentage of its total revenue. In the 2000-2001 financial 
year it received more revenues from commercial sources (55%) than from FRST for 
the first time in its history (AgResearch Annual Report 2001: 6).32 
 
AgResearch has been corporatised, and has come to fit Drucker’s description: 
The main function and purpose of the enterprise is the production of goods, not 
the governance of men. Its governmental authority over men must always be 
subordinated to its economic performance and responsibility (Drucker, 1951: 81 
cited in Grint, 1991: 130). 
 
This making of an organisation into a business or company is the response of 
Government, Boards and management of many state sector organisations to the 
perceived external contemporary environment and the Government’s 
requirements for accountability and efficiency in the use of tax payers’ money. 
This is evident in the CRI Act of 1992. It was not articulated in a way that 
impacted on workers in AgResearch until 1997 when the new CEO arrived. In 
AgResearch, corporatisation included increasing the emphasis on strategic 
planning and profit making, restructuring into smaller units to better achieve 
the strategic direction, acquiring aligned commercial and research companies, 
and the addition of a product development company, Celentis. 
 
According to Simpson and Powell (1999) in their study of the organisational 
structures of eight of the nine CRIs from 1992 till 1997, AgResearch followed a 
‘Technology Push’ design archetype but was showing signs of movement towards a 
‘Multiple Project’ design, which the authors feel is a better way of producing the 
innovation required in the present environment. The latter requires a “high degree of 
integration and cross-communication … to hold such a mobile form of organization 
together. Typically this coherence is provided by developing shared values and a 
strategic vision which makes the purpose and direction of the business explicit” 
(ibid.: 444). The development and change of these structures supposedly indicates “a 
shift in the fundamental beliefs and values that are held within an organization” 
(ibid.: 441). My thesis challenges this statement. Simpson and Powell make no 
distinction between the desired ‘beliefs and values’ expressed by the company  
                                                 
32 There is criticism of this as commercial sources may include revenue from subcontracts with other 
CRIs which may well be sourced from FRST.  
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strategy and management, and the ‘beliefs and values’ as practised by workers. This 
is a major flaw in their argument – particularly as the authors interviewed only the 
CEO and one other senior management person in each organisation, and collected 
data from the annual reports and statements of corporate intent, which represent the 
strategic plan (ibid.: 446). Simpson and Powell also measure the success of the 
organisational design by the profit made (ibid.: 450). They do not appear to 
understand that the profit made is an indication of the cut taken off funding before it 
is allocated to science budgets, rather than an indication of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the organisation. 
 
An important part of corporatisation in AgResearch has been the dissemination of the 
strategic plan. This tells workers that AgResearch has the vision - “better life science 
... better lives”, the mission – “sustainable and integrated solutions through life 
science innovation”, and brand values – “leading edge, in touch, and responsible” 
(AgResearch Strategic Plan 2000-2003). These statements are overlaid on a beautiful 
pastoral scene, on the log-on screen of all staff computers, so that they see them 
every day. The key parts of the strategic plan are stated as:  
• Investing in new science capabilities to ensure international leadership in key 
areas of science 
• Jump-shifting our performance in new product development 
• Building our reputation as a responsible, innovative and customer-focused 
leader in the life sciences 
• Getting maximum value from our asset base to ensure neutral EVA (economic 
value added) in the long term (ibid.). 
 
Staff were introduced to the Strategic Plan by the publication of special summary 
booklets and by an annual presentation by the CEO to each campus with input from 
senior management and group discussion. In addition, and as I alluded to earlier, 
there was an effort by the CEO and the Board Chairman to get workers involved in 
the preparation of the Strategic Plan.  
3.5 Context 4: The context of science 
This section outlines two strands of literature on science and its practice. Firstly, I 
consider briefly what science is and secondly, where it is practised. These themes 
will be developed later within the particular context of this study (Part B onwards). 
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3.5.1 Science and its practice 
According to the Collins Compact English Dictionary (Makins, 1994), science is:  
“1. The study of the nature and behaviour of the physical universe, based on 
observation, experiment and measurement; 2. The knowledge obtained by these 
methods.” Hence, science is defined both by its practice and the result of that 
practice, knowledge. In general, furthering knowledge in science is an incremental 
process. From an already espoused theory, an extension is predicted in the form of an 
hypothesis, which can be tested experimentally and the results observed (empirical). 
This testing is done in such a systematic way that other researchers could replicate it. 
Hence, according to the dominant Popperian falsification account, theory is always 
open to challenge, change and extension and is seen only as being supported by the 
evidence, but never proven. An assumption is that the universe is ordered and able to 
be explained by generalised laws. This scientific method of practice is thought of as 
rational by its exponents and, while research may be value-led, researchers seek to be 
objective and value free, eliminating bias by following the given method and 
submitting their work to the scientific community for critical review before 
publication (Monette, Sullivan & DeJong, 1994: 22-23; Blaikie, 1995). Despite the 
counter-views put forward by certain philosophers of science such as Kuhn 
(1970[1962]), the scientific method was regarded until recently as the best way of 
discovering knowledge. Scientists held a mystique within the public domain due to 
the perception that they possessed rational and objective ways of thinking, and higher 
level theoretical, conceptual and empirical skills compared to other ‘ordinary’ folk 
(Fuller, 1997; Fuller, 1993: 7).  
 
The study of science and of the practice of science by social scientists have gone 
through a number of stages. The acknowledged ‘father’ of the sociology of science, 
Merton (1942 in Merton, 1973: 268), added a third meaning of science to the 
dictionary meanings: a “set of cultural values and mores governing the activities 
termed scientific”. His widely accepted work on the norms of the scientific 
community identified four values as essential: universalism, communism,33 
disinterestedness and organised scepticism (ibid.: 267-278). In a later work, Merton  
                                                 
33 As in “common ownership of goods” (Merton, 1973: 273) or “communism of intellectual property” 
(ibid.: 303). 
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(1973: 298-302) writes that eponymy, the drive for professional recognition, and the 
wish to be ‘first’ in a discovery, are the drivers of, or dynamic behind, this normative 
system.  
 
In the latter part of the twentieth century, the focus of social research on science 
changed to the observation of scientific practice. Social researchers34 have described 
how scientists carry out their work in much the same way as anyone else (e.g., Knorr  
Cetina & Mulkay (1983) Science Observed; Lynch (1985) Art and Artifact in 
Laboratory Science, Woolgar (1993[1988]) Science: the very idea), but report it to fit 
the “norms” and the process of the scientific method (Fuller, 1993: 9). This  
‘demystification’ of science, together with disillusionment with science over events 
such as the use of the atomic bomb, and concerns about the environment (e.g., 
Rachel Carson in Silent Spring (1962), H. Patricia Hynes in The Recurring Silent 
Spring (1989)), and more recently the issue of genetic modification, have placed 
scientists and the work of science under greater public and academic scrutiny. The 
‘black box’ that was science is being “unpacked” (Latour, 1987). The freedom of 
science to choose its own direction with the declared aim of increasing knowledge is 
seen by scientists to be under threat. Others outside the scientific community may see 
this preference on the part of scientists to be accountable only to science (Sommer & 
Sommer, 1997: 20), as scientists escaping responsibility for the use made of their 
work. 
 
This study is concerned with the practice of agricultural science and uses the 
scientific method to seek to understand the physical world of agriculture. Busch & 
Lacy (1983: 6-19) describe the rise of agricultural science as part of the change in 
attitudes to production from the land that were required to turn farming from a means 
of subsistence into a commercial operation. In the past, agricultural science in New 
Zealand has been seen to fit a utilitarian framework with its major concern being 
increased production (Brooking, 1996).35 As such, agricultural science has always 
had a practical, “commercial” side. This is now being balanced by a concern for  
                                                 
34 Owing to the recent nature of this work the coherent name ‘science studies’ is only just emerging 
for what in the past have been called the ‘social study of science’ or ‘science and technology studies’ 
and other variations. 
35 Busch & Lacy (1983) outline this with respect to the U.S.A. 
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environmental and agricultural sustainability as demonstrated by the changing 
emphases in the output descriptions for applications for FRST funding. There is a 
growing interest in quality as compared with commodity production (Bezar, 1994).  
3.5.2 Science within an Organisational Setting  
Most people concerned with scientific research work in organisations. Organisations 
exist to “get things done” and they do this by using a division of labour, assigning 
workers to different groups to achieve particular tasks (Munro, 1997: 20). As 
organisations may provide people with a strong source of identity (Eccles and 
Nohria, 1992: 65), this “work of division” where people actively put energy into 
maintaining divisions, can be a source of conflict (Parker, 1997: 126-137). 
 
Scientists belong to a particular group of employees identified as ‘professional’.36 
They demonstrate an allegiance “to science” which supersedes organisational 
boundaries. Their membership of the scientific community may at times set them in 
conflict with their organisation’s aims and objectives. Scientists tend to be 
“cosmopolitans” rather than “locals” (Gouldner, 1954). Raelin (1991[1985]: 2, 16) 
identifies cosmopolitans as those who were likely to have been adolescents in the 
1960s and hence part of the ‘flower power’ generation. According to Raelin, 
cosmopolitans have strong views about being autonomous and free to make decisions 
about how their work is to be done; they would probably stay in the job if their pay 
was reduced; their friends are in the same profession; they do not want to be 
administrators; they think their professional peers, rather than any one else, should 
judge their performance; and they are more concerned with advancing their own 
professional reputations, than that of their employing organisation.  
 
Scientific workers, like any other workers, can be studied in terms of their work 
practice – the work they do - and the organisational environment in which it is 
carried out.  
                                                 




In this chapter I have articulated how this thesis is to be placed within the context of 
the New Zealand restructuring of the public sector, particularly how the public 
funding of research was organised in a manner supposed to ensure efficiency and 
accountability to Government goals. As the particular organisation I studied, 
AgResearch, conducts research in the pastoral agricultural sector, I described the 
changes in the place agriculture has played in society over recent years. Then I 
considered how AgResearch has responded to the challenges of restructuring by 
corporatisation. Because AgResearch is also concerned with the work of science I 
briefly touched upon how science has been studied in the past and how science 
practice is carried out by workers in organisations.  
 
Context is important for this research as it was conducted at a significant time for 
New Zealand and for the changing world of work. It tells the story of the impact of 
the restructuring of New Zealand’s public sector on a particular group of workers 
within that sector. To my knowledge, this has not been done before. It describes the 
impact of a particular change of emphasis in workforce control and so joins a 
growing body of literature in this area, but provides a different context and research 
perspective. In the next chapter I describe how I carried out this research and why I 
chose to use particular methods to study scientific workers in AgResearch. 
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PART A: SETTING THE SCENE 
Chapter 4: The ethnographic method  
In this chapter I discuss why I chose an ethnography as an appropriate way to study 
workers in an organisation. The interpretive perspective, along with the tool of 
symbolic interactionism, enabled me to study how the workers in this organisation 
made their work meaningful. The research process I followed is described, followed 
by a full description of the site of the ethnography, AgResearch, including two 
figures outlining the organisational structure. The chapter concludes with a 
description of each of the case study groups to draw a picture of the work and the 
workers studied for this thesis. 
4.1 The appropriateness of the ethnographic approach  
I decided that the best way I could find out what was going on for scientific workers 
in AgResearch, consistent with the research objectives stated earlier, was to use 
qualitative research methods. When this study started I was not able to tell what 
issues would emerge as I explored what it was that was about their work that made 
scientific workers happy and unhappy. I wanted to use a research method which 
would leave this quite open and allow me freedom to pursue the research in any 
direction the data I was gathering took me. As I was exploring ‘meaning’ I needed to 
use a technique in which those I wanted to study were able to express in their own 
words what was happening to them in their work environment. There was also a need 
to triangulate what I was hearing, hence the use of observation and the collection of 
both internal and external organisational communications. 
 
The ethnographic techniques of observation and interviewing (Lofland & Lofland, 
1995; Becker, 1998) allow “a close observation of informal practices” (Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1999: 51) in people’s everyday lives. Bate (1998[1994]: 70-71) justifies 
the use of this anthropological method because it gives a ‘both-and’ perspective on 
culture, including organisational cultures in Western settings.  
It was the business ‘gurus’ and strong culture writers who abandoned this 
[variety] during the 1980s, having chosen to ignore the pluralistic aspects of 
cultures and focus on only the ‘shared’, unitary aspects – shared values, shared 
understanding, shared this, shared that. Anthropologists would criticize 
organization and management writers for disposing of the variability which they 
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have always regarded as an important feature of a culture. They might also wish 
to point out that cultures consist of similarities and differences, convergent 
systems and divergent elements, pluralism and integration, all of them rubbing 
shoulders and vying with each other in a loosely coupled system; and they 
would tell us that the culture perspective never presumed one or the other – that 
only came later when ‘culture’ had been transformed from an interpretive 
perspective to an ideology or strategy for managerial control. Their 
[anthropologists’] conception of any culture is as a ‘multiplicity of human 
communities’ … 
 
As I was able to ‘live in’ at AgResearch, having my own place within the 
organisation as a staff member on study leave, the research method was able to 
take this ethnographic form in which I could be a participant-observer, but at 
all times my researcher role was overt, not covert.37 My position on that 
continuum, “participant” versus “observer”, could vary according to the 
occasion. In the next section I explain the perspective which informs my 
analysis. I am aware that describing the research process is all very well but a 
researcher approaches the analysis of their data from a particular viewpoint.  
4.2 The interpretivist perspective  
Like Grint, I consider work to be “a social not an individual activity” (Grint, 1991: 
48) and view this social aspect of life from an interpretivist approach, which focuses 
on “the indeterminate and contingent nature of reality, the significance of human 
interaction, the unintended consequences of human action, and the influence of 
interpretation” (ibid.: 115-6). In adopting this perspective I focus on the words of 
those I am studying, accepting and respecting people as they are, not as I think they 
should be (Nord and Jermier, 1994) but at the same time positioning them in a 
particular context (Rose, 1978: 244) . This open-ended nature of the interpretive 
perspective fits well the inductive character of the qualitative method. By simply 
asking workers why they did the work they did, Goldthorpe et al. in England, and 
Dalton and Roy in America re-discovered that workers’ behaviour was rational 
(Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 33-34) and usually had to do with economic 
rationality (Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, & Platt, 1970[1968]). Clegg (1994: 
314) supports an interpretive approach promoting this meaning of rationality. 
“Rationality is not something that characterizes particular models of what it is that 
                                                 
37 In fact my notebook and I became something of an institution. This was symbolised by a photo 
taken of just my notebook sitting in my lap, by a member of one of the case study groups.  
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actors and organizations ought to do but instead should be thought of as something 
emergent from the action scenes and sense-making of the actors themselves.” 
  
 Ashforth and Mael (1998) and Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) also emphasise the 
importance of studying resistance and identity from the perspective of those who are 
resisting. “Both identity and threat are in the eye of the beholder: An assault on a 
cherished self exists when it is perceived to exist” (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 98).  
  
Rose (1978: 244) points out that there are risks with this approach: 
… actors are not sovereign in defining and acting in accordance with their 
definitions of the situation; and subjectively rational action may be objectively 
irrational. It is not arrogant or patronizing for investigators to acknowledge this 
at least in principle. Indeed, unless they do, social study can offer no important 
generalizations. Men (sic) are never completely free to define their situations 
independently of structural constraints, to identify their objective interests fully, 
or to act completely rationally as a result. They may struggle to do so, and the 
ultimate value of social science lies precisely in assisting these efforts. 
Misplaced sympathy for subjects may result in a sentimental exaggeration of 
their freedom and rationality, and indirectly assist their continued oppression. 
 
I came across very few studies by researchers who have used an interpretive 
perspective in the study of work. If the researcher does not respect and value the 
perspective of those being studied then the relevant and significant research material 
on the part the meaning of work plays in self-identity is unlikely to be available to 
them. The link between resistance and identity at work is linked to studies of 
everyday life by researchers like Goffman (1961a), who demonstrated that even 
people who have very little freedom, such as those in institutions for the mentally ill, 
develop autonomous ways of reinforcing their own identities.38 Similarly Cohen & 
Taylors’ (1992[1976]) study of prisoners demonstrated how they are able to maintain 
their identities by consciously escaping or distancing themselves from prison life. 
 
Although Clegg (1994: 281) reminds researchers that it is very difficult to “access  
the subjectivity of others” because “… one should not be where one does not belong” 
(quoting Bob Dylan’s song ‘Drifter’s Escape’, 1968) he feels that there is no way 
other than through words to gain an understanding of what is going on in a person’s 
                                                 
38 Goffman used the expression the ‘recalcitrant self’ in Asylums (Goffman, 1961a). 
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thoughts: “Outside language and other semiotic systems intentions remain 
inscrutable. There is no other access to the contents of the other’s mind” (ibid.)39 
 
Symbolic Interactionism provides an appropriate research methodology for the 
analysis of an individual’s behaviour and actions. Blumer (1969), principal 
architect of this methodology, developed an interpretive approach to 
understanding social action and interaction that examines the meanings 
bestowed by social actors on everyday objects. The theoretical foundations of 
Blumer’s method rested on the work of Mead (Blumer, 1969). In essence, 
Symbolic Interactionism considers actions and objects to have no intrinsic 
meaning. Instead meanings are constructed and conferred through social 
interactions and are negotiated by actors according to the specific social 
context (ibid.: 2-3). The constructs (notably language) come to ‘stand for’ or 
‘symbolise’ the objects and activities, often in a ‘short hand’ form (Blumer, 
1967, 1969). The same word can often have different meanings, and therefore 
significance, to different communities. Such meanings are neither fixed nor 
exclusive. Although, by common agreement, the word ‘work’ symbolises the 
application of effort for some purpose, the negotiable character of this meaning 
allows for both the possibility of other meanings (e.g., earning a living, 
housework, doing a PhD), and its tactical use in constructing action pathways 
perceived to facilitate desired ends. 
 
In keeping with symbolic interactionist principles, I will show that science actors 
construct different meanings of their work in order to safeguard their livelihood and 
reasons for doing that work. In effect, the relationship between Government policy, 
implemented through the funding structures of FRST, and the science groups, as they 
manoeuvre to obtain the funding necessary for their survival, turns in large measure  
on the meanings science workers negotiate for their work. In keeping with the 
sociology of human action and social structure (Giddens, 1989:12), no assumption is 
made here that the outcome of the negotiated meanings of work is one that will  
                                                 
39 This contrasts with Erikson (1979: 149) who wrote: “Once the observer gets over his 
embarrassment at having tried to confront so deep a pain with so casual an inquiry, he begins to 
recognize the futility of trying to convert everything into the coin of words. And yet the emotion 
behind the words seems easy enough to detect if one searches for it.” 
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succeed in the way intended by the actors or by Government. That is, the actions of 
the actors may not produce the result the actors hoped for. Scientific workers may 
find that they are not any happier and the Government may not achieve its aim of a 
‘knowledge society’.40 
 
The next section describes how I went about this research – obtaining organisational 
and participant permission and the research practice. 
4.3 The research process 
The proposal for this research was submitted to the Lincoln University Ethics 
Committee before any interviewing commenced. To seek approval for conducting 
the case studies, I approached several managers at different levels in AgResearch. I 
received support from the General Manager of the Grasslands Division (as in 1998 
AgResearch still had a divisional structure) for studying the Endophyte Group; the 
Lincoln Campus leader (a position that no longer exits); the leaders of the Microbial 
Control Group (MCG) and the Wool and Skin Group; and the Animal Genomics 
Platform Leader, for the study of the Molecular Biology Unit. The latter two 
consulted with their workers before agreeing, and the General Manager consulted 
widely. All agreed on the understanding that group members would be asked 
individually to participate and they had the right to refuse. I indicated also that I 
would not be informing group leaders about who had or had not been interviewed. 
 
In this context I interviewed 56 staff members, observed over thirty organisational 
meetings and participated in other campus activities. I observed staff at work and 
documented hundreds of informal conversations. From my previous work within the 
organisation as a biometrician, ‘bid coordinator’ for a period, and member of the 
strategic planning network, I already had well established networks with most of the 
staff on the Lincoln campus and with many other staff throughout the organisation. I 
operated as a Referral Advisor for the Employee Assistance Programme till I left in 
February 2001. I still travel to Lincoln in a carpool with three AgResearch staff 
members. 
                                                 
40 This thesis is not the place for a discussion of the ‘knowledge society’, the role of IP and its 
ownership. For a comprehensive discussion of this issue in an international context see Drahos and 
Braithwaites’ Information feudalism: Who owns the knowledge economy? (2002).  
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Participants were fully informed about the nature and purpose of the research, free to 
withdraw at any point and/or ask that anything they had contributed not be used. As 
part of the Lincoln University Human Ethics Committee approval process, each 
participant signed a consent form to this effect. After each interview was transcribed 
I returned it to the interviewee to provide them with the chance to correct or delete 
anything they had said. (Some participants took this chance to clarify what they had 
said and one person removed the things she had said about other members of staff. 
Most made no changes.) I was freely available to all interviewees. In addition I 
returned to the research sites at the completion of the research to present the results 
in order to thank workers for their participation, to check that they identified with the 
results and to listen to their comments. 
  
Participants were assured of confidentiality. The aim was to protect subjects from 
any personal risks they may have run as a consequence of their participation. The 
identity of the participants was known only to me. The transcriptions and tapes of the 
interviews were labelled according to the time of interview, not referred to by name. 
In this thesis I have used pseudonyms whenever I have quoted a participant. Some 
have been given more than one pseudonym if I was at all concerned that there could 
be a link made between one quote and another that could enable the participant to be 
identified. At some points I have also only identified the case studies by a letter of 
the alphabet (and in a different order from that first presented) if I was at all 
concerned about confidentiality issues. 
 
In the interviews, I asked workers to tell the “story” of their involvement in science, 
how they saw themselves and their work, what made their work satisfying and what 
made it frustrating, and what it was like working in AgResearch (see questionnaire in 
Appendix A). The Hawthorne experiments at the Western Electric Company’s plant 
in Chicago … 
highlighted a strong link between attitudes to work and the wider social 
attachments outside the plant, especially the early socialization of individuals, 
which the company were powerless to affect .… the employment situation 
cannot be analysed solely by reference to itself – the links between the domestic 
and the employment situation are critical (Grint, 1991: 126).  
 
People do not have a work identity that is discrete from their history, society and 
their present social situation (home, leisure etc.). This justified the approach of 
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asking interviewees to ‘tell their story’ rather than answer more detailed, pre-chosen 
questions which would have assumed that I had anticipated their answers. As Rose 
(1988: 14) stated:  
We should distrust words like ‘correct’ and ‘mistaken’. We aim to see more 
clearly what is going on – what people want, and why they do the things they 
do. But outside observers should keep a modest opinion of their objectivity and 
neutrality. Patterns of control … are not fixed but shifting.  
 
The interviews I conducted were very open and exploratory, lasting from two to four 
hours, except for those of the Science Platform Leaders (SPLs) or Science GMs, as 
they did not have such time available. The interviewees gave permission for their 
interviews to be audio-taped. Within twenty-four hours of each interview I made 
“notes on notes” to record my personal impressions and thoughts.  
 
The interviews were transcribed and these transcripts, along with the notes and 
observations, formed the qualitative data that was analysed to produce the categories 
and emergent themes discussed in Part B (assisted by the use of the software package 
NVivo, a form of NUDIST, Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching 
and Theorising (Richards, 1999)). The insights of Symbolic Interactionism (Blumer, 
1969) helped me in the selection of these categories, or objects on which the 
interviewees placed importance, and I was able to explore the meaning ascribed to 
those objects and how they were linked to develop emergent themes. This qualitative 
research process basically follows that outlined by Lofland and Lofland (1995) in 
their book, Analyzing Social Settings. In Part C these themes are linked into possible 
theories and sometimes supported by other literature as secondary data.  
 
In the next section I describe AgResearch more fully, and introduce the case studies I 
chose within this organisation. My earlier discussion (Section 3.4) was concerned 
with how AgResearch fitted in the context of the restructuring of science. This 
section describes the organisational structure. 
4.4 AgResearch – the ethnographic site 
In 2001 AgResearch was an organisation of 921 employees, of whom 281 had a PhD 
qualification. In 2000 these figures were 897 and 279 respectively (AgResearch 
Annual Report 2001). At its establishment in 1992 there were 1109 employees. 
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Approximately two thirds of these employees were scientific workers and the rest 
were in support services, human resources, information technology and so on. 
 
A Board of Directors appointed by the shareholding Ministers of the Crown provides 
the corporate governance of the organisation. The CEO is responsible to this Board. 
He41 is supported by a corporate of senior management employees including the 
Human Resources Advisor, Marketing, Science and Technology Manager, Chief 
Financial Officer, Company Secretary, Information Technology Manager. (See 
Figure 3.1.) The Support Services include the Personal Assistants (PAs), 
receptionists, farm staff and accountants. Then there is AgResearch Science, which 
has a triumvirate of general managers, only one of whom represents science on 
senior management level committees. At the next level there are ten Science 
Platforms, each with a SPL, who has responsibility for the management of all 
workers in the several science groups in each Platform, with Human Resource 
responsibilities also. Each of these Platforms has fifty to seventy workers. The ways 
in which the Platforms and the groups are managed is very dependent on the style of 
each manager. The organisation also includes the product development company 
Celentis, which has a minimal number of staff who are mainly business managers, 
each with responsibility for business developments arising from several Platforms. 
 
It is difficult to explain the structure within each Platform because they are organised 
around science programme objectives which may have overlapping personnel. In 
2001 FRST instituted larger programmes and now each Platform usually has one 
large FRST programme and many smaller commercial programmes. Staff forming a 
group may have an informal name but it may not be organisationally recognised. 
Each worker is responsible to a line manager, and line managers may be responsible 
for one or more workers. For example, in the Wool and Skin Biology Group, there 
was one scientist in charge (who was responsible to the SPL), but he was responsible 
for three scientists and two research associates. Two of the scientists were not 
responsible for any other workers but the other one was responsible for another two 
research associates. The programme leader may be the SPL, but not necessarily,
                                                 




















Figure 4.1 AgResearch’s organisational structure 42 
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42 This is a reconstruction of the ‘official’ structural diagram taken off the intranet in 2000. Note that though two thirds of the workers in AgResearch are in AgResearch 
Science and do the work for which the organisation exists, they are not well represented by this diagram.   
43 
because he may have devolved this responsibility to someone else. Figure 4.2 
illustrates the complex nature of the Platform structure using the AgSystems 
Platform as an example. The Wool and Skin Biology Group is hidden within the 
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In AgResearch there is a much greater sense of autonomy already present as part of a 
group’s evolution. (This situation may well alter as the distribution of funding 
becomes more organisationally focused, moving to a more bulk funded system under 
greater organisational control, rather than FRST focused.) 
 
AgResearch workers are spread over five major campuses: Ruakura in Hamilton, 
Grasslands in Palmerston North, Wallaceville, Lincoln, and Invermay, out of 
Dunedin. Staff in a Platform may be spread over several campuses. AgResearch also 
owns and operates various research farms, some on campus sites and others further 
afield, such as the farm at Winchmore in Mid-Canterbury and the high country 
station at Tara Hills near Omarama. Some staff work within a nearby university in 
order to have more interaction and collaboration with university colleagues. An 
example is the Soil Science Group based at Lincoln University. 
 
AgResearch set up a product development company, Celentis, in the year 2000. In a 
sense this supports Government policy with its emphasis on using knowledge to 
bolster New Zealand’s economy. Celentis was set up as a separate company because 
as such it was more likely to gain venture capital from overseas sources than it would 
if its link to AgResearch was more obvious.43 However, it was also its stated 
intention that within the foreseeable future it would provide independent funding 
from its profits to invest in more research in AgResearch, i.e., AgResearch would 
become a client of Celentis. This would enable AgResearch to be less dependent on 
Government funding. (Remembering that AgResearch was set up to serve the 
pastoral agriculture sector as part of the restructuring of the public funding of 
science, the existence of Celentis indicates the ambivalence of Government policy.) 
 
This section described AgResearch, the place in which this research was carried out. 
In the next section I drop a level to describe the particular science groups I chose to 
access the ‘ordinary’ scientific workers in the organisation. 
                                                 
43 One of the Government responses to the lack of venture capital in New Zealand has been to set up a 
capital venture fund by taking money from the reserves of the profitable CRIs. As AgResearch had 
already earmarked this money as its own venture capital in Celentis it was very upset and made strong 
representations to the Minister of Science Research and Technology. The fund has still gone ahead 
(2001 budget) with the appointment of a manager (Royal Society Alert 194, 20 Sept. 2001). It was a 
very tidy way for the Government to provide some venture capital with no cost to the taxpayer, as 
Jenny Shipley, Leader of the Opposition, lost no time in pointing out! 
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4.5 The case studies 
As case studies I chose four science groups from different backgrounds and with 
quite different foci in order to appreciate some of the wide diversity found within  
AgResearch. In this way I was ‘anticipating’ one major criticism of case study 
approaches: the difficulty of generalising findings beyond the specific group studied. 
At the beginning of this research I did not know if all groups in AgResearch were 
unhappy about the same things, for they had different levels of security of funding, 
and had come from different organisations at the time of restructuring – some 
coming from DSIR (25%) and some from MAF Tech (25%). Half of those I 
interviewed had joined the organisation since the restructuring (see Appendix B).  
 
As I was based on the Lincoln campus of AgResearch, where most of my 
observations would take place, for practical and financial reasons I chose some 
groups with workers on the Lincoln campus. One of the groups moved to another 
organisation’s campus, still in the vicinity, after I decided to study them.44 All 
workers of another group were on the Lincoln campus, another had most workers on 
other campuses, and the third had all workers on yet another campus. The selected 
groups were also in different Platforms and of quite different disciplinary 
backgrounds. I felt that there was enough variety of work situations to choose from 
within the organisation without needing to cover several CRIs. I also had to be 
practical about the number of people I could interview and the work that would 
entail. Four groups would give me an indication of the variability in the organisation 
and whether my findings were likely to be group related or common across the 
scientific workers in the organisation. At first I was only going to study three groups 
but the fourth was added when I realised I needed to study a group that was 
considered to be very successful in the current environment. The one I chose was 
based on molecular biology (the ‘latest fad’, as one of its members expressed it). 
Given that this group was so successful, I expected that it might be ‘different’ from 
the others in terms of worker satisfactions and concerns. 
 
A case study is appropriate when “a “how” or “why” question is being asked about a 
contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin,  
                                                 
44 This event was not related to my actions! 
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1994: 9). Such a study:  
is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its 
real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident …. It copes with the technically distinctive 
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points 
 
and hence relies on the researcher finding “multiple sources of evidence, with data 
needing to converge in a triangulating fashion” (ibid.: 13). Hill & Gidlow (1988: 5-6) 
used the case study method to demonstrate that the process of technological change, 
which was central to their enquiry, did not have ‘a life of its own’ and social 
processes played an important role. They found the case study approach to be very 
satisfactory because it was able to capture “the dynamic nature of relations between 
key groups” (ibid.: 5) and, through it they were able to test the validity of the 
findings by the use of a strategy that is both deductive and inductive, as well as by 
cross-validation (ibid.: 6). 
 
Having discussed my reason for studying a number of groups within AgResearch, I 
will now describe these groups quite fully in order to give a ‘flavour’ of their culture 
and the work that they do. Appendix B summarises the demographic characteristics 
of all those I interviewed. 
4.5.1 Wool and Skin Biology Group (W&S Group) 
This Group had a background in MAF Tech before restructuring. During the period 
of this study the members of the Group were based at the Wool Research 
Organisation (WRONZ), across the road from the main AgResearch workplace, the 
Canterbury Agriculture and Science Centre in Lincoln.45 The Group made the move 
to WRONZ in order to be closer to those who shared their research interests and with 
whom they were supposed to co-operate.46  
  
After the internal restructuring in 1999, the W&S Group was placed in the 
AgSystems Platform when its members actually wished to be in the Animal  
                                                 
45 This campus is shared with three other CRIs: Landcare, Crop and Food Research and HortResearch. 
46 Because of personal differences between their divisional manager and the CEO of WRONZ it took 
about two years for this move to happen. At the time WRONZ did not carry out any on-farm 
fieldwork, and so this was an area of research in which this group could collaborate. By the time the 
group did transfer, WRONZ had established its own fieldwork and the AgResearch team was left in 
limbo. The group moved back across the road to the AgResearch campus again in late March, 2002.  
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Genomics Platform. Its leader made many submissions to this effect but did not feel 
he was listened too. Officially the move was to avoid further dilution of the 
molecular genetics capability of the Animal Genomics Platform but it may well have 
been that they were placed in this Platform to even up the numbers. The AgSystems 
Platform consists of very diverse groups ranging across farm systems to modelling to 
social science (see Figure 3.2). Its focus is on work in the food product supply chain, 
which requires funding from industry sources. The W&S Group, with its focus on 
non-food by-products, was adversely affected by reductions in Government funding 
and found it difficult to obtain R&D investment in a ‘sunset industry’. 
 
Members of the W&S Group saw it as ironic, in hindsight, that their research 
proposals of 1999 were used internally as exemplars of the shift the organisation 
wished to make to demonstrate its alignment with Government policy via FRST. 
This was to be done by focusing on quality and adding value, rather than commodity 
production. Now, however, the requirement is for “new and novel products that will 
add wealth to the primary sector” (from the abstract for the ‘Low Chemical Systems 
and Associated Branded Products’ FRST programme 2001).  
 
The W&S Group, is very applied and feels research should fit the interests of the 
agricultural sector. It is not in science just to add to scientific knowledge. In the 
course of an interview, Craig, a scientist in the Group, epitomised these attitudes 
when he said, “I love sheep”.47 Others in the Group also chose their work because of 
their agricultural interests, as Grant and Brent’s comments indicate: 
I always had a fascination with agriculture and particularly when I got on to my 
teen years. I enjoyed yeah, going on holidays to relation-type farms. And I got a lot 
of personal satisfaction out of being outside working with animals - stuff like that 
(Grant). 
 
... everything we did was for the good of the New Zealand farmer (Brent). 
At the same time the Group’s members are from a very traditional scientific 
background and hold strongly to deductive ideals.  
 
The members of this Group actually liked, if not necessarily loved, sheep. They liked 
working with them and were concerned for their welfare and for the welfare of sheep 
                                                 
47 All members of the group were interested in sheep but three in particular could be said to be 
particularly fond of them. 
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farmers. This had strong implications for the orientations of the Group. It wanted to 
save the sheep industry or, to put it more moderately, to help the sheep industry, and 
(particularly for Craig) the wool industry, survive. One member of this Group (the 
youngest48) thinks that it is time science paid more attention to the concerns of some 
of the more extreme community groups, such as animal rights activists, because they 
may have a point and may well anticipate future, international and local opinion 
about animal welfare.49 (Such concerns could impact strongly on New Zealand’s 
overseas markets.) For example, some practices to reduce the impact of flystrike in 
the sheep industry add to the costs and work of farmers, involve the use of chemicals, 
or may involve short but painful procedures to sheep, to prevent the slow death that 
flystrike can cause. In this context, Craig created the concept of ‘the ethical sheep’, a 
wool-producing sheep with a bare bottom and head, and bare legs. This was in the 
process of development through traditional breeding methods. Initially money for 
this research came out of other budgets and, as Craig popularised the idea, it was first 
funded through a wool programme and then was funded within a programme on low 
chemical use. Three years down the track the whole research policy focus of the 
Foundation changed and this funding was unlikely to be continued (Scobie, 2001).50 
The Group’s focus was to apply for Meat and Wool Board funding but at the time of 
this research these entities were in disarray and the group’s future was uncertain. 
 
In its attempts to survive, the Group had also encountered difficulties within the CRI. 
After trialling titles for the ethical sheep programme proposal incorporating 
references to sheep welfare, flystrike and sheep breeding, a suitably nondescript title 
was accepted at the third attempt and it was fitted into the Low Chemical Systems 
Programme. (This is a deft reference to ‘organics’ without using the word and all its 
complicated referents.) The content of the proposal had not changed. In this way the 
scientists in the group surmised (rather than being told directly) that the AgSystems 
Platform did not research any issues to do with animal welfare, or animal breeding, 
                                                 
48 Kuhn (1970 [1962]) thought that change is initiated by younger members of the scientific 
community or by people ‘switching’ from other disciplines/sub-disciplines. 
49 His change of heart was in the nature of a religious experience. He was so troubled by a reporter 
calling him Frankenstein because in one of his experiments he had produced a ‘chimera’ sheep (four 
parents rather than two), that he reflected on the nature of his work and has changed its focus from 
being purely science and curiosity driven to solving what he sees as ‘real’ problems (Scobie, 2001).  
50 Some of the hard won funding of this research group has also been redirected internally, by the 
Science Strategic Manager, to the FRST programme ‘Control of Human and Animal Hair Growth and 
Characteristics’. In other words, it has been redirected to study baldness.  
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which constricted the possible areas of their research interests. To work in these 
areas would be seen to step on someone else’s ‘patch’. Another survival tactic was to 
diversify into research on leather, particularly deer leather. The Group had also 
looked for work with other fibre and meat-related industries but as these were very 
small there was little money available for research. One member brought in some 
alternative income by auditing and registering farmers for two meat companies under 
contracts to the CRI. Two of the Group members accepted redundancy in the 
repositioning operation the organisation carried out in 2000. 
 
This Group had not been quiet about its plight. It was continually presenting ideas to 
its Science Platform Leader. It worked hard to maintain links with the meat and wool 
industries. The scientists made presentations on their work to the Board on its annual 
trips around the different campuses and farms. From its inception, however, the 
platform structure of the organisation has impacted negatively on the Group, giving it 
a strong message about how it does not fit. 
4.5.2 The Endophyte Group (E-Group) 
The Endophyte Group with its background in DSIR, is in the Plant Breeding and 
Genomics Platform. It is a true multidisciplinary group that was informally drawn 
together by interest in endophyte51, a fungus in ryegrass. Endophyte, as the cause of 
ryegrass staggers, was discovered by one of the researchers in this group through his 
observations of sheep in an unrelated experiment (Fletcher & Harvey, 1981). 
Endophyte affects the efficiency of the production of meat, wool, and dairy products. 
It also can cause heat stress in animals, and confers some insect protection on grass. 
 
The E-Group had developed techniques for the inoculation and storage of grass seed 
containing different endophytes. It had produced many saleable (and patentable) 
technology products for both the New Zealand and overseas markets. The group also 
promoted the impact of endophyte on animal health, and its potential as a “non-tariff 
barrier to market access” (FRST Proposal 2001: Forage and Symbiont Genomes). To 
further the exploration on other properties of endophyte, the E-Group also was using 
the tools of molecular biology, hoping to exploit the interest in this area. This aspect 
                                                 
51Because of this informal nature it is difficult to say how many staff are in this group. I interviewed 
fourteen staff but only about three of these could be considered to be working full-time on endophyte.  
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of its work was successful in receiving public funding and also involved 
collaboration with a university (FRST Programme: Genomics of Plant-fungal 
Relationships), a requested part of Government science policy.  
 
The E-Group was discovering that it enjoyed its relationships with commercial 
clients. It was able to negotiate with them in a satisfying and rewarding way and 
demonstrate the skills and potential of its members to contribute something useful to 
those clients. As Fred said: 
I get satisfaction from working more recently – you know, the discussions we 
are having with private companies that are funding aspects of our work - 
working out what they want, hearing them say what they want and developing a 
programme that meets their needs and fits within our parameters. 
 
The profits generated by the E-Group could fund its future work: maintaining the 
endophyte research, improving present products, and studying all the many other 
aspects of the endophyte-plant-animal interaction yet to be explored, which, 
incidentally, may be a rich source of future products. But the E-Group felt there were 
signals from corporate office that it may wish to use the profits for other research of 
a higher organisational priority. This made Group members feel insecure and 
indicated that even though the E-Group was in harmony with the organisational 
strategic direction, that was no guarantee of organisational support in the future. 
 
Only three members of this Group were based at Lincoln – those doing the animal 
work - and they were full-time on endophyte. The rest, except a scientist at Ruakura, 
were based on the Grasslands campus at Palmerston North, and probably none 
worked full-time on endophyte. They crossed many disciplines: biochemistry, plant 
pathology, mycology, plant physiology, toxicology, seed science, plant breeding, 
entomology etc. In spite of this variety of backgrounds, the common fascination with 
endophyte meant that Group members on the Grasslands campus frequently had 
morning tea, lunch and afternoon tea together and so kept in touch with each other, 
without many formal meetings. (This did mean that scientists not on this campus 
missed out on this informal communication.) They felt privileged to be part of the 
endophyte story and I sensed much intellectual excitement and enthusiasm for what 
they were doing compared with members of other groups.  
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4.5.3 The Microbial Control Group (MCG) 
The Microbial Control Group in the Biocontrol and Biosecurity Science Platform has 
had a long interest in grass grub. It was established through the drive of one person, 
an entomologist, a self confessed atheist, who told me, “God must love beetles 
because he (sic) made so many of them”. Grass grubs are endemic to New Zealand 
and affect the production of ryegrass by eating away at the roots. The Group’s work 
has been positioned in the area of the biological control of pests and the protection of 
the environment (FRST programme title: Pest Management Technologies for 
Enhanced Environmental and Product Quality). The programme description 
mentions that: 
… the research will assist New Zealand’s primary industries in realising their 
increasing economic potential. Management systems will be based on beneficial 
organisms and related gene products; the latter will provide the foundation for 
planned new, advanced biological industries. 
 
This Group has its history in MAF Tech, which typically had a very applied 
agricultural focus, but in contrast, the scientists in this Group were quite clear that 
their interest lay in science not agriculture. The leader of the Platform reflected the 
Group’s views when he told me, “I’m not an agriculturalist. I don’t like farms 
much.” Another scientist in the Group said that farms “are places of unspeakable 
filth and cruelty”.  
 
Research on grass grub has been going on in New Zealand since the early 1900s. In 
the late 1970s work started on isolating a naturally occurring bacteria called “amber 
disease” which had potential as a biocontrol of grass grub. This micro-organism was 
patented in the 1980s and ever since attempts have been made to commercially 
produce it in a form that can be used by farmers. Also, because grass grubs are New 
Zealand natives, any means of control is only applicable to New Zealand, which is 
not a large market. Over its history, two chemical companies have been contracted to 
produce this bacteria in a commercial form, but these attempts were unsuccessful. 
This changed recently when a formulation chemist52 employed by the MCG has been 
developing innovative methods for placing this bacterial biological control agent in  
                                                 
52 A formulation chemist works on ways of making a saleable product from a scientific product. This 
product has to have a reasonable shelf life, be able to be produced to a consistent standard in large 
quantities at a price the user can afford, and be able to be applied in a form that is practical to the user.  
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the soil. His work has implications far beyond grass grub because pharmaceutical 
companies all around the world are interested in finding better ways of storing 
bacteria.53 The MCG gained internal CRI funding for this formulation work because 
of its potential for IP and potential for profit from licensing and making products of  
interest to the biotechnology industry. Most of the Group worked on developing 
different strains of this bacteria and had other contracts, many involving the use of 
molecular biology, to develop biocontrol methods for other beetles. Biosecurity is 
playing an increasingly greater part in the Group’s work. This area is of great 
strategic concern to New Zealand as it tries to maintain New Zealand’s isolation 
from such things as foot and mouth disease and potential insect pests. 
4.5.4 The Molecular Biology Unit (MBU) 
Though this Group had its origins in MAF Tech, most of the workers had joined 
since the inception of AgResearch and were generally younger than those in the 
W&S Group and the E-Group. This unit was actually only a ‘group’ in terms of 
occupying the same physical space (the end of one floor of the University of Otago 
Biochemistry Department), but all workers were from the Animal Genomics 
Platform. There were parts of at least five science groups in the unit with four being 
led by the three scientists on site and the Platform Leader while others were led by 
scientists based at Invermay. The thirteen or more54 scientific workers in the MBU 
did the molecular biology components of the research for their different science 
groups. In the past, sheep have been the flagship for all the MBU’s research. The 
Group was working hard to reduce its dependence on sheep. It wanted to move away 
from work on product traits, such as identification of the genes that affect fleece-
weight, fibre diameter, or leanness of sheep, to applications of DNA tracing such as a 
saleable product that identifies a sample of DNA back to its source. The prime focus 
of the MBU has been on gathering DNA information to form the Sheep Gene Map. 
This sounds, and is, a clinical interest, but for some members of the Group more 
human interests underpinned this clinical interest. Miles, told his story: 
… right now what would make me feel good would be if I could find a gene for 
facial eczema. The first case of facial eczema was in about 1887. Now its 2000. 
We’ve had that problem for 120 years. We are putting up with it. Other countries 
                                                 
53 This offshoot was completely unanticipated. The patent attorney thought of it. The MCG had 5 
patents pending in early 2001. 
54 It is difficult to say how many workers occupy the MBU because there are always students doing 
Masters or PhD degrees who come and go. 
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don’t have that problem because the fungus that causes it is not found there … and 
our company and our Government are saying that since it’s only a New Zealand 
problem, if we had a great discovery, it doesn’t generate money for [the CRI] or 
New Zealand, because you can’t sell it overseas … I would have so much 
satisfaction if I can do something which the farmers have been putting up with [for 
so long]. So that is more on the sentimental side because I know the historical 
aspect of it … when we first discovered a … gene could be involved in it, we tried 
to patent it. The lawyer said, is it worth it? $15,000 a year for the patent and how 
much can we generate from the patent? We come up with no profit, you see…55 
 
The MBU’s recent work on the Inverdale gene responsible for multiple births and  
sterility in sheep (FRST Parliamentary Report, 1999; Galloway et al., 2000) has been 
publicised nationally and was published in Nature Genetics, the journal with the 
highest international reputation in the molecular biology field. Another group in the 
MBU was researching the Booroola gene which also affected fertility. Others were 
researching leanness as a genetic trait, and the genetic resistance of sheep to internal 
parasites. (Internal parasites are a significant problem in the New Zealand sheep 
industry and are controlled by drench chemicals to which the parasites have become 
resistant.) 
 
The funding of this Unit was focused on the close relationship between the sheep 
genetic map and the human genome. It is argued that this is a closer relationship than 
that with the ‘mouse map’. (Most researchers studying human health issues use 
mice.) This link to human health and human reproduction was emphasised in the 
Unit’s projects. For example, the way in which facial eczema damages the liver is of 
interest in human medicine. 
 
The science groups that make up the MBU had no funding problems but were aware 
that they were riding the wave of interest on the part of biotechnology industries in 
genomics, and the belief that this was one of the areas of research that distinguishes a 
knowledge society from others (Hodgson, 2000). As Raewyn, a scientist, said: 
… at the moment the molecular stuff seems to be the winner, but that’s just the 
flavour of the month. I mean, I know the sustainable people think that they’re not 
flavour of the month, but a few more Greens in Parliament and they’ll all be the 
flavour of the month. I just realise now that even from the Government down, it’s 
in-words that are the flavour of the month. 
 
                                                 
55 Publicly funded research needs to solve problems that are “unique to New Zealand (and which 
others will have little or no interest in solving)” (ACRI, 2002: 7). RSNZ (2002: 2) emphasises that 
research should be for New Zealand’s benefit. (Note that this is a national goal not a company goal.) 
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In this quote Raewyn has aptly described the inherent insecurity of working in 
scientific research. 
 
This section has described the diversity of the work done by these science 
groups and their current position within the science funding system. Those 
working in the groups come from MAF Tech, DSIR or have joined the 
organisation since the formation of AgResearch, reflecting the breadth of their 
backgrounds. The selection of these groups should make the results of this 
research represent the views of most scientific workers within this organisation.   
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has justified the use of the ethnographic method, which, when used 
alongside an interpretive perspective, provides an appropriate way of studying the 
nature of work in an organisation, from the standpoint of the workers. It has 
described how I went about this research and given a full description of the structural 
features of the organisation studied. The nature of the work of the science groups 
used as case studies has been described and some of their other interesting 
characteristics have been presented in order to provide a background against which 
to position the emerging themes from the data that follow in Part B. 
 
55 
Conclusion to Part A 
 
In Part A I have described how I came to do this research as a result of being a 
worker in AgResearch myself. I have positioned my research within the framework 
of New Zealand’s restructuring of the public sector. Following this an explanation 
was provided of the methods I used. I described the perspective taken in this 
research, placing emphases on the interpretations of the actors of their actions and 
my observations of them in their workplace. Finally the organisation and the groups 
within it that I researched were portrayed in order for the reader to develop some 
feeling and understanding of them and their work. In keeping with an inductive 
approach appropriate to the use of qualitative methods, I next write of my initial 
findings, telling the story of why scientific workers do this particular work and the 
continuing impact of restructuring on them. 
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PART B: NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY IN A TIME OF 
CHANGE 
 
This part of the thesis explores the observations of working life in AgResearch and 
the data from the interviews of the scientific workers in the four case studies. Chapter 
5 describes why work is important to scientific workers. The work of science 
practice and the environment of that work provides feedback to scientific workers 
which reinforces and maintains their identity or valued sense of self. I demonstrate 
what it is about work that is so meaningful to them and where this meaning is 
challenged by change. The irony is that if these workers did not care about their work 
so much, they would not be feeling so unhappy and discontented. 
 
In Chapter 6 I give an account of the responses of workers to the changes they are 
experiencing as a result of the restructuring of science funding. It is these responses 




PART B: NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY IN A TIME OF 
CHANGE  
Chapter 5: Why work? 
Why do I do it? I enjoy it (Jane, technical worker). 
 
… at times I get really excited about my work – really excited where I can’t 
wait to get to work to try things out. And yeah, I just – I can hardly sleep at 
night thinking about that work. You feel wow, this is the best job in the world. 
In fact I always feel that (Len, scientist). 
 
This chapter considers the ways in which the working environment impacts on a 
person’s sense of identity by focusing on the entities or communities providing 
important feedback and reinforcement to scientific workers about their sense of self 
within that environment. I describe the feedback that workers obtain from belonging 
to society, the science community, their work group or team, and the work 
organisation. I also describe the feedback they get from actually ‘doing’ science. It 
will then be more apparent how the values and attitudes of these groups and the 
heritage scientific workers carry with them from their past, are in conflict or 
competition with those of the organisation currently employing them. The chapter 
concludes with a discussion of the preceding material. 
 
There is a general understanding amongst scientific workers that if they wanted to 
make a lot of money this is not the kind of work they would have chosen. Work is 
expected to have a purpose, apart from remuneration. It is to make a contribution to 
something bigger than themselves such as society, agriculture, or science. This 
contribution has to be one they consider worthwhile, something that would make a 
difference. It has to be useful – to solve a real problem or produce a product that 
workers really believe in. This contribution could be serving New Zealand through 
agriculture or environmental sustainability, or adding to scientific knowledge. A 
contribution could be made by leadership, or having a vision for particular areas of 
scientific work. These purposes set up expectations for workers about what they hope 
to achieve by working. They have become part of workers’ identities and are 




In sociological literature there is a general understanding of a distinction between 
two basic conceptions of the self. There is the self that is “unknowable to others” – 
an “indefinable presence” (Burns, 1992: 211) and the “subject-in-action”, that part of 
the self that may change through experience and interaction with others. Goffman 
calls the second conception “identity”, covering both a social and a personal identity 
– “those aspects of the self which are “in play” between the individual and society” 
(ibid.: 212). In this work I am focusing on the responses of individuals when this 
‘identity’ experiences conflict between its self-image and the social expectations of 
identity communicated through workplace and Government policy. This situation is 
neatly summarised in this quotation from a chapter titled ‘The Recalcitrant Self’ in 
Goffman’s book Asylums. Goffman states: 
In every social establishment, there are official expectations as to what the participant 
owes the establishment …. And behind these claims on the individual … the managers 
of every establishment will have a widely embracing implicit conception of what the 
individual’s character must be for these claims on him to be appropriate. Whenever we 
look at a social establishment, we find a counter to this first theme. We find that 
participants decline in some way to accept the official view of what they should be 
putting into and getting out of the organization and, behind this, of what sort of self 
and world they are to accept for themselves … We find a multitude of homely little 
histories, each in its way a movement of liberty. Whenever worlds are laid on, 
underlives develop (Goffman, 1961a, cited in Lemert and Branaman, 1997: 81). 
 
The first source of feedback I consider is the sense workers have of contributing and 
hence belonging to society. 
5.1 Feedback from belonging to society 
This section considers the effect that society has on the making of scientific workers 
and its relationship to the feedback they receive from belonging to society. 
Influences from childhood and adolescence have a major impact on identity and the 
formation of attitudes. What attitudes were prevalent in society during the time these 
workers were growing up? What was the influence of the education system on their 
later work? What messages did they receive about how to be worthwhile and useful 
members of society? How has their heritage influenced the attitudes they bring to 
their work – their work orientation? Scientific workers will have learned these values 
from, and in reaction to, the values of their families, their society (e.g., via their 





When I asked Ron what expectations he had when he first looked for a job, he said: 
I guess I was just looking for satisfying employment really - a sort of relatively 
stable, but satisfying line of work - a field that I enjoyed, that I was comfortable 
in, that I was skilled in and had a heritage in … (Ron, technical worker). 
 
I have continued to use the word ‘heritage’. It symbolises the attributes of the past 
that are valuable to us that we wish to continue to respect and pay attention to. We 
are not just the person that you see now but have within us these attitudes from our 
past that make us the person we are. From Ron’s quote there is the sense that it is 
these values that have contributed to the work choices we have made. There is 
something non-negotiable about this past but at the same time we are continually 
reinterpreting it (recursive) and making sense of it (reflexive). It is ever present to us 
(co-present). For example, Ron was brought up on a farm, but he may not have 
known how important that is to him, until he finds himself unhappy when the 
organisation he works for changes from an agricultural science research institute to a 
life sciences company. Even then he may not make the connection. 
 
Many of the people I interviewed grew up at a time when agriculture was very 
important in New Zealand. To be involved in helping farmers to produce more wool, 
meat and dairy products for export was considered to be a very worthwhile way of 
contributing to society. This value still had a very high salience in the minds of many 
of those I interviewed, across all science groups, but for the W&S Group this interest 
in agriculture was a dominant theme (as discussed in Part A). One of the scientists in 
this Group was training in endocrinology and changed direction when he realised 
“this was never going to save sheep farmers from doom” (Craig, scientist). For some 
workers in other groups there are connections with agriculture and the wish to do 
something for farmers but it is not necessarily the dominant feature of their work.  
 
The role of public service was highly regarded in society. As Government 
departments, MAF or DSIR provided scientific workers with secure and reliable 
employment while also serving society.  
It [MAF] was a whole cushion that dealt with the agricultural sector because it was 
valuable. So it propped it up, kept it safe, and all the rest of it ... I had no problems with 
being ‘of Government’ - of something put in place that was important to New Zealand 
and important to the agricultural industry. It was a very clear - like the Reserve Bank or 




This ethos still is very much present among scientific workers. Jim (scientist) told me 
he had left his former job to take his present one because, “We were making 
discoveries and everything else, but it just wasn’t that relevant to New Zealand …”. 
Dave (scientist) agrees with the changes in science funding to the extent that he does 
not believe the system should “provide sandpits for scientists to play in … without 
producing any tangible benefit.” He makes it clear that this ‘tangible benefit’ was for 
‘the nation’. Most workers had a clear commitment to working for the public good. 
 
Most respondents had become inculcated with the values of the science community56 
while studying and had come to regard the pursuit of knowledge as making a 
valuable contribution to society.  
Here is the chance I can do something worthwhile, you see. Otherwise I just find 
that science is almost like an intellectual pursuit where you can go round and 
round. You can generate your own problems and try to solve them … At least I 
have an aim. There is an end-user to my question rather than just going round in 
circles … (Mark, scientist). 
  
All scientists interviewed have tied their pursuit of science to attempts to solve 
practical problems important to agriculture or environmental sustainability. For 
many, the pursuit of adding to scientific knowledge, rather than the contribution to 
New Zealand agriculture, has become the driving force. In this way the values of 
their past merge in to the rewards they are receiving at present from their practice of 
science and their membership of the science community. They can belong to both the 
world of their past and the world of their present. 
 
Many workers emphasised ‘doing a good job’. As Brent (technical worker) said, 
“[It’s] important to do a good job, I think – to do the job to the best of your ability – 
do your best, the cub motto.” Ron (technical worker) would like to be remembered 
for “just a solid and sound effort through the years …”. There was the assumption 
that if you did a ‘good job’ then you had that job for life. This contrasts with the 
younger generation of workers, those under 40, who have a different outlook on life  
and work than those who are older. They may love their work and be very committed 
to it, but they are also very emphatic about having time for following pursuits outside 
work hours. For example, Lisa (technical worker) states, “My outside work life is 
                                                 
56 Even though technical staff would not be considered to be part of the science community (see next 
section) most had some university education, or were taught by someone who did. 
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more important to me than my work. So my main goals and ambitions are there 
actually rather than at work.” The feedback about identity for younger workers 
comes just as much from these non-work activities as from work.  
 
In 1999 there was the possibility that AgResearch would change its name just when 
workers felt that name was beginning to mean something, to have a history. Rumour 
had it that the name change would not be linked to agriculture or science, upsetting 
those of an agricultural and/or a science orientation.57 This encapsulates the 
importance to these scientific workers of making a contribution to New Zealand 
through scientifically solving practical problems of concern to the agricultural sector.  
 
The second source of feedback I consider is the feedback scientific workers derive 
from their membership of the scientific community. 
5.2 Feedback from belonging to the scientific community 
The first part of this section describes how scientific workers come to belong to and 
maintain their membership of the science community. Who is considered to belong 
to it, and what is the feedback from belonging? The second part considers how 
change could come to this community through feedback. 
5.2.1 Membership of the science community 
Science provides a way for a scientific worker to feel valued. It is an entry path into 
the scientific community. Membership of this community, usually the community of 
a particular science discipline, can be gained by becoming part of the privileged 
discourse (Gramsci in Harris, 1992) through publication in the appropriate refereed 
journals and going to conferences, especially as a presenter or an invited speaker.58  
Many AgResearch workers did not think that the interests of science were 
represented at the senior management level of the organisation. The only 
representative of the approximately two thirds of staff working in science at the  
                                                 
57 The name did not change because of the forthcoming election. If the incoming Government was to 
change from National to Labour there may have been a different attitude to agriculture, the National 
Party having been the traditional supporter of farmers. 
58 Tim, a business manager, thought that at any one time there were 300 letters from scientists “flying 
around AgResearch” justifying their trips overseas. He said there were only a few days in the year 
when he could talk to a certain scientist because he is always overseas, listing four countries this 
person was visiting that year (2000) to his knowledge. This indicates how much more important 
international connections are to this scientist than the work he engages in, in his local environment.  
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monthly Senior Executive Meeting (SEM) was one of the three Science GMs.59  
Workers were dubious about his scientific credentials because he came from a Farm 
Systems background, which they felt was not ‘science’. The CEO countered this by 
saying that he and the Science and Technology Manager were also scientists. This 
statement was met with incredulity. There was the feeling that neither of them had 
‘practised’ science for a long time. Evidently, being in practice is part of belonging 
to the science community: “I stand entirely for scientific leadership – representation 
of science, leadership of science, and doing science. My belief is you can only lead 
science by doing it. You lead from the front, participating” (Eric, SPL). 
 
If this is so, what does it mean to be a practising scientist? A cost of being promoted 
in an organisational system emphasising accountability is that a scientist has to take 
on more and more managerial responsibilities leaving less time to ‘do’ science. Rae 
(scientist) has found that she has redefined what it means to make a ‘scientific’ 
contribution, now seeing her job as facilitating others to do science:  
… for a while I was really frustrated that I wasn’t doing any work, if you 
know what I mean. I wasn’t doing ‘real’ work, because I wasn’t at the bench. 
But I think I’m more at the point now where I realise that they’re [the staff I 
manage] doing my work at the bench …. So I suppose my typical day is spent 
more now trying to do things that mean their task is easier, or meeting with 
them and other people to get the work sort of sorted more (Rae, scientist). 
 
Other science group managers set up special times when they can ‘keep their hand 
in’ as it were. Some come in to the lab at weekends (Owen, scientist). Others may 
work in the evenings (Mark, scientist). Rae (scientist) has made herself responsible 
for a particular, fairly routine procedure to maintain her skills. These workers are still 
seen as full participants in the science community, but are concerned about losing the 
feedback that work at the ‘coal face’ brings.60 
 
The science community is not a community of daily, social, face-to-face interaction. 
Contact is more likely to be by email or at conferences. Within their own 
environments, scientists may form small communities of those whom they consider 
                                                 
59 There are many issues here. SEM was replaced by two groups, one concerned with policy, the other 
with operational management. The latter collapsed because the SPLs, who were included in this 
group, wanted to be involved in policy not just operational matters, demonstrating yet again that there 
was no-one - not even SPLs - really concerned about the internal organisation of the company. The 
focus was always ‘up and out’. 
60 Note that these are also responses to change. 
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to be their intellectual equals (e.g., E-Group). It is still, however, very much a 
‘community in-the-mind’ or a feeling of co-presence that scientists have.61 As Euan 
(scientist) says, “… I think that peer review again is the audience that I work to and 
I’ve got some fairly ferocious peers who review mercilessly if you go off the rails.”  
 
The standard way of gaining entry into this scientific community is by publication in 
a refereed scientific journal, preferably international, the more prestigious the better 
for your status. For example, research on the Inverdale gene was published in Nature 
Genetics, the most prominent journal for molecular biologists (Galloway et al., 
2000). The first author said:  
I haven’t been publishing much with Inverdale for a long time because … 
anything we published would give away the location [of the gene] so I decided 
to keep it all to the one big one and just run it on the biggy. 
 
Within the organisation, the job classification of ‘scientist’ is usually achieved after 
the completion of PhD studies; however, scientists themselves tend to see publication 
as the entry path. Two members of the E-Group do not have formal scientific 
qualifications but are now organisationally and internationally recognised as 
scientists. This gives them great delight and they still find it hard to believe. For one 
this recognition came about through the quality of his published work. The other 
gained international recognition (confirmed by publication) through his discovery of 
endophyte as the cause of ryegrass staggers (Fletcher and Harvey, 1981).  
 
Hence, the traditional gatekeepers to membership are the anonymous peers who 
decide through the system of peer review whether a paper is worthy of publication. 
Within AgResearch authors are required to give a copy of a paper to their SPLs 
before it is submitted to a journal, with a list of those who have already commented 
on it to ensure that authors are not unwittingly giving away potential IP or 
commercially sensitive information. This is also a check on academic quality. Thus 
                                                 
61 Turpin and Hill (1995: 183) refer to the work of Hill, Fensham, and Howden (1974: 99) on the role 
of completing a PhD in the ‘making’ of a scientist: “… their early disciplinary training supported the 
internalization of self-concepts such as individualism and elitism and the construction of boundaries 
between science and other segments of society. The authors argued that the nature and process of the 
thesis served to socialize the student into professionalism but that this was a process in which the 
student was insulated from colleague or occupational reinforcement so their reference groups were 
often abstract. The result, they argued, was a socialization of the professional in an atmosphere of 
virtual reality”. Turpin and Hill continued, “Unless new experiences were in some way commensurate 
with these reference groups, these new experiences would be devalued or rejected ” (ibid.: 184).  
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the organisation is now acting as an additional gatekeeper. Decisions of who is ‘in’ 
and who is ‘out’ of the scientific community are complex and hidden. 
 
Many scientists hope that by publishing, the work they have done will stand the test 
of time and be useful to future generations. George (retired scientist) kept publishing 
after being made redundant until he had submitted all the results of work 
accumulated over the years. Noel (scientist) mentioned the satisfaction he had when 
he was able to pass on to his colleagues some still relevant papers, published twenty 
or so years ago that had come out of his PhD. For many scientists there is a concern 
to publish a book that is a compilation of all that they have learnt over their career.  
 
Status in the science community is also obtained through discipline choice and 
collaboration. Any research to do with molecular biology, particularly genetics, and 
involvement in human health issues, is given the highest regard. When AgResearch 
carried out its respositioning exercise in 2000, ‘agronomists’ suddenly found this title 
for their work speciality was no longer a title to be proud of. Collaboration is an 
indication by a fellow scientist that your ideas and work will give added value to a 
programme. Until recently scientists have been free to choose their collaborative 
partners.62 The work on endophyte and the Inverdale gene is based on collaboration. 
 
The science community provides a way of telling its members and outsiders whose 
word can be trusted or whose information is more likely to be reliable and objective. 
It is also a hierarchical community and many scientific workers, particularly 
technical workers, are excluded.  
5.2.2 The role of feedback as an influence on change in science 
A major part of the present change is that yet again the Government of the day is 
attempting to get the science community to do what it wants. Scientists, with their 
strong sense of autonomy and concern about freedom, do not like this interference. 
Some feel the direction in which their research takes them should be dictated by 
science alone. I observed that within AgResearch there was a resistance to the idea 
that the ‘outside’ world should have any say in things scientific. Garth, for example, 
                                                 
62 According to Alister Metherell (pers. comm., 12-12-02) FRST are stating that research is unlikely to 
be funded unless it is collaborative across institutions. FRST would say it encourages collaboration. 
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had experienced first hand the resistance to his ideas within entomology. His idea 
that disease played a part in the mortality, and hence the life cycle of insects, was 
still resisted in classical entomological circles. He is reluctant to allow Government 
policy (the outsider) to influence his work, however, he submits himself to the 
science community for recognition. He accepts feedback from within that 
community, but does not accept feedback from those who are not of scientific status. 
Kuhn (1970[1962]: 55-95) portrays ‘normal science’ and the scientific community 
supporting it as a closed system that only admits of incremental change. It resists 
revolutionary changes even though, according to his analysis, such change provides 
the dynamic that keeps science moving on. Kuhn pays little attention to non-science 
forces, seeing change more in terms of perceptual shifts within ways of seeing a 
particular scientific issue rather than through social and outside influences.  
 
A member of the W&S Group named the MCG the ‘dinosaurs’ because of the belief 
that new ideas should come out of their own scientific community and research on 
them paid for by public funding.63 Will (scientist), a member of the MCG, adopted 
the name ‘dinosaur’ with some pride. When someone put a small sticker of a 
dinosaur on his shared office door, the three scientists using this office left it there, 
indicating their acceptance of the name. In contrast, the W&S Group think their 
science should be directed both by concerns outside the scientific community and 
scientific ideals, and preferably paid for or subsidised by industry. I am not saying 
that this group values feedback from non-scientists more than scientists, but they are 
trying to listen to a variety of voices.64 The E-Group accepts feedback from the 
science, agriculture and business worlds because commercial funding provides a 
better, more stable way of pursuing their scientific fascination with endophyte, rather 
than public funding. (See Hunt, 2002b, Appendix C.)  
 
So do scientists and group leaders value feedback from clients and change 
accordingly? The answer would have to be ‘it depends’! It depends who the client is 
                                                 
63 According to New Zealand’s Minister of Science and Technology, “If there is any scientist left in 
this country who believes that science funding exists for them, personally, and not for the knowledge 
they create and its appropriate transfer to the business community, the policy community or the public 
would they kindly go outside and retire” (Hodgson, 2000a: 8). 
64 Another example would be Craig’s concern that women, as the major consumers of wool (those 
who make the decisions about what their families wear and what household furnishings to buy), are 
not represented in the direction and decision making processes of wool research. 
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and the nature of the work. Most commercial work would be seen as achieving 
something a group knew it could do already and so such work would not provide the 
satisfaction of producing new knowledge. For all groups but the W&S Group, 
commercial contracts were seen as a way of subsidising science (MCG), doing more 
science (E-Group), not as a way of listening and responding to the outside world. (In 
general, the ‘business world’ is not one that I have found scientific workers feel they 
‘belong’ to, so it is not included for discussion here.) 
 
To conclude this section, as members of the scientific community, scientists can set 
up another value system independent of the organisation that is not available to other 
workers in the organisation – technical, corporate or support staff. This exclusive 
community can give them another reference point and allow them to be more 
independent and resistant to organisational norms. When I asked scientists what they 
valued most about their work, the reply was usually ‘scientific excellence’ and the 
respect of peers. When I asked how they measured scientific excellence I got a 
strange look as if I must be very ignorant! The answer was ‘by publication’. There 
was no mention of meeting the company’s strategic goals or producing a product. 
 
In the next section I consider the third source of feedback – that from the sense of 
belonging to a science work group or team. 
5.3 Feedback from belonging to the group or team 
In AgResearch, workers can belong to different organisational groups such as 
science groups, and Occupational Safety and Health, Animal Ethics, and conference 
committees. In the first four subsections I will describe the cultures of the different 
science groups in this study to demonstrate how belonging to a science group played 
a very important part in the everyday life of those in the case studies. These groups, 
situated within a Science Platform (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2), provide a contrast to the 
scientific community, as a worker was placed within a group as part of their work. 
Such a group may come to feel like a team to some, providing them with a place 
where they are accepted, valued, liked, and needed. These feelings can be reinforced 
on an everyday basis, providing a person with very good reasons for going to work 
each day, or the exact opposite. The section concludes by considering the impact of 
SPLs’ differing styles of management on the sense of belonging of group members. 
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Because of the stability of workers within AgResearch, the present group leaders had 
chosen most group members. This in itself gave a worker a sense of belonging. 
Groups, in other words, were not set up to satisfy some Human Relations ideology 
on the part of the HR staff. If a strong team feeling emerged it was not intentional but 
a welcome by-product. Part of reason for the Invitation to Innovation programme 
(I2I) was to make clear that innovation was more likely if work groups included 
workers with a range of different ways of coming at things (e.g., as identified by the 
use of Myers Briggs Personality typing). No practical attention had been paid to this 
in the assignment of workers to groups. 
 
Each group had its own distinctive heritage or story. It may be based on something 
internal to the group, such as the way the group was formed, or it may be a common 
external heritage such as a family background or interest in agriculture. Groups were 
situated within a local workplace shared by others in the organisation but individuals 
did not get much support outside their groups. There seemed to be no binding 
together across groups through the common experience of change.  
 
In the next subsections I consider feedback related to specific group membership. To 
ensure the maintenance of confidentiality I have named the groups A, B, C or D and 
the name has been randomly assigned so, for example, Group A is not necessarily the 
first group described earlier. 
5.3.1 Group A 
Group A members received a lot of feedback from their team interactions. As 
workers in the Group come from many disciplinary backgrounds and chose to come 
together through an interest in the same subject, they had developed a strong sense of 
team. They were respectful of each other’s talents and abilities and enjoyed this 
interaction and the contribution of their different disciplines. ‘Creative abrasion’ 
(Leonard & Straus, 1998 [1997]: 109) would be a good way of describing how they 
operated. Belonging meant being valued for your contribution to the team. This was 
not taken for granted.  
And to me that’s the big bonus about the situation – to be able to work on 
interesting problems with quality people. … I wouldn’t complain if I managed 
to do something for lots of accolades – no doubt – but what really matters to me 
is the few people that I’ve worked with closely, looked favourably at the work 
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we did together – as I do. So there are lots of jobs where you don’t have that, so 
I think it’s a privilege to have that framework to work in (Ken, scientist). 
 
This valuing of each other was one way in which these workers’ identities had 
changed. Some scientists in Group A expressed surprise about how they had found it 
so rewarding working in such a team, not expecting this to compare with the rewards 
from ‘doing their science’. Technical workers did not play a part in this camaraderie. 
When members of the Group rather reluctantly realised that they needed to be 
organised, they chose to have a facilitator rather than a ‘leader’, emphasising their 
relationship as a non-hierarchical one between science peers. They were not an 
exclusive group. Other scientists came and went when they found that the subject 
holding the Group together did not offer anything to their science.  
 
The commercial nature of a lot of the work of this Group gathered them together 
across campuses several times a year. They regularly fronted up to agribusiness 
companies to negotiate contracts. Their relationship with an overseas company had 
been particularly productive for them in this way, as it provided opportunities to 
demonstrate what they each had to offer. Each member of the Group could make a 
presentation to representatives of the client company on their visits in the presence of 
other team members which developed a greater appreciation of what each person 
could contribute. Since the initial discovery that started this Group, such discoveries 
have continued and all members have contributed to this heritage.65 
5.3.2 Group B 
Group B exemplified the very positive role group interactions can play in providing 
feedback about work and self. The physical layout of the Group’s laboratory in an 
open plan design facilitated informal interaction. The lab was a large, very open, 
light space. It was very informal with workers being trusted to obey lab rules and 
protocols whenever it was necessary for their own safety and the safety of others. 
The scientists’ offices were placed on the far side of the lab so that they had to pass 
through the lab to reach them and could interact with technical workers on the way. 
There was an awareness, demonstrated in the lab design, that personal space was 
important. Each technical worker had their own ‘space’ and bench, plus access to the 
                                                 
65 I cannot say whether a group with a ‘story’ has less sense of ‘belonging’ than one without such a 
story, as all the groups in this study had their own heritage. 
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areas that were shared – including the computer corner. Computers appeared to be 
considered to be just like any other shared resources in a modern lab (with its 
dependence on expensive, up-to-date technology). 
 
Each person was aware of what the others were doing and they gave each other 
words of encouragement and congratulations when a problem was worked through 
successfully. Kevin (technical worker) told me how he would shout across the lab to 
Lisa for advice. As he said, “I’m enjoying the people I’m working with. I really like 
working in the lab.” These interactions showed the cooperation and trust that the 
members of Group B had for each other. They demonstrated a consciousness and 
deliberation about the quality of their interactions not apparent in other groups.  
I show them [others in lab] that I value their skills and their knowledge/work, 
by, you know, recognising that they’re an expert in a certain area and asking 
them, listening to what they say, and making use of it, rather than just asking 
and going ahead and doing it how I was going to do it anyway (Lisa, technical 
worker). 
 
Alongside this interaction there was a respect for each other’s autonomy. All workers 
were managed in the same way and given responsibility for their own projects 
whether they were the most humble dishwasher, technician with polytechnic or 
university qualifications or scientists with a PhD. As Jane (technical worker) said, “I 
plan my day and I … do it the way I want to do it. Yeah.”  
 
There was a strong emphasis on sharing and peer feedback amongst all workers and 
it was obvious to me that they tossed ideas about and learned who was good at 
particular techniques, so workers knew who to ask when they themselves needed to 
learn something new. There was the expectation that a worker was responsible for 
becoming competent in the techniques required to do their project and did not pass it 
around other members of the group who might specialise in a particular technique 
(except for the routine work that went to external agencies). Workers seemed to give 
advice only when asked. Kevin (technical worker) talked of how it was important for 
him to try to solve his own problems first before asking for help and this was a 
common pattern. This atmosphere actively encouraged learning. It was supported in 
other ways. For example, Nan (technical worker) mentioned how, following a 




Group B as a whole celebrated and enjoyed the successes and achievements of 
others. Its members liked to think that even if they were not involved in the actual 
work that has produced the success they contributed to it in some small way by their 
participation in the lab. “… like with [Rosie’s] success – I mean that reflects back on 
everybody else. She says I’ve helped by doing all the dishes and things so that makes 
me feel good, acknowledged. You know you’re part of it” (Olga, Technical staff). 
 
The social space for tea breaks was very confined, making it seem very intimate and 
personal. Workers had been able to establish communication in such a way that two 
or more conversations could go on over each other simultaneously! The SPL and his 
Personal Assistant (PA) were very accessible, the SPL taking tea breaks whenever he 
was there because he considered it important to be with his staff. This sociality was 
extended to gatherings outside work hours organised by a staff social club. 
 
Workers in this environment valued their relationships with each other. The 
environment helped workers to be autonomous and in control of their work, while 
maintaining an atmosphere in which they were free to ask for help if needed. Each 
worker had projects and a place of their own, yet to get their work done they needed 
to interact successfully with others who shared their common spaces and resources. 
This atmosphere helped workers to feel that they belonged and were valued.  
5.3.3 Group C 
Group C was a very tight knit group.66 As a whole this Group expressed a great 
degree of cynicism about the organisation, its management, and the system of 
science funding. It was an obligatory part of the culture to complain about the 
organisation and about managers.67 Ironically this produced a strong team feeling, 
demonstrated by the almost compulsory attendance of technical workers and some 
scientists at tea breaks when they gathered in the cafeteria and formed a group almost  
                                                 
66 I suspect that the Group needed to have someone to exclude to keep it together (Durkheim, 
1966[1938]: 2-3, 10). This role was taken by Don, a young scientist, a difficult, talented person, who 
was not approached for help by other lab staff. His line manager did not say hello to him when he 
entered the lab or engage with him, yet did engage with others who were present. Don would 
frequently return from morning tea disgusted because the conversation had been about babies or 
Coronation Street. On reflection, this could also have been a way of excluding him. 
67 This behaviour did pervade the organisation. It was almost institutionalised, but it seemed more 
essential to this group. Yet they were very successful – scientifically and commercially. 
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impenetrable to outsiders. This also indicated the exclusive nature of this Group. The 
group met for pizza and games evenings, or for lunch at a winery at any excuse, and 
seemed particularly good at welcoming new people to the group. 
 
Members of Group C had developed different roles over the years as they discovered 
and appreciated areas of expertise not necessarily linked directly with science. For 
example, different workers became associated with the leadership and coordination 
of ideas for funding applications; being the go-between who maintains relationships 
between workers; administration, occupational safety and health (OSH); setting up 
lab rules, procedures and protocols; taxonomy; and molecular biology. Once areas of 
expertise were developed they were not shared with others in the group but became 
‘owned’ by the individuals. 
 
In spite of the strong team feeling, there was also a definite distinction between the 
manager scientists and ‘the rest’. Their ability to mutually cooperate was not 
enhanced by being spread across at least four labs on the one campus and scattered 
about in many different offices. In this environment, scientists were separated from 
the technical workers who usually had offices within their labs. The male manager 
scientists were discouraged from working in the labs by the technical workers and 
were seen to be an almost different species.68  
The distinction between scientists and technicians in our group – the scientists 
are a bit airy-fairy – waffling on .… All our technical workers tend to be quite – 
do something it gets done and things are not left lying round or half finished … 
[scientists] just lack common sense I think …. What’s blindingly obvious is 
completely lost to them (Dawn, technical worker). 
 
As a result, these scientists sought time overseas where they had an opportunity to do 
their own lab work. A third scientist manager was happy to work alongside a 
technician whenever the latter was under pressure. Another scientist working by 
himself but supervising younger scientists and PhD students working on projects 
outside the ambit of Group C, found it stimulating working with younger workers. 
The communication from the scientists to the rest was not good. Lab space was 
always in high demand. Lab staff were not told of the arrival times of visitors from 
                                                 
68 Ironically, once out of the lab a scientist may find it difficult to get back in! The technical workers 




overseas who needed lab space. Heather (technical worker) told me how male 
scientists would arrive with work that they expected to be done straight away without 
showing any awareness that technical workers might have other plans. Technical 
workers would complain behind a scientist’s back but there was never any attempt to 
negotiate. The field worker would also just turn up with specimens for analysis 
without notifying lab staff. Technical staff received little warning of when scientists 
would be away overseas, a frequent occurrence.  
 
The exclusive behaviour of this Group made them ‘the group’ noticed on campus. 
Two people, a business manager and a scientist, who worked alone outside 
established groups, managed to become included. The business manager told me that 
he consciously worked at it because he felt it was important to be part of this group. 
The scientist was able to demonstrate that he could add value to the Group’s 
programmes. The Group manages to give others the idea that a person needs to 
belong to them to be taken seriously on the campus. 
 
This Group had a strong ‘heritage’. It was founded by its present leader and has 
grown over the years. Members acknowledged their dependence on him for his 
‘visionary’ skills and his ability to acquire funding and were prepared to forgive him 
any other shortcomings because of this. 
Gareth is a really, really good visionary. He’s a pain in the arse to work with 
half the time because he has visions and you’ve got to make them work. But 
he’s always looking ahead. So, for someone who is often unfashionable as far as 
their scientific-management requirement goes, he’s always on top of the pile 
because he knows how to look ahead … and what we’ve noticed is, say … 
looking at [another campus] and our group, they have suffered a lot more than 
we have because they lost their visionaries. And they only had working stiffs 
like me. And they didn’t have people who were actually sitting at the top and 
working out where all the groups were going to go (Will, scientist).  
5.3.4 Group D 
Group D’s scientists had offices off an open plan area shared by the technical 
workers. This allowed the scientists to come out and talk to the others whenever they 
felt like it. I was not aware of the interaction going the other way in such an informal 
fashion. In other words, the scientists initiated interaction.69 
                                                 
69 It is interesting to note that when you work in an open office space you have no control over access 
of others to you. This is another measure of hierarchy and status (see Appendix D). 
 
73 
This group was very hospitable. They kept a biscuit tin well filled and helped 
themselves from it while going out to morning and afternoon tea together at the 
cafeteria. A person having a birthday was expected to bring along some baking or a 
cake. Good use was made of a coffee percolator. At lunch-times they all went their 
separate ways – walking, to the gym, eating lunch at the desk, playing badminton. 
 
Technical workers in Group D provided the physical labour required for fieldwork 
on an AgResearch farm. This could require all technical workers on some occasions, 
particularly as a trip was more economical if everyone went to attend to their own 
projects. I observed Group D in action in the field on three occasions. Catching 
sheep, for example, required a systematic approach in which each person had a part 
to play! There was an unspoken agreement that the person whose project was the 
subject of the work, was in charge of ‘the labour’, though there did not seem to be a 
need for many instructions as each had an area of expertise. Consequently, they had 
the satisfaction of being part of a team where their expertise was implicitly 
acknowledged. The scientists rarely took part in this fieldwork and when one did, it 
was considered a special occasion.  
 
I was impressed by the technical workers’ concern for and treatment of the animals 
in their care. I have unforgettable memories of watching them rubbing the noses and 
talking to calm distressed sheep strapped on their backs in cradles while being 
artificially inseminated or receiving embryo implants. Some of the comments were: 
“We’re just good friends” (Grant). “You’re a big-hearted sheep aren’t you?” (Brent,  
rubbing her on the nose.) “Come on granny” (Grant). “Hello dear. How are you?” 
(Brent.) They demonstrated a deep understanding of animal behaviour. 
 
The technical workers in the group showed great loyalty to each other when the time 
came for one of them to be made redundant during AgResearch’s repositioning 
exercise. They chose to accept a reduction in hours rather than have this happen. 
However, one person decided to resign rather than to work in this stressful, uncertain 
environment which gave no indication of getting any better. Members of Group D 
share a common heritage in their interest in and concern for sheep farming. 
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5.3.5 Attitudes of SPLs 
The feedback of Science Platform Leaders (SPLs) to the groups in their Platforms 
played an important part in group morale and attitudes. SPLs were the go-betweens – 
the managers who represented their groups to the next levels up in the organisational 
hierarchy and represented the organisation to their groups. They can act to make 
workers feel they belong to the organisation or they can isolate them and discourage 
such loyalty. I suspect that the behaviour of SPLs was not conscious or intended to 
produce particular results and so it is difficult to say whether their impact was 
intended or has had unintended consequences. 
 
Only one SPL said what a great lot of people he had in his Platform and how his 
primary concern was for them.  
It’s very important to me that I am valued by the staff that I look after. I value 
their feedback more than I value feedback from above to be honest. I’m one of 
those people that tend to not look up too much. I seem to worry about those 
below me rather than above me in the system (Jack, SPL). 
 
Another SPL believed that his job was to stay out of people’s working lives as much 
as possible and let them get on with it. This ‘hands-off’ approach supported workers’ 
autonomy to the maximum extent. He also had a primary concern with science 
excellence. So the group in his Platform had been able to ‘do their own thing’ and 
became a closed entity. A third SPL had a vision of how he wanted employees to 
‘be’ that fitted with the organisation’s strategy for the future. He was very concerned 
with ‘out there’ rather than with what was going on in his Platform. Another SPL 
was perceived in negative terms. Members of the group in his Platform did not 
receive any positive feedback from him. They talked of him in violent language – not 
in terms of how they felt about him but about what he was going to do to them. “He’s 
visiting us next week to give us another hit around the head.” “We’ve just had 
another beating up.” “He’s coming to knock some sense into us.” This affected the 
morale of the group, particularly of the scientists.70 
5.3.6 Conclusion to section 
The feeling of belonging in a team is very complex as is illustrated by the different 
experiences of those in these science groups. Group C, for example, was internally 
                                                 
70 “No passion so effectively robs the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as does fear” 
(Terez, 2001: 3, quoting Edmund Burke). 
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stratified yet exhibited a strong team feeling. In other groups there were also quite 
strong distinctions between scientists and technical workers by virtue of both the 
physical separation of scientists in separate offices from technical workers in shared 
offices, and the more formal, restrained and respectful access by technical workers to 
scientists, even within a relaxed relationship. So belonging in all groups contained an 
awareness of status and fit within the science hierarchy. 
 
A group can provide a working environment which challenges workers in a way that 
makes it easier for them to learn. It can do this by providing an environment of 
respectful sharing of skills, an appreciation of where individual work fits in a 
programme, and an appreciation that workers like to be responsible for a whole unit 
of work. Group B and C illustrate this contrast. In Group B all these things were 
happening. In Group C they were not and workers were not as happy. In Group A 
(among scientists), Group B, and Group D (within the group) there was a feeling, 
even if it was not often stated, that everyone’s contributions were valued and 
appreciated but the workers in Group C did not get this feeling to the same extent. 
 
In all groups, individual autonomy was strong and supported except in Group C 
where it was confused. Technical staff in this Group were expected to work without 
knowing how their work fitted the whole, a form of extreme autonomy. At the same 
time they were expected to disrupt their planning without warning, demonstrating 
how little respect was being shown for their autonomy. In most groups it was 
presumed by line managers that workers would just get on with the job: “… well, my 
management style is … let people find their own way to heaven” (Dave, scientist).  
 
For all workers the feedback gained from belonging to their group was very 
important. In a sense, members of these different groups are just thrown together by 
their work and have no reason to get along. Obviously if they do their experience of 
work is enhanced and enriched. Group members have the chance to become part of a 
unique group story that has a past and will continue into the future. 
 
In the next section I consider ways in which scientific workers can get feedback from 
their actual work. I describe how the very ‘doing’ of science provides workers with a 
sense of achievement and satisfaction and reinforces their sense of self. 
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5.4 The work of science: Feedback about identity 
Most scientific workers I studied received such rewards from their everyday science 
practice that they did not feel it was necessary to participate in any other 
organisational activities. Why is this feedback powerful? This section answers this 
question by describing how science practice, particularly experimentation, provides 
feedback and reinforcement of a worker’s identity;71 how technology can contribute 
further to the rewards of this work; how scientific work can be packaged so that it 
has a process and an endpoint both contributing to a workers sense of well-being; 
and finally, the advantages and disadvantages of working in a scientific environment 
which places a great importance on autonomy.  
5.4.1 The everyday work of science 
Most of the work carried out by the scientific workers I studied revolved around 
experiments either directly, through doing experiments and writing experimentally-
based papers, or indirectly, through collecting literature to provide information for 
future experiments or to explain what was happening in present ones. An experiment 
is an important part of the scientific method.72 It provides an empirical, deductively-
structured way of testing a theory. As such it provides an ideal unit of work over 
which a worker can have complete responsibility and autonomous control of what is  
done and when. If well managed, a worker can have the satisfaction of seeing how 
their experiments fit into a whole programme. An experiment may provide feedback 
about identity because it may give a worker clues about where to go next, providing 
another part to the solution of the puzzle they are solving, making them think. These 
workers see themselves as problem solvers. An experiment produces a result, 
informing a scientific worker whether they conducted the experiment correctly, thus 
demonstrating their competency. Ken talked about how the practice of science 
provides feedback without the need for any other human involvement, reinforcing his 
feelings of autonomy:  
I certainly like working in a scientific discipline where the test of your ideas is 
going to be experimental – is about something out there, not just about the self-
consistency of the ideas or … not just about how many people you can get on 
                                                 
71 Ayree (1992) uses feedback from the job itself as one of his indices of job satisfaction. 
72 Most of the work of the groups I studied involved a search for ‘cause and effect’ knowledge. In 
other words hypotheses were developed from theories and tested by the manipulation and control of 
different variables in order to establish cause and effect relationships. Some groups, particularly 
ecologists, did do exploratory, inductive work, but they still used systematic and ordered methods. 
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your team and push against the other lot ... I like to be working in an area where 
there’s that discipline that your ideas are going to be put to a test that’s not just 
somebody else’s opinion. I suppose I believe in truth, which is a bit old hat, 
huh. We might actually find that little bit of it .… Chemistry in many ways is a 
quite robust and well developed science and ahh, the questions you get to ask 
when you put this chemistry into a biological context are often much bigger, if 
you like, or open-ended. So yeah, it’s an intellectual challenge that isn’t just an 
intellectual game, if you like (Ken, scientist).  
 
Ken’s quote also describes his larger goal – to find ‘truth’ – and his need for 
work to have some practical goal rather than to be just a ‘game’. 
 
I now describe the differences in work of the different groups under study in order to 
explore the many ways in which feedback from science reinforces and adds to 
aspects of identity. A large programme may involve many hundreds of experiments 
in the laboratory and/or only a few in the field. Some groups do not do many 
experiments as experiments are an indication of a more mature science. Instead their 
science may be more exploratory in nature (inductive) and involve the collection of 
data in a systematic fashion in order to see what is there. Having a clear hypothesis 
was of particular importance to one of the scientists: 
Yeah, a major influence early in my career was the thought that you had to have 
an hypothesis and test it …. it’s sort of like a work plan. You come up with a 
hypothesis and you collect data that is directed at answering that question and 
by the end of the experiment you either have answered that question positively 
or negatively – at least you’ve got an answer … whereas other people just 
collect stamps and at the end of their experiment they don’t really know one 
way or the other about their original idea and they’ve got a thousand other ideas 
… (Colin, scientist). 
 
This scientist was not impressed by exploratory research.73  
 
The W&S Group has experiments that may cover many years as particular sheep 
breeding groups are followed. For technical workers in this Group, the division of 
labour was across different aspects of work. Grant, for example, was in charge of 
fieldwork but called on the others for help whenever required. (Grant designed the 
sheep yards at Winchmore.) Another was responsible for databases of literature and 
photographs. The managing scientists spent their time in administration and planning 
and rarely got into the field. Workers in the W&S Group saw themselves as flexible, 
                                                 
73 In fact this is part of status in the science community. Recently physics (until superseded by 
molecular genetics) was seen as the queen of the sciences being considered the ‘most scientific’ 
(Nelkin and Lindee, 1995), and something like ecology which is more systems focused and reliant 
upon less controlled data gathering has had lesser status (pers. comm. Euan Kennedy, 14-6-01). 
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adaptable and able to take up any challenge that came along, as they have had to do 
over the years. 
So, I’ve got some basic grounding in research skills and it’s easy enough to go 
to the literature and learn up about the new area, and then discard that 
information when it’s not wanted .… The good times are the times of change – 
when I’m learning new stuff .… I enjoy more working in new areas and the 
rapid learning phase when you go into a new area (Dave, scientist). 
 
Experiments in the E-Group were of many different kinds because of its multi-
disciplinary breadth. Each scientist could be completely autonomous in choosing 
what they offered the group. They did not need to compete for publication. Different 
endophyte strains have to be tested in the field in experiments lasting three years or 
more. The first year is taken up with the establishment of the grass cultivars, then in 
later years the effects of endophytes are tested on grazing animals. Grasses produce 
endophyte under hot summer conditions and these conditions were simulated in 
tunnel houses. This was hot, dirty work for the technical workers, as they gathered 
blood and other samples from sheep. Plant breeders and agronomists associated with 
the programme had experiments outdoors or in glasshouses. Mycologists and 
biochemists worked in laboratories. The relationship between these different 
experiments required complex, long term planning as seed supplies, endophyte 
inoculation and so on needed to be coordinated with the requirements of others. It 
was important to scientists whose experiments were field oriented to get outdoors as 
much as possible and not just leave this to their technical workers. All the other 
scientists spent time at the bench.  
 
The MCG was dependent on the seasonal supply of grass grubs and other insects and 
organisms for its work. Most technical workers worked in the labs on experiments to 
do with bacteria pathological to grass grub. Work for several of the lab staff was 
divided according to their skills. For example, one technical worker was responsible 
for the routine work of testing soil samples for any bacteria or other microorganisms 
with potential as biocontrol agents, while others with higher qualifications did 
microbiology and molecular biology and had their own individual projects. One 
scientist mentioned how he likes to see the a commitment to science demonstrated by 
workers in this Group:  
I think the thing I most value is the commitment … and I do think that we do 
have that … it is at times a bit pressured so it means doing things to get things 
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completed - self sacrifice, loyalty! (laughs) Umm, yeah, that’s it practically and 
I think they [my staff] are pretty good. And I think we do actually have a lot of 
it. The lights at night burn … (Graham, scientist). 
 
The MBU did lab experiments in molecular biology, microbiology and biochemistry 
which could be planned over a reasonably short time frame. Most technical workers 
ran five or six experiments concurrently. They were solely responsible for their own 
experiments, were aware of what they needed to do, planned it themselves, and had 
an idea of a larger time frame. Their experiments could contribute to a programme 
that had been going for many years. For example, the Inverdale gene success came 
from a programme started in the late 1970s (Easton, 2002). I found that workers in 
the MBU knew where they fitted and what they contributed. Manager-scientists in 
the unit spent most of their time on administration but found time to do some 
experimental work, reinforcing the value of the work of the technical workers.  
 
There were many aspects of feedback from science practice that were common to all 
groups. Firstly, it was particularly important for researchers that their work was 
considered accurate and trustworthy by their peers:  
I’d like to think that my results can be trusted and that there’s not too much 
doubt that I’ve made a mistake. I mean it’s always possible but umm, yeah ... I 
think I know more the implications of making a mistake so you are more 
careful. You know that down the track it’s more likely someone is going to 
come back and look at your results for whatever purpose - usually to validate 
something or rule it out, umm, so you know that that’s a possibility so you want 
to be careful that you do get it right (Lisa, technical worker). 
 
Most were extremely aware that their work produced part of the knowledge required 
for the work to move on and if they made a mistake the impact on their work and the 
work of others could be considerable. They all had examples of working on a project 
in which they had made assumptions from prior work about where to start their 
experiments and had found later that the assumptions were not correct. For Kylie this 
meant six months of her PhD work was of no value; she had to find a new topic and 
renegotiate with her scholarship providers. Mark (scientist) had to go back over 
many years of experiments to discover why his work was not finding what he 
expected it to, until he reached a point where he felt a decision made many years ago 
about sheep breeding for the particular characteristic he was looking for was actually 
wrong. The method used for selection at the time with the technology available then, 
was just not accurate enough.  
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These examples, taken from my field notes and interviews, indicate the importance 
of trustworthiness, honesty and integrity as personal qualities required for good 
science. Workers need courage and integrity to admit to mistakes and move on. They 
have to be able to trust the work of others if at all possible, otherwise their own work 
would never be able to happen. Knowing that their own work is trustworthy indicates 
to them that it has some permanence within the history of their research area. 
 
Secondly, technical workers saw themselves as well organised in both a day-to-day 
and a long-term sense, and as hard workers with a practical, ‘hands on’ approach. 
They knew what was required and got on with it. The success of an experiment 
reinforced their knowledge of themselves as skilled people.  
 
Thirdly, many workers spoke of their sense of curiosity and for some this was a drive 
(see also Sommer & Sommer (1997: 15)). They were people who needed to know!  
I am a very nosey person. I need to know everything. I can’t handle not 
knowing. I need to have the answers. I have always been told I should have 
been a lawyer or a detective or something … So, that’s just me. I am curious by 
nature (Kylie, PhD student). 
 
Scientists saw experiments as filling in the larger picture, satisfying their curiosity 
and stimulating it further by leading them on to more interesting questions. The E-
Group came together because of their curiosity about a particularly fascinating 
fungus, endophyte. Because it is involved in a plant-animal-environment interaction 
it is a problem which has many dimensions providing an intellectual challenge, but a 
practical application as well. As Ken (scientist) states: “I’m not sure that people in 
senior management necessarily have a clear recognition of what it is that motivates 
us – interesting problems and good people to work with.” Challenging issues in an 
area of interest are an important motivating force for scientists. 
 
Fourthly, other qualities necessary in scientific workers are persistence74 and 
resourcefulness in response to the many challenges presented by their work.75  
                                                 
74 Glassick from the Carnegie Institute spoke at Lincoln University on 31-7-00 on the attributes of 
scholarship. One of these was persistence. 
75 Persistence has also become a valuable quality in the search for funding. Angus’s (MCG) Marsden 
funded PhD was a proposal that was successful on its fourth submission for funding, indicating the 
way the scientists in the MCG persist with an idea if they think it is a good one. They are successful at 
getting funding but they do not say how many applications they put in. It may be that this group just 
puts in more applications than other groups, but gets the same proportion accepted. 
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They need to persist in trying to find out and understand what has gone wrong and 
keep trying different ways of getting around a problem.  
I don’t like things that don’t work … I try not to think of work at home but if 
something hasn’t worked I’ll think about it at home all the time ... even if it 
didn’t give the result that we wanted, I would prefer we got a result so that we 
knew. If something doesn’t work I take it very personally and I always think it’s 
something I’ve done wrong and probably 50% of the time it is human error. But 
the other 50% of the time it is something else. It might be that one of the 
chemicals has gone off or the temperature in the lab did get too high. But it 
could be … that it’s something that I’ve done wrong so I have to work at it at 
least to eliminate that it was me, so that at least at a lab meeting I can say, this 
didn’t work because this went wrong … I don’t ever want anyone saying that 
nothing ever worked because her technique was sloppy or she wasn’t well 
organised … (Nan, technical worker). 
 
As an example of innovation and resourcefulness I was told of the method used by a 
science group to capture weevils to feed their parasitoids at times of the year when 
the weevils are difficult to find. On a sunny day they place a tarpaulin out on the 
grass and trap the weevils under it as they come towards the warmth. On a dull day 
they put out an electric blanket! Technology may be used in ways not originally 
intended (Akrich, 1995). 
 
In the field, compared with the lab, there is a longer time factor involved as 
experiments may take several years. A scientific worker cannot afford to make a 
mistake in the design of an experiment or in its execution whereas in the lab, 
experiments have a shorter time span and something can be repeated until it is right. 
External factors such as drought, flood and seasonal variations over which the 
experimenter has no control, may cause delay or failure. The challenge and 
satisfaction may come from limiting the effect of unexpected happenings, such as 
Peter (technical worker) controlling an insect attack. In the lab there still may be 
seasonal issues because certain insects may only be able to be collected in certain 
seasons and it may not be possible to breed them in the lab.  
 
Fifthly, another necessary quality for scientific workers is optimism. They need to be 
hopeful that they will eventually succeed in getting something to work.76 In the lab 
one of the tactics they may employ to keep their spirits up is to have as many 
                                                 
76 Alan MacDiarmid, a New Zealand-born scientist who has won a Nobel Prize, said most scientific 
experiments go wrong (Radio NZ, John Campbell Show, 8.30-9am, 30-6-01). He agreed with the 
interviewer, John Campbell, that scientists have to be optimistic people. 
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experiments as possible underway concurrently. This means that at least something is 
working!  
 
Finally, scientific workers seldom have a single point of feedback. If you are reliant 
on science experiments for your feeling of value, they are a very risky measure,77 but 
when an experiment does succeed, it immediately tells the experimenter they must 
have done things correctly. If this is in an area that has challenged the experimenter’s 
skills and they have overcome many problems requiring all their ingenuity and 
creativity in the use of chemicals and equipment, success gives a worker such a 
feeling of satisfaction it makes all the struggles worthwhile.78 
… a highlight for me is when you spend several months on an experiment and 
then looking down a microscope or something and seeing what you’ve done 
actually worked and it’s given you a result, and then you know, yes, then it’s all 
done. And that’s – you probably get a buzz for a day and a half, or whatever. 
And then it just goes back to reality again. Yeah. But that only happens about 
three times a year, ‘cos things take so long before you finish everything. It’s 
like building a house. It takes 100 days and then you’ve built it and you’re 
happy, then you go on to the next one (David, scientist). 
 
5.4.2 The place of technology 
Technology can reinforce a worker’s sense of autonomy, giving them control of a 
whole experiment from planning through to execution, to entering data into a 
computer and analysing it. In the past these jobs may have been divided between  
different workers considered experts at particular tasks. Technology can turn once 
exciting jobs into jobs that are routine and boring. In Group C, routine work has been 
passed down the line to the lowest technical worker while the others move on to 
learning more interesting techniques. DNA sequencing can now be contracted out so 
that workers do not have to be involved in work that has become routine. Technology 
can add to the feeling that science is objective. If something is untouched by humans 
then it has the aura of seeming more likely to be correct and outside human 
influence. It gives the data more authority, leading to workers questioning it less and 
becoming less observant in the field and the lab. 
I sometimes wonder whether the human content that we try and eliminate to 
avoid errors might also be eliminating other personal insights … that it becomes 
                                                 
77 Behavioural psychology seems to fit here – random rewards are more powerful in their effect than 
regular ones. 
78 Again from behavioural psychology – the more difficult something is to achieve and the more 
problems have been overcome to achieve it, the greater the reward. 
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a set of numbers that are just channelled through things rather than you having a 
chance to interpret them. You know … you are weighing sheep and if you’re 
very involved in it, you are getting all sorts of perceptions as it’s happening. 
Whereas, if it’s just pushing a button, you are not necessarily taking notice of 
what’s happening around you. And then you pull it on to a computer and it must 
be right because it has been captured correctly. I find that a little bit dangerous. 
But I can understand the scientist saying, “Oh it’s good because no human has 
been in here making mistakes or reading numbers upside down … (Grant, 
technical worker). 
 
Technology can increase the feeling some scientific workers have that they are in 
touch with ‘the truth’ – something bigger than themselves. Workers enjoy being 
adept and skilled in the use of technology. It is something they can feel good about. 
5.4.3 Process and endpoint 
Keeping up their own records, such as lab books, provides a worker with feedback 
on what they have done and how well they have done it, as well as being a means of 
accountability. In 2001 a new policy was to be implemented79 in which lab books 
were to be kept by all technical workers and signed off every week by a worker’s 
line manager.80 This was to cover any patent challenges. Some workers were not 
looking forward to this potential threat to their autonomy because having something 
imposed is different from doing it out of choice. Each worker has developed their 
own ways of keeping these records and it may not be particularly tidy or regimented. 
 
Technical workers may never tell the scientists they work for how an experimental  
result was achieved. For example, in Group C results may be forwarded to a scientist 
on a spreadsheet via email without any interaction between them. Thus the work of 
technical workers may be invisible and never appear in a publication. A scientist 
receives a result, then incorporates it into their overall picture of the research 
programme. The work of many scientists is reliant on the work of technical workers 
and the electronic medium by which the results of this work are received, can 
distance it from the worker who did it.  
 
It is important, as illustrated by the examples above, that ‘the experiment’ and a 
‘good job’ provide work that is structured into achievable units over which workers 
                                                 
79 This was after I left the research arena so I do not know if it was implemented or not. 
80 This has more to do with the organisational priority given to competing patent claims than as a 
means of accountability or feedback. 
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can exercise control. They can make such work meaningful by gaining satisfaction in 
seeing their work complete, even if they never hear about it again.  
But the planning and then going through and executing it and then finishing it 
up and then having this sort of fairly nice tidy package that you felt like you 
were part of - that you had some sort of input into … making sure that things 
happen and the results are there ready to pass on to the scientist - that probably 
gives me the most satisfaction (Grant, technical worker). 
 
In Group A, some of the scientists have been surprised to find out how pleased they 
have been to see their work result in an end product that is out in the market.  
I suppose nowadays that real highlight is that they are now going into 
commercial production …so to actually carry through your science till you’ve 
got a marketable product at the end gives one a lot of satisfaction. And perhaps 
that is one thing with the new regime where the emphasis is on 
commercialisation, is a good thing. Ahh, but I think it has to be in moderation. 
In the old days you seemed to get much of your satisfaction in science from 
publishing a good bit of research and it didn’t go very much further often, 
whereas now the new product is the dominant theme and perhaps it’s a little too 
dominant (Jerry, scientist). 
 
A particular way of completing a unit of work is to publish a paper about it, as 
described earlier. This can represent work done over many years. It can be disturbing 
for technical workers in particular, to see something that they have worked on come 
to nothing when the scientist involved leaves the organisation without publishing.81  
5.4.4 The culture of autonomy within science practice 
Science culture prizes autonomy. This can have two sides. Petra described the 
positive side of the ‘autonomous worker’ well when she said:  
… everyone has their own standard of what they want, how they want things, so 
if things are working and working well, you feel good. I mean having some 
other people say – congratulate you – it’s like the bonus, but it’s often at the 
personal level, you’re your worst critic yourself, to your own work. I mean, you 
always know how you stuff up things, or what you should have done. Yeah 
(Petra, technical worker). 
 
A person who is most strongly autonomous will place greater value on what they 
themselves know and less on what other people say. They are more self-directed and 
self motivated.82 However, as Petra illustrates, they appreciate people giving them 
feedback about their work as well. 
                                                 
81 A technical worker would not think of publishing such work themselves. 
82 “Frequently observed characteristics of research scientists cited in these studies include creativity, 
innovation, self-reliance and independence” (Turpin and Deville, 1995: 6). 
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The negative side of autonomy is a tendency for an autonomous culture, such as that 
in AgResearch, to place a low value on feedback from others in the workplace. While 
workers in general said they would like more feedback there were strong cultural 
reasons why it did not happen. Ian talks of how it was like when he first started in his 
job: 
Interviewer: How did the way you were managed change over your time in 
employment? 
Ian: It went from being really awful to start with …. when you first started you 
were just given an office, you had a job and there was no really clear role, 
you just sort of stumbled ad hoc, along the way. 
Interviewer: Does it still happen? 
Ian: Yeah. I still think that it appears to be a scientific thing, that new people 
come in and you get them an office and you’re expected to develop a work 
path and umm, and I think some people really, really struggle with that. I 
spoke earlier about people learning to manage their time and I think that’s 
fine once you’ve been on deck for a while, but I often think that really it’s 
important when you’re starting in your new job – or starting in a new area - 
that there’s a bit of a support structure around you and you’re sort of guided 
through it a little bit … I’d imagine there’d be some other managers that say, 
“You’re here. Get on with it.” (Ian, business manager). 
 
An environment which encourages autonomy and individuality is not one in which 
there will be a lot of feedback from others.  
So nobody’s going to help you around here. The only way to do it is to sit down 
and do the hard slogging and you know, I have some animosity from my fellow 
technical people – because basically I’m a technician – and those other 
technicians see what I’ve done and where I’m going and I get a wee bit of flak 
and it doesn’t worry me … and basically I couldn’t care less. They can do what 
they like. I work on my own. I never ask them to help me. OK. Never. Not once 
(Ted, technical worker).  
 
The science culture also tends to be very male (Keller, 1990[1978]). It is perceived as 
rather weak and immature to need other people telling you how well you are doing. 
Group C provides the best examples of such a culture. The experience of this group 
demonstrates a lot about feedback and the dominance of the group leadership in 
setting the culture.  
Interviewer: Do you think the way you know you’ve done a good job … has 
changed over time? 
Graham: Yeah, only in the sense I would have been more responsive to 
immediate managers I think … you know, happy little puppy, wags it tail, 
have I done a good job? - kind of thing, umm whereas I’m old enough now 
not to worry about trivial little things like that (laughs) (Graham, scientist). 
 
The lack of feedback from the top has permeated through Group C. Gwen, a group 
member, indicated that she would like to get more feedback from her line manager.   
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I know if I’ve done a good job - I guess that in things like science it’s easy 
because you get things published and that’s recognition. It’s nice if your peers 
recognise it too. And often that doesn’t necessarily happen – especially quiet 
little [workers] who are beavering away in the background. … Greg could 
occasionally say, “Oh, that was really well done,” which he doesn’t do - ever. 
Umm, and that yeah, I could easily be satisfied with that. You know, I don’t 
need awards on my wall or anything but just that really. 
 
Gwen’s line manager makes the assumption that workers do not need to be told they 
are doing a good job. I think because this scientist/manager does not need it himself, 
he thinks no-one else does either. He has an international reputation gained in part 
from the work done for him by others, and is getting his feedback from other sources 
that he values, whereas other workers may not have the same opportunities or may 
need different means of support. Angus has learned that as a PhD student, if he wants 
some feedback from his two supervisors, he has to go and ask for it. Heather 
(technical worker) said that if she says ‘thank you’ too often, she gets the impression 
that other workers in the group see it as a sign of inferiority.  
 
Formal feedback through performance appraisal processes is part of an 
organisational structure whereas informal feedback is spontaneous. The latter just 
comes from the way people ‘are’. Informality cannot be structured into a system. Can 
an environment encourage informal feedback? The way the MBU lab is designed as 
an open plan, encourages an environment of interaction.83 Mark (scientist) mentioned 
how much he liked the spontaneous remarks others make about his work. However, 
not all informal feedback made workers feel good. Another technical worker 
mentioned how they were sometimes introduced to visitors to the lab: 
People come into the lab and some of the scientists have said, “Oh, these are all 
the robots.” … That really sucks. It doesn’t happen very often, but it has 
happened and it makes us grit our teeth thinking, “Well, that’s how you 
appreciate us. Thank you.” (Petra, technical worker). 
 
Informal feedback is related to autonomy. People are free to give it. They choose to 
give it. All workers appreciated the formal feedback of the performance appraisal 
process and preferred that to nothing, but they valued spontaneous feedback more.  
 
                                                 
83 This is what ‘business incubators’ are trying to do when they house people in open plan offices. It is 
supposed to be an environment that stimulates innovation and creativity (Hofbauer, 2000; Baldry, 
Bain & Taylor, 1998).  
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The relationship between autonomy and feedback is complex. Giving a worker 
increasing autonomy indicates indirectly that they must be a very trustworthy person. 
Chris (technical worker) said his line manager had never told him whether or not he 
had done a good job. This lack of judgement or reinforcement by a line manager, 
made this worker feel part of a collegial team (of chaps) rather than someone in a 
hierarchy. He was trusted as an autonomous responsible worker. Jane and Nan 
(technical workers) had sufficient autonomy to demand that their managers give 
them increasingly challenging work. It was part of their growing ownership of their 
right to be happy in their work and their right to negotiate with management. At the 
same time, this confidence had probably grown through the feedback they were 
receiving from those around them in their lab. Feedback does not have to be initiated 
by a person higher in the system. This peer support was a distinctive quality of 
Group B’s technical workers. In Groups C’s environment of little feedback, the 
technical workers just complained and did not take any responsibility for acting on 
their complaints.  
 
As I have said before, nearly all members of the groups indicated they would like 
more feedback, particularly from their line managers. Because they usually get no 
feedback at all they have to assume that this means that they are doing their work 
well and presume that if they hadn’t been someone would have said so. Part of being 
a professional and working in science is the expectation of a high degree of 
autonomy – that people will be self directed and self motivated. For some in this 
autonomous environment, usually the scientists, only certain sorts of feedback are 
given value, demonstrating how privileged discourse is indicative of membership of 
the scientific community. For others, particularly technical workers, the feedback 
from the actual practice of work can be very important because of the lack of other 
ways of getting this reinforcement of their identity and worth.  
5.4.5 Conclusion to section 
There are many forms of feedback received in the experimenting process. Scientific 
work can satisfy many of the reasons people had for becoming scientific workers in 
the first place. It can reassure them that they have made a worthwhile contribution to 
the things that are important to them – science, knowledge, the agricultural sector, or 
something that they believe in. It can tell them that they are helping to make a 
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difference in solving a problem of importance to some sector of the community, to 
their boss or to the company. It has used the skills and training that they have 
acquired over many years indicating that they made a worthwhile choice to work in 
this area. It has reinforced the personal qualities they would like to think they have, 
such as integrity and perseverance. It has provided them with opportunities to be 
innovative, to satisfy their curiosity and most importantly to have ideas and think.  
 
Feedback is one of the mechanisms that makes the practice of science so powerful. 
Science gives people regular if somewhat random feedback and they become 
hooked. Kuhn (1970[1962]: 38) has described it as addictive! Feedback from science 
can be regarded as more reliable than people in the sense that it is perceived to be 
more consistent and objective.  
 
In the next section I consider the ways in which senior management instructed 
scientific workers on how to belong to the organisation, and the feedback it supplied 
to them to encourage that belonging. 
5.5 Belonging to the organisation 
In this section I consider the part the company plays as one of the entities that would 
be expected to take a role in workers’ sense of belonging. Firstly, I describe the 
‘listening up’ culture which has developed as workers have learned that they are not 
expected to participate in company decisions of importance to them. This leads to a 
description of the impact of the demands for accountability to company and 
Government goals. I finish by considering the ways in which workers achieve 
company recognition. This section is placed to the end of this chapter in order to 
contrast with earlier sections, as will become apparent. 
  
In a sense a worker belongs to a company by virtue of being employed by it. 
AgResearch, however, wants people to feel as if they ‘belong’ to it – that they have a 
sense of loyalty towards the organisation and identify with its strategic direction in a 
way that goes beyond the fact that it is the organisation that pays them. “The 
employee culture will be one which is aligned to the strategic direction of the 




Part of what binds a person to a group or organisation is the feedback and rewards a 
person receives from belonging. A person will feel more positive about something 
that gives them strong affirmative messages about themselves. They will be less 
likely to feel as if they belong when there is an absence of, or negativity in, such 
messages. Any discussion needs to contain a consideration of the circumstances in 
which people do not receive feedback from others when there would be an 
expectation of it as a lack of response is strong negative feedback in itself. It implies 
that the person hoping for a response is not important enough, not valued enough for 
someone to spend time to respond to them. This has implications for the ways in 
which people ‘exist in’ the organisation and how they ‘exit from’ it. 
 
What were the expectations this organisation had of its workers and how did workers 
learn about them?  
5.5.1 Listening up 
AgResearch management communicated its expectations of workers in many 
different ways. The most overt and obvious flow of information was downward. 
Through ‘listening up’ workers became aware of the beliefs, attitudes and orientation 
that the company expected them to have towards their work, to the company and to 
each other. They were to be “AgResearch people living AgResearch values” 
(Strategic Plan 1999: 9). ‘Becoming aware of’ and ‘embracing’ AgResearch values, 
however, are not synonymous. 
 
When employees logged on to their computers each day (most employees had a 
computer solely for their own use) they were immediately confronted with a picture 
on their screen of a pleasant pastoral scene across which was emblazoned the 







Better life science… better lives 
Our mission 
Sustainable and integrated solution through life science innovation 
Brand values  
Leading edge, in touch and responsible  
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Other sources of communication were rather more infrequent. The major event 
confronting workers with the expectations of the company was the annual strategic 
plan presentation when the CEO and other staff from senior management toured the 
five major campuses, spending a day on each. A very attractive booklet outlining the 
major points in the plan was distributed to all workers. It had been through a long 
process to reach this stage. First, it was worked through at a Board retreat and written 
up by the Company Secretary.84 Next the CEO would visit each campus and present 
the proposed strategic plan for staff input, although it was made quite clear that the 
main issue that concerned scientific workers, the strategic direction, was not up for 
discussion. Finally, it was sent to the Shareholding Ministers for their approval. 
 
The format of the strategic plan presentation differed each year. In 1999 a video of 
the CEO, a corporate manager and the Board Chairperson speaking, was introduced. 
(In later years some staff were included.85) This was followed by the CEO’s power 
point presentation of the (mainly financial) history of AgResearch and the features of 
the strategic plan. The next part was an attempt to get staff acquainted with the plan 
in an interactive way through discussion groups and some prioritisation of issues.  
 
The Green to Gold Strategic Implementation Network (see Chapter 2) suggested that 
there needed to be some regular communication about what was going on in the 
organisation. This resulted in each campus being visited by a member of the 
corporate management to report on the major senior management meetings held in 
the previous month. The Team Brief, as it was called, was circulated by email before 
the meeting to give people the opportunity to read it in order to bring up any issues 
they wished to clarify. And this was exactly the function it performed. As in the 
                                                 
 84 The Company Secretary, who is charged with the preparation of the strategic plan, revealed some 
dissent about its purpose at corporate level. At one of the Team Briefs (10th February 2000, Lincoln 
campus) he said that he felt the strategic plan was a matter between Government and the AgResearch 
Board as part of the governance and accountability requirements. It was not for the consumption of 
employees. He had been the Company Secretary since the inauguration of AgResearch and it was only 
with the coming of Keith Steele as CEO in 1997 that this changed and the strategic plan was presented 
as involving employees. The CEO saw it as a guiding document for the organisation’s direction and 
hence it was the duty of employees to acquaint themselves with it in order to align their work to this 
direction. This understanding is now incorporated into the annual performance appraisal. (See 
Appendix E.) The involvement of employees in the preparation of the strategic plan is a common 
management practice and a way of trying to achieve employee buy-in to the company goals and 
direction (Kanter, 1999; Arnold, Rush, Bessant & Hobday, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1999; Flood, 1984). 
85 Ironically, in view of my later forced exit, I was in this video one year, supporting employee 
involvement in the strategic plan! 
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strategic plan presentation, the agenda was decided and the corporate manager was 
there to clarify issues, not to allow new ones to emerge.  
 
One of the major messages staff received from these meetings was the company’s 
emphasis on profit. Each Team Brief finished with a summary of whether the profit 
targets for the month and the financial year to date had been attained. Staff found this 
focus rather irrelevant. To them profit was removed from a programme’s funding by 
corporate, leaving them with the operational finances only. They had little influence 
over profit, except by working under budget, something they did not intentionally do. 
“From where I stand it’s a bit difficult to work out how I can help them achieve that 
[more dollars]” (Brent, technical worker). Staff inferred from these meetings that 
corporate was not very interested in science as it received little mention. This was 
thought strange in an organisation in which over sixty percent of workers were 
directly involved in science practice, indicating further the devaluing of their 
scientific contribution to the organisation. When this was pointed out to the CEO he 
referred to the ‘science engine room’ for a while. This was not appreciated. As one  
worker said, it gave the impression they were working in the bowels of a ship!86 
 
I first became aware of ‘listening up’ at the Team Briefs on the Lincoln campus. It  
became very predictable who was going to speak and even who was going to speak 
first. Most speakers were group leaders. I made the assumption that those who did 
not speak were ‘oppressed’. When I asked those who did not speak why they did not, 
I was surprised to find that they did not wish to speak. They attended mainly as an 
information gathering exercise to find out what was going on in the organisation, this 
being one way in which they had the opportunity to gain information about how they 
could structure their work to make it more likely to continue.  
Yeah, even if things were really, really bad I’d still go [to meetings], because 
information’s power ... you’ve got to know what’s going on to know where you 
fit or where things are going .… Team Briefs are the main way that I use [to 
learn about what is going on in AgResearch]… I guess, not so much talking but 
listening … (Angela, technical worker). 
 
These workers felt that anything they said would not make a difference anyway. 
Whereas I had thought of the Team Brief as a way in which the organisation could 
                                                 
86 At the first strategic plan presentation, I wrote on a feedback sheet that I did not like being referred 
to as ‘the troops’. It is to the CEO’s credit that I did not hear him use that expression again. 
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find out what its workers were thinking and concerned about, as a place where 
workers could give feedback to the organisation, the workers saw it as a ‘passing-
information-down’ exercise. There was no real encouragement of a two-way process 
on the part of management or workers. 
 
A concern of many workers on the Lincoln campus was that the dominant voices at 
the Team Brief meetings would be the only ones ‘heard’ by corporate when these 
voices did not necessarily reflect the views of ‘the rest’ of the campus. The dominant 
voices were always negative and critical, and were those workers whom others felt 
were secure in their jobs.87 One scientist described the Lincoln campus culture: 
I get incredibly frustrated with the same few people grumbling about everything 
and questioning every single thing that comes along. And if they’re not asked 
they grumble and if they are asked they grumble. If there are changes made that 
they asked for in the first place, then they grumble (Colin, scientist). 
 
As workers were apprehensive about the viability of the Lincoln campus it was felt 
that such negative perceptions created by those whose jobs were more secure, were 
not helpful in securing their futures. In contrast, the dominant voices on campus were 
proud of the reputation they presumed the campus had with corporate management. 
As Wade (scientist) said, “… if anything characterises this campus … it is quite a 
high level of cynicism … there’s a lot of bolshie-ism out there.” The culture was one 
of complaint (Bluck, 2001) rather than visible action. 
  
Most people interviewed read the CEO’s Update. It was emailed at monthly intervals 
or more frequently when the CEO wished to communicate urgently with workers. 
This was appreciated as an effective method for the CEO to get information to all 
staff. Of course, it is very much a ‘passing-information-down’ medium. It was 
received in the belief that what was stated in any corporate communication was only 
what ‘they’ wanted you to hear. It had to be mulled over to discover what it really  
                                                 
87 The organisational staff survey of 2001was organised and analysed by the biometricians in 
AgResearch. It included a device to check out this negativity. The survey especially targeted 100 staff 
selected at random, and encouraged them to respond. Anyone else in the organisation was able to 
respond too but the responses of this targeted group could be measured against the ‘voluntary’ 
respondents. The former group showed a less negative response about such things as attitudes to the 
organisation’s direction and management. This illustrates how voluntary surveys are more likely to 
represent polarised opinions. 
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meant (whereas what is published in a science journal is ‘true’). The meaning of 
organisational communications was negotiated. 
 
The information-based, listening up culture of the organisation, linked to 
accountability (see next section), is reinforced by the scientific culture. It is a familiar 
mode of thinking for many workers. On the one hand, scientists expect to be heard. 
On the other hand, those lower down in the hierarchy, the technical workers, expect 
to be told. Most of the latter have university qualifications, so they are familiar with 
the university system of sitting in lectures and not engaging very actively in the 
process of learning. This view of learning changes when a person does a PhD where 
they experience, hopefully, reasonably egalitarian interchanges between themselves 
as students, their supervisor, and their peers. A person then learns that their point of 
view is of value. Organisational culture can be seen to be partly like the science 
culture and partly different from it. 
5.5.2 Reporting up – the culture of accountability 
Workers in AgResearch are frequently required to demonstrate that their work fits 
organisational and Government goals. This demand for accountability has developed 
into a particular culture, which I describe in this section. One subsection is devoted 
to considering the role of accountants in keeping workers accountable. I conclude 
with a general discussion of accountability. 
 
One of the roles of Government restructuring was to make recipients of public 
money accountable for its use in achieving Government policy. To this end, 
representatives of the recipients, usually managers, are expected to make reports 
and/or front up to special committees to testify on progress and achievement of 
‘objectives’ or ‘outcomes’. Within an organisation this may be a monthly occurrence. 
For external organisations such as FRST, annual reports may be required. 
 
The accountability culture requires that some workers, often managers, have to 
attend many meetings. In the organisational meetings in which I was involved88 I 
was confused by the lack of preparation beforehand. My perception of this lack of  
                                                 
88 Morale committee, Green to Gold. 
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accountability was endorsed at one meeting I attended, a video-conference, when 
those attending did not receive the material they were supposed to have read until the 
meeting was underway.89 Before the meeting an SPL and a Science GM made 
comments such as, “What’s this meeting about?” indicating their lack of 
commitment to the meeting’s purpose – finding ways to improve staff morale.90 It 
was as if meetings had to be seen to happen and there was some status in attending 
but what happened at the meeting or as a result of the meeting was not important. 
 
At the science group leader level of management there was unease expressed about 
reports that had to be written and plans that had to be made, which were never 
acknowledged let alone incorporated into company policy. I was quite surprised by 
this so I looked up to the next layer of management, the SPLs, and found the same 
thing there. There was evidence for it in the next layer of management. When I spoke 
to Tony, an employee who has since left, he said, “This is the problem I have with 
the way Keith [CEO] and corporate operate. You don’t get any feedback. It’s like 
putting things up into a black hole”. I was visited by Jack Sommer who had been 
talking to the CEO the previous day. He said the CEO had expressed the same 
feelings about FRST and MoRST. The CEO was concerned because he was not able 
to establish a dialogue with them and felt as if he was up against a brick wall.91 
Everyone in the organisation was listening up and those at the top of the organisation 
were so busy listening to the external environment, trying to interpret it and predict 
what was going to happen next, that no-one was listening down. 
 
This ‘reporting up’ required by the accountability culture is also reflected in 
relationships with FRST, the main single provider of research funding. The leaders 
of FRST science programmes are required to write annual reports and Parliamentary 
Reports. A directive is circulated around the organisation reminding programme 
leaders that the reports need to be written by a certain deadline. When completed 
they pass through the organisational system on to FRST. The Parliamentary Reports  
                                                 
89 I was particularly unimpressed by this because my report, which was part of this material, had been 
handed in a week earlier. 
90 An exception was possibly the CEO who appeared to be very concerned, but as chairperson he had 
not instigated procedures that ensured committee members had read and acted on reports from the last 
meeting or read the material for this meeting beforehand. I had to doubt his commitment also. 
91 Pers. comm. 8-5-01. 
 
95 
are published on the FRST web site. There is no response to these reports, either 
from the organisation or from FRST. There is no engagement in dialogue or 
indication of further interest. A programme leader can get satisfaction from 
completing them but that is the end of it. Gareth (scientist) comments on this scene: 
… there’s a big difficulty with contractual research … When you’re six months 
into a project … the idea might not be quite as good as it was when you started 
but umm, you’ve got another two and half years of money for it. … you’re 
hardly going to [give it up]- you’re going to pursue that idea rather than - and 
you may bend it a bit - I mean there is opportunity to do that, but umm, but 
there is a difficulty I think - and a misconception … that strictly defined 
contractual work gives you better answers, and I think probably it’s wrong. I 
think setting the general objectives and providing a good reviewing structure 
actually gives you a much, much better answer, a bit more critical concentration 
on the problems rather than a huge amount at the start until you get the money, 
and then almost nothing till the end and then at the end, well as long as you tick 
the boxes, everybody’s happy. And it doesn’t work like that because even if you 
do that, you don’t survive in the long term because all you’ve done is tick the 
boxes and you haven’t positioned yourself for the next grant ... 
 
In some areas of AgResearch, this ‘listening up’ or ‘reporting up’ could be 
considered standard practice. One of the most basic examples of it is the lack of 
‘thank-yous’ throughout the organisation (as well as that identified within some 
groups). When a staff member sent off a report or some information by email to 
management, at whatever level, there was no response - not even a brief ‘thanks’. 
The person was left wondering if the report was ever received. A lack of response 
meant that everyone spent time trying to make sense of what was going on: “This 
organisation is not strong on positive or negative feedback. You’ve got to actually be 
watching out for the signals for it” (Owen, scientist). It leaves the onus on the 
workers. They felt as if they did all the work! Such a culture provided very good 
reasons for workers to feel that the organisation did not value their input. 
How I’d like to see it is that everybody had an influence – that everybody felt 
that they could put forward an idea and have it looked at seriously, even 
whether it was acted on or not, but to get positive feedback for coming up with 
the idea and umm, rational arguments about why it can’t be implemented … as 
opposed to the sort of black hole that we seem to have (Ivan, technical worker). 
5.5.2.1 The role of accountants in the accountability culture 
In this subsection I consider the relationship between accountants and accountability. 
Accountants have oversight of groups’ finances and time use. The word accountant 
would appear to be related to accountability. Accountants in AgResearch were 
strangely unaccountable to the managers of science teams with responsibility for 
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team budgets. The accountancy system used was generally acknowledged to be a 
very difficult one for workers to follow and understand. There seemed to be no value 
placed on this concern and no indication that the system should be changed in spite 
of there being others available. This resulted in some groups keeping their own 
system of running totals while others just gave up and became passive. It was 
mentioned to me many times how accountants were very reluctant to change 
mistakes that were discovered in budgets and how many fruitless hours were spent 
poring over balance sheets and trying to get mistakes corrected.  
 
The biggest complaint about the accounting system was to do with accruals, the 
system incorporating money already received but not spent into the monthly 
balance.92 There was the perception that the accountants were permitted to keep as 
much of this money at the end of a financial year as was required to meet the profit 
targets set by Science Platform Leaders and the organisation as a whole. Operating 
money counted on for work in the new financial year, disappeared. One day I came 
across one manager almost in tears when this happened to him. He was concerned he 
would have to lay off a young staff member. He understood that the organisation had 
to make a profit - a profit of 15% on commercial contracts was acceptable to him – 
but he felt it was immoral for an organisation to make 30% on a contract. By the time 
group leaders found out about these accruals it was too late to do anything. Also the 
turnover of accountants was so high that new staff in the financial area would claim 
that they were not responsible for something because it had not happened in their 
time of employment. 
 
The budget planning system was the source of many complaints. Group leaders were 
not able to forecast how and when they would be using their operational allocations, 
which led accountants to budget income and expenditure evenly across months, not 
reflecting the reality. There would then be complaints from corporate every year 
about the company lagging behind on its profit targets when it was obvious that the 
pattern of income had not been modelled in a realistic fashion. Scientists felt that 
their job was science and they had not been trained as accountants.  
 
                                                 
92 Accrual accounting is one of the unique features of the public sector restructuring in New Zealand 
(Nagel, 1997: 350). 
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Another way workers were held accountable was through time management. 
Workers were required to submit monthly timesheets recording the use of every six 
minutes in each working day. This issue was debated internally. The organisational 
response was that timesheets were required by FRST as a demonstration that funding 
was being used in the way FRST had allocated it across programmes. Also, 
timesheets were needed to calculate an employee’s annual leave. Accumulated 
annual leave is a big cost to the organisation. (For the response of scientific workers 
to this system see Chapter 6.)  
 
These issues are an indication of how scientists did not feel valued by the 
organisation because they had things ‘done’ to them rather than being part of a 
mutual negotiation in which their work, the work on which the organisation was 
based, was valued. To me, and to many of my respondents, this placement of the 
priorities of accountancy over those of science practice, challenged who was serving 
whom. Was the prime purpose of AgResearch to do science or to make a profit?  
5.5.2.2 Discussion of accountability 
… but you do feel like you’re not doing your science because you’re always re-
writing little reports on what you did in your science (Rae, scientist). 
 
Ironically, accountability seems to be about the choice between how much time is to 
be spent filling in timesheets, doing performance appraisals, writing reports, 
budgeting and following up accounting issues and attending meetings, rather than 
doing the work which supposedly earns the income. Workers were sent on time 
management courses and taught how to make lists, tick boxes and prioritise. In this 
way it could be said that workers are helped to see what they have achieved. But are 
they the things that workers wanted to achieve? According to my research, 
achievement and satisfaction involve more than this simple kind of feedback. 
 
The managerialist approach produces a report-making culture as part of a 
demonstration of accountability, but reports, in the AgResearch system of 
management, seem to require no response. In this way report-making is not valued 
and is not seen as ‘work’ by scientists. The constant requirement for justification of 
what one is doing does not suit workers who desire autonomy as part of their work. 




For some groups, the relationship with clients has proved more satisfactory than that 
with FRST because of the interaction involved.93 Through interaction people were 
actually getting to know one another and relationships were being formed.  
Good times I think, are probably the exposure to a wide range of external clients 
and the friendships that develop. So you not only build up a business 
relationship with these people but also you develop some good friendships, both 
in New Zealand and overseas (Ian, business manager). 
 
An accountability culture has a need for measurements to demonstrate that 
accountability requirements are being met. Consequently, the focus goes on 
quantitative measures because they are easier to implement and practise, and, more 
importantly, can be compared in what looks like an objective way (Bowker & Star, 
1999). For example, the company’s profit for the financial year to date and its 
comparison with what was budgeted appears to be a straightforward measure. But is 
it really? It tells nothing about why profit is low or high this month, or how it was 
obtained. As I have explained earlier, the accountants use a method of dividing the 
expected profit over months in the year, calculated from group budgets, which bears 
no relationship to the way contract payments come in. Company profit never ‘looks 
good’ until the end of the financial year.  
 
In trying to force an organisation such as this one to be accountable, tensions are 
created.  
I mean, you have to face it, that’s the way AgResearch is going and if you don’t 
agree with it … well complaining about it’s not going to work …. All the 
strategic plan stuff makes me mad … I mean I hate the word strategic. It’s just a 
flaming plan for goodness sake! … they say, well you’ve got to have a strategic 
plan about what you’re doing. Well I mean, [X-name] never started working on 
parasite resistance because it was a fun idea. It was because it was a serious 
economic problem – let’s solve it. And [Y-name] hasn’t been working on 
reproductive genes just because he felt like it. You know everybody’s thought 
about why they’re doing it, or haven’t been working on what makes caterpillars 
green or something, you know. Scientists have picked on projects that they do 
see a use for and I think they are probably making the decisions about what will 
be the best thing in the future … I mean, AgResearch has been raving on about 
the Inverdale thing, about how wonderful it was. They never picked it as one of 
their winners, you know (Rita, scientist). 
   
                                                 
93 John Lancashire (2001: 9) makes the point that scientists’ contact with FRST has fallen off over the 
years, probably because corporate managers were not happy about it “because they regard funds as 
belonging to the corporate body rather than the science team”. 
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Such accountability requirements imply that people are not to be trusted. Scientific  
workers take great exception to this because trustworthiness is an expectation they 
have of themselves as it is so important in their work of science practice (see Section 
5.4). Some scientists take an implication from these requirements that scientists, 
experts in their fields, do not really know what they are talking about and cannot be 
expected to make decisions about the direction of their work.  
I think [X, named scientist] is very good at it – manoeuvring would be the word 
somebody said to me. But the organisation doesn’t realise that he’s doing it for 
them, you know what I mean? … He does what he has to do for them. He 
comes up with products. In the early days when there was no system he did 
products with other companies …. I’ve just found out that the provisional 
patents that we’ve written – somebody in corporate’s been going over them with 
a fine tooth-comb to see what commercial money they can make out of it and 
they won’t even ask us – they won’t even understand them. You know, they 
won’t have a clue. And they’re spending all these hours going through saying 
we could do this and we could do that and – I mean I just think that’s pathetic 
… and if anybody – I mean [X]’s on these patents and if anyone can make them 
fly [X] can. He’s done it before. He’s got patents. He’s got products … there’s 
almost that feeling that they think we don’t know what we’re doing. You know? 
I mean this wouldn’t have happened if we hadn’t known what we were doing. 
Anyway, it’s almost, well this has now become commercial and we know more 
about this – but they don’t. They’re just playing round (Raewyn, scientist). 
 
Requirements for accountability can imply that workers will not manage their 
finances and time efficiently – that they will ‘rip the system’ off. It is in conflict with 
scientists’ sense of autonomy, integrity and freedom. 
Somebody came down [from corporate] and was talking about this, you know, 
people skiving off early and stuff and I was just so cross. I just thought, 
everybody in this room – I looked around - is the sort of person who’s pulled 
their finger for AgResearch … I mean we were complaining about different 
aspects but we weren’t anti-AgResearch, because they were all people who 
would really get stuck in but then, when they [HR] get all picky about these tiny 
little details it makes you think, oh well, I’m off home at 5 ... And if Keith 
[CEO] and those guys think, well, financially it doesn’t look good. If they think 
that’s all that counts, then they haven’t got an idea of the work force and you 
know, they’ve let the finances rule …. It’s hopeless. … I actually think it’s a 
lack of insight .… Well, they [HR] think you’re skiving off with sick leave and 
they think you’re doing all that, but you’re not. If anybody started pulling a 
sickie in here, people would know, you know? That’s the other thing the HR 
person should have said. You know, the evidence is that if you give people 
unlimited sick leave they use less (Rae, scientist). 
 
Accountability has a short-term, end focus. It is prescriptive and controlling. Science 
is a long-term activity. Nothing is ever quite finished because it is part of a whole. 
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The investigation is never complete.94 Science is process oriented rather than end 
focused.95 
 
One of the ways to be innovative is to allow room in science practice for serendipity 
to occur, to allow space to follow up hunches and explore possibilities, and to allow 
so-called non-productive time for reading and discussion. Even relationships with 
non-FRST (commercial) clients tend to be ongoing and open to negotiation. 
Accountability, on the other hand, requires all time to be ‘productive’. There is a 
logic here, which says that those who are accountable do not have a part in drawing 
up the ways in which they are to be held accountable. There is lack of trust in those 
who are accountable - an unexpressed belief that they will abuse the system or 
become free-riders (Hodgson, 2000a: 8; Nagel, 1997: 355; Blau, 1964). This results 
in people being held accountable to a system they have no ownership of. It is not a 
system that people feel valued by. 
5.5.3 Organisational recognition 
This section describes how workers do achieve some recognition within the 
organisation in many different ways. Some of this recognition comes through 
remuneration and the provision of both resources and a working environment that 
enables workers to achieve their work objectives. This section demonstrates how 
workers could be expected to feel some ambivalence towards their employer. 
 
How does an employee know when they ‘really’ belong? What is the feedback they 
get as a reward for or an indication of belonging? There was a mix of feelings about 
belonging to AgResearch. Some workers wanted to feel as if they belonged. Some 
feel it was a decision the individual worker made for themself.  
I belong because I choose to. I think everybody belongs here because they 
choose to because they could just up and off if they don’t. Well it’s easy to say - 
if they had jobs to go to. Yeah, I don’t belong because of some touchy-feely 
thing AgResearch has tried to make me feel like I belong – like sending me 
tickets to the movies – yeah, I belong because I choose too (Raewyn, scientist). 
 
                                                 
94 Rabinow (1996) describes that while some scientists who developed the polymerase chain reaction 
(PCR) process felt it was not good enough for commercial release others pointed out that Ford 
produced the Model T before the Rolls Royce! 
95 This conflicts with the requirements of FRST funding. 
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One scientist mentioned how proud he was to be part of AgResearch when his 
colleagues were speaking at an international conference. His pride was more related 
to the quality of the science than the organisation. He was proud to be part of such a 
group of scientists and be recognised by them. Many of the technical workers and 
scientists felt more commitment to their group/team than to the organisation, though 
some scientists had stronger links to their scientific community than their team.  
 
There were some areas in which the corporate part of the organisation was 
demonstrating that it was listening to workers. An increasing effort was made to 
recognise the scientific achievements of workers where they coincided with the 
organisational goals. Rosie (scientist) was enjoying receiving recognition for her 
discovery and felt the organisation was making a real effort to celebrate such 
successes. Rosie’s team demonstrated many things – science excellence, IP through a 
patent and the possibility of a product. All of these attributes were examples of the 
sort of work AgResearch wanted. The Annual Report (AgResarch, 2000a) also 
contained examples of the year’s scientific successes after criticism that in the report 
of the previous year all the pictures (except those of the CEO and Board members) 
were artistic shots of arrangements of test tubes containing coloured liquids unlikely 
to be seen in a laboratory and with no scientific workers in sight!  
5.5.3.1 Employment issues 
An obvious way the organisation rewards a worker is by their pay packet – both the 
fact that they get paid and the amount. Some workers felt that that this was the only 
way they received any feedback about their value to the organisation.  
I don’t get a lot of sense within AgResearch of having done a good job. The 
origin of most of that satisfaction is myself rather than other people .… when I 
think of umm, the staff that I’ve worked with and the managers that I’ve worked 
with – there’s not a lot. The most obvious, and you might say the most tangible 
indication that a good job is being done, is the salary rewards that I get from 
time to time, but there’s not much other than that (Dave, scientist). 
 
Apart from the annual employment contract negotiations, any extra remuneration a 
worker received was decided each year by the ‘Individual Planning and Performance 
Review’ (hereafter referred to as performance appraisal) carried out by line managers 
but within a format set up by the organisation. Final decisions on performance 
awards within each Platform were made by the SPL. Some SPLs had a generous 
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attitude towards their workers but one had been known not to use all the award 
money available to him and there was concern about this on the part of the Human 
Resources staff. 
 
The performance appraisal forms first used in the year 2001 had no room for the 
worker to write anything until the end of the document, after the line manager had 
made their comments. (See Appendix E.) The form was all about the response of the 
manager. When this was pointed out by workers, this concern was not taken 
seriously enough to lead to a change to the form. The response was that workers 
could attach pieces of paper if they wished. By not incorporating an opportunity for 
comment into the document, the worker’s voice was not given validity and power. A 
performance appraisal from became a document in which the manager’s voice was 
dominant. 
 
Discussion of the performance appraisal scheme needs a coda. The form contained a 
Section B that assessed a worker’s behaviours and competencies on a scale through 
N – Novice, D – Developer, C – Competent, P – Proficient, to E - Exceptional. Some 
of the qualities being measured under the heading ‘Personal Leadership’ were:  
• Committed to company strategy  
• Demonstrates company values 
• Positively influences others to reach organisational values 
• Consistently strives for excellence  
• Views change as positive and as an opportunity 
• Takes responsibility for own decisions and actions   
The measurement of these attributes in workers communicated a strong 
organisational determination to put into practice what it expected. However, this 
determination for worker ownership of the company strategy and values contrasted 
with the way in which this form was developed and introduced. A woman employed 
on a contract to develop this system travelled the country teaching workers, both 
managers and those managed, how to use it. When this was finished she left, her 
responsibilities over, having completed her contract. No-one else in the organisation 




Performance appraisal did mean that at least a worker received formal, explicit 
feedback once a year and for this reason workers generally looked forward to it. It 
gave workers the only chance they had to address their concerns about how their 
work was going and what they should do next.  
5.5.3.2 Resources – the work environment 
In general, AgResearch workers appreciate the resources they have to do their work. 
Good resources tell workers that what they are doing is important and so can be 
regarded as feedback about their own value to the organisation.  
… the farm is being very well run now. It’s improving all the time. The 
standard of plant and equipment facilities is slowly, you now, it’s not just a 
blank check approach, but each year it gets that much better …. We will put a 
spoke in but umm, again what I want isn’t what always gets prioritised. But by 
and large if it’s not this year it might be next year or the year after …. It’s just 
unfortunate that a lot of the agronomy type work is going out of vogue just … 
when the place is working more efficiently now than it ever worked (laughs) 
(Ron, technical worker). 
 
Having a say in the resources that you use is also a measure of your value. In 
particular, a lot of workers took it upon themselves to do their own ordering with 
expenditure limited to a certain level before managerial permission was required. 
AgResearch provides its workers with good working environments and they are 
reasonably well resourced.  
 
This section has described the feedback workers receive from the organisation about 
how they are supposed to behave in order to belong. In the next section I shall tie 
together all the sections of this chapter. 
5.6 Feedback from working in science - discussion  
Within AgResearch, feedback is a way of transmitting positive or negative value. 
Scientific workers indicated that they like to get a response to an action they make. 
Feedback tells them whether or not they are valued, whether or not they belong 
(included or excluded), and whether or not they have made a contribution. Feedback 
may tell them whether or not they are doing their job properly. It makes them feel 
more secure. Many workers said, “I must be doing OK because I’d hear about it if I 
wasn’t.” They would rather hear about it. Feedback helps people learn. Some 
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workers would rather have negative feedback than nothing because at least it means 
they are noticed.  
 
Feedback is very subtle. If it is not given people look for it by picking up implicit 
and explicit clues, constructing it from their own perceptions. This may explain why 
the ‘rumour machine’ was so alive in AgResearch. Workers were desperately trying 
to find out what was going on. Any information would do rather than none. Rumours 
are also one of the ways in which people manage risk. They could be seen as part of 
the process of colonisation of the future as described by Giddens (1991). From 
rumours, workers learn how to manage themselves to increase their chances of 
survival in work. In the present environment, organisational senior management96 
acts as the mediator between Government and science while reaping some of the 
benefit for the organisation. It tries to be the motivator (carrot and stick) of getting 
workers to follow Government policy, accruing some benefit for ‘the organisation’ 
so it can pursue its own development, simultaneously better fitting itself to carry out 
Government policy.97 Management also attempts to colonise the future because part 
of its role is to have foresight and make the future less chancy – to form the future 
rather than let it form the organisation. Corporatisation has made management so 
outwardly focused that it has lost track of the welfare/value of those who work for it. 
Everyone is accountable to someone above them but no-one is accountable to those 
below them. The future focus of the organisation does not relate to the past nor does 
it pay attention to the present. It does not acknowledge the recursive and reflexive 
process by which workers learn about themselves and their work.  
 
Work provides opportunities for people to demonstrate to themselves and others 
what they can do and to receive recognition for it. In most work situations, people 
can demonstrate achievement through reaching a goal or objective, completing a 
piece of work, solving a problem, and fulfilling a purpose or dream. The resources of 
the workplace provide an environment in which people can achieve. The meanings 
workers make of workplace feedback are part of the negotiations they make of their 
                                                 
96 I make a distinction between senior or corporate managers and science managers from the SPLs 
down, though this is a moot point because some SPLs act more as advocates of ‘management’ and 
others as advocates of their own science staff.  
97 The Government has CRIs in a cleft stick. It set them up both to fulfil Government policy and as 
companies to meet business goals. 
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own identities. Such meanings can confirm or bring into question the ideas that 
workers have about their identity.  
 
As a scientist, a scientific worker may belong to the scientific community which 
provides them with relationships and international networks with peers, and with 
opportunities to achieve status and recognition through publication and other 
communication of their work.  (Sommer & Sommer (1997: 12) support this with 
survey data from New Zealand scientists.) In the case of some scientists, belonging 
to this exclusive community can be very important to their sense of self. 
 
Most feedback is focused on the day-to-day. It gives value to the day-to-day. In a 
person’s everyday life they may receive feedback directly from the work they do – in 
this instance, the practice of science. Scientific work is organised in such a way that 
this feedback is very powerful and can, at times, be a closed system with little input 
required from other people. The scientific culture rewards the autonomous worker. If 
the resources (including the environment) are supplied then a worker can work at 
science independently and achieve much of what they require for their sense of well-
being. Most scientists, however, are dependent on technical workers to provide the 
results that they are then able to use for their part of their work. For some scientists, 
the technical workers may be treated as just part of this resource.  
 
The overarching entity to which workers belong is the organisation itself. An 
organisation, almost by necessity, gives mixed messages about what workers need to 
contribute to really belong. Senior management wants workers’ loyalty and 
ownership of the organisational aims. At the same time it has to demonstrate to its 
workers who in particular exemplifies those aims and who does not. It gives 
Christmas gifts to everyone, pays everyone, and provides the resources for them to 
do their work, but at the same time it has to decide on a strategy to ensure the 
organisation’s survival. This may mean ‘encouraging’ some workers whose skills 
will not be needed as part of this future, to leave. Management is faced with the 
dilemma of how to communicate and encourage workers to adopt values and 
implement a direction that it thinks is important. It has to consider how important 
workers’ adoption is and what is going to happen to those who resist. Management 
can be covert or overt in the use of power. It can put organisational values in 
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competition with other values and ideas that workers may have. It can involve 
workers in the change process or it can just tell them about what is going to happen 
to them. On the one hand, the organisation provides very good resources and pleasant 
environments in which workers can work. On the other hand, management may not 
listen to or take notice of what workers say. It may tell them that to be acceptable 
workers they have to believe certain things, or do certain things, which clash with 
feelings that they have about themselves. The organisation’s accountability culture 
makes it difficult for workers to feel valued, trusted members.  
 
It is evident that the feedback from belonging to different entities may encompass 
conflicting values and rewards. Choices may be needed to negotiate some resolution 
of these conflicts. Belonging or being true to one entity may exclude another. It 
makes sense then that people will respond in such a way that the things that give 
them good feelings about themselves will be valued above the others and they will 
seek to maintain and perpetuate them. They will resist, ignore or adapt to the other, 
less valued options.  
 
The negotiation of identity is obviously not a simple process! Another reason why it 
is not simple is that structural components both constrain and enable work to be done 
(Giddens, 1989: 25). Many scientists could be self-employed but they choose to 
work in an organisation because through it they are able to do the work they want to 
do, for all the reasons outlined so far, in an environment they prefer. Particular 
aspects of their past have helped them see the world in a particular way, and have 
given them particular orientations to work, for instance. These drive them to do the 
work they do but may also act as restraints in the present environment.  
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter demonstrates that there are many reasons why members of each case 
study group are happy about their work. Through work they can make their lives 
meaningful and reinforce valued parts of their identities. At the same time there are 
aspects working against this feeling. Although most workers were very pleased to be 
part of a team and the feelings engendered by the team, these same teams did not 
necessarily give feedback to workers about their value. This lack of feedback went 
beyond the groups to the organisation. Very few workers felt the organisation valued 
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them. The very values the organisation was promoting gave messages to members 
that conflicted with who they were and the reasons they worked in the organisation. 
It made them question whether they belonged, particularly when the ‘listening up’ 
and ‘reporting up’ culture seemed to embody a lack of trust or discretion. 
 
In a working environment such as I have described, which is so rich in possible 
rewards and reinforcement of established identity, an organisational management 
wishing its workers to identify with it and feel a sense of organisational belonging, 
faces strong competition from the other sources described in this chapter. Do workers 
want to change in order to belong to a work organisation if they can find other ways 
of maintaining valued parts of their identities and continuing in the work they get so 
much from? In what ways is it possible for workers to change the way they think of 
themselves in order to belong? How are they able to resist the organisation but still 
remain? Are the rewards from some of the aspects of work described above so strong 
that workers do not need to ‘belong’ to anything else anyway? How do workers act 
(or not act) as a result of the changing environment in which they work? These are 
questions for the next chapter. 
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PART B: NEGOTIATION OF IDENTITY IN A TIME OF 
CHANGE 
Chapter 6: The responses to change 
In this chapter I describe the situation in AgResearch as the organisation changed in 
order to fit and survive in the environment in which it found itself. This will 
demonstrate why workers had reason to feel insecure. They felt their jobs were on 
the line and they were confused because they no longer knew what was expected of 
them and what choices to make. As they ran the risk of the organisation’s policies 
changing yet again, which they knew from experience was highly likely, it was 
important that their responses should be ones which protected them. By making the 
point that workers do not resist all change, as is assumed in most management of 
change literature, just parts of it, Dent and Goldberg (1999) encouraged me to think 
about what exactly it was that scientific workers were reacting to, and what change 
they accepted.  
 
For these reasons, the first section in this chapter describes the initial responses to 
change, such as confusion, after the communication of the strategic plan in late 1997, 
and the second considers the more obvious ways in which workers adapted to this 
change, by changing employment practices, for example. In the third section, the 
more covert responses to change are explained as forms of resistance protecting 
workers’ self-identities. In particular, the ways in which workers can distance 
themselves from organisational rhetoric are described in the fourth section while the 
fifth section describes the ways they resist features of the organisational structure 
such as the use of timesheets. The final section describes and discusses the particular 
challenges and demands business has made on the science culture and how workers 
have continued to emphasise science practice.  
6.1 The first symptoms of the reaction to change 
I think AgResearch now thinks it stands for a global life sciences company, 
which is something that I’m not that rapt with. I’ve never worked for an 
organisation like that and I can’t identify with it and I think to a certain extent – 
to me – that would make us like the manufacturers of thalidomide or Round-up 




[AgResearch wants me to make] a transformational leap – [that] would be my 
ultimate answer ... to come up with something outside of where we are but 
relevant to science, to agriculture, which is very profitable. Umm, I guess that 
would be the ultimate but realistically I don’t see that as me. I guess I see me 
more as working on something once some of these have been identified 
(Angela, technical worker). 
 
In the previous chapter I described the AgResearch organisational environment as 
workers were introduced to the strategic plan and changes in the organisation to 
support this strategy. As scientific workers on the Lincoln campus came to know 
about my research, I was frequently asked, “What is going on?”98 There was a 
feeling that I would have some overview that would help people understand the 
confusion they felt in reaction to the change in emphases of the purpose of their 
employing organisation. Those who were most confused were the ones outside the 
larger groups who were not protected by their group leaders. They were the people 
who went to the Team Briefs and other organisational communication events. Such a 
group was the W&S Group whose members saw meetings as a source of information 
to guide them on what they needed to do to continue working in the organisation. But 
they did not find what they were seeking.  
There’s people standing by with hammers and saws waiting to do something – 
to tighten something up or cut something off. They just need someone to tell 
them what it is and where it is. Umm, everyone is keen to help but they don’t 
know quite how to go about it. I see quite a bit of confusion (Brent, technical 
worker). 
  
My interviews with members of the W&S Group took place during the period (1999) 
when AgResearch was asking workers to come up with ideas for products which the 
company could develop (hence Brent’s reference to ‘hammers and saws’). Most of 
the group did not feel that this requirement fitted how they saw themselves, but one 
member of the group did come up with an idea for a product and was very 
disillusioned when it received little support and was referred to WRONZ, the 
opposition. It appeared that the organisation could not cope with the volume of 
responses from members of staff with ideas for products. Many found their ideas 
disregarded or not taken seriously. Some found that if their ideas were thought to 
have potential they would need to do further work on them in their own time and out 
of other budgets. This gave further justification for disillusionment and cynicism. 
 
                                                 
98 Law (1994: 47) writes about being asked similar questions. 
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There was also the prevailing feeling of not being valued and having to justify your 
existence all the time, as part of the accountability culture.  
The biggest frustration … in the last 3 or 4 years is continually trying to defend 
our position to exist the way we are within AgResearch ... even though we’re 
successful we seem to be constantly trying to justify the way we are currently 
set up. For me, that is frustrating because while you’re trying to defend your 
existence you’re not out there trying to get business. So that’s for us, I’d say 
would be our [biggest frustration] – yeah, constant interference from the 
internal hierarchy (Ivor, business manager). 
 
Many of those I spoke to on the Grasslands campus said they would not recommend 
becoming a scientist to their children because they felt a future in science would be 
too uncertain, and besides, it was not such fun anymore. 
 
Many workers in AgResearch have been protected from organisational change over 
their employment lives. Promotion had been just a matter of ‘hanging in’. For 
example, Eve (technical worker) started work in AgResearch by grass grubbing for 
three months and then the job just continued – she never went for a job interview. 
Some scientists were ‘picked up’ while they were at university by DSIR or MAF, 
and they have just carried on. These workers may well be very good at their jobs but 
change put them on the line in a way they had not experienced before. This situation 
made them feel very insecure. Staff morale dropped to a very low point in 1999 as 
was demonstrated by a staff survey at that time (Hunt, 2000).  
 
In 2000 the organisation decided to reposition workers to better fit FRST’s and the 
organisation’s changing strategy. By this time AgResearch had changed its focus 
from being a food and fibre, biotechnology company to a life sciences company. 
Workers were assigned ‘skills’ in order for the organisation to assess what 
capabilities its workers possessed and what would be required for the future. This 
was done in such a rush99 that SPLs (with possibly some input from science group 
leaders) had to decide what categories of skills individual workers possessed, without 
consultation with them. The senior management then announced that about fifty 
workers were surplus to requirements. For example, it decided that it employed too 
many agronomists. Those who had trained in agronomy suddenly felt like second-
                                                 
99 Management actions taken under urgency seemed to be such a regular occurrence that it must be 
considered to be either a strategy or an indication of lack of foresight and planning on behalf of 
management and HR. 
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class citizens and strived to think of other ways of naming their skills.100 This 
resulted in an exacerbation of the feeling of insecurity as rumours swept the 
organisation about possible redundancies.  
 
The title ‘repositioning’, given to this exercise, implied that workers would have the 
opportunity to retrain into an area of potential use to the company. However, in the 
event, very few people were found to be eligible and very few were able to join the 
‘capability bank’ of those the organisation thought it could support because their 
capabilities would be needed in the future. The cynicism grew about AgResearch 
being ‘the employer of choice’ (as espoused in the Strategic Plan), especially when 
there was a campaign to recruit scientists from overseas for a new plant genomics 
facility at Grasslands. To its surprise, Human Resources was so inundated by 
overseas applications that the more expensive possibility of training existing workers 
into these skills was sidelined. It was assumed by HR that newcomers would not be 
carrying the baggage of past values and would therefore find it easier to align 
themselves with AgResearch’s strategic vision.101 The implication was that a person 
‘was’ their skills. Workers were not given any individual help in deciding what they 
could do to upgrade their skills and the risk of this choice appeared to be have to be 
borne by the individual.  
 
Organisational management may be aware that the organisation’s survival does not 
depend entirely on how well its staff work. Survival has more to do with the 
direction in which the organisation must head in order to ensure its own survival 
through maintaining its Government funding and developing IP for products in order 
to generate its own revenue. It could not continue to employ workers who had no 
                                                 
100 When something is measured and becomes part of the bureaucracy, the reaction is for people to fit 
the structure produced by this measurement (Liz Stanley, Stories, Lives and Feminist Research, 
seminar in Sociology Department, University of Canterbury, 27 August 1998). 
101 Ironically, I was talking to Harry (scientist) on 25-9-01 and he said the new scientists in the plant 
genomics area were proving very difficult to deal with. He had been part of a group drawing up 
research proposals for the next year’s FRST programmes. These scientists had no definite aims for 
their research and no time-lines. He saw them as very ‘fuzzy’ and very much into ‘blue skies’ or basic 
research, which just does not fit the CRI or FRST environment. Most scientists in AgResearch have 
an applied orientation and their research has originated in trying to find solutions to practical 
problems. These ‘new’ scientists, would have been employed to produce products within a short time 
frame, and would have been expected to identify with the organisation’s strategic direction more 
easily than ‘older’ staff. That this has turned out not to be so could be regarded as an unintended 
consequence of the AgResearch employment policy. It seems there are some past values the 
organisation may want! 
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funding, either commercial or public, and whose skills were not seen as being of use 
in the future, however good those workers were at their jobs. Most workers who 
leave the organisation do so through redundancy or enforced resignation. It is rare for 
someone to choose to leave except for those who are prepared to go overseas, or 
those who are young. This point was made at the retirement of one of the 
interviewees when her boss said in his farewell speech, that Fiona (technical worker) 
was one of the few people who had ‘chosen’ to retire.  
 
This was the scene in AgResearch from late 1997 to early 2001, and what follows 
(Part B) are my initial, less theoretically informed, and what could be described as 
sometimes naïve, reflections on the data. As Law described it in his ethnography of a 
physics laboratory, the researcher does not ‘discover’ what is going on. The process 
of interpreting the data is “slow and painful” and is one of simplification and 
translation (Law, 1994: 48-51). In Part C, and in keeping with the chronological 
pattern of events, I will provide a more informed interpretation of the data, one 
which responds to further reading.   
6.2 Adaptation to change 
The purpose of this section is to highlight the more overt signs that some workers 
were adapting to the changes in AgResearch both personally and more particularly 
by changing some of the structural features of their work. The first subsection 
describes some of the personal tactics scientists practiced when they became middle 
managers no longer receiving the feedback that their science practice used to bring. 
As well they found themselves caught between the responsibilities to those they 
managed and those who managed them. The next subsection details some of the 
ways managers changed some workplace structures, such as the way workers were 
employed and where work took place, to make more efficient use of their funding. 
Then I describe how these same managers protected their own funding. The section 
concludes with a consideration of how workers adapt to the insecurity of the situation 
they have found themselves in. Sometimes it was unclear whether these signs of 
adaptation were also forms of resistance because they often meld in with the more 
covert techniques of resistance I describe later. All of these tactics for dealing with 
change enable workers to continue with their work. (I elaborate on this further in 
Chapter 8 when I develop models of resistance.)  
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6.2.1 When scientists became managers 
The further you climb up the ladder 
The sadder you get and the madder … 
(Excerpt from limerick contest to celebrate AgResearch’s tenth birthday, 17-7-02.) 
 
When scientists became managers they have found that they needed to change what 
it was about their work that made it meaningful and their ways of knowing that they 
were doing a good job. They started to be owned by the organisation more and had 
less time for their teams and science communities. They did not find this easy, as the 
limerick above implies. 
 
Managers complained about a lack of feedback and would have liked to hear how 
they are doing from those around them. In the absence of this one way they could 
give themselves feedback was by having a full diary. In this way, managers could 
document what they had achieved. For example, it was apparent on a visit to Lincoln 
of one of the SPLs that he had a set himself a timetable. Workers wanting to see him 
were assigned fifteen minute appointments. When I was contracted to the Morale 
committee there was a suggestion that on campus visits, corporate managers should 
slot in half an hour, or some set time, to ‘mingle’ with workers on an informal basis. 
Such informal interaction could not just happen. It had to be documented and 
timetabled (and so lost its informality).  
 
Busyness is a way a worker has of conveying messages to themselves that 
demonstrate they must be very important. Busyness indicates that you have work to 
do. Busyness is powerful feedback. It is an indication of status and hierarchy. Those 
with the fullest diaries, and who are the most difficult to get hold of, must be the 
most important, and they rule when and where meetings are to be held. If someone of 
higher organisational status requests a meeting then a lower status person has to alter 
their appointments to attend. Thus meetings provide feedback to science managers, 
which they can no longer obtain from science practice. (See Appendix D.)  
 
Another method of adaptation was to make lists that could be ticked off when they 
were complete. Rae (scientist) was trying to do this and was adjusting her vision so 
that she could still feel she was doing a worthwhile job.  
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See, I have lists up there … You know, you can wipe one of them off or two, 
but Jim used to just put up the day’s things and get them done. You go into 
Jim’s office and there’d be five things up and three of them would be crossed 
off by lunch-time. Well at least it would make you feel like you’re doing your 
stuff. You know, it looks impressive. Whereas I write up, must get the 
containment manual done – more like a hope on the board! (Rae, scientist).  
  
Some responses to change can be seen as straight adaptation. Gareth’s response to 
finding funding was to reframe the meaning of the funding process so that it served 
other purposes as well as being a means to obtain funding.  
You know, we have to apply a lot of our creativity to grant writing and I joke 
that … we put our most creative effort into writing grant proposals and I think 
it’s not totally stupid … they are very competitive and you have to have ideas 
very well formulated (Gareth, scientist). 
  
For him, writing funding proposals was a way of planning for the future, making sure 
that the work his group was doing was going to help it get work in the future. It was 
a way of keeping him up with all that was going on in his field. It was a skill he had 
added to his list of skills and it was a skill he had become proud of.102 It had become 
incorporated into his science practice rather than being an add-on that was resented 
and not seen as part of core science practice, in keeping with the following limerick. 
The job of a scientist is to find money 
Do Science? Ha, ha, don’t be funny! 
We write lots of proposals 
That end up in garbage disposals 
Well, except those that may create a GE bunny 
(Limerick competition to celebrate AgResearch’s tenth birthday, 17-7-02)    
 
Each of the examples above illustrate, albeit in different ways, responses to change. 
Senior management also employed tactics to encourage workers to see change from a 
different perspective – as being an inevitable response driven by the external 
environment, rather than as management’s ‘fault’. One such tactic was to make more 
information available about this environment. A large part of the Strategic Plan 
presentation in the year 2000 was devoted to it and it was one of the topics discussed 
in groups after the presentation. An employee working for the Marketing Manager 
collected relevant material on science, research, development and business off the 
internet and made it available every month in the form of an environmental report. 
The AgSystems Platform had a ‘cuttings’ section in their monthly report in which 
relevant material was posted for workers to read.  
                                                 
102 This approach contrasts with that of Colin (scientist). He thinks finding funds is something he is 




Middle management were also picking up on this tactic. One of the SPLs had started 
redirecting the complaints of workers away from the company to FRST, as he saw it 
as responsible for much of the confusion and insecurity surrounding research 
funding. In this way he was able to align himself with the CEO and the AgResearch 
Board, as well as those in his Platform. 
… I’ve spent a lot of time trying to smooth people’s hair down around my 
group ... The morale issue – yeah, it plays a part. It’s quite interesting - it’s kind 
of a trade off. You can get good morale by being cynical - but then you’ve kind 
of denigrated the corporate. You can promote the corporate and get bad morale - 
at least you’ve supported the corporate. There’s a kind of trade-off there. No, I 
think the important thing for me is to quit the corporate bashing and start 
saying, let’s have a good hard look at the Foundation [FRST] shall we? … and I 
think that’s the right way of doing things at the moment (Eric). 
 
As an SPL, he did not want people to see him as part of the problem. He sought the 
understanding of his staff about the situation he found himself in: 
Interviewer: So what do you want from the people you work with? 
Eric: Umm, professionalism, productivity, acceptance of the status quo. I want 
them to know that things aren’t exactly hunky dory. I want them to know 
that I’m doing what I can and that I haven’t made it like it is and really I’m 
in the same canoe as them ... And the big problem now is external to 
AgResearch, not within AgResearch. And we’ve got an amazingly hostile 
community of so-called leaders in New Zealand who seem to have 
completely overlooked the importance of primary industries and 
environmental quality. Therefore I feel that’s really where we need to be 
applying our attention as an organisation, not tearing ourselves apart. 
 
This example shows how middle management had the delicate task of straddling the 
needs of corporate and the needs of workers, and, in particular, this SPL’s position 
was more viable if he could get workers to focus on external factors, thereby 
distracting resentment from his position. It shows that management was attempting 
to divert the focus of workers to the external environment, not management, as the 
cause of internal change.  
6.2.2 Structural adaptation to uncertain funding 
Some groups in the organisation adapted to the changing environment by adjusting 
their patterns of employment and diversifying the work they did to better manage 
their funding. Both the MCG and the E-Group had a pool of wageworkers to draw on 
at times of the year when they needed more workers, for example, when field 
samples need to be collected or field trials established. In many cases these were 
workers who formerly would have expected to be salaried employees. In the E-
 
116 
Group there was a particular need for extra help over the summer when the 
endophyte reaction is at its height in grasses and animals. The MBU and the MCG 
sent routine work such as DNA-typing out to other agencies. The W&S Group used 
the lab services in WRONZ and other agencies to do particular work for which they 
did not have the skills. These examples demonstrate how the labour structure was 
changed in order to keep costs down by reducing the organisation’s commitment to 
certain workers and passing risk on to other agencies.  
 
In order to keep their staff in work, two of the groups diversified into areas not seen 
as core to their science practice. One member of the W&S Group took on contracts 
auditing and registering farms for meat companies. This was not well paid but it did 
take some of the stress off the group’s finances. It was not directly related to the 
group’s work of science. Similarly, the MCG took on many commercial contracts, 
enabling it to have the resources to do other work it wanted to do and to keep 
workers employed. Some felt that this detracted from their ‘real’ job.  
I personally feel that we’re stretched so thinly that we can’t do things perhaps as 
thoroughly as we would have and I think that for me is reflected in things like I 
have a lot of conference publications but not that many journal ones because I 
haven’t been able to do the necessary repeats of the experiment and things like 
that … So, I do think it’s changed actually and we tend to do little bits of work, 
you know, a little bit of money here and there, and not the big pieces of work 
that we would have done before (Gaye, scientist). 
 
Some groups reduced their need for on-farm research or found other cheaper ways of 
doing it. Workers in the MCG became more skilled in their collection of grass grubs. 
As they moved more into the area of bacterial diseases their work became more lab 
based. This group made use of local farms for its trials rather than AgResearch farms 
and collected its experimental material from farms all over New Zealand. This meant 
the MCG did not have to pay research farm costs, which were a considerable drain 
on operational finances as the W&S Group found. The E-Group intensified its 
research by the use of tunnel houses, reproducing the environment that enhances 
endophyte production, rather than being reliant on the weather and seasons. Overall 
there has been a movement from the field to the lab, a less risky and more controlled 
environment, as noted in the following limerick: 
Some gene jockeys got in cahoots 
With the AgResearch corporate suits 
They hired lots of riff-raff 
And now in the staff caf 
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The labcoats outnumber the boots 
(Limerick to celebrate AgResearch’s tenth birthday, 13-7-02) 
Another adaptation has been an increasing emphasis on retraining and the learning of 
new skills. This became codified on the performance appraisal form,103 as some 
group managers did not always take it seriously as part of their role. Many workers 
used this as a chance to gain some grasp of molecular biology because they believed 
it would be important to their future survival. 
6.2.3 Patch protection and lack of collaboration 
A consequence of the way the funding of science was organised was that it 
encouraged science groups to guard their own funding and not share it with others, as 
a way of protecting their own future. As the FRST bidding system developed it 
followed an audit trail whereby the funding received for previous research was 
maintained, as was its association with particular scientists. In this way anything new 
was identifiable. However, this system encouraged scientists to ring fence what they 
were doing and not allow others in as collaborators. It was very difficult for 
newcomers to get into established programmes. When FRST said it wanted to 
encourage collaboration, many groups became subcontractors to other CRIs such as 
Landcare Research, and in this way extended the base of AgResearch’s funding 
rather than competing internally. 
 
The ring fencing of research within the organisation was particularly evident. This 
was illustrated by the way in which one of the group leaders described the 
organisation and the way his group fitted into it.  
It [AgResearch] works from the bottom up. Well not entirely from the bottom 
up - it works from the research group, the research contract … it’s basically the 
budgetary people up … there’s my group, there’s S’s group, there’s L’s group, 
there’s T’s group, and those are the bricks and you put them together and 
you’ve got AgResearch … with a thick line of mortar between each group … 
but the core structural bit is these bricks and you can actually take some bricks 
out and … they get a bit shaky but it still holds together - and you know, that’s a 
strength (Graham, scientist). 
 
He saw the separation of science groups as a good survival tactic. For example, two 
groups refused to work with the E-Group on the relationship between endophyte and 
                                                 
103 In some respects the need for the ‘repositioning’ exercise was an indictment on managers who had 
not done this in the past. However the uncertainty of the present environment is such that some 




certain insects and the E-Group think they have missed a big opportunity. (Some of 
the components of endophyte act as a deterrent to insect attack and could have 
potential as biocontrols.104) The leaders of these groups see every group as a separate 
entity, able to operate independently of any other group.  
 
The W&S Group discovered, by a lack of response to its suggestions, that there were 
various areas it could not enter because they were the territory of other groups, e.g., 
sheep parasites (it had to make clear it was looking at external parasites in wool), 
sheep breeding and animal welfare. The group found there were certain aspects of 
wool research that were earmarked for WRONZ and it could not be seen to be in 
competition. The whole point of the group being situated in WRONZ was to 
encourage collaboration, not competition.105 Some groups in the MBU worked hard 
to collaborate. While this was not encouraged in the past they now have successful 
collaborations both across Platforms in AgResearch and internationally, as 
demonstrated by the Inverdale gene paper with its list of thirteen authors (Galloway 
et al., 2000). The E-group has been rather different because it has always been made 
up of scientists from different groups.  
6.2.4 Balancing survival and personal freedom 
Scientists wishing to continue work as practising, full-time, researchers and stay in 
New Zealand do not have many employment options. For AgResearch scientists this 
is a big issue. It means they are less likely to expose themselves to risk by expressing 
their disagreement with organisational policy unless they feel particularly secure in 
their work. This security can come about through knowing that they are contributing 
to the profit ethos of the company, or that they are skilled enough to get a job 
elsewhere, probably internationally. Gareth and Walter illustrate this confidence. 
They are two of the most obvious “grizzlers” on the Lincoln campus but their 
grizzling does not put them at risk. Gareth is very secure in the funding of his group 
and it is producing results that would be seen to be fitting company policy. Walter 
mainly has contracts outside AgResearch and would fit into another CRI very easily. 
                                                 
104 I may be doing these groups a disservice. They look for biocontrols in the form of parasites or 
diseases for insect pests, rather than through enhancing natural plant responses. 
105 Note that the restructuring of science was supposed to provide a competitive system! This is part of 
the built-in paradox of providing research in a competitive environment but within programmes 
covering different research providers. 
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Both of these scientists have international reputations. Other workers express more 
of a ‘keep your head down and hope you won’t be noticed’ attitude to survival.  
 
At the next level up in the organisation, the SPL level, there are real indications of 
tension between loyalty to the organisation and expressing views that may be seen as 
disloyal. Workers at this level can also feel insecure: 
What happens to people in my position who get to an age where we’re not 
transportable? I can’t get another job now so I’m stuck with this. Managers have 
gone down like nine-pins in my career - more so than anybody else. So no, I 
don’t feel any more bloody set up than anybody else. And so one reason why 
I’m determined not to move away from science is I don’t want to lose my 
bloody [job]- well I’m interested in the science and proud of the science, but it’s 
also my job, basically (Eric, SPL). 
 
Another SPL does speak out within the organisation but suggests: “Keep your 
powder dry. In other words, save yourself for the really important battles. That’s 
about the only tactics I’ve got.” Jack describes his management role as a time of 
service to science in return for the many enjoyable years he spent as a scientist: 
And I see this job as similar to a service role where I’m actually doing a job that 
I don’t particularly enjoy because I’ve had a good run ... I’ve had 20 years of a 
wonderful job and I’m basically, as I’ve said, five years and I’m out of here 
(Jack, SPL). 
 
This SPL has plans to manage his own exit from the organisation and this gives him 
a greater sense of freedom.  
 
Only one respondent was not actually worried about his survival as a scientific 
worker. He said that as the organisation was acting like a business and as businesses 
acted out of self-interest, he was going to play that game too and make sure he got all 
the benefits and pay owing to him. This person applied the rationale of the New 
Right politics that has driven the changes in New Zealand’s public sector to himself, 
and behaved accordingly.  
… when I entered in 1993 things had just started changing. They’ve continued 
to change. So, as far as my dreams go, they wouldn’t be idealistic dreams based 
around science. They’d be always based around a business model. So my dream 
for science as a career, now would not be based around so much making a 
contribution, but more around what I could get, I guess. Sad to say … [getting] 
what benefits accrue to me within the organisation (Peter, technical worker). 
 
This assertive stance and adoption of the company’s ‘commercial’ competitive 
model could produce an antagonistic worker who continually assumed that the 
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company was not giving him his ‘rights’. Further, the instrumentality inherent in 
such a position hardly promotes company loyalty.106  
 
I have described the different ways I have observed scientific workers adapting 
themselves and their work structures to the changing environment in which scientific 
research is practised. Now I would like to turn my attention to the ways I have 
observed these same workers resisting some of the changes and how these methods 
of resistance indicate that they are protecting parts of their self identities which are 
important to them. These ways of resisting tend to be covert so could also be viewed 
as ways of adapting or complying as they enable workers to continue working 
without openly challenging or causing any disruption to the overall work of the 
organisation. (Resistance and compliance are explored further in Chapter 8). 
6.3 Identity and resistance to change 
It seems as if I have always known about resistance and its link to self identity. 
Perhaps it comes from having experienced myself as the object of resistance as the 
mother of three sons who all discovered the joy of resisting parental pressure to 
conform at an early age! Perhaps I was aware of the link even earlier than that when I 
was a teenager myself in the 60s and very aware of parental expectations. Perhaps it 
dates from my growing awareness of feminism since the 1970s. The concept of 
resistance was brought home to me in an academic sense when I recently studied 
Foucault and his linking of resistance and power (e.g., Shumway, 1992: 139-140) 
throwing some light on my personal experiences.  
 
This section describes how scientific workers in AgResearch found their identities 
challenged by some of the changes in AgResearch and how they developed 
conscious and unconscious ways to negotiate and protect themselves from these 
challenges. First, I paint the scene by describing particular situations in which a 
scientist felt challenged. Then I go on to consider how the ways in which scientific 
workers make their work meaningful, described in the previous chapter, can be used 
                                                 
106 This illustrates one of the contradictions of the neo-liberal philosophy and its fear of the ‘free 
rider’. It does not make for good relationships of trust between employer and employee, but 
continually provokes the suspicion that one must be trying to put something over the other. 
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as a protection of identity, countering the different messages received from 
organisational management.  
6.3.1 Identity under siege 
Chapter 5 described the discrepancy between the ways in which workers in 
AgResearch saw their identities compared with the picture promoted by 
organisational management. To add to this further I quote Mark’s words to describe 
how he felt when he was seeking research funding from LandCorp:  
 … the LandCorp people … want to come and see us. We have to tell them what 
projects we are doing and then they will see which one they want to buy into. 
And I was sitting there, you see, and it just occurred to me that I’m not much 
different from those males or females who cruise the street. I’m prostituting 
myself here. I’m just sitting down here, you see, waiting for my customers to 
come. That’s just exactly how I feel. It was so real, you know? And I have to be 
nice to them, you know? And try to sell them my science (Mark, scientist). 
 
In spite of this feeling, Mark was still prepared to play the game because his 
livelihood and his wish to do his science was such that he was prepared to put up 
with some indignity. Mark felt as if he had no power, whereas he could have viewed 
his situation in the way the E-Group does - as a matter of mutual negotiation in 
which both organisations are getting something they want (Hunt, 2002b). Mark knew 
some part of him was being challenged and he felt that if he were to comply with 
what the company wanted he would have to sacrifice a part of himself.  
Now, for instance, every time you apply for [funding], they want a cost-benefit 
analysis. It’s almost like saying, now tell me, if I give you $10, how much do I 
get back? I find it very hard. I imagine I could be good at it, but I have to 
sacrifice a certain part of myself to be good at things like that. I find it very hard 
to do that (Mark, scientist). 
 
Mark, in common with other scientists, demonstrated a resistance to the feeling 
that his science and he himself, were products for sale in the market place for 
profit. The next subsections explain how scientific workers were able to 
negotiate the maintenance of their valued ideas about themselves. 
6.3.2 Commitment to something ‘other’ than the company 
In Chapter 5 I described the strength of the feedback that workers get from their 
work, the importance to them of belonging to a society which used to value the work 
they did for agriculture and the contribution they made to science, and for some the 
importance of membership in the international scientific community. The younger 
workers, in contrast to older workers, demonstrated a commitment to ‘having a life’ 
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outside their work. They often indicated that they found their identities were based 
just as much on recreational activity as on work.  
 
At one point in mid 2000, workers came back from briefings with their SPLs and the 
Science GMs with the message (short-lived as it turned out) that scientific 
publications were no longer required. This message was across all Platforms I was 
involved with.107 Workers demonstrated considerable consternation, even those who 
only published annually in national conference proceedings. Ray (group leader), who 
first told me about it, was concerned that this would mean the work of his group 
would not be documented. It removed his choice of whether or not to publish. It 
threatened one of the ways scientific workers connect with a community outside 
AgResearch, particularly the link with the extended agricultural community through 
such events as the New Zealand Grasslands Association Conference. In their 
arguments, always presented as rational and unemotional, workers spoke about how 
important publications were for ensuring the scientific excellence of their work, how 
they were a guarantee of objectivity, and how it would threaten their applications for 
another job if they could not add to their publications. To me this directive threatened 
their very scientifically and/or agriculturally based identities. 
 
All those I interviewed had a strong commitment to ‘the team’ but this was not 
company directed. This strong identification with ‘the team’ meant workers were 
more committed to the team than to AgResearch and counterbalanced the ‘One 
AgResearch’ rhetoric of the Strategic Plan. It is ironic that to get work done, 
organisations organise workers into groups which can then develop an identity of 
their own that in turn produces a stronger commitment to those groups than to the 
organisation as a whole (Parker, 1997: 126-137)108. It is also ironic that for some, the 
commitment to the work itself (apart from the team) was so strong that organisational 
commitments had low priority. For example, when it came to a choice between 
attendance at a Team Brief or work, most staff chose work. On one occasion, even 
the CEO acknowledged this by saying, “You can go back to work now” at the 
                                                 
107 Why did this message come out in the first place? I can only think that it was a way of giving 
workers a jolt in order to emphasise that first and foremost AgResearch was a business not a science 
organisation. It was later in this year that the organisation’s name was changed to AgResearch Limited 
from the New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited. 
108 Hodson (1997) challenges this perception. 
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conclusion of a meeting. The knowledge of the organisation, its structure and 
strategic plan, obtained through such meetings, is not required by workers to do their 
work well.  
 
Interestingly, scientists demonstrate their loyalty/group affiliation in their choice of 
work clothes. They prefer to wear casual clothes, not suits as is typical of corporate 
managers. While a dress code for scientists existed prior to restructuring, my 
observation is that sensitivity to it has increased to mark the distinction from 
corporate management. Those with an agricultural orientation often dress in check 
shirts and comfortable trousers. Ray told me that he could not turn up on a farm 
looking as if he came from a bank or an agribusiness company! I have it on good 
authority109 that on one campus, by wearing t-shirts and jeans scientists are indicating 
that they did their PhDs in an American university while those wearing shirts are 
indicating that their PhDs came from European universities. This contrasts with 
corporate members who always are seen in suits and given a generic designation by 
their clothing – ‘the suits’. The need to dress consistently with the norm is illustrated 
by the example of advice provided by one of the scientists to his SPL, who was told 
to dress down when he visited the Lincoln campus in a suit. Next time he came 
looking very uncomfortable in track pants! However, all these distinctions aside, the 
common claim workers were making was that their identity was in science, not 
business.  
 
Another claim of identity separate from organisational rhetoric was to have a dream 
that existed apart from things that would benefit the company or a worker’s status in 
science or agriculture. Lisa (technical worker) dreamt of sailing around the world. 
Rae (scientist) hoped to become a writer one day and she felt she could exist on “the 
smell of an oily rag”. Mark (scientist) was trying to have a life that was not 
dominated by science.110 Jack (SPL) and Dave (scientist) were working out what 
they could do if they retired early. Such dreams cushioned them against whatever the 
company decided about their futures. 
                                                 
109 Bob Skipp, pers. comm. 16-7-01. 
110 He did not like a typical day because a typical day was just filled with science! (For him a typical 
day may have included nights and weekends as well.) He was trying to make an identity for himself 
elsewhere as this one was under threat. This could be seen as a form of resisting what is happening. 
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As the older generation become more disillusioned with their own work (for the 
reasons outlined in this thesis) they may take on more of the characteristics of the 
younger generation and look to spending more time on non-work activities. Or they 
might start planning a future outside science. Others may see themselves as trapped 
because there is little else they feel they can do and no other job opportunities in 
New Zealand.  
 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated that there are some other places in 
which workers could develop and maintain valued parts of their identities rather than 
through association and identification with the AgResearch values and strategy.  
6.4 Resistance by distance 
In this section I cover the different ways in which workers were able to distance 
themselves from corporate aspirations, apart from the identification with other 
entities described above. Collinson (1994: 25) described resistance by ‘distance’ 
when workers “distance themselves either physically and/or symbolically from the 
organization and its prevailing power structure”. The first subsection describes how 
physical distance may or may not work as a barrier to corporate communications. 
The second describes how some workers consciously seek to make themselves and 
corporate communication invisible by not attending corporate meetings, for example. 
The third subsection explains how workers can distance themselves from corporate 
communication by turning it into information, and the fourth and fifth detail how this 
enables workers to deal with the credibility of managerial and Government policy by 
arguing against it. The sixth subsection then explores how the endemic cynicism, 
supported by such arguments, helps workers further distance themselves from the 
organisation. Finally, I discuss how scientists by ‘playing the funding game’ protect 
their integrity. Such distancing tactics support workers in their maintenance of 
personal identities and enables their resistance against organisationally inspired 
values and goals. 
6.4.1 The use of physical distance 
Both the MBU and the W&S Group were separated by physical distance from a main 
AgResearch campus. The placement of such groups is obviously not a conscious 
choice on the part of workers to distance themselves from the organisation. Workers 
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could use their geographical location, however, to facilitate their avoidance of 
organisational activities. This distance works more as a physical barrier for the 
MBU. There was a lot of coming and going between members of the MBU and 
Invermay. At the same time, because of their placement within the University of 
Otago’s Biochemistry Department, there were strong relationships with that campus. 
John, as SPL, worked hard at keeping the group open to intellectual ideas both 
through his Journal Club, which maintained relationships with Invermay staff as well 
as keeping workers up to date with the current knowledge in Molecular Biology, and 
through attendance and contributions to departmental seminars within the university. 
So the placement of the MBU within the university has allowed it to be more open to 
other influences apart from AgResearch, and these are science-based influences. 
 
The W&S Group were in a different situation. Though on the WRONZ campus at 
Lincoln, and able to mix with WRONZ staff at tea breaks,111 they were made very 
conscious of their separation from WRONZ. They were not allowed to move freely 
on the WRONZ campus, and were excluded from campus communications. They 
worked hard to keep their AgResearch links by attending organisational meetings in 
full strength, compared with the low attendance by others actually on that campus. 
 
Corporate management also demonstrated an awareness of the way in which physical 
distance could separate workers from the organisation. AgResearch was seeking to 
address this by going through a centralising phase. ‘Outstations’ such as the 
Templeton farm have been closed down, and work that goes on, for example, at 
Winchmore and Tara Hills, was being reduced and staff moved to the major 
campuses. This meant that workers had more contact with ‘the organisation’. 
Fieldwork was reducing as field workers were brought more and more indoors. This 
was demonstrated in all groups. On all the main campuses, security doors have been 
installed to protect AgResearch property and commercial secrets.112 These doors also 
restricted workers’ easy access to ‘the outside’ – mainly to those in other 
organisations on the same campus. (See Section 6.5.2 later.) There was also an  
                                                 
111 The members of the W&S Group did not always sit with each other, indicating their interest in and 
inclusiveness of others outside their group. 
112 Another CRI on the same campus had some of its potato research trials damaged in 2000 by 
Greens objecting to genetic modification. This also caused an increased concern for security.  
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emphasis on video conferences rather than travelling as a way of reducing travel 
costs. As was his right, the SPL of the W&S Group expressed concern about car 
usage and rent paid to WRONZ. All these actions carried out in the name of 
organisational efficiency, restricted the independent movement and networks of 
workers and isolated them from ‘outside’ influences. Perhaps it was not just the 
decline in agriculture as a source of public funding and commercialisation that was 
causing these things to happen. These observations indicate that organisational 
management wished to have more power over workers’ lives, challenging the 
autonomy of both individuals and groups. Workers were aware of this as the 
following limerick aptly illustrates.  
The AgResearch corporate dudes 
Got in one of their dangerous moods 
They said, “We must keep 
Our staff herded like sheep.” 
Now we all have ID tags like ewes 
(Limerick contest to celebrate AgResearch’s tenth birthday, 17-7-02.)  
6.4.2 Distance by ‘non-attendance’ 
There was a common saying in AgResearch that went something like, “If I keep my 
head down in a few years time I’ll still be here but corporate and its vision will have 
changed.”113 This ‘keeping your head down’ philosophy was a good reason for not 
speaking at, or not attending, campus meetings. It was a way of being invisible. 
 
Non-attendance at organisational meetings could also involve staying away, not to 
make yourself invisible, but as a means of protecting you from ‘hearing’ what the 
organisation wanted to communicate. For example, there was a strong resistance in 
some groups to attending the ‘Invitation to Innovation’ courses described in my 
introduction. Some group leaders and SPLs supported this lack of attendance. Such 
attitudes did not encourage those who worked in their Platforms to go to courses, and 
in fact protected them from the influence such courses might have had.114  
                                                 
113 Murray (2000: 47) has a similar quote: “Lets (sic) just hang in there guys, the managers have a 
really short shelf life, they will move on and we will still be there, so just let the management team go 
away and do what they want and we will continue to run the organisation the way we want it to be 
run.” 
114 For those on the campus who went to these courses, the second part stirred up such an awareness of 
how a lack of feedback was part of the culture, that they formed a group for their Action Learning 
Experience (groups formed to practice techniques taught at the courses) on how to give feedback. This 
group then presented feedback to the campus leader about his handling of one of the ‘moving people’s 
offices’ exercises. Needless to say nothing came of it – either the presentation exercise or the attempt 
by the group to change the culture. 
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There was a lack of attendance of certain groups at any courses conducted by or set 
up by the National Training Officer. These courses were about communication and 
managerial skills, indicating the increasing interest, particularly on the part of Human 
Resources, in the so-called ‘soft skills’ of employees. Technical workers, in contrast, 
were interested only in courses that increased their work skills, not their social and 
communicative skills.  
 
‘Non-attendance’ can take the form of ‘not noticing’. When AgResearch workers 
logging on to their computers each morning were presented with the mission, vision 
and brand value statements on a scenic farming backdrop, workers concentrated on 
criticising the backdrop! They thought it was not a good example of a farm – it was a 
bit rundown - the fencing was not in good shape and there were weeds in evidence. 
And where was it anyway? In this way they avoided the words on the screen. 
 
Lower managers could counter workers’ non-attendance at meetings by passing on 
information to them. However, this may act to protect workers. The third party may 
have added their own ‘colour’ to the communication or may choose not to pass it on 
at all. In the year 2000 I was looking for a copy of the AgResearch Annual Report 
usually received by every member of staff. Eventually I found a large pile in the 
storeroom. Someone had decided not to distribute them or even to announce their 
availability. On other campuses, the system of corporate communication worked 
slightly differently. Only group leaders attended Team Briefs and they were expected 
to communicate back to their workers. Though all workers received the Team Brief 
on the email, many did not know what I was talking about when I asked about it. 
This rather haphazard system was dependent on the group leaders’ communication 
and as the groups did not have regular meetings, most communication was conveyed  
over tea breaks, not in a systematic way. Some of the groups on the Lincoln campus 
could be seen to operate in the same fashion. This system of dependence on a third 
party, protected and distanced many workers from corporate messages. 
 
The W&S Group did not have this protection. Through their attendance at all 
organisational meetings and the thorough job of communication done by their group 
leader, they were fully aware of what was going on in the organisation. They were 




I also observed this among individuals not strongly associated with a team, who 
attended organisational meetings. These were the workers most at risk of losing their 
jobs or those who did lose their jobs. They could be seen as those who were trying 
the hardest to identify what the organisation wanted and to adapt to it.  
 
These examples indicate that organisational communication impacts less on workers 
if it is received through a third party, or if workers do not attend meetings, thus 
placing some distance between the communication and the recipient. This distancing 
can be viewed as resistance if it is intentional behaviour by a worker, or if a lower 
manager initiates it in order to protect his or her workers. 
6.4.3 Distance by turning organisational communication into information 
Other methods of distancing oneself from the organisation are related to the ways 
that workers deal with organisational communication when they do ‘hear’ it. 
Information is highly regarded in science, and is seen as objective and devoid of 
emotion. Interpreting communication as information is a way of desensitising it of its 
emotional content. Organisational management colludes with this way of presenting 
the organisation. The Team Brief, for example, was produced as an emailed 
document of two or three pages. It was compressed into two columns, the left hand 
one stating a subject and the right hand one giving a fuller explanation. This 
document was the focus of the Team Brief campus meetings when it was presented 
as overhead transparencies printed from the original. It meant that it was impossible 
for the audience to read, yet the corporate manager would make their way through it 
as if it could indeed be read. The abundance of natural lighting in the meeting room 
did not enhance this readability either. For at least eighteen months the Team Brief 
was presented in this form. One of the major presenters on the Lincoln campus was 
the Marketing Manager! The only time I observed a different and better performance 
was at the Grasslands campus. The version presented by one of the Science GMs, 
who had not been present at the meetings about which he was passing on 
information, was broken down into major headings with only so many per overhead, 





One of the members of the E-Group commented on corporate presentations:  
… if I stood up in front and presented like that at a conference I’d feel disgusted 
with myself at the end – as if I was letting the organisation down. These people 
are interacting with our clients, not necessarily just us - we can forgive them – 
but they should be really switched on. They shouldn’t stand right in front of 
overheads or whatever, and they should make sure that everybody could see 
them. They should stand up when they’re talking – the basic things about 
presenting. You know they should be doing that automatically ... and I get very 
disappointed when I see them … do a presentation like that (Martin, scientist). 
 
Martin has illustrated how, to him, corporate presentations do not even deliver 
information well. The other notable example of the corporate tendency to see 
communication as presenting ‘information’ only was the strategic plan presentation. 
It was the usual science conference type with the CEO standing to the side of a 
Power Point display while the audience and the presenter were in darkness. I call it 
the ‘primacy of information over people’ approach. What is on the screen is deemed 
to be more important and have more impact than the person presenting the 
information. The CEO did not help dispel this impression - many people described 
how his presentations made them go to sleep (indicating that they wanted more than 
factual information).115 This had something to do with his monotonous delivery, his 
voice having little variation or passion. He gave no evidence of any emotional 
involvement with or commitment to his topic.  
 
This way of presenting and receiving communication lessens its emotional impact 
and its chance of achieving a change in attitudes. Even though organisational 
management said it wanted workers to get on board with the new direction, it was 
not good at communicating this in a way that would have made a difference, even 
though it had the skilled personnel to do it.116 Communication presented in this 
fashion actually facilitated workers resistance to it by its implication that it was 
‘only’ information, did not have to be engaged with, and was not imperative. 
                                                 
115 I found this reaction of staff surprising as I had always found his presentations interesting because 
they were packed full of information and gave some insights into the way he was thinking. For 
example, he was persuading the audience to see things a certain way such as becoming more aware of 
the international context in which he saw AgResearch operating. He was doing this long before it was 
apparent in any other way within the organisation.  
116 This raises some interesting questions which I am unable to answer. Is this conscious or 
unconscious? Is it an indication that staff are not the real audience? Is management just saying the 
right things to align itself with Government and FRST priorities? 
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6.4.4 Distancing by challenging managerial credibility 
If organisational communication is received as ‘information’ then workers can 
manipulate, challenge, accept or reject it, just as they treat any information received  
in their science practice. Some organisational communication was simply not 
believed. For example, when the CEO stated AgResearch’s future revenue goals 
workers felt they were just not possible. When it was stated that it now had over 40% 
(in year 2000) non-FRST funding, some workers just laughed because they knew that 
a considerable amount of what was called ‘commercial’ funding was in fact FRST 
funded subcontracts with other CRIs. When the Strategic Plans (1997-1999) stated 
that AgResearch wanted to be the ‘employer of choice’, workers felt they had little 
‘choice’ to work anywhere else. They laughed too, particularly those in the 
Endophyte group, when AgResearch was called an international organisation 
because they knew that at the time AgResearch had one man in Australia with the 
Cultivar Development and Marketing Unit (CDMU) and another half-time in the 
United States. They did not think this made AgResearch an international company.117  
 
Wade (scientist) summed up the perceptions scientific workers had of managers:  
Wade: I think it was a shock to learn that the people above me are no smarter 
than you are and often are dumber … I had something of a rosy eyed view 
that the people who are leading an organisation actually knew what was 
going on and it was very, very disappointing to find out that they didn’t … I 
think I’m a pragmatist and I don’t expect people to be umm, more than 
perfect and so it didn’t so much shock me as just surprise me, I suppose.  
Interviewer: So how did you make sense of that? How did you learn to live with 
it? 
Wade: … half the time you know what is going on as much as the people above 
do or even more sometimes. It just changes the way that you view the 
information coming back. I don’t assume that the direction that’s coming 
from corporate is the right one because I know that the processes that are 
used to make these decisions are pretty flawed. They’re not scientifically 
sound. I know that personalities matter more than what people know. It just 
changes the way that you view the organisation. 
  
Wade and others talked of the ‘stupidity’ and ‘silliness’ of some managerial  
decisions. Such attitudes could be considered intellectual arrogance, but these 
are people who have had their intelligence confirmed by society through its 
educational institutions. As Martin (scientist) said: “The problem is that you’re 
                                                 
117 By 2001 this had changed with AgResearch purchases into companies like SASTEK in Australia. 
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dealing with very intelligent people, not just little plebs. And they don’t like 
being treated like plebs.”118  
 
There was plenty of evidence of situations where things said by corporate managers 
never happened. When the CEO started in 1997 he said that he did not want to be a 
power and control manager. Dave (scientist) commented:  
This move towards a [strategic] plan driven approach is certainly - given what 
Keith Steele [CEO] was saying a few months before that - something of a 
shock. Again it’s something that has crept in rather than ahh, been in place. 
Because Keith was saying, yeah, we’re going to consult staff more and more, 
and all that sort of thing, so yeah, it has been a bit of a shock (Dave, scientist). 
 
At a Grasslands campus meeting I attended in October 1999, one of the then Science 
GMs, John Hay, said the incoming Board Chairperson, Brent Layton, wanted to have 
internal debate about genetic engineering (GE) and about the possible AgResearch 
name change. As far as GE was concerned, the Board chairperson felt that there 
would be many different points of view in AgResearch and he did not want 
AgResearch adopting a stance that, for example, would embarrass staff when they 
were talking with their neighbours. The communications manager had been 
instructed to set up debate on both these issues. What ensued was one presentation 
throughout AgResearch, which attempted to educate workers about GE rather than 
debate points of view. The branding/name debate never happened. On another 
occasion the Board chairperson was invited to Lincoln by one of the scientist 
managers to talk about AgResearch’s new way of reporting on its overall financial 
position, EVA (Economic Value Added). Later the CEO told this manager that his 
behaviour in making this invitation was inappropriate. All communication with the 
Board Chairperson was supposed to go through the CEO.119  
                                                 
118 Becker (1971: 126-127) has given the name ‘hierarchy of credibility’ to the common understanding 
that as all information goes up the people at the top of an organisation should know the most. Here it 
is presented as a belief that scientific workers have become disillusioned with, even though 
AgResearch bucked the common practice during the restructuring of the public sector, by continuing 
to employ a scientist as its CEO rather than a generic manager. “A central notion of the New Zealand 
reforms of the 1980s and early 1990s was that an able manager was capable of managing any agency 
in the private or public sector” (Easton, 1995: 39). 
119 However, the Board Chairperson could have refused on these grounds and did not do so. This lack 
of contact between Boards and employees is standard practice for governance bodies, which makes it 
difficult for Boards to get any feel for the grass roots of the organisations they have responsibility for. 
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These examples explain why the behaviour of corporate management did not 
contribute to workers’ trust in the corporate management of the organisation and 
made it appear to workers that their cynicism was justified. Scientific workers are 
capable of making thoughtful and rational analyses and if something is found 
wanting, or they are not given a chance to provide input into organisational policy, 
that provides sufficient reason for them to generalise and presume all organisational 
utterances should not be taken seriously. In this way they were able to use this 
distancing tactic in an attempt to resist much of the impact of corporate statements.  
6.4.5 Distancing by challenging the credibility of Government policy 
In the same way, scientific workers were able to challenge the credibility of 
Government policy as well as organisational policy. When Petra (technical worker) 
said, “When I want a laugh I look up the CRI Act” she was indicating her perception 
that how things have turned out in the science restructuring do not match the 
Government’s initial intention. Some scientific workers hoped that the incoming 
Labour Government in 1999 would return to certain ideas in the CRI Act such as “the 
purpose of every Crown Research Institute is to undertake research” (Principle 4) 
and “the research undertaken by a Crown Research Institute should be undertaken for 
the benefit of New Zealand” (Principle 5). (However, it should be noted that the Act 
also states in Principle 5 that a CRI should be “operating as a successful going 
concern”, and should provide an “adequate rate of return on shareholders’ funds”.)  
 
Many scientists in AgResearch could not understand the Government’s desire to 
reduce the importance of agriculture in the national economy. They argued that if  
New Zealand increased its agricultural exports by one percent this would be far more 
than any new product could earn in export earnings. Agriculture is where New 
Zealand’s expertise lies and it already has a head start on other countries. To these 
workers it would make sense to maintain that expertise and competitiveness rather 
than run it down. Others disagreed with the emphasis on genetic modification 
research, and this was not necessarily disagreement from a ‘Green’ perspective:  
… I’d have to tell you I’m not that enthusiastic about genetically modified 
organisms. I think it’s just an approach – it’s not to save the world. It’s not 
going to feed the world. It’s just going to push commodity prices lower. Umm, 
yeah, so I don’t think it’s the answer. I actually think it’s an old technology 
now, because it sort of started before I even went to university and it’s not given 
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the rewards that it was supposed to and, at this point in time, consumers don’t 
want it and that may prevail (Colin, scientist). 
 
By arguing against Government policy as not following common sense, 
workers were able to resist by continuing to follow their own beliefs about 
what would benefit New Zealand. 
6.4.6 Distance by cynicism 
Cynicism grew among scientific workers as organisational communication did not 
live up to its promises, a likely evolution from workers treating organisational 
communication as information and then proceeding to argue about it. The practice of 
cynicism was endemic. It was a way of placing a distance between oneself and the 
object of resistance – in this case corporate rhetoric. For some groups cynicism was a 
valued part of their identity.  
I think this campus [Lincoln] is regarded as quite good but cynical by our 
corporate type people. We are reasonably courteous but cynical. But probably 
reasonably competent. Now if you were competent, cynical and courteous 
you’d probably get by on this campus (Euan, scientist). 
 
However, it was interesting to discover that the Grasslands campus also felt that it 
had a cynical image and they were rather proud of that. “This campus [Grasslands] 
has always had a degree of independence and stroppiness inside AgResearch. We 
were the DSIR people. We were always seen as being more cynical. We were not 
seen as having quite the right culture” (Owen, scientist). My contention is that 
though cynicism may have always been part of scientific culture in DSIR it has now 
become something to be proud of in certain groups, and has become endemic 
throughout the organisation. Other workers, however, told me that they had become 
cynical and did not see that as a good trait.  
 
Cynicism is a great way of finding some solidarity with other workers. It is the glue 
that can hold a group of people together. It enables them to resist in their minds what 
is being done to them, and so it fulfils an important function and does not need any 
action. It provides workers with an alternative. It becomes part of their identity to see 
themselves as cynical and challenging. Cynicism is also a way of self-protection 
from getting emotionally involved and excited about something that may not happen.  
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6.4.7 Distance by passivity 
Passivity can be another distancing mechanism. Scientists who remain with the 
organisation and do not seek promotion to management status, could be seen as 
offering passive resistance, particularly to the idea that success is denoted by such 
promotion. Graham, Noel and Jerry are examples of this. They have decided not to 
progress further up the management ladder because that would mean doing less 
science. Such decisions can denote that the rewards which workers are still receiving 
outweigh the negatives. Some workers can have the idea that corporate managers 
come and go but “I’m the ‘really’ loyal staff member. By surviving, by hanging in, I 
demonstrate that”. The ‘hanging in there till you kick me out’ frame of mind 
demonstrates the same attitude. The organisation has to make the effort or take the 
action, not the worker. These forms of conscious passivity are resistance.  
 
Passivity is an aspect of cynicism. Cynicism enables people to be passive about their 
situation. It saves them from acting. The problem with this myth of passivity is that 
those who have survived have forgotten how many have not. Furthermore, it places 
the responsibility for the “vision” with corporate and not with themselves.  
6.4.8 Playing the game 
When scientists come to see communication as information, they can treat it just like 
scientific information and are able to distance themselves from it sufficiently to play 
the games required to continue to do their work. The most common example in 
AgResearch was the way in which scientists writing funding proposals played the 
game of aligning their work to Government and organisational policy in order to 
obtain public funding (Hunt, 2002b). By seeing themselves as ‘playing the game’, 
scientific workers attempted to distance themselves from any challenges this might 
have for their integrity. After all, if you are playing a game you abide by the rules of 
that game while within it, and this is not supposed to have consequences outside it. 
There is pride in playing the game well. There can be a lack of emotional 
commitment to the organisation, while still having a commitment to ‘the game’.  
One scientist said to me that he would hate to be the writer of a funding proposal - 
trying to “second guess” what FRST wanted all the time. He (Merv, a scientist not in 
a case study group) said that with programmes becoming so large it was fairly easy 
to keep them vague. This meant scientists could be more adaptable and flexible in 
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what they did, satisfying FRST’s changing directives. It can be seen as helpful for 
the organisation if science groups do ‘play the game’ and use the “weasel words” 
(Colin, scientist) required in order to present their funding applications in the way 
that they think would be most attractive to FRST.  
 
Most of those who play the game do not like themselves for doing so and find it very 
stressful. Part of the desire of the E-Group to get commercial funding is because it 
may remove them from this sort of game. Ironically, in a sense this also satisfies 
organisational goals though the reasons for doing it do not. The organisation itself 
mimics this response in its establishment of Celentis as a means of making it 
independent of the fluctuations in Government policy. 
 
This ‘playing the game’ attitude is also present in the responses to the performance 
appraisal process. I asked one scientist about how the latest round had gone (late 
2001) and his response was completely light and amused. He felt it was not a 
problem for ninety five percent of workers to align their work objectives to the 
company strategy and values, and the five percent who did not do so just did not 
have the imagination. He seemed to have no awareness that the company wanted 
some personal commitment to these goals. (See Appendix E.) It was also worth 
noting that this scientist related Section B (on personal attitudes) to the science 
objectives of Section A rather than seeing them as separate and a demonstration of 
commitment to AgResearch values.  
 
While scientists may have had to play games in the organisations of the past, DSIR 
and MAF Tech, the games now require different things of them. They have to try to 
guess what FRST wants, they have to use a language they may not believe in, they 
feel they have to make claims that they may not be able to fulfil, and most of all, if 
they do not get it right they will probably lose their jobs. 
 
This section has described how workers in AgResearch practice many different 
tactics to distance themselves from the organisational messages which challenge 
them to change their beliefs about themselves and their work. By practicing these 
tactics they hoped to resist these challenges and to continue practicing their science 
to receive rewards that continue to be meaningful to them while preserving their 
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integrity. The links between these emerging themes of distancing, resistance and 
identity will be backed up by the sociology of work literature reviewed in Part C. 
The next section considers more overt forms of resistance than those already 
described.  
6.5 Resistance to structural features of the work system 
In this section I consider how workers tried to resist some of the structural features of 
organisational and Government (via FRST) control such as timesheets, security 
arrangements and the length of a research programme. The section closes by 
considering types of managerial control that some workers find acceptable. 
6.5.1 Resistance to timesheets 
Within AgResearch, action on timesheets was one of the few obvious signs of 
resistance. The use of timesheets arose through a FRST expectation. FRST wanted 
some accountability for the way funding was spent over programmes (see Section 
5.5.2). An indication of resistance to this system was that some workers never filled 
in a timesheet (and nothing seemed to happen to them). The other way workers 
resisted timesheets was by using a facility of the spreadsheet programme to insert a 
‘typical’ day averaged over their science programmes whether it was an accurate 
record of that day or not. This was an example of the degree of collusion the 
organisation entered into in which the accountability culture deemed that it was more 
important to complete ‘the books’ than for the record to be accurate. Because of this 
lack of accurate record keeping, science managers in the organisation never learned 
how long certain work actually took, knowledge which would have helped them plan 
future work or complete budgets realistically. It could also have provided them with 
a way of working out if some piece of equipment or a changed process had made a 
difference to the time needed for some activity.  
 
The basic reason for the resistance to timesheets was “philosophical”, according to 
Bill (scientist). He had a belief that scientific workers, as professionals, should not 
need to justify the way they spent their time. They should be trusted. He also pointed 
out that he did not stop thinking about work just because he was not sitting in his 
office and the time was not between 8.30am and 4.30pm, Monday to Friday. 
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But sometimes a lot of these things are a genuine eureka type thing that come 
out of nowhere … I was walking in the local hills yesterday and umm, just had 
an idea. I was sort of composing a paper in my head because you know your 
mind is free to wander while you walk, and this was a synthesis kind of thing - 
just a little idea that brought together a few disparate kind of ideas. I was sort of 
excited enough to try and write down the thoughts when I got home. So yeah, 
basically … you’re doing science all the time (Bill, scientist).120 
 
He had taken his concern about timesheets to senior management and a committee of 
three, of which he was made a member, was formed to consider it. But he was 
outnumbered. One member did not really care about timesheets and the other was 
very supportive of them.121 
 
The irony (or an unintended consequence) of timesheets is that they encourage 
workers to work to time, to keep track of their time so that they do not spend more 
time at work than they are paid for. It places an emphasis on time rather than getting 
the job done, the latter being the expectation of a professional attitude with a salary 
being paid for ‘doing the job’ rather than spending a certain amount of time at work.  
6.5.2 Resistance to security restrictions 
Another element of control which an organisation can exercise over its workers 
relates to restrictions on access to workers in other organisations or on other 
campuses. There was quite a furore early in 2001 on the Lincoln campus when 
AgResearch worked with Crop and Food Research (the landlords of the campus as a 
whole) to have security doors installed throughout the buildings, and security gates at 
the entrance (referred to earlier in Section 6.4.1). Some workers within AgResearch 
gathered together with Crop and Food workers to state how much they disliked the 
idea and how it would restrict their access to each other. The event even made the 
local newspaper, The Press, with the source remaining anonymous. Government 
policy, as expressed through FRST, has indicated CRIs are to do more collaborating. 
One scientist said this decision about security obviously went against that and 
indicated to him that AgResearch management was saying it did not care so much 
now what FRST thought because it was going to be less dependent on FRST funding 
in the future. This security issue was something that science workers became really 
                                                 
120 Note that this highlights the contrast between organisational and scientific ‘loyalty’. Scientists 
spend time thinking about their science not the organisation. 




disturbed about, and it is interesting in the light of their general passivity and 
tendency to complain but not to act, that they did do something about it. However, 
nothing changed. The security system was still installed.  
 
Another side to this concern about the restriction of interaction between workers in 
the two CRIs, was that I had not observed much interaction between the two at the 
scientist level. There was interaction at the technical worker level because some 
equipment was shared (and I gather this was able to continue). The security doors 
were a barrier to the relationship between scientific peers. It was seen as a symbolic 
action by corporate management to confine workers to the organisation over and 
above their science relationships. (There was, however, nothing to stop people 
ringing or emailing to make arrangements to let each other through the doors.)  
 
In contrast to this response there had been little concern expressed about changes to 
the telephone system in the previous year. Formerly all calls had gone through the 
same reception and within the campus there was internal dialling. All staff had 
access to a combined phone listing of all organisations on the campus. In the new 
system all calls to AgResearch had to pass through a different system to the other 
CRIs on the Lincoln campus. Outside callers looking for someone in AgResearch 
had to phone an 0800 number based at Ruakura. The way to phone the other CRIs 
and other organisations on campus was never made clear and certainly made such 
access more difficult. There was not the same outrage about that, perhaps because it 
did not have the same visual, and hence symbolic, impact as security doors. 
6.5.3 Resistance by stretching the time-span of research 
FRST exercised control over how long a research programme was to last but as the 
AgResearch Board Chairperson said, FRST’s audit trail system actually encouraged 
scientists to never finish their research. When something is ‘solved’ what does a 
science group do next? It pays not to solve a problem. Ray (scientist, not in case 
study group) indicated to me that he certainly would not be in any hurry to solve the 
latest pastoral issue he had received funding for. The leader of the Argentine Stem 
Weevil (ASW) Group was fortunate that just as he was told by FRST that it had done 
as much as was sensible in its development of a biological control for ASW, the 
clover root weevil problem came to its attention. Other groups were critical about 
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how long the MCG has been able to spin out grass grub research but it has now had 
pressure put on it and is expanding into biosecurity and biocontrol work on some 
overseas insect pests.  
 
With scientists’ job security vested in the subject of their research, it was 
understandable they would act to maintain a research programme. It was too risky to 
branch out and lose their funding. Over my time as bid-coordinator I noticed that any 
new ideas were unlikely to be successful in the FRST bidding system of the past, as 
was indicated by the lack of acceptance of new AgResearch proposals. It was very 
difficult to get a new area of research up and running while another was winding 
down. New work could only be carried out within the audit trail of older research. (If 
Government policy requiring innovation were to be implemented, there needs to be 
some system to ensure scientists have employment as scientists rather than for a 
particular programme, if they are to be encouraged to take risks.) 
6.5.4 Management that is not resisted 
As I have mentioned before, not all change is resisted and not all management is 
resisted. So what is an acceptable way to introduce change and what management 
intervention is regarded as satisfactory? Managers play an important role in 
introducing change. For example, Gaye (scientist) has encouraged Eve (technical 
worker) to move to new areas of work and do further training. This has been well 
received by Eve because it has made her work more interesting and less routine. But 
also the encouragement has to do with ‘work’ rather than with changing her attitudes 
to why she is doing the work. The threat comes from the corporate-type manager 
who wants workers to ‘be different’ from who they are. At the same time it must be 
noted that the norms of the science group manager and those who work for her/him 
are probably the same, so there is no need for workers to be threatened by change 
from these managers. Workers already ‘think and feel the right way’! Walter 
(scientist) told me about another means of control that he does not resist: 
Interviewer: Who makes sure you do your job? 
Walter: I don’t think anybody. I think I’m trusted to do it. If I don’t and there is 
… umm, the way it comes through to me is not in a formal way at all. It’s just 
semi-joking comments both from Eric and from Greg. And I mean, even though 
it’s semi-joking, they don’t pull punches, you know those guys. (Laughs) And 
I’m sensitive enough to pick that up and it’s there now, it’s with me and it’s up 
to me to respond and if I don’t it will just be a sort of steady erosion, I guess, of 
trust and loyalty. And those are things I value quite highly so I’m not about to 
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let that happen … and it’s certainly the case that one motivation for doing it is 
actually to make other people happy!  
 
I suggest that these two examples, involving Eve and Walter, illustrate the difference 
between corporate management and science group management. The main reason for 
scientific workers’ unhappiness does not come from science group managers. The 
latter manage the everyday work of science and may suggest change or further 
training in relation to that which is quite acceptable to workers. 
 
This section has described how scientific workers have been able to resist in some 
way or other some of the managerially imposed structural components of their 
workplace environment. This resistance has rendered timesheets useless except as 
formally satisfying accountability requirements. Resistance to restrictions on access 
to other organisations on the same campus have not resulted in the restrictions being 
lifted. Similarly, efforts to lengthen out the time span of research may work for a 
while but eventually new areas of work need to be found if workers are to survive in 
employment. Finally, I considered briefly how some ways of managing are 
acceptable to workers. This leads into the next section which examines some of the 
conflicts between managing a scientific, compared with a business, enterprise. 
6.6 Science versus business 
This section will enlarge the emerging areas of interest further by identifying and 
discussing the many ways in which the intent of AgResearch management to turn 
AgResearch into a science business has challenged scientific workers. First I 
describe further how scientific workers are asserting the primacy of the practice of 
science in their everyday working lives. Secondly, I consider how the cultures of 
business and science do not fit together well, judging by the responses of scientific 
workers. This subsection is followed by others considering more specific challenges 
business makes to a science culture – the concentration on endpoint rather than 
process, the conflict between selling a product and being objective, the concern for 
scientific excellence, the demand for commercial secrecy, and finally, the way 
middle management becomes trapped between the two cultures. 
6.6.1 The primacy of science 
I'm not sure you can make a distinction between “agricultural science” and 
“science” in AgResearch … all my colleagues, whatever their background and 
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current affiliation, owe strong allegiance to “science” and are champing at the 
bit to be able to do more of it (Rob, scientist). 
 
Why were scientific workers adapting to and at the same time resisting the changes 
they saw impacting on them and their work? I suggest that it was because they 
wanted to continue to work in an organisation that enabled them to ‘do science’. This 
is clear, both because they say that, and, because when the choices and actions they 
take are reflected on, such choices and actions support their scientific practice, or 
assert their identities first and foremost as scientific workers. It is through science 
they were able to achieve and make their contributions, whether they were to 
agriculture, science, and/or the environmental sustainability. It is through science that 
they were able to obtain the day-to-day rewards and feedback from doing such work. 
They chose to spend their time doing the work of science practice rather than going 
to organisational meetings, such as (non)attendance contrasting with the full 
attendance at Science Platform meetings (held annually in some location away from 
a campus) and science group meetings, as these were about planning actual work.  
 
Tim, one of AgResearch’s business managers, pointed out that scientists were 
focused on science and he was focused on clients, so if a scientist had to make a 
choice between getting something done on time for a client or going to a conference, 
the scientist would go to the conference. Tim felt that this was wrong, but I see it as 
each having their different priorities. Scientific workers indicate by their use of time 
where their priorities lie whenever they have to make a choice between something 
that is a company priority and something that is a work/science priority.  
 
The very ‘doing of science’ entails continuing associations with past practices and 
individualised purposes. Scientific workers I interviewed were very aware that they 
were building on knowledge from the past. In molecular biology in particular, there 
was a high consciousness of this because within their own employment history, 
scientific workers had learned the importance of prior work when they had found it 
to be faulty. The W&S Group was building up a database of several thousand 
publications of work done on fibres and skin. One scientist was going back over 
previous work and finding that some long-term assumptions in wool research were 
incorrect. Scientists felt that any products they were involved with had a history. The 
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E-Group and the MCG were very aware of the stories associated with their main 
research issues – endophyte and grass grub. Endophyte research started in the late 
1980s. The control of grass grub has been an ongoing concern for New Zealand 
agriculture since the 1920s when the first parasites were imported as a means of 
biological control (Hunt, 1998). All workers were conscious and proud of their MAF 
and DSIR histories. Even those who had started work in the time of AgResearch 
were aware that when asked by outsiders who they worked for, they had to describe 
AgResearch as replacing MAF Tech and DSIR, because these organisations were 
familiar to most New Zealanders. All these examples illustrate the importance of a 
historical perspective in science practice. 
 
There is a feeling among scientific workers that this past is not acknowledged by 
senior management. The associations of MAF with agriculture and of the DSIR with 
scientific excellence are no longer recognised yet these things are important to the 
identities of most of the workers in AgResearch. Scientists did not see new products 
as being produced ‘out of the blue’. Government policy inferred this when it said (via 
FRST and the New Enterprises Research Fund (NERF)) that it wanted to sponsor 
research for ‘new’ industries that had not yet been thought of, as if they would have 
no history. By restructuring into Platforms, AgResearch carefully positioned itself to 
obtain funding from the NERF fund its first round and hardly received any (Team 
Brief, 8-3-00). Only fifteen percent of this funding went to CRIs. The signals were 
quite clear that agriculture did not fit into the ‘new industry’ definition. It was an 
existing industry that was not seen as having the potential to produce anything 
‘new’.122 My notes on the Pre-Strategic plan talk (7-3-00) indicate the reaction of the 
Board Chairperson. He said, “It’s a lesson to make ourselves independent of all that 
nonsense”. This comment illustrates the Board’s concern for AgResearch to gain 
more commercial funding – to become a business. 
 
According to Government and organisational policy, this business was to be based on 
innovation. Innovation and discovery on a larger scale in AgResearch arose through  
                                                 
122 AgResearch scientists thought by manipulating the words they would receive funding as they had 
in the past . For example, in the early 1990s when FRST said that it wanted to fund research that 
‘added value’ and implied this could only be done beyond the farm gate, AgResearch was able to get 
funding for adding value ‘on the farm’. 
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trying to solve agricultural problems. This was the motivation. The ability to persist 
and pursue thinking that was outside the norm or the beliefs of the time, required 
particular individuals who were prepared to be different and to be isolated. Henry’s  
religious beliefs had given him the feeling that there was something special waiting 
for him. He was able to stand against the thinking of the time about ryegrass 
staggers. He had the commitment and support to pursue what he thought outside 
working hours. Garth’s conceptual idea about disease as being part of the life tables 
of insects went against the views of the entomologists at the time. His commitment to 
the environment tied this in with methods of biocontrol rather than chemical usage. 
Craig’s ‘ethical sheep’ idea grew out of his commitment to sheep farmers and his 
vision of what could be a concern in the future. Hunter is so committed to his work 
and the company through his manager Greg, that he is unaware of company politics. 
He is relishing solving a problem that other larger and more renowned organisations 
have been unable to answer. His job description is very specific and his racial origins 
and attitudes separate him. Rosie had a commitment to collaboration and in spite of 
an organisational climate that disapproved of it, she was able to gain valuable skills 
and input from others. This enabled them together to make a notable discovery. Ted 
has such different ideas that it is difficult for him to find an audience for them in the 
organisation at all. He is generally regarded as eccentric.  
 
At the ‘ground level’ much of the innovation that was described to me arose from a 
desire to do a job more efficiently so that time could be freed up for more interesting 
aspects of the work. Technology and new techniques were also seen in this light, 
indicating how these could be stimuli for change. Another driver of innovation was 
the challenge to solve problems occurring in the use of lab techniques and protocols, 
particularly in molecular biology. Innovation can be a two-edged sword, as Todd 
(technical worker) discovered. As he became more and more efficient in managing 
and scoring his different experiments by inventing measuring equipment, he found 
he was given more and more work! At the same time there was no mechanism within 
the organisation to encourage others to use his techniques and so increase the 
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efficiency of their work as well.123 Innovation at this level of science practice was 
developed and instituted by those who benefited from it. 
  
I did not see any examples of innovation and creativity that arose out of an 
organisational commitment. Some of the major discoveries I became aware of were 
made at the time workers were employed by MAF or DSIR and have taken a long 
time to come to fruition as a product. This is important because if an organisation 
wants to focus on innovation it has to be aware that motivations for innovation may 
not be obvious, and may come out of difference, and the strength of belief in 
something other than the company. 
 
Scientific workers demonstrate great persistence and creativity in trying to overcome 
problems in their everyday scientific working lives. But when they are feeling 
unhappy about other aspects of their working lives they give evidence of dealing 
with these problems in passive ways, indicating their feelings of powerlessness. A 
risk could be that this attitude of passivity moves over into their science practice. 
They might just come to work and ‘do their job’ rather than have any enthusiasm 
about it, or energy for solving the many practical problems that are a daily challenge. 
 
In wishing to impose some uniformity of beliefs and attitudes, the organisation runs 
the risk that its achievement of innovation may be hampered. Innovation appears to 
come out of the freedom of people to think differently and from their exposure to 
difference.124 The corollary is that people who are already different by nature of 
belief or culture, are frequently a source of creative and innovative ideas. Often they 
are prepared to pursue these against the negative responses of others.125  
                                                 
123 Turpin and Deville (1995: 14) note: “… it is the choice between the scientific manager and the 
scientific entrepreneur that is probably more critical [than the career pathway between research and 
management]”. 
124 Winsley, Gilbertson and Couchman (2001) in their case studies of innovation in New Zealand 
companies emphasise the importance of interactions within a company, and externally both nationally 
and internationally (pp. 170-172).   
125 Jessop mentioned in his lecture Globalisation and the State (21 September 2001, University of 
Canterbury) that some nations welcome immigrants because they are seen as a source of difference 
and hence a stimulus for new ideas.  
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6.6.2 A clash of cultures: science as business126 
There were many aspects of AgResearch as business which did not fit workers’ 
views of their organisation. When the logo was changed in 2000 it met with almost 
universal derision from science workers. It changed from a seraph font AgResearch 
outlined in white or gold, on a dark green background, to a non-serif font 
Agresearch in white, set at the bottom of a lime green square.127 Scientific workers 
regarded it as pale and insignificant without the strength and class they associated 
with the old logo. It was a symbol of the corporate world and the market place, 
which they did not identify with. Their feelings were identified in this limerick which 
also expresses dismay at how corporate managers can move on to another job 
without being accountable for the changes they have made. 
There was a young lass called [name] 
Whose graphic design was quite strange 
She made a green blob 
That made the staff sob 
Then buggered off for a job change 
(Limerick written to celebrate the tenth anniversary of AgResearch, 17-7-02.)  
 
When AgResearch’s corporate clients were invited to the launch of its subsidiary 
product development company, Celentis, in Wellington, the lack of client knowledge 
demonstrated by the communications manager, the organiser of the event, 
embarrassed some of the scientists attending: 
At the corporate launch of Celentis they brought some little twit from a radio 
station to MC the whole thing. There would be a dozen people I could think of 
in AgResearch who are fantastic orators and really witty speakers, so why do 
you have to bring in a radio personality? Hah. So that disappoints me and I feel 
that decision makers could do well to acquaint themselves with the range of 
talent, capability and attitudes in AgResearch and celebrate it (Eric, SPL). 
  
The razzmatazz of a commercial company brand launching seemed out of place for 
the standard AgResearch clients. The way Celentis was launched did not represent 
the identity that scientific workers within AgResearch perceived the organisation to 
have.128 The use of a radio announcer as front man did not indicate a consideration, 
knowledge and valuing of the many AgResearch workers who could have done a 
better and more appropriate job. 
                                                 
126 After the title of Raelin’s book: The Clash of Cultures: Managers Managing Professionals (1991). 
127 According to some workers it needed a good dose of nitrogen fertiliser! 
128 John Law (1994: 163) discusses how the scientists he observed at the Daresbury Laboratory 
distrusted the “impression management” required to keep the laboratory funded and noticed in the 




Workers became human resources who had ‘capabilities’, which were disposable. In 
spite of the emphasis on retraining, ‘capabilities’ had a fixed connotation. If there 
was a reasonably good chance they might be useful to the company in the future they 
– the capabilities - were placed in a ‘capability bank’. When the company was 
‘repositioned’ by changing the organisational direction some workers were discarded 
because their capabilities no longer matched what the organisation required, just like 
a piece of equipment that no longer serves a useful purpose. The language was one of 
objectivity, detachment and thus disassociation from the human beings involved. The 
reasoning was presented as logical and not able to be challenged. 
6.6.3 Science as process, business as end product 
The desire to be more independent of FRST funding, to be a successful business, and 
to satisfy Government policy for a knowledge economy, led to a clash between the 
science and business cultures within AgResearch. In the past, the end product of 
science practice was further understanding and knowledge of biological and 
agricultural systems. The knowledge gained was seen to be part of a much larger 
whole. This knowledge was to be used – these workers are applied scientists – but it 
was to be used by other people, for the country, for science or for the protection of 
the environment. The aim was ‘out there’. This may still have been the aim of the 
company but it was to be fulfilled through the company, by the company making a 
profit from exploiting the knowledge of those who work in it. The science institution 
had become a business. While scientists emphasised the conduct of science, 
AgResearch management emphasised the development of finite products from which 
money could be made for the company. Andrew summarised this change:  
… CRIs were formed to service the sectors they are related to – dairy, meat, 
seeds, fertiliser, dah-de-dah. And between the chairman of the Board, Neil 
Richardson, and Keith Steele [CEO] … they took a very liberal interpretation of 
that and even started to get to the culture of telling us that we weren’t there just 
to service the industries, we were there for the interests of AgResearch as an 
entity itself. So it was important for us to capture intellectual property and to 
exploit that in the best interests of AgResearch - not necessarily the sector 
groups we were set up to support. So if the biggest return for us with certain IP 
was to go to America or Denmark, wherever, to get a return on that then we 
should do that rather than New Zealand. And I felt uncomfortable about that … 
I felt the obsession with maximising profit and chasing after commercial 





Nearly every scientific worker I spoke to defined science as a process: a process of 
discovery; a process of gaining knowledge always incomplete; a process in which the 
scientist was only part. A scientist was building on the knowledge of those who had 
gone before, hoping that the knowledge s/he produced was reliable and trustworthy 
so that it would be a firm foundation for whatever came after it. A scientist was 
driven by a curiosity to find out, “What was going on here?” A scientist was a person 
who found that a solution to one problem just meant more questions and other 
problems! At the same time it must be remembered there is an endpoint of sorts. Part 
of the process of science is usually publication and this is a way of documenting the 
work done in the public arena. It is a record of a worker’s contribution. 
 
This process view of science contrasted with business goals. In business, the end 
product is something that is saleable. It did not seem to matter that it still might have 
a few associated problems. In science, a product has to be tested and demonstrated to 
be of use, whereas in business the customer rules. Tim (business manager) talked of 
examples where a customer wanted something and a scientist refused to sell it 
because he said it had been scientifically demonstrated to be useless. The way the 
customer used it seemed to be for a different purpose than the one the scientist had in 
mind. For Tim, as a business manager, the response was that if the customer wants it 
then let the customer have it. An example of this is deer velvet, which AgResearch 
sells through its subsidiary company, BioProducts. Scientists find this disturbing as 
they say there is no evidence that deer velvet has any of the pharmaceutical 
properties its adherents claim. BioProducts counters this by saying it guarantees the 
purity of its product but it makes no claims for the product’s properties and the uses 
its customers may put it to. It is in the area of nutraceuticals that AgResearch wishes 
to do research because compared with the pharmaceutical market, nutracueticals do 
not have to undergo rigorous research to justify their efficacy. The AgResearch 
science groups wanted their products to be as effective as they could make them, for 
the purpose they had in mind. The Endophyte Group was particularly cautious in this 
respect because it released one endophyte inoculated cultivar, Pacific ryegrass, in the 
early 1990s which was put into the market too early and had to be withdrawn. Fiona 
(technical worker) talked of a time when one of the batches of the MCG’s product 
Invade was non-pathogenic and somehow had been missed in the quality testing. The 
Group had to search out all the farmers to whom the product had been sold and 
 
148 
withdraw it. The need for a product to sell can conflict with scientist’s need to be 
sure that the product will work satisfactorily. 
6.6.4 Seller of products or objective scientist? 
Scientists pride themselves on their objectivity and feel that this would be 
compromised if they became sellers of products. They would be seen to be pushing 
their product as better than that of competitors. Scientists feel that they should be the 
testers of the products, not a backer of one in particular. They find it difficult to see 
how they could act in both capacities and be seen as credible by consumers.  
And hidden in all this is we’re still trying to have a career path and still trying to 
publish stuff. But we are getting less and less time to do it, less and less money 
to do it. It’s more tied up with - the principle that Keith [CEO] has, that we have 
these product teams … and looking for a product champion. And they’re even 
looking at science people as product champions. While I have a real enthusiasm 
for [a particular product] and have been seen, not only in New Zealand but also 
overseas, as being the person who should be able to push [it], once you start 
getting involved in that then you can compromise your science because you 
tend to sort of say, “Well okay, that result is significant but it’s not particularly 
big, but look at these other things” … and I can’t see how you can remain a 
good scientist and be a product champion. Now that doesn’t sit well with 
corporate. They seem to think you can. And if they’re going to be pushing this 
line and talking about intellectual property, I think you’d be lucky if you get in 
The New Zealand Journal of Ag Research every three years at the rate they are 
going, because no-one’s going to publish anything. They’re not going to have 
the time and neither are they going to be allowed to because … knowledge is 
power, knowledge is money. And if you’ve got knowledge you’re not going to 
publish in a paper, if someone is going to turn round and say well hang on to it. 
And this is where a lot of scientists nowadays are having a struggle, because 
they’re saying, don’t tell anyone this, or don’t tell anyone that. I mean I have the 
same problem as manager of this group here - going to people and saying, 
“Look, you have to keep the lid on that”. And they jump up and down and say, 
“Look, that’s not why I want to do science”. But if you’re going to do it within 
the confines of AgResearch or most other future research organisations in New 
Zealand then you’re going to have to get used to it … (Harry, scientist). 
 
In this quote Harry also described other problems that come from seeing knowledge 
as a commodity rather than as science.129 
 
Some groups such as the Endophyte Group already had strong commercial 
relationships formed over a long period through their interactions with seed 
companies. These relationships extended to other areas in their work, not just  
                                                 
129 Alongside this perspective is that in which scientific workers can be seen as ‘capabilities’ which 
can be ‘leveraged’ to produce knowledge for the ‘knowledge economy’ as the R&D Management’s 
2001 conference ‘Leveraging Research and Technology’ would have it. 
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endophyte. AgResearch decided to put a ‘client’ manager in charge of this 
commercial relationship. Members of the group were perturbed by this approach. 
They had formed these relationships over periods of ten to twenty years. As Ian 
(business manager) said, when he started certain people were low down in a 
particular company just as he was and as they progressed up their company ladders 
they maintained their relationships. Now they are all in management positions. They 
frequently developed personal friendships over that time. Many said the agri-
business community is a very traditional one and relationships of trust take a long 
time to develop. By imposing a client manager over and above these relationships, 
AgResearch demonstrated a lack of value of these relationships, causing it to have 
little credibility in the eyes of its workers and in the eyes of the companies with 
which it did business. When AgResearch was suddenly presented as a business, 
senior management did not acknowledge the business relationships which workers in 
AgResearch were already part of.  
6.6.5 Business: changing the use of time 
A lot of time in AgResearch is now spent in a search for funding or in fulfilling 
commercial contracts. This way of spending time conflicts with what scientists 
would like to be doing. For example, scientists I interviewed thought the pursuit of 
scientific excellence was their primary aim and claimed the only way it could be 
measured was by publication. They felt this was under threat. As Gaye (scientist) 
indicated in her interview, she no longer has as much time to do experiments with 
sufficient replication and quality for publication. They might be acceptable only for 
conference presentations. The pursuit of commercial funding and following the 
‘flavour of the month’ themes in science mitigate against the pursuit of excellence 
because excellence takes time. Science is a long-term enterprise.   
 
Scientific workers with less time have to put to one side interesting things and 
serendipitous events that crop up along the way which could be useful to pursue. 
When a worker has certain objectives to achieve in a certain time there is no place 
for pursuing something just because it looks interesting. Sommer expressed a 
concern that the discovery element of science was being lost.130 
                                                 
130 Pers. comm. 8-5-01. 
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6.6.6 Commercial secrecy  
It could be argued that the requirements of commercial secrecy are no different from 
those of scientific secrecy. Science is a competitive enterprise just like business. 
Scientists make great efforts to publish only aspects of work which will not give any 
clues to competitors. This is not a way of perceiving science that scientists often 
acknowledge. They talk of the openness of science and the sharing of knowledge. 
What they do not say is that this is so only once the knowledge has been published 
and owned by the scientists concerned. There is also the concern for patents and the 
restriction that may place on publication. Most scientists, however, felt this was not 
too much of a problem for them as it only delayed publication for up to six months. 
Some did feel differently. Don (scientist), for example, felt his manager had delayed 
his career. The ongoing work required to gain a patent meant he had to postpone 
publication for over 18 months at a time when he wanted to establish his reputation 
in the international science scene.  
 
Sometimes there can be a decision not to seek a patent because that would be giving 
away commercially sensitive secrets. This can stop publication completely and 
means there is no possibility of verification by the science community. One PhD 
student found this out to their detriment when the secret result their work was based 
on, proved incorrect. 
 
The risk of disclosure of material that could eliminate a patenting opportunity has led 
to scientists developing skills they did not have before. With patents being seen as an 
important addition to a scientist’s CV, secrecy is doubly important. Patents can only 
be applied for if there has been no previous reference to a work in the public domain. 
Harry (scientist) told me how he and his business manager had to spend a day and a 
night before a European conference applying for provisional patents because they 
suddenly realised the importance of his paper. Len discovered several years ago that 
he had inadvertently published some information which later meant that something 
could not be patented. His publication had been vetted and fulfilled the programme 
objective required but his divisional manager continued to blame him personally for 
this loss. Scientists have to pass their publications through many hoops in case they 




Scientists have had to become aware of what they can say and what they cannot say 
at field days or other public occasions. They cannot be seen to be supporting one 
company over another, or giving away information that could prejudice another 
company’s business. Tim (business manager) had to prime up Todd (technical 
worker) before they went to meetings with potential clients so that Todd did not tell 
them too much about his product for which he had an overwhelming enthusiasm, for 
the client could go elsewhere with the information. In a conversation with a senior 
lecturer in Animal Science at Lincoln University,131 I was told how, at a South Island 
Dairy Event, the scientists from AgResearch were wary of saying anything at all 
because of the IP implications. Learning what you can and cannot say impacts on 
scientific workers desire to share what they are doing and may affect their stimulus 
for innovation and creativity. They can no longer engage in free conversation. They 
have to think suspiciously rather than collegially.  
6.6.7 Middle management: caught between the corporate vision and science 
The impact of AgResearch’s policies and their ambivalent reception was particularly 
apparent at the SPL level, as mentioned earlier. SPLs were in a difficult position in 
the organisational structure -  seen by senior management to be the enforcers of the 
new direction and of organisational values while their success was dependent on the 
groups under their management. They were expected by senior management to have 
a ‘One AgResearch’ vision but their success was more likely to be reliant on meeting 
their budgets and getting funding. Bate (1998: 69) describes middle management as 
subscribing to a segmentalist culture while senior management, who naturally have 
an overview of the organisation, subscribe to a unitarist culture.132 SPLs could be 
seen to be adapting to the views of senior management by accepting better pay to 
‘manage’, however, two SPLs told me they accepted management positions to 
maintain a good environment in which others could do science. 
 
                                                 
131 Denis Elvidge, pers. comm. 10-3-01. 
132 Bate (1998) himself subscribes to a ‘both-and’ culture. He thinks there needs to be a mix in 
organisations and what is important is whether “there is a ‘fit’ between the form and its environment” 
(ibid.: 71). Primarily AgResearch has had to demonstrate to Government (shareholders) that it is 
changing to fit the environment, as prescribed by Government policy and enforced by FRST. Most 
organisational culture theory says organisations have to respond to their external environment, e.g., 
Nilakant and Ramnarayan (1998). 
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Evan (SPL) is aware of the risk of uniformity demanded by the ‘One AgResearch’ 
vision and its challenge to the ‘psychic self’, as Catherine Casey (1995) would call it: 
... personally, I think that there is a danger of looking for too much conformity 
and uniformity. We’re not Dekka, we’re not the NZ Army, we’re not Harcourts. 
You know, we are a bunch of fairly intellectual individuals and I think there is 
an over-estimation of the effect that training courses can have on achieving 
conformity and uniformity. Personally, I think AgResearch could do well to 
celebrate diversity and maximise the value from that diversity ... So, I think that 
this idea that the Science Leaders can kind of control their so-called Platforms 
to a degree of precision and uniformity is not true. I don’t think it can be done. 
That’s what worries me a bit right now (Evan, SPL). 
 
In conclusion, this section has demonstrated the conflicts experienced by workers 
when their organisation developed a business emphasis and how they have responded 
to this by emphasising that their priority is science.133 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have described and made a preliminary interpretation of the 
responses of scientific workers in AgResearch to the changes they experienced as a 
result of the restructuring of the system for the public funding of science. In this 
initial interpretation I have been influenced only minimally (where mentioned) by 
my reading of any academic literature on the topics of work and management. What I 
observed is that scientific workers adapted to the changes in their organisation and to 
the funding system in order for their work to continue, but they have mainly been 
able to carry on with their work by practising different forms of quiet resistance. 
Many of these forms of resistance act to distance them from organisational 
communication. This protects their identities and enables them to receive the 
feedback from their work of science described in Chapter 5. When taken together 
these examples demonstrate the many tactics workers had in their ‘tool box’,134 
which enabled them to negotiate and protect valued ways they had of making their 
working lives meaningful. In the final section I have demonstrated how some of the 
values and ways of doing science conflict with the ways of doing business, and how 
scientific workers give priority to ‘doing science’.  
                                                 
133 For another description of this conflict see ex-AgResearch scientist’s book, Science Friction 
(Edmeades, 2000). 
134 A reference to Foucault’s “box of tools” (Shumway, 1992: 159) or “tool kit” (Macey, 1993: xx). 
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Conclusion to Part B 
In Part B I have explained how the feedback scientific workers receive from their 
work is important to them for reinforcing valued aspects of their identity, and how 
this feedback may differ between technical workers and scientists. I have described 
how this identity was often based on the heritage of the past – what was valued and 
important in society when attitudes to work were being formed for these workers. 
The feedback scientific workers get from belonging to their work group is very 
significant to them. For scientists, the feedback from belonging to the scientific 
community and its claims of excellence is important. The exclusiveness of this 
community was described, as was the way in which some scientists use it to close 
themselves off to outsiders in order to resist interference from Government policy 
and commercial interests. The lack of value placed on input from non-scientific 
sources by some scientists was also established. Because the culture of science 
emphasises autonomy at the expense of personal feedback, the practice of science 
has become a very powerful feedback mechanism for scientific workers. It reinforces 
the ideas these workers have about themselves, such as their trustworthiness, skill 
and accuracy. The practice of science also rewards them in many other ways. On the 
other hand, the culture of the organisation in which they work, through 
corporatisation and a focus on accountability, is perceived to not value them in the 
same way, and at times interferes and conflicts with the things that are important to 
them. They respond to this in many ways, most of which enable them to continue to 
do the work that is important to them; however, the majority feel compromised and 
unhappy.  
 
At the beginning of this research I was concerned that workers spent a lot of time 
moaning, complaining and being cynical about the management of the organisation 
and I felt they should be doing something about it. What I have learned is that this 
behaviour is serving the purpose of distancing workers from caring too much about 
and believing in an organisation that may well let them down. It protects them from 
making personal changes to their beliefs about themselves that may not work for 
them in the future. It protects them from changing the ideas they hold about their 
work and the implications these changes would have for their identities. There are, 
however, inevitable conflicts and risks when ‘doing science’ conflicts with ‘doing 
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business’. In spite of all the responses these scientific workers made to enable them 
to continue their work, the fact is that they still complained and most of them were 
not happy at work. This environment and the behaviour required of them in it was 
very stressful.  
There was a tired scientist at Lincoln 
Who eventually got around to thinkin’ – 
Why did I study for years 
And get all these grey hairs 
When AgResearch seems to be sinkin’? 
 
Ten years for a crime I didn’t commit 
A bloody long time you’ll have to admit 
I’m dreaming about an early release 
No problem said FRST, your funding will cease … 
(Limericks written to celebrate the tenth anniversary of AgResearch, 17-7-02.)135  
 
In Part C I will report on some of the related sociology of work literature which my 
initial foray into the AgResearch data provoked. I will also take another look at the 
context of this research, and then, informed by these ideas, consider again the 
response these scientific workers made to the circumstances in which they found 
themselves.  
                                                 
135 RSNZ (2002: 3): “Science and technology remuneration … offers insufficient compensation for 
the years invested in training …” etc. 
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PART C: FURTHER ANALYSIS INFORMED BY THE 
LITERATURE 
During the first analysis of the case studies I became aware that two of the major 
themes were the meaning of work for scientific workers, and its relationship to 
identity. These two themes did not have sufficient depth. It was not enough to just 
describe this meaning. There was something else happening in this situation that 
made these workers unhappy. Why did they complain so much when they were also 
telling me about how they placed so much importance on their work, and describing 
it with so much enthusiasm and obvious enjoyment? I started reading more about 
resistance. Often the discussion and arguments in the literature did not fit what I had 
observed. Usually the literature focused on blue collar workers in factories and 
industrial situations. It was to do with forms of conflict that I had never observed, 
such as pilfering, sabotage and wasting time (e.g., Mars, 1982). Only some of the 
labour process writers (Knights and Morgan, 1991b; Collinson, 1994, 1992; Knights 
and Collinson, 1987) (with the introduction of subjectivity) and one or two 
Americans (Ashforth and Mael, 1998; Hodson, 1991; 1995a, 1995b) seemed to take 
seriously the accounts of the workers themselves. The latter, however, were not 
referring to particular empirical studies but reflecting on the topic in general. Even 
these writers placed a greater emphasis on macro issues rather than on what was 
going on for workers. I became aware, thanks to a seminar given by Perkins and 
Thorns,136 that I was studying how this group of people at AgResearch were making 
their work meaningful and were resisting the things which contested that. It seemed 
to me that writers taking a Foucauldian approach (with their interest in subjectivity) 
and/or those adopting a labour process perspective or an organisational culture 
approach, while concerned about identity, were stripping away the very things that I 
considered to be important. In their desire to uncover relationships of power they 
disregard the ways in which people act to negotiate and mediate the impacts of 
power in order to make their lives meaningful. This emphasis on ‘making meaning’ 
is exactly what I have not found in any literature. It is what my research offers. 
 
                                                 
136 Studies in Human Settlement. Seminar, Lincoln University Human Sciences Division, 7-3-02. 
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I then became aware that a focus of much of the resistance literature, and more 
widely, the industrial sociological literature, was on methods of work control which  
were not a common feature of AgResearch management. A particular form of control 
called ‘normative control’ (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 113) most closely described 
what I was observing. Normative control is a system of management in which 
attempts are made to regulate the thoughts and feelings of workers to align them with 
particular organisational values (ibid.). Attention to this as a conscious form of work 
control only surfaced in the sociology of work literature in the late 1980s (e.g., Rose, 
1988137). Actual research studies of organisations in which it was practised started 
appearing in the 1990s (e.g., Kramer and Neale, 1998; Bate, 1998[1994]; Casey, 
1995; Jermier, Knights and Nord, 1994; Kunda, 1992; Sturdy, Knights and Willmott, 
1992b; Kondo, 1990). This aspiration on the part of management to consciously 
control the beliefs and attitudes of workers through normative control was arising at 
the same time as the New Zealand Government’s restructuring endeavour. State 
sector organisations were developing management structures to ensure accountability 
and efficiency of workers. It is not surprising to see the two – accountability and 
normative control - coming together in AgResearch.  
 
In Chapter 7 I discuss some of the literature relating to work, in particular the story 
of how the contested nature of the meaning of work between employers and 
employees has led to the development of the normative control of work. I will 
examine the responses of workers to such control as observed and interpreted by 
other writers, although I will be focusing only on the literature that I see as relevant 
to the themes and ideas that were arising in the data from Part B. In Chapter 8, 
through reflecting and building on what others have said about work and its meaning, 
I extend the analysis of the data further to finally develop two models of resistance 
which encapsulate the responses of those I have been studying.  
                                                 




PART C: FURTHER ANALYSIS INFORMED BY THE 
LITERATURE 
Chapter 7: The sociological literature on work 
This chapter gives a brief summary of the relevant ideas from the sociological 
literature which were useful in furthering the analysis of the themes developed in 
Chapters 5 and 6. The first section outlines an understanding of the meaning of work, 
particularly the function it was believed to fulfil in society, covering the seminal 
ideas of Marx, Simmel, Durkheim and Weber, and more latterly Habermas. The next 
section follows the development of the ways in which work has been controlled, 
leading on to the third section on the most recent form of control noted in academic 
writing, normative control. The fourth section, on workers’ responses to this form of 
control, includes a discussion of resistance. The chapter concludes with a 
consideration of the relationship between work, scientific research and the role of 
Government. 
7.1 The meaning of work 
In Chapter 5 I described the first emergent theme arising from the data analysis – the 
meaning of work to those I studied. Attitudes to work and how workers should be 
managed can be traced back a long way. The Bible begins with two accounts of the 
creation of humankind: in one, humans are created to care for the earth God has just 
created; in the other, humans are condemned to work for the length of their lives 
because they have sinned by eating the fruit of the forbidden tree. In the former 
account, work is something that is part of being human. It is why we were created. 
To not want to work is unnatural. In the latter account work is a punishment and in 
order to be saved from our sinfulness we will always have to work. In each account 
there is the hint that humans may resist work and that to do so is somehow wrong. 
Each account expresses a different view of human nature. In the first humans are 
“benign” and in the latter “egocentric” and self-seeking (Tausky, 1995: 20). The 
latter account contains the idea that workers need to be coerced into working. This 
attitude relates directly to the implied distrust of workers in present systems of 




Why do we work? Is it a way of gaining money/pay in order to realise our potential 
(and I would say, negotiate our identity) outside work, or is it at work that we realise 
our potential? Workers in AgResearch cover the whole spectrum of these extremes. 
Mainly they demonstrate that at work they are striving to reach their potential and to 
fulfil a purpose, beyond what they earn. The former point of view was espoused most 
strongly by Adam Smith (Grint, 1991: 23). The latter view is espoused by Marx and 
is also the basis of the Protestant work ethic. When work is not a place where we 
realise our potential and fulfil a larger purpose in life, then we become 
instrumentalists, we separate work from the rest of life (Goldthorpe et al., 1970: 39). 
Everyone needs to ‘make meaning’ by believing that they have contributed to 
something that will live on after they die (Durkheim, in Burrows and Lapides, 1969: 
53). Gini (2000: 73), with reference to Victor Frankl, writes in a similar frame:   
… [we] need to feel that our lives, our efforts, make a difference to others, and 
to be denied this recognition is to be diminished in our humanity. Because so 
few of us feel we are part of a larger purpose, we lose ourselves in the pay-off, 
the paycheck, and are driven solely by the goal of pecuniary well-being. The 
primary meaning of our labor is reduced to what it allows us to get or buy. We 
no longer work to create or contribute but only to consume. 
 
Some writers relate instrumentalism directly to capitalism. Capitalism is seen as 
turning labour into a commodity: “Employees resort to economically instrumental 
behaviour when, to paraphrase Oscar Wilde, capitalism puts a price on everything 
(i.e. labour as a commodity) while valuing nothing” (Knights and Willmott, 1999: 
80). Whereas for me, instrumentalist behaviour may just mean that some people 
strive to fulfil a ‘larger purpose in life’ outside the workplace. 
 
This section is divided into two major parts. The first details how the ‘founding 
fathers of sociology’ influenced the development of thinking about work, and how 
their writings have led to my interest in using the words ‘estrangement’ and 
‘alienation’ to describe the experience of the workers I observed in AgResearch. The 
second part outlines the concern of contemporary writers for what is happening in 
society and its influence on the world of work. 
7.1.1 The influence of the ‘founding fathers of sociology’ 
It is generally acknowledged that there are three chief theoretical influences in the 
study of work, Marx, Durkheim and Weber, “the founding ‘gang of three’ ” 
according to Grint (1991: 104). The ideas of each give important support to my 
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study, and each, in their own way, is remarkably prescient. From Marx comes the 
concept of the creativity of labour and the argument that workers can become 
alienated from the product of their labour; from Durkheim comes an understanding 
of the balance that is required between the need for humans to belong to society and 
the control exercised by belonging which contributes to social cohesion; and from 
Weber comes an awareness of the development of so-called ‘rational’ systems of 
control of work, which may not actually help human well-being, a point conveyed by 
Weber’s use of the bleak descriptor, the “iron cage” of bureaucracy.  
 
Marx (1818-1883) “saw human estrangement as rooted in social structures which 
denied people their essential human nature”, and that “this human essence was 
realized in labour, a creative activity carried out in cooperation with others by which 
people transformed the world outside themselves” (Abercrombie, Hill & Turner, 
1988: 8). The ‘young Marx’ developed the concept of alienation from philosophical 
and religious sources. He related it both to the feeling workers had in a capitalist 
system and to the economic and social structures of capitalism. For him, workers had 
a sense of powerlessness. Their work was meaningless because of the way the 
‘division of labour’ turned work into a commodity. This dissociated workers from 
their labour and resulted in a self-estrangement or alienation from their ‘human 
nature’ – their essential human self - that made them distinct from animals. With this 
denial of the satisfaction of their labour, workers became instrumentalists 
(Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Bechhofer, & Platt, 1969: 165). At the same time their 
involvement in a market economy caused workers to become competitors, isolating 
them from each other (Grint, 1991: 92; Abercrombie et al., 1988: 8-9). The ‘mature’ 
Marx referred less to the concept of alienation, replacing it with the harder-edged 
concept of the exploitation of the working classes, defined by a labour theory of 
value (Abercrombie et al., 1988: 9). It is the idea of alienation that interests me here 
because it articulates one of the reasons why scientists in AgResearch demonstrate 
evidence of resistance. They are resisting losing control over the direction and the 
product of their research; their work becoming a commodity; the denial of their 
human qualities; and being judged by market success (ibid.: 8). 
 
I wish to use this concept of alienation, and keep it separate from the way the concept 
was enlarged upon by Marx and later mid-twentieth century writers to encompass 
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feelings of self-estrangement. By doing this I am able to distinguish between 
scientific workers’ response to change as estrangement compared with an additional 
response particular to scientists, that of alienation. I will use the word ‘estrangement’ 
to encompass the experience of scientific workers: their feelings of not belonging, 
not fitting, not being able to make a valued contribution, and the sense of insecurity 
these experiences engender.  
 
The expression ‘self-estrangement’ has a long sociological history. Marx appears to 
have used its equivalent within his alienation concept through the influence of Hegel: 
“Alienation from self (spiritual)” appears in an index of Hegel’s translated work 
(Kaufmann, 1971: xviii). Grint (1991: 92) writes of workers not being able to 
achieve “self-realization” through their work. Simmel (1858-1918), concerned about 
social interaction, wrote three works of particular interest. In the first, The Metropolis 
and Mental Life, Simmel (1950a) delineates the dilemma of the metropolis: in order 
not to be over stimulated by the life in the metropolis, people have developed an 
emphasis on the intellect, allowing them independence from what is going on around 
them. The price one pays, however, is “one nowhere feels as lonely and lost as in the 
metropolitan crowd” (ibid: 418).138 This work demonstrates how, a century ago, a 
perceptive writer was aware of the impact of distancing on human well-being. In his 
work The Philosophy of Money, Simmel (1990[1900]) links this development of self-
consciousness with the rise in the use of money. In the third work, The Stranger, 
(Simmel, 1950b) the role of the stranger or outsider is portrayed as necessary to a 
group; the stranger may act as a ‘trader’, for example, bringing ‘products’ from the 
‘outside’ into the group or taking their ‘products’ to the ‘outside’. “The stranger is by 
nature no “owner of soil” – soil not only in the physical, but also in the figurative 
sense of a life-substance which is fixed, if not in a point in space, at least an ideal 
point of the social environment” (Simmel, 1950b: 403). Simmel does not examine 
the power balance between the stranger and the group but emphasises more its 
mutuality. In this sense, Simmel’s ‘stranger’ is in fact the managerial staff in an 
organisation like AgResearch. Such staff could be viewed as acting as go-betweens 
or mediators between the world of science and the world outside science. Ironically 
in this world, it is the scientific workers who are actively feeling like the ‘strangers’. 
                                                 
138 Foreshadowing Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd (1950). 
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Perhaps the work of Simmel clarifies the need for management and scientific 
workers to be aware of their mutual, interdependent relationship, rather than one in 
which the power is vested predominantly in one group.  
 
The concept of self-alienation became popular in post-World War II America under 
the influence of refugees from Germany and Austria (e.g., Erich Fromm, Hannah 
Arendt) (Kaufmann, 1971: xix). To develop further this idea of estrangement I have 
selected the work of Blauner (1964), one of many possibilities. In his book, 
Alienation and Freedom, Blauner operationalised four dimensions of alienation to 
explain his observations of the behaviour of factory workers: powerlessness, 
meaninglessness, isolation and self-estrangement. For Blauner (1964: 16-22) 
‘powerlessness’ relates to a work situation in which a worker cannot be self-directed 
and/or is not free to leave a job for alternative employment. Traditionally, according 
to him, there have been four areas of interest relating to powerlessness:  
(1) the separation from ownership of means of production and the finished 
products, (2) the inability to influence general managerial policies, (3) the 
lack of control over conditions of employment, and (4) the lack of control 
over the immediate work process (ibid.: 16). 
 
The latter two areas are not applicable to AgResearch workers. The first I wish to 
bracket as the description of alienation I wish to use (see earlier). I would like to 
include the second area and that of insecurity of employment, in my concept of 
‘estrangement’. To AgResearch workers, work is a very meaningful activity when 
constructed by their reasons and purposes for doing it. To Blauner ‘meaninglessness’ 
indicated a lack of a “sense of purpose” in work (ibid.: 22) and so is not relevant to 
AgResearch workers. Blauner describes his third dimension, ‘isolation’, as “the 
worker feels no sense of belonging to the work situation and is unable to identify or 
uninterested in identifying with the organization and its goals” (ibid.: 24). His final 
dimension, ‘self-estrangement’, describes a worker who “may experience a kind of 
depersonalised detachment”. This may be “a threat to a self-approved occupational 
identity” (ibid.: 26), a pre-condition to the development of an instrumental attitude to 
work (ibid.: 27). I wish to incorporate these last two meanings into my definition of 
‘estrangement’ as they describe not only the sense of ‘not belonging’ and 
powerlessness to do anything about it, but also how this can lead to distancing and 
instrumentalism. This then challenges a worker’s identity and its association with the 




Workers throughout AgResearch blamed the organisation and the CEO in particular 
for any discontent they felt. Other writers have taken the concept of alienation further 
by calling this process ‘reification’. For example, Berger and Luckmann (1967, cited 
in Seidman, 1994: 130) saw it as “an almost natural, inevitable property of the social 
worlds that we create, to take on an object-like character”.  
 
The second person to influence theories of work is Durkheim (1858-1917), who was 
concerned about “social solidarity and cohesion during a time of rapid social and 
economic transition” (Grint, 1991: 101). Durkheim argued that people’s capacity for 
greed was ‘inherently infinite’ and so for society to function there needed to be 
societal norms which people internalised and that restrained this human tendency.139 
In his study of suicide, Durkheim identified four types of situations in which people 
were more at risk of suicide. Two are of interest here. The first is ‘egoistic’ when 
individuals are responsible for their own salvation and the second is ‘anomic’ which 
is the condition in which people experience a state of ‘normlessness’, a conflict of 
norms (Abercrombie et al., 1988: 78-80) or an “anarchy of selfishness” (Grint, 1991: 
101). These two are of interest because they indicate that in situations where people 
are left to themselves and have a lot of autonomy they may feel unconnected to 
society and unappreciated.  
 
Clegg and Dunkerley (1980: 24) link the ‘egoistic’ and ‘anomic’ concepts to the 
impact of the encouragement of excessive individuality. This is a common state of 
affairs for scientists as members of the science community, which has a strong 
emphasis on personal autonomy. ‘Belonging’ plays an important part in social 
cohesion. Durkheim thought that as the role of the church, family and state declined, 
the workplace, via the refurbishment of the medieval guild system, could take over 
some of the functions these groups had performed by “providing a kind of moral and 
social center for the individual” (Seidman, 1994: 66).  
 
Weber (1864-1920), the third of the ‘founding gang’, argued that “sociology had to 
aim at the understanding of the meaning of actions” (Abercrombie at al., 1988: 268). 
                                                 
139 The development of normative control (see Section 7.2 later) could be seen as consciously 
applying Durkeimian thought to the workplace community. 
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The methods of research that I am using owe a lot to this ‘interpretive method’ or 
verstehen, as Weber called it (Grint, 1991: 107). Weber also believed that there 
would be a “decline of magical interpretations and explanations of the world, and the 
gradual elimination of all mysteries, as science exploded more and more mythical 
assumptions” (ibid.: 108). He posited that there was a dominant trend in capitalist 
society, which, by a process of ‘rationalization’, would come to understand human 
actions. This knowledge could be then applied to the way people are organised in a 
‘bureaucracy’ in order for them to work more efficiently. At the same time, Weber 
understood that this increasing rationality would convert “capitalist society into a 
meaningless ‘iron cage’ ” (Abercrombie at al., 1988: 268). He was chilled by what he 
saw as the inevitable spread of rational systems of administration driving out less 
rational, but more ‘human’ systems (ibid.: 268-9; Grint, 1991: 108-111).140  
7.1.2 Concerns about what is happening in the world of work 
The analyses of work and organisation provided by Marx, Durkheim and Weber are 
reflected in the struggles workers in AgResearch are experiencing as they try to make 
their work meaningful in a changing environment. These struggles are reflected also 
in larger debates, evident in a broad range of literature, about the sort of world we are 
now living in and its implications for work. Many scholars and seers are interested in 
what is going to happen to work in the future (e.g., Beck, 2000; Freidson, 1994, 
2001; Ransome, 1999; Thompson and Warhurst, 1998; Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 1994). Their concerns cover many issues. 
Beck (2001: 4) points out that insecurity is endemic at all levels of society. He is 
worried that democracy will be destroyed by the quest for profit. Grint (1991: 3) 
reminds us that when “employment is configured and constrained” by market forces, 
it is forgotten that work is also “a social and moral sphere”. Workers’ actions can be 
seen as irrational in one sphere but rational in another. Freidson, the most eminent 
writer and thinker on professions over the past thirty years, believes that 
professionalism brings a meaning to work that is missing from the two dominant 
‘logics’ of work (Freidson, 2001: 106): the free labour market (consumerism) and the 
“rational-legal bureaucracy” (managerialism) (ibid.: 5). At the centre of issues raised  
                                                 
140 The rise of Islamic militancy in the 21st century indicates the prescience of Weber, who believed 
that ‘charismatic’ authority was the one way in which the inevitable trend towards domination by 
‘legal-rational’ authority might be disrupted. 
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by the ideology of professionalism “is the question of the proper role of knowledge  
in political and social life” (ibid.: 106). Rather than just using knowledge to 
maximise profit and efficiency, professionals would also want to use it to benefit 
society, ideally those in need (ibid: 121-123).141 An example of such a figure is 
Bruhn (2001), who writes, “the opportunity to be good and to do good is what 
motivated us to become health professionals” (ibid.: 3). These reasons for work are 
no longer being rewarded in the current environment (ibid.: 8).  
 
My research demonstrates that scientific workers in AgResearch have exhibited a 
growing division between their beliefs about the purpose of their work organisation 
compared with that espoused by management. Concerns about bureaucracy and its 
emphasis on efficiency have surfaced also in comments by other New Zealanders. 
The State Services Commissioner expressed his worry that management impacted on 
standards of integrity and cost cutting: “[M]anaging outputs endangers the long-term 
health of organisations”.142 Brian Easton (2000, 1995), a long-time commentator on 
economic policy and its impact in New Zealand, writes, “teachers, researchers, health 
and other professionals, the suppliers of services” find themselves working within a 
“management structure that seems to have objectives of its own, independent of the 
apparent purpose of the institution” (Easton, 2000: 56). In a reflection on the ‘New 
Zealand experiment’, Nagel (1997: 354) asks the question, “Should efforts to 
restructure public management derive only from the economist’s dour image of 
human behavior?” He wonders if other motives apart from economic should be used 
to encourage work in organisations (ibid.).143  
 
Those who presently work in science have their professional scepticism conjoined 
with a general societal atmosphere of distrust. In the 2002 series of Reith lectures, A 
Question of Trust, for example, Onora O’Neill (2002) in her third lecture, considered 
                                                 
141 This is Sarewitz’s (1996) concern also. However, it challenges my notion that many professionals 
serve those who are already privileged, e.g., lawyers, medical specialists, architects, engineers. 
Professionals who do not ‘serve’ the privileged are becoming less privileged in our society, e.g., 
nurses, teachers (at all levels of education), general practitioners, and scientists. 
142 The Press, 30 December 1999, p.9. 
143 Nagel (1997: 354) suggests these could be “social, moral, and intrinsic motives; inspirational 
leadership; and strong cultures devoted to excellence and service (even if service is now viewed as 
rendered to identifiable customers rather than to a generalized public).” Some of these motives bear 
remarkable resemblance to elements of normative control! (See Section 7.3). Also there was a definite 




the relationship between distrust and the emphasis on accountability in society at 
present. Bruhn (2001: 1, citing Carter, 1996) states: “the people of the United States 
have a serious problem: They neither mean what they say or [sic] say what they 
mean. Moreover, they hardly expect anybody else to mean what they say”. He 
comments that this has flowed on to a mistrust of government and other institutions 
(ibid.: 2). In New Zealand the “loss of public confidence in the institutions of 
government, politicians and public servants” has been lamented by the State Services 
Commissioner.144 Brian Easton pointed out that it works both ways: “the new 
management style requires greater controls in the name of “accountability” and 
abandons the principle of personal responsibility” (Easton, 2000: 56).145 Some 
writers promote scepticism (Breeling, 2001), and cynicism, because it is seen as an 
important dimension of moral decision-making (Turner and Valentine, 2001).146  
 
Hill and Turpin (1994: 351-355) use Habermas (1984, 1987) as a reference point to 
interpret what is going on in society. Habermas contends that how we live in the 
world has been taken over by systems – “systems of education, administrative power, 
and most important of all, market systems”. This has made making meaning complex 
and difficult for people. Society has developed “steering media” to simplify this 
‘making meaning’ process. The prime steering media, according to Habermas, are 
money and administrative power (Hill and Turpin, 1994: 352). Using this scenario, 
one could argue that scientific workers, by not valuing their work principally for the 
monetary reward it brings and not having a desire for managerial power, no longer fit 
within a society that measures success by these values.  
 
I place my research in this societal context and in the context of the development of 
different methods used to control work and workers in particular, foreshadowed by 
the work of Marx, Durkheim and Weber. I now wish to explore how systems of work 
control developed historically in order to understand what was happening in 
AgResearch.  
                                                 
144 The Press, 30 December 1999, p.9. 
145 In other words, accountability is about systems. See reference to Habermas in next paragraph. 
146 Now that cynicism is deemed to be a ‘good’ quality for employees to possess, Turner and 
Valentine have even devised a questionnaire to measure it! 
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7.2 Control of work 
During the industrial revolution there was no general theory of organisation (Littler, 
1982a: 123). Out of reflections on this period of history arose the seminal ideas of 
the three ‘founding fathers’ that have led to strands which have continued through 
the construction of working systems to the present day. From Marx we received the 
understanding that ‘workers’ in the capitalist system were ‘alienated’ from their 
work, and an awareness of fear on the part of employers and governments that if 
workers were not controlled there was likely to be anarchy, if not revolution. 
However, while an employer hires labour power, labour still has a certain amount of 
‘discretion’ over how their labour power is to be used. This means “… management 
are forever seeking new strategies or tactics through which that discretion can be 
deflected” (Clegg, 1994: 283). Taylor offered a ‘solution’ to this tension inherent in 
the capitalist labour process, a tension highlighted by Marx in his labour theory of 
value. Taylor thought of workers as machines who, with particular individual skills, 
could each complete a part of an industrial process while overseen by managers who 
had an understanding of the whole system. The result would be greater efficiency 
and workers would be happier because their jobs would match their skills and 
intelligence, and they would earn more by way of bonus payments. They were not 
required to ‘love’ the company but they were expected to appreciate the greater 
instrumental/economistic rewards made possible by the ‘scientific management’ in 
the company (Grint, 1991: 121, 185-188: Abercrombie et al., 1988: 215-6).  
 
From Durkheim we received the understanding that through strengthening societal 
(and therefore group/team/organisational) norms, people’s excessive desires would 
be controlled; they would experience a feeling of belonging, which would protect 
them against anomie (Clegg and Dunkerley, 1980: 28). By taking up this idea, the 
Human Relations ‘movement’ was able to draw attention to the need for a ‘happier’ 
work environment which it was believed would result in higher production (ibid.: 
122-135).147 Communities formed at work, according to Mayo and other leaders of 
the Human Relations ‘movement’, would counteract the fragmentation of society 
(ibid; Grint, 1991, 123-127; Rose, 1978: 103-146). 
                                                 
147 “What the Human Relations theorists did was to produce a highly developed ideological apparatus 





From Weber we received the idea that work practice could be studied in order to 
understand it; then that knowledge could be used to develop systems which would 
make workers more productive. The system of corporatisation has been part of this 
development. In Chapter 6, I described how AgResearch management, as part of the 
corporatisation of the organisation, communicated a strategic plan with its implied 
development of an organisational culture which would support organisational goals, 
particularly through the development of products which would make a profit for the 
company.  
 
Edwards (1979: 11-22) saw systems of work control as passing through certain 
stages of development by employers as workers resisted them and further 
developments were made to counter that resistance and so on.148 Initially, in the 
workplace, hierarchical control was all that was required. As work organisations 
grew and the technology became more complex there was the need for greater 
control of how work was done (technical control), and for bureaucratic control in the 
form of rules and policies. These have been called external controls and merely 
required an employee to conform to them. As Ashforth and Mael (1998: 92) state: in 
such systems “the hands matter, but the head and heart do not.” Incorporating 
internal control or self discipline (as Clegg names it – with reference to Foucault) in 
workers, however, would decrease the costs of supervision, and hence increase 
global competitiveness and efficiency (Clegg, 1994: 282-3). Kunda (1992: 12) 
endorses this view. This ‘internal’ system of work control has become known as 
‘normative’ control.  
7.3 Normative control 
To function effectively, organizations must regulate the activities of their members 
in the service of organizational goals. Increasingly, controls that regulate 
behaviours are being complemented or supplanted by normative controls that 
regulate the very thoughts and feelings of members. Part of the normative freight 
conveyed by such controls includes organizationally endorsed values, beliefs, 
modes of sense-making, and definitions of the organizational self. Because 
individuals have existing and emerging self-conceptions abstracted from 
experiences and roles beyond their organizational involvement, the imposition of 
                                                 
148 Barley (1992: 1) argues against this perspective. He “challenges the prevalent notion that American 
managerial discourse has moved progressively from coercive to rational and, ultimately, to normative 
rhetorics of control”. He suggests that rather there have been surges and contractions between these 
different rhetorics since the 1870s. 
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definitions may be perceived as threatening and trigger ambivalence toward the 
organization. In this light, resistance can be seen as a contest for meaning, a way 
of asserting or preserving a valued sense of identity independent of – or 
antagonistic to – the organization’s definition (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 113).  
 
This section describes normative control, answers the questions of why workers 
would want to resist this form of control, and if resistance is in fact possible within 
such a powerful system. It outlines the contribution Labour Process Theory has made 
to the study of resistance, particularly with its introduction of subjectivity. The 
section concludes with a discussion of the link between identity and work, 
particularly how competition fosters individualism. Thus it positions this thesis as a 
study of the impact of a system of normative control on scientific workers. 
7.3.1 What is normative control? 
Rose (1988: 9-12) postulates five main ways in which employers can control 
workers. These are: through the terms of employment, the work organisation, the 
supervision structure, employee representation, and the frameworks of interpretation 
held by personnel. This latter form of control has come to be called ‘normative or 
cultural control’ (Bate, 1998: 38-42; Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 113) and is 
recognised as becoming a common practice in work organisations (Knights and 
Vurdubakis, 1994: 173 referring to Rose (1987)). This awareness came about as such 
academic writers as Hassard, Holliday, & Willmott (2000), Casey (1995), Willmott 
(1993) became aware of the impact of the so-called changing forms of managerial 
practice advocated by writers such as Peters and Waterman (1982), Peters and Austin 
(1985), Crosby (1984) and Kanter (1984). For example, Van Maanen and Kunda 
(1989, cited in Hassard et al., 2000: 7) claim that these writers assert that all the 
“(emotional) obstacles to managerial rule” can now be managed so that autonomy 
becomes exercised within the shared values espoused by the organisation (also 
Willmott, 1993: 525). The fifth theme of Rose (1988) is an echo of Etzioni’s (1961) 
work – the latter being the earliest source in which I found a reference to ‘normative 
power’. Etzioni classifies power in organisations as having three dimensions, 
‘normative power’ being one of them (Etzioni, 1969[1961]: 60-62). Sturdy et al. 
(1992a: 5) link this sense of changing control patterns to Burawoy (1979) and 
Edwards (1979). Kunda (1992: 11-12) describes such control as “the attempt to elicit 
and direct the required efforts of members by controlling the underlying experiences, 
thoughts, and feelings that guide their actions … a sort of creeping annexation of the 
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workers’ selves.” By “practices of symbolic management (e.g., mission statements, 
stories, rituals, physical setting) and substantive management (e.g., strategy 
formulation, reward systems, budgets, information systems)” an organisation imparts 
the “identity, seminal goals and values, prevailing beliefs and assumptions, and 
behavioral norms” expected of its workers (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 92-93). 
 
The Organisational Culture school of thought (e.g., Child, 1988; Handy, 1985[1976]) 
proposes that organisations work best if the goals of an organisation match those of 
the people who work in it (Grint, 1991: 131). According to other theorists from this 
perspective, organisational change is about changing the culture to fit the 
environment in which an organisation finds itself.149 150 The problem then arises 
when an organisation brings these two strands together: when it seeks to impose this 
new culture on the cultures already practised by those in the organisation. Bate 
(1998)151 thinks that any organisation considering a strategy of cultural development 
sees its primary function as one of control. He describes this strategy as the 
manipulation of culture to bring about a “love of the firm and its goals” in order to 
increase productivity (ibid.: 38). Bate outlines three levels of organisational control, 
one of which is “a form of ideational control that works by controlling the way 
people think rather than their behaviour – in short, mind control” (ibid.: 39). He 
suggests a fourth: “Control exercised by operating on people’s sensory, aesthetic and 
emotional responses – playing on their feelings as well as their thoughts” (ibid.: 42). 
  
In Chapter 6 I explained how workers have responded to change in a way that I have 
described as resistance, because they developed ways of reducing the effect of 
corporate communications about the meaning of their work. I described the lack of 
accountability in the ‘accountability culture’ (as I call it), and how this workplace 
context has made people feel very insecure in their employment. Some writers 
suggest that resistance in the workplace has become very difficult under present day 
management systems. Ashforth and Mael (1998: 100) argue that when hierarchical 
                                                 
149 Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 20) and Wicks (1998) are critical of organisational researchers who 
insist that organisational structures should be shaped by the environments they operate in, leaving 
little role for individual agency. 
150 Simpson and Craig (1997) have said that AgResearch has adopted this strategy. 
151 Bate (1998), a writer on organisational culture takes, on his own admission, a different perspective 
from most members of this school as he wishes to study organisational culture to understand it rather 
than to further its use to control workers. 
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control developed into technical, bureaucratic and normative controls, control 
became depersonalised as it was incorporated into the system and became accepted  
and unquestioned. This made it invisible. Under such a system, resistance is likely to 
“be more muted, sporadic, and diffuse”. This leads into a discussion of resistance. Is 
what I have observed ‘resistance’ as defined in the sociological literature? Why and 
what would workers be resisting? 
7.3.2 Why resist normative control? 
The development of systems of work control rest on the premise that workers will be 
motivated to resist (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Clegg, 1994; Edwards, 1979). 
And, as May (1999: 6), using a reference to Foucault, suggests, there is a need to 
provide an “understanding of how to resist domination in everyday life”. Rose 
(1978[1975], 1988), though giving his books the title Industrial Behaviour (with 
different subtitles for each edition), relates his work more to systems of control of 
work than to the behaviour of the workers under these systems. The emphasis on 
‘control’, however, has another side that could be interpreted as resistance. A system 
of control could be interpreted as a description of the way workers are believed to try 
to exert control over their work. For example, when in 1918, early psychologists 
decided to focus on worker fatigue as a reason for low productivity, it took till 1924 
for Myers, the foremost researcher in this field, to discover that workers were 
recalcitrant because they found the work boring and monotonous and so tried to 
introduce variety in whatever way they could (Rose, 1978: 65-84). The emphasis on 
control of work implies that resisters must be very powerful. So much energy has 
been expended looking for ways to control workers!152 
 
If normative control is about management in organisations trying to control how 
employees make their work meaningful, then there are going to be times and places 
when employees have different meanings from others in their work organisation – 
both from other groups and from the organisation itself as promoted by its senior 
management. Whether or not workers resist will depend on how important those 
meanings are to them. As Ashforth and Mael (1998: 99) assert “because the 
                                                 
152 Nord and Jermier agree. “The heavy emphasis on overcoming resistance reflects an important 
assumption managerialist writers seem to hold. The writers appear to be assuming that those who 
resist are powerful actors (or could easily become so). If they are not powerful, why would so much 
attention be given to dealing with them?” (Nord and Jermier, 1994: 3). 
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individual is not a tabula rasa onto which the organization can simply inscribe an 
identity, ambivalence and resistance tend to result.” Rose (1988: 12) claims that 
some of the causes of resistance are surprising. Workers may simply not care about 
the economic interests of the employer. If the workers do see their interests 
differently they are more likely to resist the ways in which managers try to control 
“their effort and their ways of thinking”. 
 
According to Ackroyd and Thompson (1999), resistance is a way of asserting 
autonomy and hence maintaining identity. Suppressed ‘misbehaviour’ will appear in 
another form. Hence, the literature suggests that resistance to normative control is 
likely because the norms imposed by management are likely to differ from those of 
workers, and because workers tend to seek control or autonomy over their work. 
7.3.3 Is resistance to normative control possible? 
Can some of the behaviour of workers that I have observed in AgResearch be called 
resistance? Is it possible for workers to act or are they overwhelmed by the 
organisational structures and management systems, and Government policy as 
implemented by FRST? Writers in the sociology of work are concerned about the 
lack of literature about resistance. The accounts given of the theoretical basis for the 
management of work (e.g., Grint, 1991; Rose, 1978, 1988; Littler, 1982b), have paid 
little attention to how workers adapted or resisted these regimes, suggesting that 
employers were successful in controlling and/or manipulating the ‘natural’ 
recalcitrance of workers. Indeed this lack of literature has been used to argue that 
even the New Wave Marxists were so overwhelmed by the success of capitalism that 
their works could be read as supporting it (Rose, 1988: 381). The power of normative 
control is asserted by contemporary writers: “The power of administrators to regulate 
action, thought, and feeling is institutionalized in systems of control that veil the use 
of power and confer a patina of legitimacy, thus making resistance appear 
unwarranted and ultimately hopeless” (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 114). 
 
The Board and senior management in AgResearch developed the organisational 
direction as communicated in the strategic plan, and presumed that workers would 
accept it. The CEO then implied, if AgResearch did not change quickly, it would not 
survive. According to Grint (1991: 131-2), managers act as if organisational culture 
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as expressed in a strategic plan actually exists. There is “a presumption that all 
organization members do, or should, share the aims attributed to organizational 
leaders” (Rose, 1978: 227-8). Other tactics are used to ‘encourage’ workers to buy in 
to company values. Any resistance or “tactical protests” can be seen by management 
as a luxury “in the face of the … ‘imperatives’ of [organisational] survival: for 
example, the pursuit of efficiency, effectiveness and economy” (May, 1999: 9; 
Nilakant and Ramnarayan, 1998: 359). Schoenberger (1997) suggests that allusion to 
competition masks power relations at work. If workers refuse to accept this need for 
urgency they are “open to the charge of being … out of touch with the necessities of 
a given reality, in whose name managers are positioned within the organizational 
field to speak” (May, 1999: 9-10).  
 
Evidence for the strength of the belief in the dominant power of capital/employers is 
also seen in the lack of attention paid to resistance in the management literature. The 
Neo-Human Relations School saw resistance “in terms of the psychology of 
individual deviancy … Such perspectives did not start from the reality of observed 
behaviour, but from a variety of preconceived starting points” (Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1998: 18), which included human needs (Maslow, 1943) and 
behaviourist notions (Skinner, 1953; Homans, 1950). The Neo-Human Relations 
School assumed that a “compliant, programmable worker is possible” (Ackroyd and 
Thompson, 1999: 18). Most literature studied organisational behaviour in order to 
achieve greater control: “… that if something can be understood, it is manageable” 
(ibid.: 19). Clegg (1994, 1990) spends a lot more time writing on how organisations 
‘outflank’ employees than on how employees resist. My conclusion, on reading some 
of the management literature, is that any problem with worker behaviour is regarded 
as a fault of management for not managing it properly. In this respect, later 
management theorists stand alongside F.W. Taylor. Other writers support this 
conclusion (e.g., Analoui and Kakabadse, 1993: 56-58; Rose, 1988: 11-12).153 In 
                                                 
153 E.g., “The message that managers have found most often in such accounts [frameworks of 
interpretation held by personnel] is that the interests of workers coincide, in the end, with those of the 
employer. In this perspective, any resistance or uncooperativeness by workers to being controlled is 
not just a danger to efficient production. It is also wrong headed: the reflection of a poor character (‘a 
bad attitude’) on the part of the worker; the outcome of his or her ‘stupidity’; or the sign of a 
‘political’ motivation. Even when they say it results from ‘poor communication’, seemingly criticizing 
themselves for putting the management message across badly, they may actually be blaming workers 
for not understanding it” (Rose, 1988: 12). 
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spite of this, such resistant workers are portrayed as deviant or irrational (Rose, 1988: 
11-12; Strebel, 1996: 86).  
 
Other writers hope that by focusing on resistance it will become visible. Ackroyd and 
Thompson (1999) in the book Organizational Misbehaviour154 attempt to persuade 
the reader that the workplace is no different from anywhere else. People ‘misbehave’ 
everywhere! In the past, “[m]uch employee action has been treated as a rehearsal for 
something else – social deviance, class struggle …” but Ackroyd and Thompson 
(1999: 52) wish to present and understand “mis/behaviour on its own terms”. They 
point out that industrial relations, organisational or management theorists “have not 
sought to identify the extent of misbehaviour or to constitute it as a subject” 
(ibid.).155 Hence, for Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 47), absolute control can never 
be exercised over workers. The latter will always find ways around management.  
 
Other writers also disagree about the power of normative control. In a study based on 
the finance industry in New Zealand, Austrin (1994) was sceptical about the 
emergence of self-disciplined workers (one of the goals of normative control 
according to Clegg (1994: 282)). Hassard et al. (2000: 8) assert “… there is 
invariably the possibility of slippage and resistance whenever employees experience 
corporate demands to transgress their embodied sense of self-identity”. As far as 
Bate (1998: 40) is concerned “it simply does not work!” He does not believe, even in 
times of uncertainty, that employees will buy-in to anything just because someone 
else thinks it is ‘a good thing’. Ashforth and Mael (1998: 94) draw attention to the 
relationship between the process by which control is used, in terms of its respect for 
individuals, and whether or not resistance occurs. It is argued that as insecurity of 
employment is becoming more endemic, workers are less likely to trust employers 
than they did in the past. It seems rather naïve, even irrational, of employers to 
expect loyalty from their workers when they cannot offer security in return. 
Employment relations are likely to become more calculative in this situation (ibid.:  
106). Other writers, as indicated elsewhere, also direct attention to the importance of 
the organisational (as well as the national and international) context of work.  
                                                 
154 In the book title the second word is italicised so that the title is ‘Organizational MisBehaviour’. 
155 By making resistance a subject in its own right I fear that these authors risk objectifying it again by 
losing its personal and contextual nature. 
 
174 
Other situational contexts, apart from managerial systems of control, may be limiting 
workers’ actions. Most writers do seek to find an analytical balance between the 
power of structures set up by organisations and environments, and a worker’s ability 
to act (though some writers have a dislike of such a dualism, e.g., Knights and 
Willmott, 1989). Nonetheless, some contexts do exist in which the actions of workers 
are very limited. The dominance of structure over agency (and vice versa) may occur 
by degree, rather than absolutely (Law, 1994: 52-71). Davidson (1994) has depicted 
a situation in which, she argues, the state of the labour market has dominated any 
control workers may have had. Dent (1991) in his study of the medical profession in 
Britain, described the medical arena in terms of “competing strategies” between the 
profession and management, with these strategies being policy rather than 
management driven, but with similar objectives to those found in the private sector 
(ibid.: 84). He points out that the medical profession has had the power to modify 
and reinterpret management strategies to fit their concerns (ibid.: 83-4).  
 
Similarly, the context of the labour market and its requirement for particular skills 
may limit a worker’s actions. According to Littler (1982b: 7-11) there are two forms 
of the social construction of skill. The strong version says that skill is not dependent 
on job content but on the control of the supply, through employers’ or workers’ entry 
barriers. The weaker version has it that skill is recognized and rewarded only to the 
extent of the capacity of workers to define it as skill – a capacity which is derived 
from their “strategic position within the production process combined with collective 
organization” (ibid.: 9). The medical profession has had the power to both control 
supply and define their own strategic position within the health system. The science 
community in New Zealand does not appear to have either of these controls over the 
skills of its workers.156 According to May (1999: 3), the argument about the meaning 
                                                 
156 I think this aspect is also crucial to the argument about what is different now compared with both 
the period when AgResearch started and DSIR and MAF Tech before that. In the public sector in the 
past there was not this concern about control by management, particularly as interpreted and 
implemented by Human Resources practice. One of the consequences of restructuring the public 
sector in New Zealand was that more managers were required to ensure greater accountability and 
efficiency. In this restructuring, medical specialists have benefited (The Press, Saturday, 23 Feb, 
2002) because of their power in the market place through the construction of private health insurance. 
Scientists do not have this bargaining power in spite of Government rhetoric about their important role 
in the knowledge economy. If R&D featured more strongly in New Zealand’s industrial culture, this 
situation could change. 
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of work should be “centred on a continual struggle between resistance and power 
with due consideration being given to the elements of both agency and structure”.  
 
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 47) mention the importance of Labour Process 
Theory (LPT) in the study of resistance in the workplace. I describe this branch of 
the sociology of work briefly in the next section.  
7.3.4 Labour Process Theory (LPT) 
The relevance of LPT is based on the dialectic between capital and labour, in which 
capital is trying to control labour in order to produce more profit, and which labour 
resists (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 20, 47; Edwards, 1979; Smith and Thompson, 
1999: 211). LPT developed from Braverman (1974) (Braverman, 1999; Grint, 1991: 
184; Smith & Thompson, 1999) and traditionally has been centred on skill and 
control (Smith and Thompson, 1999: 207), and the division of labour. Its intellectual 
roots are firmly in a labour theory of value, although the domain of discussion has 
moved increasingly from economics to sociology, after neo-classicism usurped 
economics; these roots are sometimes forgotten.  
 
The influence of Marxism is apparent in the many work studies, which until recent 
times, focused on the so-called working class with attention being paid to factory 
work and coalmining. At the time (early 1970s) workers in these industries went on 
strike for long periods. There was always the hope among Marxist supporters that 
such strikes actually were indicators of the revolution to come (Nord & Jermier, 
1994: 3). The second wave of LPT (e.g., Edwards, 1979; Littler, 1982b) described a 
new labour process which was “not so attached to revolutionary ideas” and class. 
Writers thought that resistance was now against management and how it controlled 
work (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 47). Ashforth and Mael (1998: 107-108), 
however, still see those who come from LPT and radical or critical theory 
perspectives as portraying the romantic notion of “the noble but downtrodden worker 
fighting valiantly against a system of oppression governed by greedy capitalists or 
impersonal bureaucracies (Braverman, 1974; Nichols and Beynon, 1977)”.157 
Knights and Morgan (1991a, b), Wilkinson, Godfrey & Marchington (1997), and 
                                                 
157 Note that these authors do not cite more recent works even though this was published in 1998. 
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Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) do emphasise dominant power and how such power 
leads to oppression.  
 
Smith and Thompson (1999: 209), writers from an LPT perspective, challenge the 
supposed move from “models of control to ones of commitment”. They say that the 
call for greater participation and increasing autonomy for the workforce is a pretty 
hollow one. “Even among professionals, self-regulation is increasingly giving way to 
regulation through external audits and assessment” (ibid.). Others have argued that 
work is intensifying in the drive for greater efficiency in an increasingly competitive 
environment, and that this intensification has been introduced into the public sector 
(Smith and Thompson, 1999: 208-9; Warhurst and Thompson, 1998). 
 
Since the late 1980s, labour process theorists and researchers such as Knights, 
Collinson and Willmott have started taking the individual into their accounts, by 
focusing on subjectivity (e.g., Knights and Vurdabakis, 1994; Collinson, 1994; 
Willmott, 1993). Academics in this tradition are paying attention also to ‘white-
collar’ work (e.g., Smith, Knights and Willmott, 1991). Their work is important to 
me because there is actually very little literature on resistance and its link to identity 
outside the tradition of ‘blue collar’ work. 
 
May (1999: 2-3) makes the point that Braverman made labour an object rather than a 
subject. As editors of Resistance and Power in Organizations: Agency, Subjectivity, 
and the Labour Process, Jermier et al. (1994) indicate in their introduction, to better 
understand resistance in the workplace, researchers need to consider worker 
subjectivity. Wicks (1998:4) thinks that LPT is addressing the alienative effect of 
normative control type systems through its attention to subjectivity. He believes that 
in the absence of a “unifying class consciousness”, the way in which identity is 
formed and maintained and the conditions which allow “compliance and/or 
resistance to occur” is an important object/subject of study.  
 
What does this expression, ‘subjectivity’, mean? How does it relate to the issue of 
identity? Clegg (1994) uses subjectivity to describe how a person or identity is acted 
on or constituted by power. Hence a subject is also the site of resistance. Clegg is 
particularly interested in how intervention by management can create 
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“accommodative and co-opted subjects but also ones who are resistant” (Clegg, 
1994: 315). He develops two dimensions of the way authors constitute the resistant 
subject: a person’s awareness of themselves as a resistor and the way structures make 
a person into a resistor.  
 
Smith and Thompson (1999: 214) claim that the “Knights and Willmott camp” (as 
they call those who have added ‘the subject’ to LPT) and other writers in the 
tradition of “radical scepticism” have focused on the “nature rather than effectiveness 
of new management practices” (ibid.: 212). Such writers believe these practices are 
so powerful that any dissent disappears. In their accounts Smith and Thompson 
(1999: 215) feel “the voice of labor is not accessed, but constituted within 
managerial discourse”. Smith and Thompson fear that the “subject of the action” is 
lost (ibid.) and go on to say that they would rather refocus on the competition 
between capital and labour (ibid.: 216).  
 
Smith and Thompson demonstrate the importance of relating this study back to the 
restructuring of the public sector in New Zealand. However, I think they too also risk 
‘losing the subject of action’ by seeing conflict as between two structural forces, 
capital and labour, neglecting an interpretive approach to workers’ actions. The 
worker, in their analysis, becomes invisible. By contrast to the ‘constituted subject’ 
of Knights and Willmott, or the invisible worker of Smith and Thompson, an 
interpretive approach leads to a consideration of how people make meaning and may 
resist such ‘forces’ in order to protect their identities.  
 
Giddens, according to Knights and Vurdabakis (1994: 182), believes that people 
always have power to act, even if these actions are subject to particular boundaries 
and unanticipated consequences. He is concerned that in Foucault’s account “human 
beings do not make their own history but are swept along by it” (ibid.). Grint (1991: 
132-3) arguing from a contingent, interpretive framework, sees cultures as a result of 
“social action”. People are not as they ‘should be’ but have their own power as 
‘translators’ (Law, 1994:49) ‘interpreters’ (Grint, 1991; Blumer, 1967, 1969) and 
‘negotiators’ (Strauss, 1978). What happens is contingent, dependent on the context.  
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The previous section has introduced the topic of self-identity through the focus of 
some LPT writers on subjectivity. I will now discuss what other writers have said 
about the link between identity and work, so important to this study. 
7.3.5 Self-Identity and work 
For Ricoeur (1994, cited in May, 1999: 9), self-identity is expressed as the answer to 
the question ‘who am I?’ Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 27) assert the importance of 
the relationship of this answer to work: 
This matter of identity at work is becoming more rather than less important … 
The view of the employer and manager – that the employee will be willing to 
identify with their company – is no more nor less than a startling piece of 
wishful thinking.  
 
Goldthorpe et al. (1970: 1-3), informed by Marxism but researching in the context of 
growing British prosperity in the 1950s and 1960s, sought to ‘test’ the thesis, widely 
accepted at the time, that with increasing affluence the working class were becoming 
part of the bourgeoisie. The authors carried out large studies of three industrial plants 
in Luton and developed theories about orientations to work. People seek work that 
fits their particular ideas about why they should work and what they wish to get from 
it (ibid.: 178-9). These ideas come from a worker’s own background and the impact 
of the society of the time. They are context related and do not have to do just with the 
work organisation. Indeed, one of the major contributions made by Goldthorpe and 
his “affluent worker” colleagues was to extend the study of work beyond the “factory 
gate”. (The Human Relations movement did not like this result because it placed 
workers’ orientations outside the domain of influence of the employer, so, according 
to Grint (1991: 126), played down its significance. I observe that the development of 
normative control has placed workers back ‘inside’ this domain.) Workers may also 
choose to enhance extrinsic or intrinsic rewards at the expense of the other, or may 
choose to enhance their economic rewards in order to seek other satisfactions in their 
“out-of-work lives” (Goldthorpe et al., 1970: 179). Goldthorpe et al. also wished to 
modify the psychological focus of the Human Relations and Neo-Human Relations 
movements, by asserting that the satisfactions people seek in their work are 
“culturally determined variables, not psychological constraints” (ibid.: 178) and 




As I was analysing my first case study, the W&S Group, I became aware that identity 
was the big issue for those I was studying. It was only when I read Ashforth and 
Mael (1998) later, that I became aware that resistance and identity were linked in the 
literature. If workers feel that their identities are under challenge then it is likely that 
they will respond in some way that can be perceived to be resistance. Ashforth and 
Mael (1998: 90) argue that “acts of resistance are inherently meaningful to the actors 
and their peers. In particular, resistance is often prompted by a perceived threat to 
identity, to a valued conception of self”. Since then, I have found many other sources 
also making this link (e.g., Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Knights and Willmott, 
1999; Smith and Thompson, 1999; Bate, 1998; du Gay, 1996; Casey, 1995). It was 
also implicit in earlier work, where identity was linked to class or occupations such 
as coal miner, or factory worker, and it was assumed that workers resisted because 
they were members of (had the identity of) the working class. (Goldthorpe et al. 
(1970: 40-41) called the orientation of such workers ‘solidaristic’.)  
 
In AgResearch I observed that those workers whose lives have been centred on work 
as scientists seem to be most challenged by change. Ashforth and Mael (1998: 106) 
reviving (unknowingly) Simmel, discuss how life in contemporary society means 
that a person wears many different hats and so develops a facility for fitting into 
different situations as required, rather than be dominated by any one identity. 
“Furthermore, a multifaceted self has more internal resources for resisting external 
demands.” As companies demand more time of their employees or demonstrations of 
commitment by time spent at work, whether that time is efficiently used or not, 
employees may not have other ways of maintaining and reinforcing valued identities 
because they simply will not have time for alternative activities (Casey, 1995: 138-
182; Coser, 1974).  
 
For some workers, self-identity may be influenced more by their lives outside work, 
particularly how they spend their leisure (Iso-Ahola, 1989) and how they consume 
(du Gay, 1996). My focus is on identity and work but for many that connection 
relates to whether or not they have any leisure, and if they do, how it is related to 
their attitudes to work and to their identity, compared with those whose identities are 




Identity is about belonging and it is also about difference. Durkheim believed that by 
belonging to society, the limitless aspirations of individuals could be curbed. 
Encouragement of individuals to be different, apart from the need for a division of 
labour, would result in “unregulated egoistic behaviour” (Clegg and Dunkerley, 
1980: 27). The desire to belong and also to be different has been called “the paradox 
of identity” (after Smith and Berg, 1987, cited in Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 95). 
Collinson (1994) noted that much of the behaviour he observed was to do with ideas 
workers had about themselves and how these were reinforced by being different to 
other groups and especially to management. According to Collinson (1992), 
Thompson (1983), and Ashforth and Mael (1998), the development of an ‘us versus 
them’ mentality is a precursor to resistance.  
 
Ashforth and Mael (1998: 97) contend that ambivalence about who you work for is 
normal and probably healthy. As Collinson writes (1994: 29): “Resistance frequently 
contains elements of consent and consent often incorporates aspects of resistance.” In 
other words, people like to think of themselves as individuals and simultaneously as 
members of certain social groups (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 94-5). Within particular 
occupations, certain traits will be regarded as important, and that identity will 
become valued; then, as it is practised and recognised by others, it will come to be 
seen as part of a personal identity.  
 
In my study I am interested in what happens to workers whose livelihood now 
depends on work in a competitive environment such as the FRST system for the 
public funding of scientific research and the emphasis on the ‘global market’. 
Knights and Willmott (1999: 82) argue that workers become constructed as self-
interested individuals through such a system: “Marx’s analysis makes clear how 
individual self-interest is not an essential element in human existence. It is 
conditioned and sustained by the very workings of capitalism, the market and 
enlightenment conceptions of the autonomous individual.” For example, Goldthorpe 
et al. (1969: 165) link a growth in individualism with the increasing pay of a section 
of blue-collar workers. Knights and Morgan (1991b) reveal how life insurance sales 
people present clients with the choice of purchasing ‘security as a commodity’ rather 
than developing a “community of social relations” which could ensure their security 
(ibid.: 236). By studying the work of journalists, David Murphy (1991) demonstrated 
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that while they have strong unions, the need to ‘sell’ stories to an editor and meet the 
market demand for news forced journalists into individual competition with their 
colleagues. So, the need for bureaucratic control was reduced or eliminated and such 
workers became more active participants in capitalism. 
 
Austrin (1994) promotes the view that human resource strategies such as the 
performance appraisal system, described by Clegg (1994: 315) as “a form of 
simultaneous interrogation and therapy”, individualise work relationships and hence 
undermine the work of unions. Austrin suggests that unions should provide an arena 
in which workers can articulate their concerns and hear those of others, developing a 
collectivity.  
 
These writers see capitalism as forcing people into individuality and competition 
with others rather than encouraging a collectivity of community. People make 
decisions in order to bring themselves individual benefit rather than benefit a group 
or society.158 Giroux (2001) argues that capitalism has produced a society that fosters 
individualism at the expense of the common good.  
 
How is individualisation different from autonomy? There is some conflict in the 
literature. There is an implication that normative control reduces autonomy while, as 
a hand-maiden of capitalism, it increases individualisation. It seems to me that 
autonomy is about having a free choice over ‘how to be in society’ whereas 
individualism is something that decreases the chances of acting cooperatively. 
Though neo-liberalism is based on a catch cry of providing ‘more choice’, this 
choice is about market choice and therefore about making meaning through 
consumption (du Gay, 1996). It could be that normative control is a way to manage 
individualistic workers so that they cast this individualism aside and conform at work 
for the sake of production and exercise their autonomy only within the bounds of 
their organisational culture, which to some writers, is not autonomy at all (Hassard et 
al., 2000: 8; Sturdy et al., 1992a: 5). 
 
                                                 
158 This links to the notion of social capital and how the more developed a society the less social 
capital it is seen to have. In other words, there is less emphasis on social networks. (Ichiro Kawachi, 
Sociology Seminar at University of Canterbury, 3-8-01.) 
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I have discussed how many writers assert that resistance does occur in modern 
organisations and that frequently it can be seen as a response to the way in which 
normative control systems challenge identity and encourage individuality. I now go 
on to consider how others have described and interpreted what workers actually do or 
do not do in response to such a system of control. Identity is also something that may 
not be expressed by action, but by self-awareness, a secret activity (Cohen and 
Taylor, 1992). 
7.4 Responses to normative control  
Until I read the sociology of work literature I was unaware that normative control, as 
a system of work, existed. I had thought of systems of control as more visible and 
obvious, and I found it difficult to understand exactly what it was that scientific 
workers were unhappy about. By reading the literature I was made aware that 
workers were responding to the normative aspect of the systems of work control used 
by AgResearch corporate management. At first the implementation of the strategic 
plan was limited to its inclusion only in organisational policy. This in itself was 
sufficient to confuse many staff members as they wondered where they fitted and 
how they could contribute to this new description of the organisation in which they 
worked (Hunt, 2001). The Strategic Plan did not seem to apply to them and yet they 
were told that it did. For some, it was not that they did not want to conform to it. 
They just could not see how they could. It did not seem to describe the person they 
saw themselves as. For others there was a strong wish not to conform to this new 
vision.  
 
May (1999) emphasises, like other writers (e.g., Rose, 1978, 1988), the importance 
of understanding how the ‘local level’ or context affects the “variability and 
indeterminacy” (May, 1999: 13) or “contingency” (Grint, 1991) of the response of 
workers and their work organisation in ‘spaces of discretion’, or situations in which 
workers have choice. For instance, in AgResearch one could observe an overall 
effect of change on workers’ sense of insecurity, as well as a response to the 
particularities of this change. As Knights and Willmott (1999: 77) so aptly express it:  
Our sense of self is endangered by situations where we perceive ourselves to be 
vulnerable to social or interpersonal rejection or denial .… human beings 
interpret every situation through a self-conscious perception of what it means 




This section covers the possible responses of workers to a system of normative 
control ranging from active commitment to corporate values, to compliance, to 
resistance, followed by a discussion of different models of responses to work control 
taken from the literature. The section concludes with some thoughts on what is 
effective resistance. 
7.4.1 Commitment – active embracing of corporate values 
I have come across very little in the sociology of work and management literature on 
workers’ commitment to change. It would seem that a lot of the management 
directed literature is about how to manage change (e.g., Huber & Glick, 1993), 
getting workers to change (e.g., Eisler, 1995; Gustafson & Reger, 1995; Larkin & 
Larkin, 1996), and why management fails (e.g., Kotter, 1995; Moore & Spector, 
1995; MacLeod, 1993). Much of the sociologically based literature is about 
resistance to change (e.g., Jermier et al., 1994; Ashforth and Mael, 1998) or how 
work is changing, but not about the nature of the reaction to this change (e.g., 
Knights & Willmott, 2000; Beck, 2000; Thompson & Warhurst, 1998). Commitment 
and engagement of workers implies that management and ‘work’ have successfully 
appropriated the identity of workers (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 25; Casey, 
1995). As I have mentioned earlier, the assumption of most of the literature is that 
systems of work control have become so powerful that workers will submit to them 
and become committed to their work and their employer. 
 
Other words used in the literature on work that could be related to commitment are 
those of ‘manufacturing of consent’ in which the informal nature of competition 
between workers (such as playing games during breaks) is seen as subtly changing 
workers to fit the capitalist system. Burawoy (1979) interpreted Roy’s (1973) 
‘banana time’ behaviour in this fashion.159 I consider, however, that this behaviour is 
open to many other interpretations. It could be seen as a playing out of an 
acceptance, or a reinforcement of the system and rules of work control. This 
behaviour was also a measure of status within the working group and of self-identity,  
                                                 
159 Contemporary Sociology, a journal usually reserved for book reviews, recently (September, 2001) 
devoted its opening pages to several authors, including Burawoy (2001), in order to consider the 
impact of his idea on their own lives and work. 
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as Roy himself said (Roy, 1973: 218-19). ‘Manufacturing consent’ could be used to 
describe any manipulation of workers on the job which encourages them to 
unwittingly align themselves to organisational goals and requirements. (In this light 
it could be seen as a form of normative control.)160 Efforts by management to get 
employees ‘on side’ or ‘buying-in’ to corporate/Board inspired strategic directions, 
by using methods espoused by management gurus161 (e.g., Andrews & Herschel, 
1996; Kotter, 1995; Larkin & Larkin, 1996; Leonard & Straus, 1998;  Quinn, 
Anderson, & Finkelstein, 1998; Senge, 1990; Strebel, 1996; Tichy & Charan, 1995), 
also smack of ‘manufacturing consent’. Such methods could also be described as 
ways in which employers are able to ‘outflank’ employees (Clegg, 1994). Sturdy et 
al. (1992a: 6) are critical of Burawoy. They say he places too much emphasis on 
hegemony and consent, neglects “the significance and persistence of resistance” and 
marginalizes “the influence of ‘external’ factors – such as culture, race and gender, 
and social institutions (e.g., school, media, family) …”. Sturdy et al. (1992a) see 
individual workers as ‘susceptible’ to discipline but that they too can exercise power 
through skill and control. 
 
Whatever resistance was happening in AgResearch was happening in such a way that 
work continued, meaning workers must have developed ways of complying. 
7.4.2 Compliance 
Resistance, compliance and consent were simultaneously embedded in a 
shifting combination of contradictions, ambiguities and unresolved paradoxes 
and tensions … (Collinson, 1994: 38).  
 
Compliance is universal, existing in all social units. It is a major element of the 
relationship between those who have power and those over whom they exercise 
it (Etzioni, 1969: 59).162 
 
                                                 
160 My work in the Strategic Planning Implementation Network or Green to Gold Network, as it 
became named, could be seen in this light. It is only as I now reflect on the lack of enthusiasm of 
scientific staff for it that I realise my naїvety! 
161 The titles of some of these are quite revealing: Organizational Communication: Empowerment in a 
Technological Society (Andrews & Herschel, 1996); Putting your company’s whole brain to work 
(Leonard and Straus, 1998); Managing Professionals’ Intellect: Making the most of the best (Quinn et 
al., 1998); Why do employees resist? (Strebel, 1996); The CEO as Coach (Tichy & Charan, 1995). 
162 Etzioni references this understanding to an article by Simmel in an 1896 issue of the American 
Journal of Sociology. 
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Most accounts and theorising about resistance imply that workers do not resist to the 
extent of demonstrating their resistance by ‘exiting’ (Hirschman, 1970). This must 
mean that the forms of resistance and control documented and pondered over by  
many writers have been reasonably successful in getting a compliant, if not 
committed, workforce. Edwards (1986: 7) has been described by Ackroyd and 
Thompson (1999: 49) as moving away from a “ ‘control and resistance’ model to one 
that recognises a variety of forms of ‘conflict and accommodation’ ”. The word 
‘accommodation’ implies a bit of give and take, and is a good description of how the 
behaviour of each ‘side’ allows work to continue.  
 
Foner (1993) studied work in a nursing home. She cites Benson (1986: 228) to define 
work culture as “the ideology and practice with which workers stake out a relatively 
autonomous sphere of action on the job”, with an emphasis on how “employees 
distance themselves from the impact of formal authority structures as they confront 
the limitations and exploit the possibilities of their jobs” (Foner, 1993: 2). This work 
culture has a dual character for Foner. It provides adaptive and coping strategies and 
generates resistance. From her perspective, Roy’s (1973) description of ‘banana 
time’ is an example of adaptation. The “informal practices and customs” the nurse-
aids developed made them happier and often benefited patients (Foner, 1993: 2). The 
development of this work culture and the resistance to formal structures 
demonstrated within it showed how the workers were “not passive players” but 
“active agents” (ibid.: 9). Bate (1998: 41-2) also discusses how workers develop their 
own subcultures in order to resist. 
 
The literature asserts that compliance is related to an exchange relationship. Kelman 
(1958, cited in Wicks, 1998: 4) developed a typology which shows how individuals’ 
attitudes to change can be influenced in three different ways: by  
1) “compliance or exchange … compliance occurs only to gain specific rewards, an 
exchange of individual behaviour for material or psychological benefit”; 
2) “identification or affiliation … satisfaction of needs for affiliation …”; or  
3) “internalization or value congruence … congruence between individual and 
organizational values ...”.  
Kelman’s framework implies that people are open to manipulation by others. If, for 
example, an organisation can set up work that people want to do and which gives 
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them good rewards (of whatever nature), then they will comply because of the 
benefits they get. The relationship is only seen in terms of exchange (like homo 
economicus or ‘rational’ man theory (Grint, 1991: 123)). Similarly, one of the 
rewards could be providing workers with a place where they belong (Human 
Relations Theory). In other words, the second description could be incorporated into 
the first as one of the pay-offs. The third description is not about being influenced at 
all because there is no need. The workers already match with the organisation or the 
organisation has aligned itself with the values of its workers. This situation takes the 
focus away from power implying, erroneously, that the exchange is negotiated, free 
and between equals. Willmott (1993: 537) also links compliance and exchange. 
Instead of a deep identification with corporate values, there can be selective, 
calculative compliance. In which case, employee behaviour is (minimally) 
congruent with ‘realizing’ the values of the corporation, but only insofar as it is 
calculated that material and/or symbolic advantage can be gained from 
managing the appearance of consent. 
 
Wicks (1998) develops a different approach to control and resistance in organisations 
by considering an agency and constraint perspective in which compliance and 
resistance are responses to structural conditions which are also shaped by these 
responses (with reference to Giddens, 1989: 25). Compliance is very important 
because without it organisations could not exist. In fact Etzioni (1969[1961]) 
considers that the degree of compliance in an organisation is a measure of 
organisational effectiveness. He suggested that compliance relationships can be seen 
in three ways. Management have: coercive power, which leads to subordinates 
experience of alienation; remunerative power, which leads to subordinates having a 
“calculative” involvement/interest in the organisation; and normative power, which 
leads to subordinates having a moral involvement. (Wicks, in discussing Etzioni’s 
framework, does not mention how workers comply in this framework or what 
constitutes compliance as compared with other types of response.)  
 
Knights and Willmott (1999: 80-81) link identity and autonomy to resistance and 
compliance. They consider that employees respond by “distancing themselves 
mentally” when their sense of autonomy is threatened by managerial control and that 
this resistance is not noticed because it is “concealed in acts of compliance” (ibid.: 
80). Organisations have responded by setting up ways of obtaining employees’ 
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‘commitment’ to organisational goals, implying that organisational management 
want more than compliance.  
 
It is noticeable that in discussing compliance there is frequent reference made in the 
literature to four key, interlinked elements: resistance, identity and autonomy, 
distancing, and the notion that workers are able to comply only because they develop 
forms of resistance. I will attempt to describe and discuss these concepts within the 
limitation of the linear nature of writing. Note that this ordering and linking is my 
construction and not modelled on anyone else’s work. 
7.4.3 The nature of resistance 
Resistance is defined by Ashforth and Mael (1998: 90) as: 
… intentional acts of commission or omission that defy the wishes of others. 
The term intentional signifies that one’s motive is central to the dynamics of 
resistance but does not mean that resistance is necessarily premeditated or 
rational … The notion of resistance implies opposition against something, 
usually the exercise of power – the attempt to influence or control the resister. It 
is somewhat arbitrary, however, to label one behavior an act of power or control 
and another as an act of resistance .… power and resistance are embedded in a 
dynamic relationship that tends to be mutually reinforcing … Acts of control are 
usually intended to create and maintain the conditions of employment and to 
craft meaning for organizational members ... Conversely, employee responses 
that are intended to oppose these acts are referred to as resistance. 
 
The negative view of resistance as something to be overcome in the workplace is 
linked, according to Nord and Jermier (1994: 2-3), to the use of the word in 
psychoanalytic theory in which resistance was seen as a denial of reality (as 
perceived by the therapist). On the other hand, resistance could be a way an 
individual is protecting themselves from something that could harm them, and so it 
could be perceived as positive. Klein (1976), the only proponent I came across of the 
latter view, suggests that it is important to understand resistance as a natural part of 
change, because it is a response of people who may be experiencing “frustrations and 
[a] sense of helpless rage which these followers feel but usually cannot express” that 
may be voiced by just one person who may be seen by management as a 
“demagogue” or “rabble rouser” (ibid.: 122). It is important for organisations to take 
notice of such individuals as they may be articulating the views of many. As far as 





The idea of organisational misbehaviour as outlined by Ackroyd and Thompson 
(1999) is a fascinating and useful one. They wish to adopt Sprouse’s (1992: 3)  
working definition of misbehaviour as “anything you do at work you are not 
supposed to do”. Ackroyd and Thompson also point out that although it is those in 
power who decide what misbehaviour is (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 3), it can 
also occur at the management level and is not just confined to workers, though this 
may appear to be so because they are the ones under greater scrutiny. As I have 
discussed in an earlier work (Hunt, 2001), when an organisation produces a strategic 
plan it then has a document which says what it wants its workers to be like, and if 
they do not conform then they do not fit. In fact, if workers behave in a way which 
knowingly does not match this document, then according to Ackroyd and Thompson 
they could be said to be ‘misbehaving’.163 Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 7) argue 
“that the pursuit of autonomy (which is, from the managerial point of view, for the 
most part irresponsible), is the basis of organizational misbehaviour.” In other words, 
misbehaviour has a contingent nature and is context related. In contrast to Ackroyd 
and Thompsons’ definition, I suggest that misbehaviour could be defined by those 
doing the misbehaving. If you see yourself as a cynic and a resistor, then this also is 
how you define your behaviour, management’s inattention to it notwithstanding. 
Clegg (1994: 296-7) reinforces this idea that self-consciousness has to be part of a 
worker’s self-awareness for certain behaviour to be called resistance.  
 
Ashforth and Mael (1998: 92) emphasise “the power of resistance lies at least partly 
in its potential to contest meaning, specifically the definition of the individual 
derived from organizational membership”.  
 
Resistance can take the form of direct action or it can be indirect and embedded in 
other behaviour. This makes it difficult to distinguish. As Collinson (1994) indicates, 
in many cases resistance contains elements of consent and vice versa. It can serve 
several purposes simultaneously, the main one of which may be symbolic. Such 
symbolic acts “can express the oppositional side of one’s ambivalence and thereby 
preserve the integrity of those valued social and personal identities that do not align 
with the prescribed organizational identity” (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 101-2). The 
                                                 
163 I was not familiar with Ackroyd and Thompsons’ work when I wrote this paper. 
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fact that someone resists can be of far more importance than what happens as a result 
of such resistance. Cohen and Taylor (1992) are clear that self-awareness is 
something we usually keep secret from others, but it allows us to maintain our own 
identities without ‘rocking the boat’ or actually acting it out. There is no simple 
delineation which allows one to make assumptions about what particular purpose 
certain behaviour is serving. Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 51) discuss whether the 
particular behaviour of women workers described by Pollert (1981) could be called 
resistance because “they did give gentle nudges to authority, without in any way 
denting the structure of control (Pollert, 1981: 154)”. At the same time, this group of 
workers was oppressed and colluded with patriarchal ideals. Working relationships 
are complex, and often workers will achieve what management wants but not in the 
way that management wants them to (e.g. Hodson, 1991: 62-3). These examples 
provide other ways of considering acts of resistance.  
 
As direct action was not behaviour considered by AgResearch workers, I will explore 
it only briefly here. An implication in most industrial sociology literature is that if 
resistance is not about direct action, usually in the form of strike action, then it is not 
‘proper’ resistance (Nord and Jermier, 1994). Karlsson (1995, citing Therborn, 1986: 
123)164 implies that it is only when professionals come to see themselves as 
employees that they go on strike. He uses nurses and teachers as examples. There is a 
perception among professionals that going on strike degrades a professional’s status, 
as demonstrated by public reaction and explanations given by professionals such a 
teachers, nurses, junior doctors and university lecturers about why they are striking. 
It also implies that for resistance to become overt, professional workers need to see 
themselves in a different light – as part of the capitalist scheme of things where 
workers are pitted against employers, labour versus capital. 
7.4.4 Typologies of resistance 
I have selected five attempts to develop typologies of resistance or ways of 
classifying worker behaviour: Hodson (1995b); Clegg (1994); Ashforth and Mael 
(1998); Ackroyd and Thompson (1999); and Collinson (1994). These frameworks 
                                                 
164 Karlsson is using Therborn to argue against Claus Offe (1985: 129-150) who suggests, according 
to Karlsson (1995: 4-5) that “work is not – and should not be – a key concept in sociological analysis” 
because “work has lost its important place in people’s biography”. Volkerling (1995) supports Offe’s 
views in relation to New Zealanders.  
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have been useful because they gave me some new material from which to further 
develop my analysis and also because they led to fruitful disagreements and areas for 
debate as my observations initiated different ways of considering resistance from 
those provided in the literature. The descriptions which follow are partial because I 
mention only concepts which resonate with my observations. 
7.4.4.1 Hodson’s basic agendas of resistance 
Hodson (1995b) wants to give resistance a greater place in theoretical models on the 
workplace.165 He has devised what he calls four “basic agendas of resistance: 
deflecting abuse, regulating the amount and intensity of work, defending autonomy 
and expanding worker control through worker participation schemes” (ibid.: 79). 
(For a simplified schematic diagram see Figure 7.1.) Hodson ties each of these in 
with four systems of work control as being the most likely typical forms of resistance 
under such regimes: direct control, technical control (e.g., Taylorism), bureaucratic 
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are considered to be a “first crucial step in worker resistance”166 and such “meanings 
require social affirmation for their continued vitality” (ibid.). Crozier (1964: 150) 
further developed March and Simon’s idea of ‘bounded rationality’167 as he saw 
there were factors in the workplace that limited rationality. That is, different groups 
in the workplace could have ‘rationalities’ that worked for them but made no sense 
outside of the group. 
 
Another category in Hodson’s agenda of ‘deflecting abuse’ is ‘degradation’. 
Hodson’s writing is not clear – he wavers between the control of work and 
resistance/responses to it in his categorisations. In this instance he uses a quote to 
illustrate ‘degradation’ but does not describe what workers did about it – how they 
deflected the abuse. Rather he describes how the workers felt – they just did not like 
it. His final agenda of ‘worker participation’ is a system of work control rather than 
resistance, as he describes it.  
 
Hodson (1995: 95) sees autonomy as being protected when workers take pride in 
their work and that this is a form of resistance. Workers do this in spite of 
organisational control. They make personal choices about how much work they will 
do, rather than being management driven. This is interesting because Hodson is 
presumably stating that actions which reinforce and maintain a sense of autonomy 
are resistance. Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) say that the main reason people 
‘misbehave’ is to protect and assert their autonomy, but they do not consider any 
‘positive’ behaviour in this light.168  
 
Hodson’s association of particular forms of resistance with particular forms of 
control is not robust because there are examples of each of the agendas of resistance 
within AgResearch. This says either that AgResearch management contains aspects 
of all forms of control and is not particularly focused and/or Hodson’s proposed  
                                                 
166 Gouldner, 1954; Nichols and Beynon, 1977: 137; Tilly, 1978. 
167 Rose (1988: 370) implies that this idea of ‘bounded rationality’ comes from Crozier, but Crozier 
indicates the source to be March and Simon’s (1958) book Organizations. This probably demonstrates 
that Rose was not familiar with Crozier’s work. 
168 I use the word ‘positive’ to describe behaviour which could be seen from one perspective as 
compliance or identification with company values. Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) are concerned with 




typology is not tight enough. Admittedly Hodson (1995b: 102) does not say that each 
agenda is exclusive but there is an implication that particular forms of control are 
associated with particular forms of resistance, or even that the former causes the 
latter. Hodson has four forms of control which are related to supervision structure 
and work organisation (two of Rose’s themes). He has nothing related to normative 
control type systems (except perhaps participative systems), even though the 
responses to such control can be seen in some of his categories of his ‘basic agendas 
of resistance’. His typology has been useful in giving validity to forms of resistance I 
have observed (see Chapter 8), even though he has not linked them specifically to 
normative control. I suspect that resistance is also linked to the degree of power 
exercised by those in control, as well as its nature.169  
7.4.4.2 Clegg’s strategies of outflanking 
Clegg (1994) suggests that before a person can become a resistant subject they must 
first pass through a development of consciousness or awareness of the need for 
resistance. This requires an explanation of “resistance as a form of power … in its 
absence, or at least its minimization” (ibid.: 289), which he calls ‘strategies of 
outflanking’, the strategies employers can use to overcome resistance or the potential 
for resistance (see Figure 7.2). This concept serves to enhance my descriptions of the  
actions of AgResearch’s scientific workers but in the opposite way to Clegg’s 
intention. This outflanking’ can work both ways, as the subjects of the power (e.g., 
workers) could be outflanking those with the power (e.g., employers).170 
 
Clegg’s first description within this concept is simply ‘ignorance’. Ignorance can 
both facilitate or restrict power depending on the context (Clegg, 1994: 289). People 
may simply not be aware that there is an alternative way of seeing something or that 
networks and ways of linking with people both organisationally or nationally to 
support their resistance do exist. Clegg sees any resistance that is uncoordinated as 
likely to be “easily dealt with by defeat, exile or incorporation” (ibid.: 290). Another 
way of viewing why people may be ignorant is simple isolation – one sees oneself as 
subject to certain misfortunes say, but does not see the wider context into which 
                                                 
169 See Clegg next, in this regard. 
170 Bauman’s (1998: 33-34) description of Crozier’s (1964) work as being about how power is gained 
by those groups who manage to make other groups insecure or uncertain, particularly in state 
bureaucracies, could also be describing a strategy of outflanking. 
 
193 
these may fit, and how they might be connected (ibid.).171 As I see it, ignorance can 
also work as a protective mechanism and a form of resistance, which enables 
workers to protect themselves from organisational claims on their identities. 
 
 
Workers cannot resist normative control  













Figure 7.2 Clegg’s model
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provide an environment with a language in which emotions and feelings can be 
expressed.174  
 
Clegg (1994: 291) posits that “a step further from isolation is division” in which one 
has one’s life compartmentalised in such a way that what goes on in one area stays 
unrelated to the rest. He makes a claim, important to this thesis, that the development 
of instrumentalism could be a form of resistance:  
The individual’s self-organization may be constructed in terms of divided life-
worlds in which one manages the trials and tribulations of relative 
powerlessness in one sphere by hermetically sealing experience in situational 
specificity. Subject compartmentalization into segmented and thus psychically 
protected spheres is a form of resistance in itself, as witness the ‘instrumental’ 
worker (Goldthorpe et al., 1969) (ibid.).175 
 
Clegg also describes how organisations can ‘outflank’ resistance by the way in which 
they are structured to minimise the chances for alliances to occur (ibid.: 291-2).176 177 
 
It is difficult to make conscious and unconscious exercises of power and resistance 
visible. As Clegg (1994: 295) says, “… one should acknowledge that nonetheless 
people can exercise power without knowing that they are doing so …”. Clegg 
implies that the only effective forms of resistance are those that are beyond mere 
“reflexive self-organization”,178 but that this form needs to be present for more 
formal methods of resistance to occur. I suggest that even where an employer is 
‘outflanking’ employees, this does not mean that there is no resistance. Collinson 
(1994: 59) criticises Clegg for his lack of mention of resistance in his book Modern 
Organizations (Clegg, 1990), his emphasis on outflanking at the expense of 
resistance in his book Frameworks of Power (Clegg, 1989), and the implications this 
lack of treatment has for the view that management practices are so powerful that  
resistance to them is unlikely. However, as Clegg (1994: 293) makes clear, a worker  
                                                 
174 At a Sociology Department of the University of Canterbury seminar (10-5-02), The interchange: A 
foundation for ethno-economics, Richard Dawson claimed that the discourse and discipline of 
economics dominating the world today, has no language for the discussion of values and morality.  
175 It is worth noting here that though Clegg uses outflanking to describe what employers do, this 
reference cannot apply to employers, only employees. 
176 I do not want to say that organisations are structured in this way for the specific purpose of 
minimising chances for organising resistance, which is Clegg’s implication. It may be quite an 
unintended consequence. 
177 This is consistent with Austrin (1994). See Section 7.3.3. 
178 ‘Self-organization’ is also the word Hodson and Ackroyd and Thompson use. It is not referenced 
and seems to be common usage, and linked to autonomy and the power of agency.  
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may know they are exploited, but the other things that make up their identity and 
meaning (e.g., having work) may be more important than addressing such 
exploitation: “such techniques of power may easily discipline the blithest of 
theoretically free spirits when the conditions of that freedom become evident.” 
7.4.4.3 Ashforth and Maels’ three bipolar dimensions 
Ashforth and Mael (1998: 99-101) have also offered a framework for resistance. 
They have “three bipolar dimensions”: targeted versus diffuse resistance, facilitative 
versus oppositional resistance, and authorized versus unauthorized resistance. I did 
not find this useful because the actual behaviour I observed could not be separated in 
this way. However, their thesis that resistance occurs to ‘sustain valued identities’ 
has become one of the most important concepts in developing my work. 
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because resistance could occur with the full commitment of the employee to time, 
work and product, but this commitment may not necessarily be to the employer but 
to the work for its own sake. In other words, appropriation of identity by employers 
and appropriation of identity by work need to be kept separate. The vertical axis is of 
an ordinal nature, covering the intensity of disagreement to a work task from positive 
commitment, engagement, cooperation, compliance, withdrawal, denial to hostility.  
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Figure 7.4 Ackroyd and Thompsons’ dimension
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AgResearch? Ackroyd and Thompsons’ framework has not, in my view, been 
consistently thought through in the light of empirical examples. 
 
These difficulties notwithstanding, the concept of appropriation, particularly the 
appropriation of identity, is very useful because it suggests the idea of identity as a 
space that is being claimed inappropriately by an employer. This is of interest to me 
and matches the assertion of other authors who have suggested that normative 
control makes claims on identity (e.g., Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 113). The response 
to inappropriate claims on identity is likely to be protection of that identity and 
resistance to such claims, which leads into a discussion of the final model.  
7.4.5 Protection of self-identity and autonomy 
… we find ourselves searching for, or striving to protect, a valued set of 
meanings … that makes us feel wanted, superior or seems somehow to 
transcend the ephemeral character of such ambitions [coveted positions in 
organizations and society, pursuit of material and symbolic indicators of success 
etc.]. This requires us routinely and recurrently to contrive ways of neutralizing 
or eliminating eventualities that pose a threat to these meanings and thus of the 
sense of self-identity derived from them (Knights and Willmott, 1999: 83-4). 
 
The final model of resistance involves the concept of “distancing” as a way in which 
workers make the claims of employers less effective. This requires a preamble to 
cover some relevant literature on the role resistance plays in identity. The subsection 
concludes by considering some examples demonstrating that when work is related to 
a valued identity, workers may do more work rather than less as a form of resistance.  
 
What is it that workers are exchanging for compliance? A strong case is that they are 
protecting their self-identities – the way that they see themselves that is important to 
them. “Interests and identities are not opposites. They reciprocally and discursively 
form one another .… this combination of ‘self’-interest and ‘self’-identity is the 
bedrock of employee action in the workplace” (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 55). 
As I see it, the protection of identity is essentially an exercise in self-interest. The 
consequences of such action are not likely to result in structural change, but rather in 
accommodation to what is happening. The aim is not to change the organisation or 
society. It is to survive with one’s feelings about oneself still positive. If these 
feelings include still having a job in an insecure environment, then it makes no point 
to put this survival at risk.  
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7.4.5.1 Assertions of identity 
Cohen and Taylor (1992) link resistance to the establishment and maintenance of 
identity in their book Escape Attempts: The Theory and Practice of Resistance to 
Everyday Life. The authors reflect on how, through our propensity for self-
consciousness, we can manage our lives by using distancing tactics (ibid.: 52-59). 
Collinson (1994: 25) transfers this thinking to the workplace to explain how 
“‘resistance through distance describes the way in which subordinates try to escape 
or avoid the demands of authority and to ‘distance’ themselves, either physically 
and/or symbolically, from the organization and its prevailing power structure”. (See 
Figure 7.5.) In the resistance models I outlined earlier, Hodson’s categories within  
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As Simmel (1971: 335) said, “For only whoever stands outside his boundary in some 
sense knows that he stands within it, that is, knows it as a boundary.” This ability 
gives us a feeling of importance (Cohen and Taylor, 1992: 56). 
 
Terry Austrin suggested to me that the expression ‘cynical traders’ described what 
was happening to scientific workers in AgResearch.179 This expression implies that 
scientists are calculatingly trading some aspect of themselves in order to play the 
system to fund their science. It indicates that by acting in the way they do, workers 
are selling their integrity in order to continue their work.180 Cohen and Taylor (1992: 
55) explain that the methods we use to set ourselves apart from reality in order to 
observe it from a distance, take different forms, such as sarcasm, irony or cynicism. 
Self-conscious distancing is probably a survival mechanism that also serves other 
purposes (ibid), such as protection from emotion, which may also be a characteristic 
of many male scientists (Fox, 1995; Keller, 1985). Kunda (1992) describes an 
environment in a high tech industry where cynicism amongst middle managers was 
promoted by the corporate culture as evidence of how open the company was and 
how freedom of expression was encouraged. This culture then left workers having no 
way to evaluate competing points of view. Everything was to be regarded cynically! 
 
Cohen and Taylor (1992: 63) point out that this distancing as a way of reflecting may 
also become routine, and when other people join in the same process it becomes part 
of the everyday.181 Distancing does need to have “sympathetic others” who hear and 
join in the self-awareness process, otherwise our identity becomes entangled with the 
role we are playing, and we risk ‘entrapment’. Willmott (1993: 538) describes the 
way that playing the ‘trading game’ carries with it the cost of calculative compliance, 
in which employees play the role required of them by the company culture, but have 
the belief that they are in control. However, there is the risk of ‘entrapment’ by the 
game as the way people act (even if thinking differently) affects who they are even if 
it is unintentional. In the end taking on the role produces feelings of insecurity, 
confusion and emptiness (Kunda, 1992; Willmott, 1993). 
                                                 
179 Pers. comm. 8-3-02. 
180 For this reason Austrin thinks he could not work under a sociological discipline that was dominated 
by a Government policy which would only support evidentially based research. 
181 Note: The authors see three stages in this response – “unreflecting accommodation, self-awareness 
[distancing], and self-conscious reinvestment” (Cohen and Taylor, 1992: 61). There were few 




This role-playing strategy can also hide a “conservative trap” (Cohen and Taylor, 
1992: 56) as it allows us to continue living in the same way, remaining within the 
same “conventions and roles”, and does not give any “desire for change”. Willmott 
(1993: 538) explains that a cost of ‘playing the game’ is the exclusion of “players 
from involvement in the (re)design of the institutions from which these roles are 
derived”. Clegg (1994: 299) considers Collinson’s (1994) work in this light when he 
reinterprets it as an example in which distancing as a resistance technique actually 
facilitated workers’ acceptance of a redundancy situation. By distancing themselves 
from management workers had reduced the risk of “co-option or incorporation”, but 
this meant that they effectively did not have any knowledge of how to counter the 
information about redundancies, and were able to be outflanked by management. In 
other words, the use of distancing by workers in this situation actually produced a 
consequence unintended by them. 
7.4.5.2 Rate busting – resistance by doing more work 
In AgResearch I observed scientific workers who did more work than required by the 
timesheet-defined working week. I saw this as a commitment to science rather than 
to organisational goals. I have not come across management literature which 
considers how ‘loyalty’ to work could be regarded to be in competition with loyalty 
to the organisation. In contrast, some sociological literature does consider this to be 
why some workers resist organisational imperatives (Hodson, 1995b; Foner, 1993; 
Lundgren and Browner (1990, cited in Foner, 1993: 17)). Foner describes an 
example of ‘rate busting’ in a nursing home in which some nurse-aids did more work 
than required by management, because of their commitment to their patients. This 
practice gave management an increased expectation of all nurse-aids. Lundgren and 
Browner describe how psychiatric technicians who chose their careers out of a 
concern for the mentally retarded, opposed management practices reducing the 
delivery of good care. This was positive for residents. Murray (2000) titled her work 
I pay to be a scientist, taking up a quote from a New Zealand scientist about his poor 
remuneration in relation to other careers he could have followed, with the implication 
that science organisations rely on scientists’ love of science to get work done, not 
their pay or their organisational commitment. 
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7.4.6 What is effective resistance? 
The final question needing discussion in this section on responses to normative 
control is what is considered effective resistance? According to Nord and Jermier 
(1994) many writers have “grand visions” of what resistance should accomplish.182 
In their paper, Overcoming resistance to resistance: Insights from a study of the 
shadows, Nord and Jermier contend that writers reveal their shadow, or the shadow 
of their theoretical perspective, in what they write. For example, managerialist 
writers privilege managers and owners who have a “vision of a work force 
cooperating in the pursuit of organizational goals” (Nord and Jermier, 1994: 4). 
Those who resist are considered to be deviant, non-conformers (Rose, 1988: 11-12; 
Strebel, 1996: 86). Critical writers are disappointed on several fronts. Workers who 
they think should be resisting do not, and those who do seem to be resisting are doing 
so because they want more pay - not a revolution against capitalism. For Marx (1967 
[1867]) “effective resistance was therefore something that could only occur in the 
future” and for Braverman (1974) workers were a “passive group” (Nord and 
Jermier, 1994: 3). Everyday resistance (e.g., Scott, 1986) was not of interest.183 
 
Collinson also demonstrates evidence of his ‘shadow’ side. He has two propositions:  
First, the more concerned individuals are with crafting selves, the less effective 
will be their oppositional practices… Conversely, resistance is likely to be more 
effective when those involved are less concerned with the construction and 
protection of identity and more committed to the issues on which their 
opposition is based (Collinson, 1994: 57). 
 
This gives Collinson away! ‘Effective’ resistance, he is saying, is not about ‘crafting  
selves’. Clegg (1994: 301) also accepts this perspective. He converts Collinson’s 
propositions into another: “When resistance is tied to a preoccupation with securing 
one’s identity, it may be less effective than when issue focused”.184 He considers it is 
better to try to get more involvement in organisational processes in a way that will 
make “managerial practices more visible and accountable” (ibid.). My challenge 
                                                 
182 Smith and Thompson (1999: 230) suggest, as an example of the above, that Wilmott’s way of 
looking at resistance is influenced by his adherence to Buddhist principles in which worldly things do 
not matter, and so he expects people to give such things up in order to resist ‘properly’. If true, 
Wilmott’s is not a very realistic scenario! 
183 It may be that workers cannot resist in any other way in a normative system. Wanting more pay or 
more administrative power (e.g., promotion in management) are the only goals regarded as legitimate 
in our society (Hill and Turpin, 1994: 351- 355). 
184 Clegg presumably thinks his proposition is better or he would have used Collinson’s! To be fair, 
his does develop what he means by ‘effective’ resistance. 
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would be (as I’ve espoused before) – does this resistance do what the actor wants? 
According to Clegg, effectiveness is about whether the resistance is aiming to change 
the organisational processes and is not about enabling the workers to survive within 
that organisation. The former seems to be regarded more highly and as more 
legitimate by most writers, particularly if it is not just changing the organisation but 
society as well. As Nord and Jermier (1994) argue, what is considered “effective” 
resistance depends on the writer’s ‘shadow’ and that of their particular perspective. 
 
Klein (1976[1966]), one of the few writers to suggest a view of resistance as 
something to be taken seriously as part of the organisational change process, views 
resistance as performing a beneficial function for workers. He asks for consideration 
of resistance as part of the way individuals maintain their “integrity”. Resistance is a 
key to what is important to certain people and their culture (Klein, 1976: 122-3).185   
 
Another reason for researchers not seeing resistance ‘as it is’ is that they may have an 
“outmoded view of power”. Nord and Jermier (1994: 5) cite Clegg (1989) as 
suggesting that many people still have a notion of power as being “located in human 
agents (like kings) who control resources” and so tend to look for resistance in 
actions against a human agent. “However, if … in modern society power is exercised  
in more decentralized ways, resistance can be expected to be a decentralized process 
directed at local circumstances” (Nord and Jermier, 1994: 5).186  
 
                                                 
185 It is interesting that this was first published (1966) in a period when a significant amount of 
literature was produced on innovation and organisational change, e.g., Burns and Stalker (1966[1961]) 
The Management of Innovation and Alvin Gouldner’s Wildcat Strike (1965). The Klein article is 
reprinted in the third edition of The Planning of Change (Bennis, Benne, Chin & Corey, 1976). 
186 Normative control is a form of ‘decentralized power’ and relates to the accountability culture 
which acts down but not up. It is related to a different form of power – the power of policy – apart 
from its implementation. Policy has a power to influence the normative, cultural realm of an 
organisation and a society, even if it is not enacted or implemented, because people are concerned 
about when and if it is going to be implemented and how that will affect them. I see resistance in this 
situation as likely to be ‘fuzzy’, indeterminate, and not so easily articulated because it is hard for 
workers to know what the resistance is against and how to target it because in such systems no-one is 
accountable – the ‘not-me’ syndrome - and someone like the CEO says nothing! How can an 
organisation deal with what is causing concern if no-one actually says or acts in a way that makes it 
clear who is responsible. In this way both the organisation and the employees are the losers and 
winners. Workers can maintain their identities without taking any action that places them at risk. The 
organisation, on the other hand, does not have to ‘do’ anything, and so does not risk taking a stronger 
line, which could stir up even more resistance. A status quo of sorts is reached. It is like dealing with a 
bank, Inland Revenue or an electricity company when a customer is concerned about a policy. The 
call centre employee who answers your call is not the person who is responsible and it is unlikely you 
will ever be put in touch with the person who is! 
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Nord and Jermier (1994: 6-7) consider that a final reason for a misunderstanding of 
resistance is that there is an inadequate understanding of change. The authors feel  
that the failure to ‘see’ resistance will not help radical writers to address ways of 
providing “a realistic scenario for achieving the kind of change they seek” (ibid.: 6). 
By paying attention to resistance, a better understanding could be developed about 
how people make their lives satisfying in their own context, and this could be used to 
“to help empower others” (ibid.: 7).187 As Hodson (1995: 102) expresses it: “The 
study of worker resistance has the potential to add new energy to debates in social 
stratification and political sociology about the meaning and goals of class struggle 
and the meaning and limitations of ruling class hegemony.” Hodson (1995: 103) 
feels that such a study does not need the teleology of the end goal being the 
reproduction or otherwise of capitalist relations. This would leave the question of the 
place of, and reason for, worker resistance, more open. 
  
In this literature review I have outlined how most contemporary work is undertaken 
in an environment in which the worker is not trusted either in the workplace or 
outside it. This has resulted in the development of systems of work control, in 
particular the system of normative control. This system is of special interest to this  
thesis, because through its use, management seek to control not only the work that 
people do but why they are doing it. There is debate about whether workers can resist 
such a system and what it means for resistance to be effective. One of the main ways 
in which workers can demonstrate resistance is by the use of different distancing 
tactics as they attempt to protect valued parts of their identities. Some writers have 
provided valuable models of responses to systems of control (see Sections 7.4.4 and 
7.4.5), which can be compared with the responses of workers in AgResearch to the 
restructuring of publicly funded research. What have other writers said about the 
impact of this contemporary scene on the world of science, rather than on the more 
general world of work? The next section responds to this question. 
                                                 
187 Andrews and Herschel (1996) in their book Organizational Communication: Empowerment in a 
Technological Society, see organisational communication as a means of empowerment, whereas I 
found the way they saw communication being used as another tool for control by manipulation, fitting 
into ‘the encouragement of participation’ organisational model. 
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7.5 Science, knowledge and ‘the market’ 
7.5.1 Science and the role of Government 
Lord May (May, 2002: 1), Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government of the United 
Kingdom and a recent distinguished visitor to New Zealand, said government 
support for research only became common after the Second World War when the 
economic returns gained from it were realised. Lord May gave three broad reasons 
for Government support. Firstly, a country’s culture is enriched through the 
advancement of knowledge; secondly, “investment in science buys membership of an 
international enterprise, and access to the knowledge produced in other countries”188; 
and thirdly, “it brings direct economic benefits through the transfer of people and 
ideas to industry” (ibid.: 2).189 May unconsciously highlighted the contradiction 
between the motivations of Governments, those of scientists, and one of the 
intangible benefits from research: “… in the words of British Prime Minister Tony 
Blair, “the science base is the absolute bedrock of our economic performance” ”; 
“this quest for understanding is the prime motivation for most of the individuals  
engaged in publicly-funded research”;190 and “it also produces a cadre of well-trained  
and creative individuals” (ibid.: 2).191  
 
This perspective contrasts with that of other commentators. Several assert that the 
management of the public sector, particularly in research, is inappropriately being 
carried out by methods used in the private sector. Miller (1991: 120) studied 
university research in the U.K. where “the state is driven by a Thatcherite 
programme of the reduction of public expenditure … This is confusingly masked by  
                                                 
188 This is an acknowledgement of the benefits of shared knowledge – the openness of the publications 
of the science community. 
189 Of course, the second and the third points are contradictory because if the business perspective of 
‘science as economic gain’ had its way there would be policies of private ownership of knowledge – 
even knowledge gained by public funding. Hence there would be no “access to the knowledge 
produced by other countries” and there would be no membership of such an “international enterprise”. 
190 Governments in New Zealand have looked to science to provide economic solutions to help the 
country throughout the twentieth century (Lancashire, 2001)). This debate was fuelled internationally 
in the 1960 and 1970s by the book Little Science, Big Science (Price, 1963). During the last century 
New Zealand’s scientists have always found a place/space for doing their own thing (Lancashire, 
2001: 6) so, one could ask, what has changed? 
191 These acknowledgements are quite remarkable when compared to the New Zealand scene where 
what scientists do seems to receive no recognition or value at all (except if it is carried out overseas 
and the scientist wins a Nobel Prize for it, e.g., MacDiarmid). Scientists are not valued for what they 
are – rather they are valued for what they can produce of economic value. 
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a free market rhetoric but results in increased attempts to direct and control 
research.” Miller cites Lyotard (1984: 45): “The prevailing corporate norms of work 
management spread to the applied science laboratory: hierarchy, centralised decision 
making, teamwork, calculation of individual and collective returns, the development  
of saleable programmes, market research and so on.” Smith, Knights & Willmott 
(1991) edited a collection of papers, White-collar work: the non-manual labour 
process, devoted to this topic. Hill and Turpin (1994: 327) have described the scene 
in an Australian university symbolised by a high security building containing the 
university’s commercial activities. In this environment, academic research has to  
be managed according to commercial principles and its goal is to ‘identify what 
industry wants, and give it to them’. Research is not to be based on excellence or on 
gaining new knowledge.  
 
Governments do not appear to be interested in science per se but have the belief that 
it is the way for the country to go ahead economically (e.g., May, 2002, Hodgson, 
2000b, c and d). According to Daniel Sarewitz (1996), this is right and proper: a 
Government has a responsibility to get value for its money. Sarewitz (1996, 1997) 
insists that the promises made by science in response to science policy should be 
examined in a realistic way, because it is important in a democracy that such things 
are open to examination. He identifies five ‘myths’ of science policy: 
1) The myth of infinite benefit: More science and more technology will lead to 
more public good. 
2) The myth of unfettered research: Any scientifically reasonable line of 
research into fundamental natural processes is as likely to yield societal 
benefit as any other. 
3) The myth of accountability: Peer review, reproducibility of results, and other 
controls on the quality of scientific research embody the principal ethical 
responsibilities of the research system.192 
4) The myth of authoritativeness: Scientific information provides an objective 
basis for resolving political disputes.193 
5) The myth of the endless frontier: New knowledge generated at the frontiers 
of science is autonomous from its moral and practical consequences in 
society (Sarewitz, 1996: 10-11). 
 
                                                 
192 Feynman (1988), a physicist famous for his communication skills, suggests in an appendix titled 
‘The value of science’ to his book “What do you care what other people think?” Further adventures 
of a curious character, that scientists should not be held morally accountable for what they do as they 
are mere mortals like everyone else, and that this is the job of society as a whole. To my mind, 
Feynman was ducking his responsibilities as a citizen.  
193 An example of this point of view is that of Lord May (2002: 6), who believes that all decisions in 
society should be informed by “good science”.  
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When it comes to deciding whether science is benefiting society, Sarewitz feels that 
the values of the marketplace are not sufficient (ibid.: 122-123). His model is one of 
“a sustainable science focused on accountability and well-distributed social benefits” 
(Guston, 1996: 1807). He thinks “it is time for scientists to reassess their contract 
with society and tackle the connection … between progress in science and 
technology and progress in society” (Beardsley, 1997: 119). 
7.5.2 The risks of commercial work in science 
As science practice becomes dominated by forms of work control and ideologies that 
were previously alien to it, many issues to do with intellectual property and the 
ownership of knowledge arise. Some of these issues are not new. Rose discussed 
what happened in post-World War I Britain when a research institution dedicated to 
the study of work had to finance itself from consultation work. The problems it 
studied were determined by clients and so were not publishable, and there was 
insufficient funding for basic research (Rose, 1978: 67). Lyotard (1984, cited in 
Miller, 1996: 120) pointed out in a report he wrote on British universities in the 
1980s, that only those who can pay or be paid, can test new theories or technology. 
Hence “[a]n equation between wealth, efficiency and truth is thus established”. 
 
According to Simpson and Craig (1997: 72), there is an “emergent model of 
scientific inquiry” in New Zealand, which should be better able to address the issues 
of public concern such as environmental protection and health care. This model is a 
cross-disciplinary, collaborative one with a wider range of stakeholders and is not so 
deterministic, seeking relative truths rather than the ‘one truth’. The authors do not 
consider the implications of this change. Hill and Turpin (1994), and Turpin and Hill 
(1995), however, writing in an Australian context, issue some timely warnings about 
what might be lost. These authors fear that the marketplace is so much based on 
immediacy and advantage that no time is given for the use of the scientific values of 
reflection and scrutiny of the impact of such a change (Hill and Turpin, 1994: 356). 
 
Ziman (1991) describes science as a market system where research results are 
exchanged for rewards, such as ‘prestige’. What is happening now is the introduction 
of commercial market forces into this system which “introduces a damaging conflict 
between institutional and individual interests replacing quality by price as a principle 
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of competition (Ziman, 1990 (sic))” and “… privilege and authority based on 
knowledge are displaced …” (Hill and Turpin, 1994: 351). In the view of Hill and 
Turpin (1994: 353), “the two value systems are in direct opposition”. In the 
‘scientific knowledge system’ power and prestige is gained by contributing to human 
knowledge, whereas in the ‘commercial market system’ it is gained by “money or 
administrative symbols”. In the former system these goals are achieved by 
“persuasion and mastery of discourse”, whereas in the latter they are achieved by 
‘playing the market’. In science the core values are “rigour of validity claim and 
openness of performance”, whereas in commerce core values are “measurement by 
output rather than process integrity” and manipulation rather than openness. 
 
According to Turpin, Garrett-Jones & Rankin (1996: 268) there is growing evidence 
that greater innovation occurs through collaboration than by the use of publicly 
available scientific knowledge.194 It might be “that science as the pursuit of 
knowledge, may become a cultural relic, an activity engaged in by the ‘elders’ but of 
little relevance (read economic relevance) today” (ibid.: 281). An alternative,  “more 
optimistic view” is that science could become part of community culture through 
networking and be regenerated through this relationship (ibid.).  
 
Hill and Turpin (1994: 335-336) argue that the change is not just a clash of cultures. 
The commercial marketplace is actually deciding what knowledge is. “The 
implications are profound … for [the] construction of the very knowledge base that 
will shape our collective future as well as for the paths of access to this knowledge” 
(ibid.: 336). The authors assert that a ‘boundary struggle’ is occurring between these 
two very different cultures (ibid.: 354).195 However, Hill and Turpin are aware that 
academics may outwardly be playing the entrepreneurial role required of them while 
                                                 
194 There is much to argue about in this viewpoint but as this thesis is not about knowledge production 
it is not the place to do so at length. Collaborators, to be effective, need to maintain difference as it is 
the source of stimulation. In research difference is usually disciplinary, and if working with others 
such as managers and industry representatives, difference will be cultural. A team can lose its 
diversity of viewpoints if it does not also maintain links with others and members may do this partly 
by keeping in touch with the literature of their respective cultures and disciplines. In other words, it is 
important to also have other available and trusted ‘pools of knowledge in which to fish’ as Turpin et 
al. (1996: 268) would have it. Also, as the MBU demonstrated, even the importance of continually 
improving technical competence is based on what has gone before, both in the way members of the 
group share knowledge within the lab and in the literature of their rather recent discipline.  
195 Hill and Turpin (1994) talk of the ‘academic’ lifeworld because their paper is about universities. It 
equally applies to the public science system, as their later paper (Turpin and Hill, 1995) asserts.  
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quietly protecting their “knowledge-oriented culture” (ibid.: 355-6). They may be 
secretly resisting, in other words.  
7.6 Conclusion 
The present research is timely. In 2001 the RSNZ set up a discussion of its code of 
ethics, which was mainly concerned about the impact of business culture on science  
research. In the same year the Randall Report on biotechnology in New Zealand, 
commissioned by Industry New Zealand, contained a backlash against CRIs and their 
ownership of intellectual property, which, in the opinion of Randall, should be 
passed on to businesses to develop. Randall considered that the purpose of CRIs was 
to develop products and processes based on scientific innovation through the 
expensive stages of development which businesses could not afford until they 
reached the point where they could be passed over to business, which would then 
develop, market and sell such products for profit. He did not think that the CRIs 
should be in competition with business.  
 
This chapter has provided a sociological background and a discussion based on the 
sociological literature of the emerging themes from Part B. I have considered what 
writers have said about the meaning of work and introduced the concepts of 
alienation and estrangement, important to the core development of this thesis. I have 
explained the way different systems of control of work and workers have been 
developed until the present day in which there has become an emphasis on systems 
which try to control not only what and how work is done, but also the values of the 
workers in the work environment – the reasons why they are there and the sort of 
people they are. I have covered the debate about whether workers are able to resist 
such systems, why they would want to, and what the nature of such resistance could 
be and the purposes it should serve. This introduced the concept of compliance and 
the different frameworks other writers have used for workers’ responses to systems 
of control. Both of these are essential to the development of models of resistance in 
the next chapter, based on incorporating these ideas with my own distilled from my 
observations of workers in AgResearch. I have included an acknowledgement of the 
challenges the world of science is facing as other forces, such as Government policy 




PART C: FURTHER ANALYSIS INFORMED BY THE 
LITERATURE 
Chapter 8: A model to interpret the response to change? 
I now wish to reposition the data and its analysis by using, challenging and extending 
the ideas outlined in the context and the literature (Chapter 7). First, I will 
reformulate the context so that it can be seen in terms of boundary struggles that are 
occurring at and across many different levels. Then, I will concentrate on how these 
boundary struggles have impacted on individual workers. AgResearch’s senior 
management, in response to the environment in which it finds itself, has corporatised. 
As part of corporatisation, the employer has used a system of normative control of 
work in order to encourage workers to produce work products which meet both 
company and Government goals. The result of this has been that scientific workers 
(that is scientists and technical workers) have experienced a sense of estrangement, 
and scientists additionally have experienced a sense of alienation. I describe how 
workers have acted to resist and protect themselves from these experiences, and I 
provide two models of the resistance process which explain how scientific workers 
have managed to comply to enable the work of the organisation to carry on while 
they continue to do work that is meaningful to them. Two models are necessary 
because although the processes of resisting estrangement and alienation are similar 
there are important differences between the two.  
8.1 Reviewing the context: the concept of ‘boundary struggle’ 
The restructuring of the public sector carried out by the New Zealand Government 
and its continuing implementation has created a flow-on effect, which has caused 
different boundary struggles. It has caused a questioning of who and what is now 
important in New Zealand society – business, money and the market, management 
and efficiency, or people with their differing values and cultures. This is a debate 
between public good versus private good.196 By restructuring the public funding of 
science research, tensions have been created between Government and its policy 
provider (MoRST), its deliverer of funding (FRST), and its providers of research, the 
                                                 
196 Radio NZ’s then political reporter, Al Morrison, referring to the essential difference between left 
and right political parties, Morning Report, 5th April 2002. 
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CRIs and universities. Within the CRIs, science groups compete for funding, science 
groups are set against those who service them such as accountants and Information 
Technology Services (ITS) staff, and science workers grumble about corporate 
management. Individual workers feel as if their very selves, their identities, have 
become the site/arena of a boundary struggle. Who decides who they are and why 
they do the work they do? Who decides how they make their work meaningful?  
 
It is apparent to me that scientific workers in AgResearch feel they are experiencing 
something more akin to a take-over bid of their self-identity, but on the surface they 
are subtly negotiating this, masking the subterranean struggle that is going on! 
However, the language of ‘boundary struggle’, the visual images that it suggests, and 
the way it can be used to encompass both the micro and the macro situations I am 
encountering in this thesis, make these words a useful description. They suggest that 
there is a questioning in process. What is mine and what it yours? These words hint 
at struggles for possession of identity or fights for ownership of meaning. 
 
The public science research funding system in New Zealand has been transformed 
into one in which mainly crown research institutes, with Ministers of the Crown as 
shareholders representing the Government, compete for funding. Limitations in this 
funding, and its decline in particular areas of research, has encouraged these 
organisations to go into the market place to complement their revenue by seeking 
private business contracts for research. Government has supported the commercial 
nature of these organisations by setting them up as companies and requiring them to 
make a profit. This has created confusion at the public/private good level. The 
organisation (CRI) is now free to appropriate the work of scientific workers in order 
to produce saleable products, processes, or patentable products or processes, to make 
a profit for the ‘company’. This impacts on the work of science. Who owns its 
products? Such confusion generates boundary struggles. For example, Rae (scientist) 
talked of her discomfort at finding there were people employed by AgResearch’s 
corporate office to go through her group’s research reports and funding proposals 
looking for potential commercial products. This contests the ownership of the work 
and implies that members of this group do not have the knowledge to carry out this 
activity or cannot be trusted to do so. In AgResearch in recent years, Non-Specific 
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Output Funding (NSOF)197 has been used solely for preliminary work on possible 
products. In the past it was frequently used to prepare a strong bid for the next PGSF 
bidding round. Celentis was specifically created to carry out the R&D involved in 
changing scientific products into commercial products. But is this search for profit 
for the private or the public good? After all, AgResearch is a Government-owned 
company.198 Restructuring has implied that the values of the market place are now 
applicable to the public arena. The infiltration of the language of business into the 
everyday talk of AgResearch and the process of corporatisation that it has undergone, 
imply that colonisation of this space has been successful. But has it been accepted by 
those who work for rather than manage this organisation?  
 
Before I go further, it is important to note that boundary struggles relating to 
scientific work are not new in New Zealand, just manifest in different (new) ways. 
Research should not have been carried out within MAF, for instance. When DSIR 
was established in 1926, MAF argued that its agricultural research function was an 
important part of its extension work with farmers. This led to MAF’s research being 
allowed to develop in parallel with DSIR’s (Galbreath, 1998). There were boundary 
struggles over who did what right through the history of DSIR and MAF. The 
endophyte story illustrates one of these struggles. MAF was trying to produce 
animals that were resistant to ryegrass staggers while DSIR was trying to understand 
the cause. The discovery of endophyte as the cause of ryegrass staggers was 
published by both groups back-to-back in the same issue of the New Zealand 
Veterinary Journal. This division continued into AgResearch with the group based at 
Grasslands (ex-DSIR) competing with the one based at Ruakura (ex-MAF). 
8.2 Corporatisation of the public sector: a response to environment 
Government policy has indicated that competition and the reward of profit are seen 
as tools which ensure greater efficient use of public money and greater accountability 
to Government goals. AgResearch has put structures in place in response to this 
                                                 
197 Each CRI received a certain proportion of its funding over and above that given to it for specific 
programmes. This was called NSOF.  
198 The Association of Crown Research Institutes (ACRI) issued a press statement that claimed: “CRIs 
[are] not more concerned about profitability than the public good” and cited the CRI Act. ACRI was 
responding to criticism by Jeanette Fitzsimons, co-leader of the Green Party, during the 2002 election 




environment (Simpson and Powell, 1999: 441). The dominant considerations in this 
environment are thus Government policy (and hence FRST implementation) and 
globalisation, and the response was to make AgResearch competitive in the 
international market place. In this section I first consider the impact of competitive 
values within the CRI and secondly I discuss how managers have been placed within 
the CRI to make it accountable and efficient.  
8.2.1 Competition: inducing boundary struggles within the CRI 
By introducing competition into the public funding of science and by making CRIs 
companies, Government policy, in spite of its rhetoric emphasising collaboration, 
encouraged boundary struggles. This became ingrained within the organisation. It 
also stimulated competitive attitudes between individual CRIs and universities, for 
example.199  
 
The data demonstrate that even with restructuring, this particular CRI, AgResearch, 
contains some science groups and support/service groups which are competing rather 
than acting for the good of the organisation as a whole. Members of one science 
group in the study were reluctant to collaborate within a competitive environment. 
The group built up its own self-sufficiency at the expense of sharing with the 
organisation as a whole.200 This contrasted with two of the other groups which were 
collaborative and which contracted out substantial parts of their laboratory work.  
 
When I suggested to Greg (scientist) that he share with other groups the way in 
which he ‘managed the accountants’, he declined. His group was competitive 
internally, demonstrated by the ‘patch protection’ on the part of the technical workers 
both over their own skills and the domain of the labs, and externally, demonstrated 
by the strong boundaries and self-sufficiency of the group. This contrasted with 
another group in which funding was more secure and where members were 
encouraged within their lab environment to share their skills. This group sought 
                                                 
199 It could be considered that this has changed recently with the special efforts by Government to 
fund ‘Centres of Research Excellence’ (COREs) involving collaboration between universities and 
CRIs. However, I suspect these groups have come together as a matter of necessity and there will be 
boundary struggles within them over allocation of funding and status.  
200 Greg (scientist) told me how the group to which he belonged had started with him as sole member. 




collaboration both within AgResearch and internationally. However, the entire public 
funding system is competitive and has discouraged groups from being altruistic 
toward one another because they are all competitors in the same external system. In 
the present environment they are becoming internal competitors as well, because 
FRST’s movement to larger, more bulk-funded, programmes places more 
responsibility on the organisation than the group for the content of programmes, than 
was the case in the past.201 
 
Within the organisation there were also boundary struggles on the part of each of the 
service groups as they attempted to establish their own power and identity rather than 
serve the scientific practice that is the work of the organisation. For example, the 
accountants used a language and practised a method of accountancy not understood 
by scientists. It did not help the work of science, as my earlier quotes quite clearly 
indicate. Accountants made little attempt to bridge this gap. A business manager in 
acknowledging this to me, told me how he had changed from this system within 
another organisation he had worked for, and he wished AgResearch would do the 
same. The ITS Group was having its own boundary struggle. ITS staff were ‘not 
allowed’ by their manager to ‘participate’ more in the work of science, as Bert, for 
instance, wanted to do by writing macros in specific software programmes which 
could have helped scientific work.202 They had to confine themselves to maintaining 
the computing system. The Human Relations staff had the role of advisors and in my 
experience were the only advocates of employees that I discovered, yet they had to 
bear the brunt of managers not following their advice.  
 
Merton (1968[1957]) wrote of how departments within bureaucracies developed 
loyalties and promoted group interests at the expense of the whole (Abercrombie et 
al., 1988: 23). It was such a proliferation of power blocks within hierarchies that was 
one of the justifications for the restructuring of the public sector in New Zealand  
(Britton, Le Heron, & Pawson, 1992; Shaw, 2000), and for doing it at a rapid pace.  
 
                                                 
201 Under this scenario FRST was negotiating with one senior manager in AgResearch for all 
programmes, rather than through the programme leaders, as was past practice. 
202 An example of another boundary that was detrimental to the business of science and where 
collaboration rather than difference would have been helpful. 
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I believe CRIs are in a transition period, which means that there is no established 
ethos accepted by everyone in the organisation. Is the power to reside with the 
scientists or with members of the corporate and Board who wish science to become a 
business venture? That this is a covert struggle rather than a collaborative effort says 
a lot about the parts of the organisation concerned. The Annual Reports tell their own 
story. In the 1997 Annual Report there is no reference to the governance of the 
organisation. The 1998 and 1999 Reports (AgResearch 1998: 28-29 and AgResearch 
1999a: 24 respectively) indicate that the company’s strategic direction and the 
achievement of the long-term goals is the responsibility of the Board and 
management. In the 2000 Report (AgResearch 2000a: 28) “the establishment of the 
long-term goals, and the strategic plans to achieve those goals” are one of the 
primary responsibilities of the Board. Nowhere does it say that workers should be 
consulted. It does not mention that the stakeholders should be consulted either, 
though that is part of the CRI Act 1992, and is something the Board does do. In fact 
nothing is mentioned about the Act in this section of the annual report but the 
auditor’s report in all reports from 1997 to 2000 states that complying with that Act, 
the Public Finance Act 1989 and the Financial Reporting Act 1993 are a 
responsibility of the Board. What is to be made of this development? The 
introduction of the section on ‘Corporate Governance’ in 1998 can be seen as 
coinciding with the arrival of Keith Steele as CEO, and perhaps as more questions 
were being raised by workers about the company’s strategic direction he saw it as 
necessary to distance himself and make it the responsibility of the Board. However, 
he did not ever make it clear to workers that this was so.203  
8.2.2 Managerialism: a response to context  
Alongside corporatisation, the Government’s restructuring has supported the 
employment of managers to ensure greater accountability to Government policy and 
greater efficiency in the use of public money. This has increased managerialism 
(Boston & Dalziel, 1992; Boston et al., 1991, 1996; Easton, 1995, 1997; Rees & 
Rodley, 1995). The restructuring of research to be accountable to Government goals 
                                                 
203 I emailed the CEO at the time of the discussion of the results from the so-called ‘staff morale’ 
survey (15-2-00) to express my concern about the impact of the negative remarks of staff on him 
personally. I felt that if he could state the issues of governance involved it could solve a lot of 
misunderstanding (if that was what it was), about the role of staff in the choice of strategic direction. 
Maybe the change in the 2000 Annual Report was a result of this? This example also illustrates the 
reification of the organisation. The Strategic Plan does not have an author! 
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contradicts the British model on which the DSIR in New Zealand had been based. 
This model, previously discussed in Section 3.3, advocated the separation of research 
from the government’s administrative departmental control. The CRI model implies 
that scientific workers are not efficient in their use of funding or accountable in this 
way, and management is put in place to ensure that they follow Government policy. 
Such interest in accountability and efficiency obviously challenges boundaries. To 
whom should workers be accountable? As Government policy changes so frequently 
in the experience of many of these workers, it might make more sense to be 
accountable to something more stable like the science community, or the ‘good of 
New Zealand’ as they see it. Scientific workers do not feel that producing products 
and IP for ‘the company’ necessarily performs any of these functions. 
 
I have described how the Government’s requirements for accountability and 
efficiency in the use of public funding for research has meant it crossed the boundary 
formerly maintained by the Haldane Principle. AgResearch has responded to this and 
to the competitive environment, by corporatising.  
8.3 Enforcing corporatisation: the use normative control 
AgResearch developed mission, vision and value statements, a strategic direction, 
internal restructuring and repositioning, and best-practice policies. The very 
statement of such things led to the use of normative control as a management method 
for ensuring worker buy-in. AgResearch is dependent on scientific workers’ 
creativity to make it into a profitable company so that is what it is trying to control. 
Previously in the public sector (such as when AgResearch started and in DSIR and 
MAF Tech) there was not this same concern about control by management, 
particularly as interpreted and implemented by Human Resources practice. 
Encompassing managerialism and the use of a system of normative control of work 
to implement this, has induced new manifestations of micro-level boundary 
struggles. These are the struggles occurring within the CRI between individuals and 
structures, which impact on how individuals make their work meaningful, and on 
who they are, their self-identities.  
 
A normative control system implies that management wishes to control the norms of 
the people working in an organisation. Normative control encourages workers to 
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believe in and practice the direction and goals of the organisation as espoused by its 
Board and management. It implies that workers should replace their own meanings 
with those of the organisation, where these are not consonant. If they do not, then 
they will need to be coerced into it by such organisational structures as the 
performance appraisal process.204 The aims and direction of the organisation claim 
the space or push the boundaries of workers’ self-identities, implying that if workers 
are able to commit to these values they will feel as if they belong and will become 
productive members of the organisation.205 One obvious challenge to this notion is its 
implication of stability and security. In practice the direction and organisational 
description can change as the organisation itself struggles to survive in a constantly 
changing environment. Any inferred promise of security cannot be realised. In fact, 
as I will discuss, the promotion of insecurity may well be a tactic employed by 
management to keep workers performing in order to keep their jobs. (See Section 
8.4.3.) Hence normative control comes to be about trust and obedience to the entity 
of the company rather than to what the company’s representatives are saying, 
because these statements are always going to be open to change. For scientific 
workers, such abstract, slavish loyalty is not part of who they are. As part of their 
scientific indoctrination they have been trained to consider information sceptically 
and not to trust something they cannot empirically examine. 
  
In the current reframing of the context of this research, the concepts of estrangement 
and alienation can be used as analytical devices as they give useful insights into the 
experiences of scientific workers under normative control. The next two sections 
describe these experiences and relate them to the two concepts as they were 
developed in the previous chapter.  
8.4 Estrangement 
A possible interpretation of the changes experienced by workers through the 
restructuring of the public sector in New Zealand is that they have been thrust into 
the neo-liberally oriented world of recent Governments’ policy, as taken up by 
AgResearch. Thus the norms and values of present society, as represented by 
                                                 
204 Willmott (1993) has called his paper on this subject Strength is Ignorance; Slavery is Freedom: 
Managing Culture in Modern Organizations. 
205 Policy is about normative control. It is a form of rhetoric that describes how some particular group 
wants the world/nation/organisation ‘to be’. 
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Government policy, are in conflict with the values older workers hold from the past 
and the values all workers perceive as being upheld by the scientific community. 
This has left them with a sense of estrangement as described earlier in Section 7.1.1: 
a sense of no longer fitting or belonging as they are no longer valued or considered 
able to contribute to the present needs of society as espoused by Government and 
company policy. Continuing change and the uncertainty this has created has 
exacerbated these feelings. For example, in AgResearch there was almost constant 
change in the way the organisational direction has been articulated and implemented 
since the present CEO was appointed (‘strategic planning’, ‘biotechnology 
company’, ‘food and fibre’ research, ‘life sciences company’, ‘science research 
institute’ to ‘company’, ‘divisions’ to ‘platforms’, ‘repositioning’). This illustrates 
the importance of context to this work.   
 
The next subsections describe the various ways workers experienced estrangement – 
through feeling less valued by their work organisation, through belonging to groups 
both in and out of the organisation that have values conflicting with those of the 
organisation, through the feelings of insecurity engendered by the uncertainty of the 
current environment, through the lack of trust the accountability culture implies, 
through reification of AgResearch, and finally through the way their autonomy and 
identity are being challenged.   
8.4.1 Experiencing a loss of value 
There are many ways in which workers have felt less valued within AgResearch, and 
which have contributed to a sense of estrangement. In Section 5.1.1, I outlined how 
there is a ‘listening up’ culture in AgResearch. The ‘listening up’ culture provides 
evidence of the power of normative control. It illustrates how workers experience 
estrangement (and alienation). There is no arena within the organisation for the 
voices of the workers to be heard. They feel undervalued and unappreciated, 
demonstrating their sense of estrangement from the organisation. This lack of 
participation also means that there are few avenues open to them to address their 
control over the direction and end use of their work. Part of this culture was a lack of 
feedback from management whenever workers responded to management’s requests 
for reports and information. Scientific workers in AgResearch have societal goals in 
mind, in terms of the purposes they want their work to serve. The way the 
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organisation and the Government are articulating the actions they wish workers to 
take does not permit the achievement of these goals (Merton, 1968: 235). 
  
The loss of the voice of scientists is reflected outside the organisation. Since 
restructuring in New Zealand, policy-making has been separated from its 
implementation. This has meant that interested parties (stakeholders) could play no 
role (Lancashire, 2001). As a result, boundary struggles are occurring at the micro or 
individual level, partly because scientists have been excluded from the macro-level 
of Government policy on the public funding of research. This exclusion has carried 
over into organisational policy. The policy arena is not one in which scientific 
workers have had a voice. They have been physically excluded as stakeholders, and 
the language of this arena – that of business, the market and management, as well as 
the philosophy of these cultures - has also excluded them.  
8.4.2 Belonging and being different 
When scientific workers choose which community or group to affiliate to or remain 
with, it will be one which gives them a sense of affirmation, which makes them feel 
valued and as contributing to something in a way that aligns with their sense of what 
makes work meaningful, and fits with their identity.206 This means that workers  
choose to accept the constraints involved in being part of the groups they work in and 
belong to (e.g., science groups; the science community). They do not feel coerced 
into acceptance. They are part of the society they live in and were born into, whose 
values are mainly accepted rather than rebelled against by these particular people. 
 
The research data indicate that there is definite feeling of ambivalence expressed by 
workers about the company. They want to feel as if they belong, but they do not feel  
as if they do, because they do not feel valued. They find themselves both happy and 
unhappy. I have described in Chapters 5 and 6, the fear of loss of self and the conflict 
between their identities as group members, scientific workers, members of society 
past and present, and what the company wants them to be. Also as Goffman (1961a: 
320) described it: “It is … against something that the self may emerge.” By  
                                                 
206 Though workers are assigned to a group as part of their work, they choose whether or not they feel 
as if they ‘belong’ to it or have a commitment to it. Nearly all workers who were participants in this 
research felt this sense of belonging. 
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discovering themselves to be different from the desired company culture, employees 
become more aware of their own identity and how it is different. I suggest that there 
are stronger ways in which workers can get a feeling of belonging than to the 
company – that is through their scientific peers or through their work groups. There 
are also activities and groups they belong to outside the workplace. Ashforth and 
Mael (1998: 96) write that resistance can occur to maintain a balance between these 
“valued selves”. 
 
Workers can also find value in the actual work they do rather than their relationships 
with others and the acknowledgement of others (Section 5.4). In AgResearch, 
scientific workers mainly find their jobs very fulfilling and I suspect feel a sense of 
unease because that, by itself, is not sufficient to make them happy. Ashforth and 
Mael argue from their reading of the literature that motives for resistance to do with 
identity arise from “perceived threats to social regard (respect), self-regard (self-
esteem), individuality, autonomy and self efficacy, moral principles …” (ibid: 1998: 
98). 
8.4.3 Experiencing uncertainty 
The other aspect of estrangement I wish to explore is the experience of uncertainty. 
At the time I was leaving AgResearch (Feb. 2001), the CEO acknowledged that there 
had been continual change over the past few years and he promised that now was a 
time for consolidation. Immediately a new form of employment contract was 
proposed which workers have found most difficult. Some of them discovered they 
were considered to be overpaid and were labelled as ‘grandparenting’, which meant 
they would not receive any pay increases until others had caught up with them. So 
not only was the sense of insecurity reinforced, but some workers also found out 
their work was no longer valued as much as it had been in the past. 
 
Following the restructuring in 1992 there has been a threat of job losses. In my 
experience, this seemed to be more of a threat than an actuality but it inspired much 
uncertainty and insecurity. The repositioning exercise, described in Section 6.1, is a 
good example of this. It is difficult to feel valued by an organisation which is unsure 
of whether it wants you or not. One day you fit and the next day you do not, and you 
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know that next year you might be ‘wanted’ again. These “techniques of 
individualisation” mask the effects of power (May, 1999: 10). 
 
The restructuring within AgResearch, and the changes in FRST’s implementation of 
Government policy, have certainly happened with unerring frequency! Continuous 
change also promotes a sense within individuals that they have to learn how to 
survive. The techniques people develop to survive may not be in the company’s best 
interests. Bauman’s summary of Crozier’s work which demonstrates that “most 
power is exercised by such units as manage to remain the sources of other units’ 
uncertainty” (Bauman, 1998: 34) describes to me the ‘game’ many groups within 
AgResearch are playing. Crozier’s ideas about uncertainty also align with change 
because continual change is a way of maintaining uncertainty. In some management 
literature, uncertainty is espoused as a way of keeping everyone on their toes and 
performing. (However, what is not addressed is how constant change can cripple 
work output because of the continual insecurity it causes (Nilakant and Ramnarayan, 
1998: 114, 359).)  
8.4.4 Accountability 
In Section 5.5.2 I described how an accountability culture requires reports to be 
continually written and passed upwards in order to demonstrate that public money 
has been spent ‘properly’. I also described how there is little feedback given about 
such reports. They are a requirement, a tick in a box. The accomplishment is 
completion, not feedback. This does not give the science groups any indication of 
whether their contribution is valued and how it could be improved. In fact, in 
AgResearch there was frequently no response given upon the receipt of a report.  
 
The emphasis that restructuring has placed on accountability has promoted a culture 
which links the lack of value and the uncertainty aspects of estrangement. By making 
people feel continually accountable, they feel they are not trusted. This challenges 
their integrity, and with that comes an experience of not being valued. Such an 
environment generates continual insecurity. I am not considering the stress and 
burnout created, but why these things are experienced. There is stress in having one’s 
identity challenged by a corporate management that does not even seem to be aware 
that it is doing so, and puts no mechanisms in place to find out the impact of its 
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policies. If corporate management does know what it is doing and initiates no 
procedures to consider the impact on its workforce, then it must assume that it has 
the right to meddle in workers’ lives in this way and is not accountable to them. 
Accountability seems to work only in one direction and that is ‘up’. The manager of 
a factory is not required to be accountable to its workers; why should workers in a 
“science” company expect to be treated any differently? If an organisation is 
accountable then presumably it has to demonstrate that accountability by finding out 
the impact of its policies on its workers and whether they are effectively 
implemented or not. Accountability should presumably be about what is done rather 
than what is said to be done.  
8.4.5 Reification – a manifestation of estrangement? 
It was a common practice of scientific workers in AgResearch to distance themselves 
from the organisation by seeing it as apart from themselves and blaming it for 
anything they saw as wrong, or for how they felt about it. Workers’ unhappiness was 
almost always perceived as the ‘fault’ of the organisation (or the CEO), not the 
AgResearch Board, FRST, MoRST or the Government, though one of the SPLs did 
demonstrate a switch to blaming FRST (see Section 6.2.1). A feeling of estrangement 
is produced because workers believe it is beyond their sphere of influence to change 
the organisation.207 Reification (Abercrombie et al., 1988: 205)208 is part of the 
establishment of an organisational identity practised by workers and corporate 
management alike and by those outside the organisation.  
 
This attitude was further encouraged in AgResearch by the formation of a ‘One 
AgResearch’ promotion of which I was part. The construction of a unified culture is 
one of the aims of normative control and is recommended by many organisational 
culture theorists (e.g., Nilakant and Ramnarayran, 1998; Thornhill, Lewis, Millmore, 
& Saunders, 2000; Schein, 1992; Hannan & Freeman, 1989). As my case studies 
demonstrate, different science groups have quite different identities. Presuming that a 
single culture could be formed out of such disparate groups was rather naïve on the 
                                                 
207 However, it also lets them off the hook, as workers give that as a reason for not trying. 
208 Reification is usually identified with alienation in its later post-Marxian meanings (see Section 
7.1), but as I wish to stay with the earlier Marxian concept of alienation I feel reification demonstrates 
estrangement in this context. Of course, alienation is also demonstrated when, for example, corporate 
managers employ an anonymous ‘someone’ to assess the potential for products in scientific reports 
and proposals without consultation with the scientists concerned.  
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part of AgResearch management and the Green to Gold strategic planning 
implementation. Bate (1998), an organisational culture theorist, says that 
organisations are not unities. Reification arises when this organisational culture is 
defined by corporate management who then claim it as ‘the AgResearch culture’ and 
give it powers of its own without making the link to themselves explicit. Rose (1978: 
245) claims that Silverman refers to organisations in this way, whereas he thinks: 
… the most important needs or actions which theorists attribute to 
organizations as entities are either suspiciously similar to those of 
organizational leaders, or those which a business consultant believes will 
improve efficiency …. The claim that organizations are social units which 
possess goals obscures the variety of aims which their members, including 
their leaders, pursue in practice. 
 
Rose could say that the powerful members of organisations can hide their motives 
behind the organisational mission and vision statements.  
8.4.6 Autonomy and identity: linking estrangement and alienation 
While some workers have a need for autonomy and independence, others need to feel 
a valued part of a working group; and some may enjoy a balance. Within 
AgResearch there is the constant tension, as is probably inevitable in any 
organisation, particularly one devoted to scientific research, involved in lower 
managers209 giving workers autonomy over their everyday work, while at the same 
time taking an interest in them and in what they are doing. The emphasis on 
autonomy by scientists, conveyed for example, in quotes by Dave and Graham 
(Sections 5.3.6 and 5.4.4 respectively), indicates there may not be such a need for 
feedback and encouragement for scientists from within the organisation because they 
have their own community – fellow scientists. This community could be seen to 
provide stability and a sense of social cohesion not available from the organisation as 
it is subject to such a changing environment. Having their needs met in this 
community, however, may reduce some scientists’ understanding that others in their 
groups (Gouldner’s ‘locals’ rather than ‘cosmopolitans’) may need feedback and 
reinforcement about their value, and do not like working as strongly autonomous and 
isolated individuals. The other ‘acceptable’ source of cohesion for workers is the 
team, which can provide a sense of everyday belonging and sociability as well as 
                                                 
209 Corporate management instituted normative control.   
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being the source of continual opportunities for learning and intellectual challenge 
(see Section 8.7).  
8.5 Alienation 
As scientific workers have moved from a public service environment into a capitalist 
system of production, they are experiencing alienation, as described by Marx (see 
Section 7.1.1).210 They are losing control over what research they do and the end 
product, creating a separation between their work and the goals and purposes it has 
for them. The Government has control over research priorities, as does the 
organisational corporate, which is viewed by scientists as having non-science based 
interests. Marx believed that workers in capitalist economies remained largely 
unaware of their alienation211 whereas, in AgResearch, workers are frequently taking 
steps to resist their lack of control over the work they do, and the results of the work 
they do, as this thesis demonstrates. It is ironic (in terms of Marxist philosophy) that 
the best way the Endophyte Group can control the work it does is through taking up 
more fully the opportunities the market offers in the nature of commercial contracts 
(Hunt, 2002b). A contrast to this is the alienation experienced by middle managers as 
they are co-opted by the capitalist system to become instrumental workers. At no 
point, however, is the profit making capacity of the organisation challenged. All 
workers remain within the system, even though they feel they are not likely to see the 
profits made spent in their areas of work.212  
 
An example of the way in which scientists are alienated from their science by 
management actions which are trying to ensure accountability, is given by a training 
session conducted by a contract staff member to implement the new performance 
appraisal system (previously referred to in Section 5.5.3.1). Participants were asked 
to state their objectives for the year. These had to be measurable. One of the group 
leaders, Ray, was very much against this because he said it could restrict what 
                                                 
210 In some senses the word ‘alienation’ could be replaced by ‘challenges to autonomy’. However, for 
me, alienation expresses something more. It gives the feeling of an enforced separation from 
something that matters to a person, rather than just losing control or power over it. It has a feeling or 
transcendent, spiritual dimension which autonomy does not have. 
211 Two responsibilities of the Communist Party were to (1) ‘educate’ workers as to their oppression 
and hence, alienation; and (2) if opposition arose, to vet it ‘in the interests’ of the working class. 
212 I personally find this difficult to understand as one way scientists could operate/resist is to 
overspend their budgets to the extent of the profit which has been taken out of them! However, to be 
effective, this tactic would require them to act collectively. 
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workers did. His objective was: ‘Determine the range of fungal toxins responsible for 
increasing lamb growth rate on two pastures by May 2020.’ There was discussion 
about the meaning of ‘range of’. Ray did not want a number but the trainer, Sarah, 
did. Ray sought Dave’s support for the idea that scientists may not know how many 
toxins they could find. For Ray, the point was that he ‘had looked at, at least two 
pastures’. The object of the exercise did not have to do with how many toxins were 
found at all. This scenario illustrates how management (via HR) in trying to control 
the work of scientists, did not understand it and by trying to quantify it, limited it. 
 
By setting up Celentis and perusing scientific proposals and reports at corporate for 
IP potential and the possibility of a ‘product’, the organisational management is 
enabling scientists to continue with their science and not have to concern themselves 
with products. At the same time, such developments contradictorily distance 
scientists from the end product of their labour and are part of the alienation process. 
The organisational vetting process which scientific papers pass through before 
publication can also be seen in this light.  
 
I maintain that alienation is predominantly being experienced by workers at the 
scientist level and above because these are the scientific workers whose labour 
‘product’ and the choices they have had around that are being eroded. Technical 
workers have not been experiencing conscious feelings of alienation. I say this for 
three reasons. 
 
First, in their case, it has not been part of their work to control its direction and end 
result (as I have described indirectly in Sections 5.2 and 5.4, in the difference 
between the work of scientists and technical workers).  
 
Second, the capacity of technical workers in particular, to have control over the 
product of their work has actually increased. Many scientific workers do not make a 
distinction between ‘mental’ and ‘manual’ labour (Littler and Salaman, 1985: 85). In 
fact, some AgResearch scientists who have technical help, make considerable efforts 
to carry out some of their practical work themselves rather than just plan it, in order 
to ‘keep their hand in’ (e.g., Mark, Noel, Owen, Rae, Graham, Wade). All scientific 
workers (scientists included) have experienced work change which could be regarded 
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as requiring them to be both less skilled and more skilled, and could therefore be 
perceived as a reversion back to craft labour (Piore and Sabel, 1984). With the loss of 
the lower hierarchy of so-called ‘manual’ workers in the late 1980’s and early 1990’s 
(e.g., numbers at the Winchmore research farm have fallen from 48 permanent staff 
in 1985 to 6 in 2001213), their replacement by fewer temporary wage workers who 
are hired when required, and the movement to the lab from the field, workers need to 
possess a wider range of skills. Sole workers who perform both ‘head’ and ‘hand’ 
tasks (Greenbaum, 1994: 64) have emerged. With the introduction of new 
technology, particularly computers, there has been the opportunity for workers to be 
responsible for a far greater portion of a whole science project, including data entry 
and statistical analysis, and the typing up of written reports and papers, which 
previously would have been performed by specialised workers. Similarly, there is the 
opportunity for more routine work to be contracted out or be carried out by more 
automated technology (e.g., polymerase chain reactions (PCRs)). This environment 
requires workers to continually retrain in order to use new technology or new 
techniques.  
 
Third, the autonomy allowed to all technical workers, enables them to control and 
plan their working days, and can counter a sense of alienation. They also have a great 
commitment to their work and talk of gaining great enjoyment and a sense of 
achievement from it (as illustrated in Section 5.4).  
 
It is worth noting that the attitude that workers are things, units of production, which 
employers act on in order to get them to produce what the employer wants, has been 
adopted by those wishing to colonise the work of science for its commercial 
possibilities. This was illustrated by the rhetoric used at the International R&D 
Management Conference 2001. The conference title was Leveraging Research and 
Technology.214 The frequent use of the word ‘leveraging’ in the titles of the different 
sessions implied that somehow, through methods which would be imparted to the 
conference attendees, products and innovation could be extracted from recalcitrant 
                                                 
213 Pers. comm. Ray Moss, Feb. 2001. 




and reluctant scientists! It was also notable that a key-note speaker was the only 
person I was aware of, to comment on this adversely.215 
8.6 Compliance: survival by resisting estrangement and alienation 
I consider that most scientific workers in AgResearch in the groups I studied have 
developed ways of complying that enable them to resist the feelings of estrangement 
and alienation they have experienced as a result of the corporatisation of their public 
sector organisation. Given that ‘exit’ in the New Zealand context, is not a viable 
option, they can resist these feelings directly by open challenge, indirectly through 
compliance by getting on with their work in their own way, or they can become 
committed to corporatisation so that they no longer feel estranged or alienated. I 
suggest that these workers are responding to a complex mix described earlier in this 
chapter. There is no direct and discrete relationship linking scientific workers’ 
responses to the system of normative control put in place by AgResearch’s corporate 
management. CRIs are also responding to Government policy and to what is 
happening in the global world of research, with its emphasis on economics and the 
development of innovative, profitable, products. It is not only AgResearch which has 
this emphasis. These are arenas in which scientific workers feel powerless. It is 
difficult for anyone to feel they have any power over what is happening at a global 
level. At the Government level, scientific workers have been shut out of the policy 
making process.216 The focus of their discontent therefore, becomes the organisation 
in which they work (or the CEO) where particular systems of work control have been 
put in place to achieve organisational goals.  
 
Positioning my work in this way, as part of a ‘chain reaction’ from a specific 
Government restructuring policy through to the individuals on whom it impacts, is 
not an approach I found in any literature. Certainly context is apparent in the work of 
Labour Process writers, but the context is more vaguely set in ‘capitalism’, with 
normative control just another tool of capitalists (e.g., Knights, Willmott, Smith and 
Thompson). Other writers just focus on the organisational level (e.g., Ashforth and 
                                                 
215 Jack Sommer produced a picture of a lever and pointed out that being the person ‘levered’ may not 
be a pleasant experience (Sommer, 2001: 1).  
216 This was confirmed by another source – RSNZ CEO, Steve Thompson, at a meeting of the 
Canterbury Branch of the Royal Society, 1st March 2002, University of Canterbury, on the topic ‘Why 
trust a scientist?’ 
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Mael, Casey, Clegg, Hodson, Bate) but in the writing of these four writers there is 
the spectre of an unnamed power seeking control, haunting the workplace and 
masked in managerial clothing. 
  
I suggest that employees respond to this normative form of work control in many 
different ways which can all be seen as resistance aimed at reducing the 
feelings/experiences of estrangement and alienation induced by this system and the 
process of corporatisation of which it is part. This goes against much of the literature, 
which, as I have outlined in Chapter 7, has assumed that managerial systems have 
become so powerful that resistance to them is hardly possible. Resistance of blue-
collar workers is typically used as evidence that alienation exists, offering a way in 
which workers can exert some control over what they do. However, in the literature 
this resistance is described in the context of less subtle management systems which 
are usually forms of direct control rather than consciously normative. 
 
I am suggesting a process of resistance within AgResearch, explicated in Figure 8.1. 
Scientific workers in AgResearch are experiencing unease. They are having trouble 
naming/articulating this unease, because the practice of corporatisation is new to 
them. Further, the constant change and the nature of normative control, make it more 
difficult to address what is going on. So the patterns of resistance become set – the 
cynicism and so on – but the focus is on surviving through the change, not on 
challenging it directly, partly because by the time that happens there will be further 
change. This makes it difficult to focus on anything definite. For this reason, 
maintaining one’s identity through continuing change (preserving some stability) 
becomes almost as important as the identity one is trying to preserve. Organisational 
cynics would say, “Why change to fit the current model the organisation desires, 
because it too will change? Governments and CEOs come and go, but we stay.”217 
 
The need to produce products, the need to make a profit, and being a life sciences 
company, are in fact negotiable policies dependent on governments and company 
governance (CEO and Board of Directors). The members of the groups responsible 
for such policy have limited terms in office. Scientists have seen other names for the 
                                                 
217 Matching Murray (2000: 47).  
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company’s business come and go. For example, since 1992 they have witnessed the 
demise of the biotechnology company, and the ‘adding value’, ‘relevance’ and 
‘sustainability’ rhetoric. The recent emphasis on product production may move 
entirely to the AgResearch subsidiary, Celentis. Focusing on making a profit may 
change if a government places less emphasis on the ‘company’ side of public sector 
organisations, as is happening in the health sector and the Television New Zealand 
(TVNZ) ‘charter’, for example. The situation I have described both agrees and 
disagrees with Ashforth and Mael (1998: 105), who contend that those in power in 
organisations become protected from the impact of their actions as the way they have 
gained their power becomes “institutionalized and taken for granted”. I suggest that 
this system of control may discourage direct resistance but that does not mean 
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how workers make their work meaningful. Hence the response is associated with 
their self-identities. This response also serves the purpose of providing workers with 
a way of surviving in work. The response is ultimately one of compliance, but the 
compliance is tempered, as I will demonstrate. 
 
However, before I discuss compliance and models of resistance incorporating 
compliance, I will first consider the response of ‘commitment’ to organisational 
norms (see Figure 8.1). This will be brief because most workers in the groups I 
studied had an attitude of compliance, not commitment. 
8.6.1 Commitment to organisational norms  
Scientific workers became unhappy in AgResearch because the organisation they 
worked for changed while many other things stayed the same. Here was a group of 
people who had worked together, doing the same things, and suddenly they belonged 
to something else. The situation they found themselves in was different from 
applying for a job and getting it. The change was visited upon them, not chosen by 
them. It goes without further comment that new people coming into the organisation 
may have a different sense of commitment.218 
 
One way a worker can resist estrangement is by embracing the rhetoric associated 
with normative control and taking on the corporate culture as part of their own 
identity. Such workers will feel as if they belong to the organisation and are 
committed to its goals. Ackroyd and Thompson (1999: 25) describe this as 
commitment and engagement. 
 
Only one person among those I studied had acted in order to better understand what  
was happening in her workplace. A technical worker in the MBU, who wanted to 
feel a greater understanding of AgResearch, had gone to a business studies course at 
her local polytechnic in the evenings. Another, a scientist in the MCG, was very 
happy with the company direction. However, he participated very little in the 
organisation and worked very hard to solve the particular problem he was challenged  
                                                 
218 Ironically, anecdotal evidence suggests that the dominant commitment of new workers to 
AgResearch and the PhD students funded by FRST scholarships, is still to ‘science’ (pers. comm. staff 
in AgResearch, and Nicky Murray and Lucy Baragwanath, two ‘Bright Futures’ scholars, June 2002). 
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by and employed to solve. It might be expected that as scientists became managers, 
they will become concerned to learn about business and management and will attend 
courses. In-house management courses were provided for Science Platform Leaders 
but two told me how they had managed to be otherwise engaged or out of the country 
whenever these occurred. 
 
Commitment may take different forms at different levels within the organisation. A 
worker may not completely embrace the management-communicated organisational 
culture, but may adapt partially, by accepting particular aspects of the organisational 
rhetoric. Eric, for instance, has been co-opted enough by corporate management to 
make FRST the ‘enemy’,219 rather than corporate management. The reasons for his 
discontent now lie outside the organisation rather than within it. Commitment will 
mean giving up the desire to control the product of one’s work because the 
organisation is now acknowledged as ‘knowing best’.220 
8.6.2 Compliance 
I understand compliance at work to mean workers making a practice of conforming 
to what an organisation wants in order to carry out their work. Compliance does not 
mean that workers have to ‘embrace’ the identity offered, but that they conform to 
what the organisation wants in order to do something that is more important to them 
– something that balances out or rewards them more than the cost of conformity. 
Compliance implies trying to make work meaningful in such a way that a worker 
does not experience estrangement even though its causes still exist. Compliance is a 
way of fighting the possibility of alienation from one’s work, by manipulating the 
work system in such a way that a worker still has some control over what they do at 
work, and the rewards that work brings. 
 
The very word ‘compliance’ implies that there is some pay-off for compliance. What 
is it that AgResearch workers are exchanging for compliance? I have put the case 
that the pay-off is survival in work, but survival in a way which gives workers 
control over the meaning that work has for them and the role it plays in their self-
                                                 
219 This also reinforces the importance to this group/Platform of having an ‘other’ to define 
themselves against to maintain their group identity. 
220 For this reason I have not included commitment in the model of resistance against alienation. 
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identity. At least, this is what workers hope for when they act in certain ways to 
achieve these ends. 
 
In AgResearch very few workers would say their work is ‘just a job’. They would 
like to believe what they do is important and of value to the employer and to society, 
even if for many it is also a means for them to do other things in their leisure. What 
they do not comply with is the employer’s perspective on their work and themselves 
as workers. Obtaining compliance is not a problem as workers are very busy doing 
their work but are they doing the ‘right’ work for the ‘right’, organisationally 
relevant, reasons? The way in which corporate has tried to get workers to do the 
‘right’ work for the ‘right’ reasons has been viewed as coercive and manipulative. 
Attempts to separate workers from their reasons for doing the work they do and 
replace them with other reasons, has had both an estranging and alienating effect. By 
carrying out their science, scientific workers still achieve what the company wants of 
them but if they do it for the ‘wrong’ reasons, then they are maintaining some control 
over it – stamping their own identity on it, unknown to management. When I asked 
Owen about how he resisted the things he disliked about AgResearch he tapped his 
head. What goes on in his head, he communicated, is what is the most important and 
that cannot be touched or influenced. 
 
Achieving compliance by using the techniques I am about to describe is not a ‘happy 
ending’ story. I was made powerfully aware of this one day when I was expounding 
my views to one of the members of a science group I had studied. Without 
consciousness of what he was doing he found the nearest wall and hit his head 
against it, and almost in tears, said, “But it’s so stressful!” Practising the distancing 
tactics I will describe, has not been ‘successful’ for most workers. The fact is they 
are still unhappy, returning me to my original observations of scientific workers as 
both happy and unhappy. 
8.6.3 Constructing models of resistance 
I have described earlier how scientific workers are experiencing estrangement, while 
only scientists are experiencing alienation. I suggest that it is through their resistance 
to these experiences that they are able to comply and carry on working. Through 
bringing together my observations, reflections and the thoughts of various writers on 
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resistance and its related concepts, I have constructed two ‘models’ which help to 
understand how scientific workers comply sufficiently to do their work and for their 
employing organisation to continue, while retaining their sense of autonomy. In order 
to make clear whose ideas contributed to my models and which parts are unique to 
me, the reader will need to refer to the schematic, simplified versions of the ideas I 
have taken from different exponents on resistance (Figures 7.1 – 7.5) included in 
Chapter 7.  
 
It is my idea to draw up models of the resistance process according to the patterns I 
observed of how scientific workers in AgResearch manage to continue to work while 
trying to ensure that the meaning of their own work is maintained. Because I have 
identified that all scientific workers are resisting estrangement but only some, 
particularly scientists, are resisting alienation, I have produced two models (Figures 
8.2 and 8.3). The next two major sections present each model and describe in full the 
components of each. There is some repetition in these sections because some of the 
material from Chapter 6 is being reframed. 
8.7 Resisting estrangement 
I have created a model to describe how workers are able to resist or protect 
themselves from the experience of estrangement in order to overtly comply with the 
goals of their employer AgResearch. This model aims to clarify what scientific 
workers are resisting and why, which is not clear in most models. This section  
provides justification and explanation of this model, which is schematically 
summarised in Figure 8.2. Ways of resisting estrangement can range from embracing 
the corporate culture to leaving the organisation. There were, however, very few 
workers at these two extremes. Nearly all workers were resisting estrangement. 
Many of the technical workers were already instrumentalists (in the Goldthorpe 
sense) in some ways. Still, at work they could counter estrangement by emphasising 
their group membership and taking a great pride in the skills they brought to their 
work and in the quality of that work. I did not get the feeling that they were 
experiencing the same level of distress as scientists, though there was unease among 
them due to insecurity. Most workers, scientists and technical workers, managed to 
find a way of resisting in order to comply enough to ensure their survival, at the same 
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time finding ways that continued to make their work meaningful in a way that 
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This section elaborates on the detail of Figure 8.2, showing how workers can resist 
estrangement by outflanking or distancing themselves from the system of normative 
control. They can do this by belonging to entities with alternative value systems 
(Section 8.7.2) and making themselves and organisational communications invisible 
(Section 8.7.3). This then means that they are then able to place a greater emphasis 
on meaningful feedback from their work (Section 8.7.4) and they are able to survive 
in an uncertain environment (Section 8.7.5).  
8.7.1 Distancing/outflanking 
At first I was puzzled by how these workers could do the things they did – play the 
games they did – and still maintain their integrity as people and as scientific workers. 
I was aware of their use of distancing tactics (Section 6.4) to limit the influence of 
corporate communications on who they were and the meanings they had for their 
work. Then I became aware that such tactics played another role. To continue with 
their work while gaining satisfaction from it required them to use the resources 
provided by the workplace for their own self-interest rather than the interests of 
AgResearch and the Government. This challenged their integrity. It made them feel 
dishonest. Using distancing tactics protected them from this feeling and helped 
justify the ‘rightness’ of their cause. This behaviour became a way of resisting the 
appropriation of their identities by their employer (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). 
 
From the work of Collinson (1994) and his use of distancing as a technique for 
resistance, I was able to identify similar ways scientific workers in AgResearch 
distanced themselves from the company’s strategic direction (and all that involved) 
and the desired buy-in of workers’ values (see Section 6.4). The work of Cohen and 
Taylor (1992) added substance to my observations. The resistance typologies of 
Hodson (1995b) and Clegg (1994) include concepts that could also be described as 
distancing techniques (see Sections 7.4.4.1 and 7.4.4.2). Hodson has a category 
called ‘deflecting abuse’. Clegg has ‘strategies for outflanking’, which in his work 
are described as ways in which employers inhibit resistance, whereas I am turning 
this meaning on its head by using the words to also describe ways in which workers 




By using these techniques to distance themselves from corporate strategy, scientific 
workers are able to establish a boundary between themselves and the organisation, 
which protects their integrity and self-identity. This allows them to then justify to 
themselves their appropriation of the public funding, the organisation’s resources, 
and their own time and work, to assert their own autonomy in order to do the work 
that is meaningful to them.  
 
The label ‘deflecting abuse’ (Hodson) is rather strong in this context. I had no 
indications that workers felt abused by the organisation. I suggest there was the 
potential for abuse as some workers did considerably more work than they were paid 
for and the organisation profited from this. However, I was also aware that one 
Science Platform Leader in particular (rather than ‘the organisation’) did verbally 
abuse his staff, and this group concocted a story around a possible name of a research 
programme which deflected the abuse, negated it and revenged it (Hodson, 1995b: 
83) by turning it into a story that emphasised their intellectual superiority and private 
scientific knowledge. 
 
One of Hodson’s categories for this concept of ‘deflecting abuse’ is ‘degradation’ 
which I feel is also rather too strong a way to describe some of the experiences of 
workers.221 A milder interpretation of ‘degradation’ could be ‘not being valued’. 
Some workers in the MBU noticed how previous managers had conveyed how little 
they valued them in the way they were introduced to lab visitors (see Section 5.4.4), 
for example, but they also appreciated how this had changed with a change in 
manager. Another technical worker talked about being one of the “minions”. The 
staff survey of 1999 indicated how the feeling of workers that they, and the work 
they did, was not valued by corporate management, was common throughout 
AgResearch. It could be categorised as abusive, because in seeking to impose a new 
set of values (a new culture) on workers, management are implying that they are 
blank slates (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 99) – that workers have no values and culture 
of their own and if they do, such values and culture are not worth preserving.  
                                                 
221 Note the confusion here. Hodson has developed the concept of ‘deflecting abuse’ to describe the 
ways in which workers are able to resist abusive behaviour on the part of managers. But he then has a 
sub-category which he calls ‘degradation’ which is the experience of abusive behaviour, not a way of 
resisting it.  
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8.7.2 Alternative value systems 
There are many other ways in which workers in AgResearch can feel valued, apart 
from feeling valued by the organisation. As I have described in Chapter 5, they can 
be part of strong science teams/groups. Being accepted as contributing to the work of 
their group is an important part of belonging. For the scientists, membership of the 
science community is important. Their life apart from work also provides 
opportunities for many workers to find other ways of being valued. Belonging to any 
of these different groups provides an ‘alternative value system’, one of the categories 
developed by Hodson (1995b) within his ‘deflecting abuse’ agenda. The symbolic 
rejection of organisational and Government policies (ibid.: 84) is one of the common 
strategies of resisting the experience of estrangement among each group I studied in 
AgResearch. In Part B, I described how workers produced logical, reasoned, 
arguments against organisational initiatives and particularly how their values differed 
from those promoted by the organisation. Such efforts to undermine management are 
considered to be a first movement towards resistance. Hodson says such “meanings 
require social affirmation for their continued vitality” (ibid.). (‘Social support’ is 
another of Hodson’s categories.) This is certainly evidenced in AgResearch by the 
overall cynicism with which corporate utterances are regarded and the particular 
culture of groups such as the MCG in which cynicism is very much perpetuated by 
the scientists. In other groups there was not so much cynicism. Cynicism did not 
have the ‘required-by-members-to-demonstrate-that-they-are-part-of-the-group’ 
nature that it did in the MCG. Supporting alternative value systems is related to the 
maintenance of both group and individual identities.  
 
The next subsections describe other ways of setting up and maintaining alternative 
value systems – by becoming instrumentalists, by viewing the past as utopia, and by 
reinforcing these alternatives through social support and support of an ‘us-them’ 
culture. 
8.7.2.1 Protection from estrangement by instrumentalism 
There were many technical workers who admitted to me in a rather embarrassed way 
– as if it was not what they were ‘supposed’ to feel – that they ‘worked to live, not 
lived to work’. Their ‘alternative value system’ lay outside work, and this was a 
more dominant source of identity reinforcement. At the same time, most of these 
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workers also were able to realise some of their potential through their work, both 
intellectually and socially, as, for example, in being problem-solvers, well organised 
and relating well to colleagues, and they drew a lot of satisfaction from these 
sources.  
 
Instrumentalism provides an alternative value system for all workers as it enables 
them to survive by having something more meaningful to look forward to outside 
work (see Section 6.3.2). Actions of management to increase the commitment of 
workers to company goals may actually be countered by scientists through 
demonstrating their commitment to science (e.g., Bill, Wade, Graham and see 
Sections 8.8.4 and 8.8.5), or by an increasingly instrumental approach to their work. 
In the former case, I have described how, for example, scientists who are managers 
will come back to work at their science outside working hours – working hours being 
the time they spend on management. In the latter case, scientists still do their work 
but lose their enthusiasm for it (e.g., Mark, Jack, Dave – Section 8.3.3.1), as Dave 
(scientist) said, “I won’t be able to change my beliefs sufficiently to get on the 
bandwagon.  I’ll just have to work within the constraints that it offers.” Although 
their enthusiasm for science continues, some scientists also find their leisure 
activities important or becoming increasingly important. Some of the technical 
workers, who feel they are not sufficiently rewarded monetarily, may make sure they 
work the required hours, no more nor less.  
  
Being an instrumentalist can just mean playing the system in a way to benefit oneself 
monetarily. It could be a form of resisting the inroads of work or the demands of the 
company (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999; Clegg, 1994). Goldthorpe et al. (1970: 38-
39) hint that instrumentalism is a way maintaining one’s identity outside of work, in 
other words, as dissociated from work.222 Becoming an instrumentalist does not in 
itself mean becoming a capitalist. However, it does mean supporting the capitalist 
system by competing with others for personal, individual and family gain, and by 
subscribing to a wage-effort bargain. 
                                                 
222 The ‘instrumental orientation’ is characterised by (i) “… work is as a means to an end … external 
to the work situation …” (ii) “… workers’ involvement in the organisation which employs them is 
primarily a calculative one …” (iii) “[workers’] jobs do not form part of their central life interests … 
[work] is not a source of self-realisation.” (iv) “… workers’ lives are sharply dichotomised between 
work and non-work” (Goldthorpe et al., 1970: 38-39).   
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8.7.2.2 The past as utopia 
Another way of creating an alternative value system is by remembering the golden 
days of the past. Some workers did hark back to the past and this was symbolised by 
Colin’s (scientist) description of the scientists in the MCG as ‘dinosaurs’ (see 
Section 5.2.2). Crozier (1964[1963]: 80) could have been describing AgResearch 
when he wrote that cultures containing such an ‘alternative value system’ often 
include:  
an idealization of the past, some pessimism about the present, devaluation of the 
future, and distrust of management. This pressure, however, has for the 
individuals also a very positive function, since it safeguards for them an area of 
personal autonomy to which belong most of the concrete aspects of everyday 
life.  
 
Perhaps the workers who hark back to ‘the good old days’ are those who have not 
managed to make the separation between work and not-work and the only way they 
still manage to feel valued and important is in terms of their past, not their present. 
They continually remind themselves of the past in order to keep it real for them – to 
keep this part of their identity alive.  
8.7.2.3 Social Support 
Most workers demonstrated strong social support for each other by their regular 
attendance at morning and afternoon tea breaks. Tea breaks were seen by workers as 
an important way to keep in touch with what was going on, even if they were not 
very socially inclined. Workers who did take these breaks would take as long as they 
liked. This also gave them social solidarity. The organisational directive was that tea 
breaks should only take 10 minutes. I did not ever see this practised on any of the 
AgResearch campuses I visited. 
 
When people experience a loss of voice in one arena I suggest that they look for a 
place where they are heard, where they belong, even if it is just a safe place in which 
to grizzle! A person usually loses their voice only within a particular discourse and 
they may be able to express resistance through other discourses. For example, 
workers may not be able to front up to management or speak in the way management 
would understand (and in fact they may well be invisible to or discounted by 
management anyway), but they can still complain to their colleagues at morning tea. 
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This may not change anything but it may allow them to cope and it is a symbolic 
action, demonstrating they have not taken on the persona management would like.  
8.7.2.4 Reinforcing an us-them culture 
Two of the four groups thought in oppositional terms. One wished to keep their 
separation from senior management clear – to keep up the ‘us-them’ culture. The 
other had Oliver as their facilitator. With his background as a past Public Service 
Association (PSA) negotiator for AgResearch employees, Oliver could not help but 
think in oppositional terms. Management was not to be trusted!  
 
Competition between different groups maintains a group’s distinct identity and 
solidarity. It can be both overt and covert. Overtly groups compete for funding and 
resources as if other groups do not exist.223 A more covert example of such 
maintenance of identity is the way in which a dominant group at tea breaks does not 
openly discourage others from joining it, but the very arrangement of chairs, body 
language and lack of invitations to join, may do so. One group was particularly proud 
of its cynical image. It was a ‘hot bed’ of gossip. Its solidarity was emphasised by the 
tight circle formed at tea breaks and the difficulty this created for others who might 
have wanted to break in. The size of this gathering emphasised the group’s 
importance to members and reinforced its status. This behaviour protects workers 
from estrangement because it enhances their sense of belonging and contributing. 
Members also experience solidarity (Hodson, 1995b), which strengthens their ability 
to maintain different opinions and positions from the corporate culture. 
 
As I mentioned in Section 7.4.4.1, Hodson links this concept of ‘deflecting abuse’ 
with direct control styles of management. I suggest that the examples I have given in 
the last paragraphs have elements that cast doubt on Hodson’s claim. 
                                                 
223 As bidding coordinator of the Sustainable Production Division in 1995-6, I took it upon myself to 
inform scientific staff of the different funding opportunities that were available. This had a mixed 
reception from members of one group because they already had a good knowledge of most of these 
and did not want it to become common knowledge, as their advantage would then be at risk. At the 




Workers, either intentionally of unintentionally, were able to deal with corporate 
communications in such a way as to render them ‘invisible’ or rather ‘unheard’. 224 
The most overt forms of collective yet unorganised resistance I was aware of would 
have been non-attendance at corporate-related meetings, such as the team briefs, 
strategic planning meetings and courses such as ‘Invitation to Innovation’ (I2I). 
Another form of ‘non-attendance’ was by not reading any corporate communications 
delivered via email or hard copy. There were large groups of workers in AgResearch 
who practised this ‘non-attendance’. This may sound extreme but it was in fact 
almost de rigueur for technical workers in all groups except the W&S and Farm 
Systems Groups on the Lincoln campus.225 This could be seen both as direct 
resistance and as a way of managing compliance, because it is also a way of 
distancing oneself from situations in which one could be exposed to company 
rhetoric and perceived indoctrination. These workers could not see that there would 
be anything in it for them except time away from work, when work was what they 
preferred to be doing. Meetings were not work. This view was even reinforced by the 
CEO who after a meeting one day (as I described in Chapter 6) told the workers 
present, “You can go back to work now”. There was never any desire expressed by 
workers to use such meetings as a way of getting off work. They saw their work as 
still there and time at meetings would mean they had to make it up by working 
harder or longer. In these groups it was mainly the scientists who went to such 
meetings, and who then had to develop other techniques for resistance. 
 
Others were physically distanced from where organisational meetings took place. 
This obviously was not an intentional distancing tactic but it did mean that to attend 
organisational meetings required a special effort and took more time. It was easier 
not to go (see Section 6.4.1). 
 
                                                 
224 This is my addition to Clegg’s ‘outflanking’ concept. 
225 Is this just an efficient division of labour? On the Lincoln campus there was an expectation that 
everyone should go to these meetings. (There were emails sent out suggesting that staff attend and put 
on a good showing for corporate management.) In contrast, the SPL of one of the other Platforms, 
based on another campus, consciously protected his staff from some of the corporate communications 
by attending such meetings himself and only passing on the information he felt was necessary. The 




Another way in which corporate communication could be desensitised was by 
treating it as ‘information’ just like that found in a scientific paper, for example. In 
this way it produced less of a challenge to a mind that was already made up or it 
could be argued about without emotional engagement (see Sections 6.4.3 to 6.4.5).  
 
Technical workers also tried to keep themselves invisible. “Keep your head down,” 
was a common piece of advice, even from technical workers who kept themselves 
informed but never spoke at organisational meetings. Similarly ‘listening up’ can 
mean ‘hearing’ but not participating in the fullest sense of making a contribution. As 
I have said, the W&S Group nearly always had full attendance at organisational 
meetings. These workers whose jobs were most at risk were those eager to find out 
how to ensure their continuing employment. Attendance was a way for them to work 
out how to comply.  
 
Scientists, compared with technical workers, did not make themselves invisible. The 
scientists in the MCG in particular, attended all the organisational meetings, and the 
male scientists always spoke. They acted at all times as if the organisation was an 
audience to what they do, by having a strong ‘us-them’ ethos. For the ‘us’ to exist the 
‘them’ has to exist too. 
 
Scientific workers in AgResearch actually resisted chances to participate rather than 
welcomed them. When the new CEO came to AgResearch in 1997, he said he 
wanted worker participation in the production of the strategic plan. Workers were 
very suspicious,226 and these suspicions turned out to be well grounded. The CEO 
decided the agenda for the participation and it excluded the organisation’s 
direction/strategy and the science to be carried out by the organisation, the main 
interests of scientific workers. The Strategic Plan also stated AgResearch wanted to 
be the ‘employer of choice’ (AgResearch, 1997b) at a time when scientific workers 
were feeling increasingly insecure, further increasing their cynicism. The result was 
that very few workers participated in the strategic planning process. This lack of 
participation could be viewed as resistance. Workers did not think their contribution 
would be heard, let alone incorporated. A group culture operated which implied that 
                                                 
226 In Chapter 2, I discussed my reaction, as a staff member, to this invitation to participate. 
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if one was seen to be cooperating with company rhetoric, one risked exclusion from 
the social side of one’s work group. The group agenda and the culture within the 
group that supports it may be more powerful and/or compete with the company 
culture. Workers are likely to feel much more strongly about belonging to their work 
group than to the company.  
 
Some of these responses are documented in the literature. Jackall (1978: 142) and 
Schrank (1983) have described how workers were suspicious and cautious about 
managerial suggestions of increased participation. The examples above counter 
Hodson’s (1995b: 100) final agenda of resistance, ‘empowerment through 
participation’, in which he suggests that greater participation of workers could result 
in more, not less, criticism of management in situations where management could be 
considered to be restricting production rather than enhancing it.227 Workers in 
AgResearch obviously did not see the possibility of participation as providing such 
potential to influence management. 
8.7.4 Feedback from work 
As I mentioned earlier, one way of sustaining identity against conflicting claims is to 
turn to feedback from a source better fitted to a valued identity. I illustrated in 
Chapter 5 how feedback from the practice of science is a very dominant source of 
satisfaction and value for scientific workers. I will not repeat it in this section except 
to make a few additional points which have occurred to me since reading more of the 
resistance literature.  
 
Scientific workers were able to increase positive feedback from their work by  
learning new skills. The assumption is that learning new skills and gaining new 
equipment which requires the use of new skills, is tied into more efficient work 
practice, thus saving the organisation money. The push for and the adoption of a new 
technique or new equipment, however, may not be tied into this economic meaning 
of efficiency at all. Apart from the fact that it may actually cost more, it may make 
work more interesting to scientific workers by removing the tedious, routine and  
                                                 
227 It is important to note here that participative management as such has not happened in AgResearch 
and so what I am talking about are equivalent examples that have happened in spite of management 
initiatives, not because of them. 
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repetitive aspects, and by contributing to further and faster progress in a particular 
area of research. It could give the technical workers who are using it more power and 
status within AgResearch and the scientists they work for more power and status 
within the scientific community, and make everyone’s work more satisfying.  
 
Similarly, when technical workers expressed a concern about getting more ‘training’, 
it was not of the type that the company-employed trainer provided.228 Workers 
wanted ‘training’ that developed their science-based skills. This desire was as much 
based on self-interest as organisational interest. It means workers can do more 
interesting work, get promoted or find other work more easily. An organisation can 
capitalise on this self-interest but not control it. 
 
The next subsections explain how workers can gain more feedback from their work 
by doing more work, being innovative and efficient in their use of resources and 
taking ownership of their work so that they can take pride in how well they do it.  
8.7.4.1(Mis)appropriation of time in order to ‘do science’ 
Hodson’s (1995b) agenda, ‘regulating the amount of work’, aligns with Ackroyd and 
Thompsons’ (1999: 25-28) ‘appropriation of work, resources and time’. Resistance 
in this area is usually described in terms of workers finding ways to do less work or 
doing things at work that are not work (Mars, 1982; Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). 
Roy (1969), for example, described such behaviour, as ‘making out’. He described 
the ways workers found to achieve bonuses without doing more work than necessary. 
This protected them from the risk of job loss or from the levels of product output 
being increased without a corresponding increase in pay. Turning Hodson’s 
‘restriction of output’ category (Hodson, 1995b: 90) on its head, I see workers 
actually increasing their output. The point I am arguing is that this ‘making of more  
time’ is not done in order for the company to better achieve its goals but for the 
scientific workers to achieve theirs - to do the work of science, thereby protecting 
their identity from appropriation by their employer (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 
25). The fact that the result of the work may coincide in achieving both the goals of 
the company and the worker is fortunate for the company but the company has no 
                                                 
228 This trainer was more likely to run courses which taught staff ‘soft’ skills. 
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way of identifying the reasons why workers act in this way and cannot consciously 
plan for it. 
 
By failing to separate identification with ‘work activity’ from identification with 
‘employers’, Ackroyd and Thompson confuse important distinctions re. scientific 
workers. (For a fuller discussion of this see Section 7.4.4.4.) Scientific workers in 
AgResearch identify strongly with their work but not with their employing 
organisation. For example, ‘alternative procedures’ (Hodson, 1995b: 89), which I 
call ‘innovations on the job’, have been incorporated into work practice because they 
save time and resources and so allow workers to do more in the same time (rather 
than less and have a rest), and to do more interesting activities rather than routine 
work. Similarly, as workers embrace new technology, or send work out to other 
agencies (e.g., DNA typing), they are then able to concentrate on the more interesting 
parts of their work. Most workers did not take their full holidays and management 
tried to encourage them to do so because of the impact this had on ‘the books’ if too 
much leave was piled up. Management countered this tendency by deciding on a 
maximum number of days of leave that could be stored up at any one time.229 
 
The distinction needs to be made between unpaid and paid work.230 Though my 
interest is only in paid work, many of the workers in my study would claim to do a 
considerable amount of work outside their paid hours of employment. As recipients 
of a salary, this used to mean that workers were trusted to do their work without 
‘clocking in and out’ as wage workers were required to do. However, with the 
implementation of timesheets, there is the implicit message that AgResearch 
scientific workers too are tied to certain hours of work for their pay. When they work 
more hours than required on their timesheet, workers are able to take ‘time in lieu’ 
because they are not paid for overtime. An accountability requirement has had the 
unintended consequence of forcing workers to take a more instrumentalist approach 
to their work. (That this was against the company’s intent was indicated by the CEO. 
He said that he would like to see workers so excited about their work that they 
                                                 
229 Of course, not taking enough leave is an issue for occupational safety and health, not that this 
aspect ever seems to be mentioned. 
230 This has been of increasing interest in feminist debates about work, e.g., Waring (1988) Counting 




virtually lived at the workplace as they did in Silicon Valley and the 3M company, 
for example. He learned this on his visit there with a selected group of AgResearch 
managers in 1999.)  
 
One of the less passive acts of resistance which could be loosely classified under 
Hodson’s (1995b) ‘computer vulnerabilities’ category231 within his concept of 
‘regulating the amount of work’, is the response to timesheets, which has only 
become possible through their computerisation. (Though I have discussed this in 
Section 6.5.1, this paragraph takes that discussion further.) Many workers saw the 
keeping of time use records as a waste of time and by their using the ‘average day’ 
entry facility the timesheet, as a means of control of working hours and as an 
accounting record, was rendered useless.232 It is also interesting to note that this is 
something that many workers just ‘did’. To my knowledge, there was no discussion 
of it. In one Platform, the SPL’s Personal Assistant actually completed these 
timesheets for workers who were not prepared to learn how to complete them for 
themselves, and a similar thing happened in another group in which another woman 
took on this task of ‘helping the men with their housekeeping tasks’.233 (This 
response also reduced the impact of the men’s protest or protected them against a 
possible management response.) The timesheets were also something that ‘had to be 
done’. There were requests each month on the email reminding workers to complete 
them, but there was never any indication of concern about how they were completed. 
I could not work out why workers did not record ‘thinking time’, extra hours worked 
and so on, which was ‘out of work’ time, and may have had an interesting impact on 
the system! On the other hand, no-one ever received any feedback at all from their 
timesheets and they seemed to be used by the accountants as a record for annual 
leave and sick leave only. This also provoked a certain degree of cynicism. 
8.7.4.2 Using innovation and efficiency to do more science 
At the beginning of this research I wanted to present scientific workers as innovative 
and creative because AgResearch and Government policy were promoting these as 
                                                 
231 Hodson (1995: 92) uses this category to describe sabotage attempts through the use of computers. 
232 Foucault was concerned how the desire to measure everything was a way of controlling and 
exerting power in society (Rabinow, 1994: 19-20; Smart, 1985: 106). This is a simple example of how 
such a system can be sabotaged and without increasing surveillance, which Foucault saw as inevitable 
(and the consequences of that), it is unlikely to be changed.  
233 Hochschild (1983) makes reference to organisations needing mothers. 
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desired qualities for ‘knowledge workers’. I knew from my experience of scientific 
workers that they were already innovative in their everyday working lives. I was 
confused by the organisation’s promotion of innovation as it seemed to indicate that 
the organisation was unaware or did not appreciate this quality of their workers. 
Then I realised, after talking to Gil Simpson (Jade Corporation and President of the 
Royal Society of New Zealand),234 that the examples I have of innovation are not 
recognised as such by the organisation or by people like him, because for them 
innovation means creating something new that makes money.235 Therefore the 
innovation and creativity I have described in Chapter 5 could be considered a form of 
misbehaviour (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999). It is a way workers can do more of 
the work they love, by improving their own working conditions. 
 
It pays a group to be more efficient in its uses of resources because it can do more 
science for the same money. This does not necessarily lead to the company making 
more profit. For example, Rae developed a way of doing two PCRs per sheet. Ivan 
developed more efficient ordering and buying systems. A similar innovation is the 
way in which molecular biology protocols are changed and developed by technical 
workers (described in Chapter 5). Todd developed measuring equipment which 
enabled him to do his work more efficiently to free up time for work more interesting 
to him (also described in Chapter 5). Because profit is taken out of budgets before 
the operating costs, savings go into the group rather than the organisation as a whole. 
Though these innovations do not reward workers financially, workers obtain other 
rewards from them. Such innovations are invisible to senior management, and 
frequently to line managers. Thus innovations could be regarded as a form of 
‘making out’ (Roy, 1969), or ‘appropriation’ (Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999).  
8.7.4.3 Resistance by taking ownership of work 
‘Doing more science’ is a way of asserting ones identity as a scientific worker. The  
protection of identity becomes a way of resisting estrangement. Hodson (1995b: 95) 
asserts that when workers take pride in their work, creating their own standards by 
working autonomously and taking personally their successes and failures, then this is 
                                                 
234 Pers. comm. 3-6-01. 




a form of resistance. This type of ‘craft autonomy’ (ibid.)236 is very strong in 
AgResearch as demonstrated by earlier examples (see Section 5.4). It was very much 
part of workers’ identities. There is evidence too that the idea of working hard and 
doing your best – the Protestant ethic in disguise237 – are prominent reasons for work 
satisfaction. Eric said that he knows of no-one in his Platform who does not work 
hard. Some workers felt that the harder they worked, the longer the hours they put in, 
the more satisfaction they felt. It is worth noting that for technical workers, this may 
have nothing to do with the need for the work that is being done. Fred (technical 
worker) talked of how he had been asked by his manager to pay less attention to the 
finer detail and presentation of work for preliminary reports but his personal 
standards were so high he had not been able to comply.  
 
All the technical workers in the study wanted to do things well and on time. The 
workers own these values and they feel good about adhering to them; they are not 
‘caused’ or ‘owned’ by the company, but the company hires someone with these 
attributes and provides the environment in which they can be exercised in order to 
profit from them. Workers do not use their skills to please the company but to gain 
satisfaction themselves and some of this satisfaction may come from pleasing the 
company. However, workers in AgResearch complained that they would never know 
if this was so or not because of the lack of feedback.  
 
The work of the groups I studied in AgResearch carries on because of the 
motivations of the workers, not the company’s motivations, and from their desire to 
fulfil those motivations and maintain their associated identity. Workers appropriate 
funding, resources and time, in order to assert their autonomy over the control of 
work in a way that makes it meaningful to them, and reinforce and maintain their 
self-identity. Trying to change why workers do the work they do is (according to my 
observations) likely to affect their motivation and enthusiasm and turn them into 
instrumental workers, who start looking for satisfaction elsewhere in their lives 
rather than at work.  
                                                 
236 Hodson (1995b: 95) distinguishes between ‘craft control’ and ‘pride in work’. 
237 In other words, not as a way to get the reward of ‘heaven’. 
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8.7.5 Survival as resistance to estrangement 
If creating insecurity is a management tactic, then survival could be seen as a form of 
resistance. Judging by the common response to the question, “How are you?” of, “I 
must be doing something right because I’m still here,” survival is a form of feedback. 
Given the lack of feedback, workers have to interpret all that happens to them as 
having some important meaning. Survival can also be perceived as an indication of 
outflanking management because there is the assumption that management are 
always looking for a reason to make someone redundant. Those who refuse 
promotion to a higher management position are indicating their wish to continue 
their work in science rather than serve the organisation in this way. They do not 
perceive promotion to management as a reward for good work – a point some senior 
mangers do not seem to grasp. Management ideas change, but workers remain 
(Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 161). 
 
In AgResearch the MCG, for instance, has survived and grown through many 
management changes, and so it has the understanding that it will continue to do so. 
Its very survival and growth is an indication that management strategies do not work 
and demonstrates resistance to them.238 It has been able to carry on researching a 
biocontrol for grass grub239 with a singular lack of success in producing a 
commercially viable product, until 2001 when a very talented formulation chemist 
made a breakthrough in this area. This illustrates the inconsistency of FRST  
policy as it actually rewarded scientists who did not solve an agricultural problem by 
continuing their funding in the hope that the problem would be solved in the future. 
Those scientists who were aware of this made their programmes spin out as long as 
possible. Those who did not do this discovered that their funding was reduced and 
they faced redundancy unless they could think of something else to research.  
                                                 
238 It is interesting to contrast this with Hirschman’s (1970) views of ‘exit, voice and loyalty’ in the 
public sector (pp. 104-5). He implies that people who stay are loyal in a different way – they hope by 
staying (or leaving) that they can makes things better. I think the MCG ‘stay’ because the workers 
have an awareness of ‘this too will pass’. It does not mean they have developed a loyalty of any sort to 
the organisation itself. 
239 It was in 1981 that this group discovered the bacterial disease used as a biocontrol for grass grub, 
which they are still working on (Hunt, 1998). 
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8.7.6 Resisting estrangement: model summary 
I have drawn together the ideas of many writers and incorporated them with my own 
to produce a model of how workers resist estrangement. Workers ‘sustain valued 
identities’ (Ashforth and Mael) by distancing themselves (Goffman, Cohen and 
Taylor) in order to ‘outflank’ (Clegg) their employer. This enables them to 
appropriate resources, time, materials and work (Ackroyd and Thompson) to get on 
doing work of science for their own reasons while preserving their integrity.  
 
Thus this model not only brings those of other writers into an integrated whole, but it 
also challenges and extends the meanings some of these writers have ascribed to their 
concepts. I have used Clegg’s ‘outflanking’ concept to describe a worker strategy as 
well as an employer strategy. I have separated out Ackroyd and Thompsons’ 
appropriation of work and appropriation of identity.  And, I have suggested that 
doing more work can also be a resistance tactic because it enhances the scientific 
aspect of a worker’s identity.  
8.8 Resisting alienation 
Scientific workers, mainly scientists, resisted the experience of alienation by using 
distancing techniques in ways that protected their integrity so that they could attempt 
to take control of their work in order to make it most meaningful to them. For some, 
particularly those in the MCG, and some in the E-Group, this resistance is quite 
successful, as they have managed to maintain control over the products of their work. 
Some of the scientists in the MCG fit the description ‘cynical traders’ I ventured 
earlier (Section 7.4.5.1). They are quite proud of their cynical image and how 
successful they are at playing the system. However, most scientists remain unhappy 
and are seeking to make their meaning in different ways by resisting alienation, 
sometimes in relation to their work (e.g., Rae who is incorporating ‘managing’ into a 
worthwhile skill), and sometimes in relation to their use of leisure. This section 
describes and explains the second model of the resistance process, which summarises 
how scientists resist alienation (see Figure 8.3). 
 
On some rare occasions, scientists seized opportunities to directly resist and I 
consider these first. The question also needs to be asked, why were there so few 
examples of such direct resistance if scientists are so unhappy and concerned about 
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the future of science? In the second subsection (8.8.2), I suggest reasons for that, 
before moving on (8.8.3) to examine how compliance was achieved by using 
distancing techniques which protected scientists’ sense of themselves as decent and 
honest workers, doing something for others, the environment and science by carrying 
out scientific work. The following subsections, 8.8.4 and 8.8.5, then explain how 
distancing enabled scientists to appropriate work to ‘do science’ and how this 


































Figure 8.3 Resistance model 
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8.8.1 Direct resistance  
Some scientists actively managed corporate management (Collinson, 1992) in order 
to assert some control over their work. For instance, Jim (SPL) was concerned to 
present his case to the Board and senior management in order to ‘educate’ them 
about the process of molecular biology and its likely time frame; Colin (scientist) 
contacted anyone in corporate he felt needed to be informed of something; Rosie 
(scientist) worked hard to introduce and maintain collaboration across Platforms; and 
Dean (scientist) constantly tried to communicate with his SPL. These scientists tried 
hard to think of management in collegial terms rather than as the opposition. They 
could be seen to be ‘managing management’.  
 
Others challenged the accountability culture. As scientists rose to management 
positions, they had to respond to more and more requests from corporate for reports. 
Noel (scientist) did not do anything asked of him by corporate unless he was told 
why and it was backed up by his line manager as needing to be done. Wade 
(scientist) was not prepared to do things asked of him unless he was asked several 
times. Frequently he found there was never a follow-up request. These examples 
demonstrate individual overt resistance. These acts, however, were not intended to 
change anyone or anything but rather to enable Noel and Wade to spend their time in 
ways they considered more important. These are not examples of organised 
resistance. I was not aware of either Noel or Wade exhorting others to behave in the 
same manner.  
8.8.2 Why is there not more collective resistance? 
If scientists are so unhappy about the scene in which they work, why don’t they 
‘organise’ themselves to do something about it? Like me, Brian Easton has been 
perplexed by this apparent passivity of scientists. He used a very picturesque simile 
to describe them, likening them to possums, mesmerised by the lights of the car 
coming towards them and taking no action.240 Direct resistance has connotations of 
collective and organised responses to work control and the form considered most 
direct is that of strike action (Karlsson, 1995).241 A strike demonstrates conscious, 
open, directed and acted upon resistance. In AgResearch there was very little 
                                                 
240 Pers. comm. 30-5-00. 
241 For some writers this is the only ‘proper’ form of resistance (see Nord and Jermier, 1994). 
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indication of individual workers being involved in direct action in order to change 
their situation or AgResearch. They have not yet gone ‘on strike’ or taken any sort of 
industrial action. They do not have enough group solidarity or their solidarities are so 
cross-cutting that this is unable to happen. They are still ‘old fashioned’ professionals 
in the sense of tradtitional ‘white-collar’ workers who see strike action as uncouth 
and ‘working class’, but not in the sense of workers whose market situation makes 
industrial action unnecessary (Lockwood, 1958). There is no thought of them 
banding together to get something they want.242 Most resistance to the employer 
remains covert. 
 
Most resistance in AgResearch is “diffuse” (Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 99) and does 
not threaten organisational persistence. Such resistance does not have to be dealt with 
and causes no disruption. If scientific workers were really concerned about science 
and not themselves, then they would do something that meant the changes they are 
against could not continue. By acting the way they do, policy and its implementation 
roll on. Because “diffuse resistance facilitates “secondary adjustment” (Goffman, 
1961a) – that is, accommodation to an otherwise objectionable status quo; the irony, 
of course, is that an act of resistance may actually facilitate that which is resisted” 
(Ashforth and Mael, 1998: 100).  
 
Typically, collective action is regarded as the way to deal with workplace problems, 
on the assumption that “individually we are weak; collectively we are strong”. 
Within a system of normative control, one reason why it is very difficult for workers 
to address any issues they may have about company goals is because any open 
challenge would be seen as an indication of lack of loyalty to the organisation. The 
challenger is seen not to belong or fit with Government policy. It is very difficult to 
get any collective overt response from workers, as no-one is prepared to be the one to 
initiate such a movement, and workers who have spoken out in the past have not 
been supported by colleagues (e.g., Bert, Ted). The implementation of organisational 
goals can only be ‘worked on’ or resisted in the ways that I describe from my 
observations in AgResearch. These are the only ways that protect how one thinks and 
                                                 
242 Raelin (1991: 105) writes about resistance and the ‘cosmopolitan’. He sees such professionals as 
not being ‘socialised’ enough to participate in the workforce and calls it a “problem of autonomy”. 
People who are strongly autonomous are likely to work less well with others. 
 
253 
feels. This in itself is a very individual phenomenon. This ‘individuation’ effect of 
normative control combined with the autonomy of the science culture, works against 
a collective response and is part of its power in a CRI setting.  
 
In AgResearch there is an informal alliance between workers, such as the culture of 
cynicism, through which workers’ beliefs about the environment in which they work 
can be shared. There is evidence that this happens all around the world - when 
scientists meet, they compare notes. AgResearch workers do receive support for their 
resistance; however, it is still uncoordinated and unorganised. The fact that scientists 
do not organise themselves collectively indicates that this would not serve their 
purposes. They have developed a way of complying which enables their work to 
continue, whereas if they practised outright direct resistance it would threaten their 
work, whether or not they have made this ‘calculation’ explicit.  
 
I summarise here further ways in which scientists’ ability to resist is ‘outflanked’. 
Firstly, there are few systems which scientists could access to support their actions 
for change. Secondly, ‘playing the game’ manufactures consent to the system and 
environment in which research is carried out. Thirdly, scientists feel ambivalence 
towards their employer who after all, enables them to work, and fourthly, the 
autonomy of the scientific community mitigates against collective action. 
 
In this section I have considered reasons why scientists do not directly resist the 
work systems of their employer in order to take control of their work. I now move on 
to consider how they resist in indirect ways in order to comply, and so are able to 
carry on with their valued work of science and the maintenance of their identities as 
scientists. I will argue that in order to try to resist alienation and gain some control 
over their work, scientists have appropriated the resources and the time paid for by 
their employing organisation, to do the science they wished to do. This satisfied their 
reasons for doing their work and reinforced their identity as scientists. To do this 
they have protected this identity from organisational encroachment by using 
particular distancing techniques which resisted alienation. 
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8.8.3 Distancing to protect integrity/identity 
This subsection explains the ways in which scientists also use distancing techniques 
to resist alienation, but these techniques have subtle differences from those used to 
resist estrangement. I first consider the qualities of the alternative value system, the 
scientific community, which legitimates scientists’ control over their work. Then I 
consider how ‘playing the funding game’ acts to distance scientists from the reality 
of this game, which requires them to present their proposed research in ways that 
may not be exactly truthful but which match company and Government goals. Both 
these examples demonstrate how scientists try to protect their integrity and identities 
from the actions they have to make to remain in work.  
8.8.3.1 Alternative value systems 
The culture of work in all the groups I studied was dominated by science and its 
rhetoric; work was to be recognised by scientific excellence, not by company 
recognition. Such attitudes reinforced the solidarity243 of scientific workers against 
company strategy. This is by far the most important and dominant alternative value 
system and I will be discussing it in more detail later (Section 8.8.4), where I 
illustrate how scientific workers appropriate the whole system of work to ‘do 
science’. By representing a different community to which scientists can belong, the 
science community sets up an alternative value system in which scientists can 
overcome alienation. It provides them with a place where their contribution is valued 
(hence resisting estrangement), and a community which puts them ‘in charge’ of 
what they produce and how it is produced (hence resisting alienation). It is a 
community which respects their autonomy. The risk of being part of such an 
alternative culture, however, is that workers lose their ‘voice’ in the corporate, 
organisational system. 
 
One way of developing or asserting an alternative value system is by arguing against 
the present corporate one. This is not difficult for scientific workers as I have already 
illustrated (Section 6.4), as arguing seems to come naturally! Some scientists in 
AgResearch (e.g., Wade) felt that their own approach to decision making was 
rational and objective in the scientific sense, while they viewed management actions  
                                                 
243 Another of Hodson’s categories within the ‘regulation of the amount of work’ agenda. 
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as irrational. They used rationality as a means of distancing themselves and resisting 
the organisational strategic direction rhetoric. At the same time, corporate 
management saw what it was doing as a rational way of responding to the present 
environment and felt that this was so obvious that it required no explanation.244 My 
findings assert that people do take actions for “traditional and emotional reasons” 
(Grint, 1991: 108), and that much of the meaning of work for these workers is of this 
nature. On the other hand, the organisation, by acting as if “every area of human 
relationships is subject to calculation and administration” (Abercrombie et al., 1988: 
268), is imposing on its workers a rationale for them doing the work that they do, 
with which they, as workers, disagree. They indicate this disagreement by rationally 
arguing against corporate strategy, such as presenting AgResearch as a life sciences 
company, because that would put AgResearch alongside such companies as 
Monsanto. One scientist told me that Monsanto is about killing things whereas they 
are about keeping things alive.245 The life science company concept goes against the 
very meanings some scientists have ascribed to their work. Nearly all the workers I 
interviewed talked about their love of their work. This indicates they are not, in fact, 
the rational beings they think they are, in the scientific sense. 
 
Cynicism is regarded by some science groups as a valued attribute for workers to 
exhibit. Euan, Graham, Walter and Wade exemplify this point of view. Being 
‘resistant subjects’ is part of some workers’ image/identity and they seek to make it a 
dominant part of the culture on their campus (e.g., Graham, Euan, Wade, Walter and 
Matt at Lincoln, Owen at Grasslands). The attribute of scepticism is one which has 
always been seen as a valuable quality for a scientist to possess. It was part of the 
objective approach of ‘organised scepticism’ that the scientific method brought to 
research (Merton, 1973). I suspect that for many scientists, the move from scepticism 
to cynicism has been an easy one!246 This tool of cynicism can be used in many 
different ways. That the cynicism towards AgResearch is intentional is given 
substance by some of the things scientists say about the organisation and its  
                                                 
244 The non-negotiability of the strategic direction of AgResearch and the presentation of the world’s 
economic environment as information rather than as material for discussion /negotiation illustrate this. 
245 It would seem that killing pests as part of a biocontrol method is seen as acceptable! 
246 Hochschild (1983: 50) makes a footnote about how scientific writing “is an extension of 
institutional control over feeling … In order to seem scientific, writers obey conventions that inhibit 
emotional involvement. There is a purpose in such “poor” writing.”   
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management. Cynicism has also enabled the scientists in the MCG in particular, to 
see themselves as different and superior – as scientists who have higher concerns 
than the company or business. They are concerned about ‘science’ and ‘the 
environment’ (matching Knights and Willmott, 1999: 83).  
8.8.3.2 Playing the game247 
All scientists, and particularly group leaders, play the funding game in order to gain 
the money they require to do their work. As I have outlined in ‘Sheep as object’ 
(Hunt, 2002b – see Appendix C) they learn the language required in funding 
applications in order to satisfy the Government’s need for accountability. That this is 
seen as a game is illustrated by the laughter that accompanies any talk about it. But it 
is also a competitive game with groups not sharing their tactics. It is seen as 
something of a lottery – another ‘game’ - with little feedback on what it is exactly 
that has been done right, success being the sole measure. By allocating research 
funds across different categories according to the number of applications submitted, 
some funds, such as the Marsden Fund, indicate that the fund managers see it in that 
light also.248 Some groups make many applications in the belief that this increases 
their chances of success. AgResearch limited applications for FRST funding in the 
past, giving it more control over the selection of programmes rather than leaving this 
to FRST. Potential funding was also controlled by audit trail requirements.  
 
Gareth fully engages with the changes in funding system and exploits them to the full 
(plays the game) but remains cynical and distant from it. He has adapted to the 
context of his work and claims the skill he has in ‘playing the game’ as part of his 
work. In a sense he is committed to the game and as a game it includes cynicism and 
a desire to get back at the system by exploiting it, while at the same time getting 
enough for himself and others to do the work he loves. By being committed to it as a 
‘game’, he does not see it as a reality and so in his own eyes maintains his integrity 
and self-identity. This behaviour could be seen as “self-conscious reinvestment” 
(Cohen and Taylor, 1992: 61).  
 
                                                 
247 Willmott (1993: 537-8). 
248 It is difficult not to when the percentage of applications funded is so low. 10.7% of applications 




As an example of a ‘weak form of skill’ (related to the individual) (Littler, 1982b: 9-
10), Gareth’s skill of bid writing is one that he has strategically claimed. It gives him 
great power within his group. The group’s success is probably dependent on it. At 
the same time, it is not recognised as a scientific skill and some feel it is one 
scientists should not be expected to have (e.g., Colin). Gareth’s skill enables him to 
have greater control over the research product of his group allowing him to be more 
successful in the competition for funding, against other groups within AgResearch 
and outside it. This is in keeping with the observations of Sturdy et al. (1992a: 2-3): 
capitalist production relations [are] actively reproduced, but as workers get 
‘lost’ in the ‘game’, hierarchical conflict is diffused. It is either laterally 
diverted into competition and conflict with fellow workers, expressed within 
the rules of the game, or tolerated by management in return for overall worker 
consent.  
 
Workers are now required to play the same game within the organisation by 
justifying on their performance appraisal form how their work fits the company 
strategy (as described in Section 5.5.3.1). These distancing techniques – the 
commitment to the values of science, and playing the funding “game” - enable 
scientific workers to get on with doing ‘their science’ in their own way. 
8.8.4 Appropriation of features of work in order to ‘do science’249 
Just as work can be appropriated to resist estrangement, scientists can also 
appropriate work to resist alienation. The act of appropriation of work for their own 
purposes against those of the organisation and Government policy, challenges 
scientists’ integrity, so they have to practise the distancing tactics just described in 
order to do it. Scientists basically oversee how time is spent by technical workers as 
well as having choices about how to spend their own time (8.8.4.1). They also make 
choices about how funding is to be spent (8.8.4.2).  
8.8.4.1 (Mis)appropriation of time 
In AgResearch, the practice of being “booked in to one job while working on 
another” (Edwards, 1988: 190) is quite prevalent. Gaye and Walter told me how they 
give priority to completing commercial contracts over FRST ones. Scobie (2001) 
describes how time was initially taken from other programmes (FRST and 
                                                 
249 Note that for technical workers, ‘doing science’ may be a way of resisting estrangement while for 
scientists it can be a way of resisting both estrangement and alienation.  
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commercial) to pursue the ethical sheep project. Timesheets have designated labels 
only for time spent on actual programmes, not for preparation time for future ones. It 
was a subject of gossip that one group frequently did work ahead of bidding for it. 
Part of the problem for scientists was that the bidding system needed bidders to say 
what they were going to achieve. Frequently in science this is an unknown and so the 
only way of ‘knowing’ is to have done the work already! 
 
Absenteeism, as another form of resistance by appropriation of time, was not 
apparent among AgResearch scientific workers. They were very committed to their 
work. However, it is interesting to take into account the comments of a business 
manager I interviewed, which suggest that the meaning of absenteeism should be 
questioned by consideration of the way scientists choose to use their time. He 
indicated how irritated he was by scientists choosing to go to a conference, for 
example, rather than complete work for a business client. Their priority was science, 
not business. He was frustrated also by the amount of time some scientists spent 
overseas, making it difficult for him to get hold of them (see Section 5.1). This could 
be considered a form of absenteeism. If the company now exists to ‘do business’ 
rather than science, then that is presumably what should take priority. For the 
business manager this was indeed the case, but not for the scientist. It is also another 
strong indication of the importance such scientists attach to their science identity.  
 
These examples illustrate how the definition of ‘absenteeism’ can be challenged. 
What is done when workers are ‘at work’ and what is their attitude to that work? 
Dave and Ted (scientists), for example, stated quite clearly that their hearts will not 
be in it, because of the way they are being treated. Is this another form of 
absenteeism – not giving their ‘all’ to the job any longer, as they expect to do and as 
they did in the past? It indicates a move to instrumentalism, which can be seen as a 
form of resistance (Clegg, 1994).  
 
Just as with technical workers, scientists can organise their work so that they do more 
science not less. Science managers (group leaders, SPLs) may manipulate their day 
in order to fit in some ‘science’ or they may come back in the evenings or the 
weekends in order to ‘do science’, which is not part of their managerial job 
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descriptions. In this way, they seek to protect their scientific identity. Some never go 
to tea breaks because they are too ‘busy’.  
 
That many scientists practise science when in fact they should be managing could be 
seen as straight ‘traditional’ appropriation because they are doing less of what they 
are paid to do. They may also be more likely to work longer hours in order to do the 
work of science practice that they want to do and this could be seen as an 
appropriation of materials/product. Further, among scientists there is a concern for 
excellence, which takes more time and resources (e.g., Fred, Gaye), and results in 
endorsing their scientific identity for good, published work. There is commitment to 
the work of science as they see it, but not as the employer sees it. As I have said, 
however, in the end the employer may also benefit from this (as I quoted earlier from 
Sturdy et al., 1992a: 2-3). ‘Doing science’ in the evenings and weekends may, for 
example, free up a science manager to attend to organisational administration during 
the ‘working day’ and management may tolerate it because of this. 
 
In the past there was a concern that scientific programmes in AgResearch actually 
over-delivered on their contracts (Team Brief with Science GM, 11-4-00) with the 
unstated implication that this meant AgResearch was actually undercharging. This 
gives legitimacy to the classification of doing too much work as ‘misbehaviour’. 
Such behaviour has also been called ‘rate busting’ (Foner, 1993). Corporate 
management want science groups to practise work limitation. 
8.8.4.2 Appropriation of resources 
There are obvious ways in which the introduction of new technology, processes and 
resources can be “sold” to the company, but such resources can be used to serve 
different purposes – the company seeing them in one way and scientists in another. 
There is competition for resources within the company. The MBU, for example, was 
competing with other groups for the micro-array technology, and the MCG had to  
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make a good case for not using the molecular biology facilities of other groups on 
other campuses but rather having their own facility.250  
 
In the next section I will consider how the appropriation of resources and time 
protected scientific workers from having their scientific identities appropriated by 
corporate management for organisational purposes. So did other practices, which 
protected their autonomy, knowledge and personal networks. 
8.8.5 Defending autonomy: resistance against appropriation of identity 
And I still perceive AgResearch simply as a vehicle for me to do Government 
funded research. Umm, to think that I’m working for the good of the company 
AgResearch is just alien. I could never persuade myself of that. I know they pay 
my salary but as far as I’m concerned that’s coming from the Government 
(Walter, scientist). 
 
Walter is still carrying on his work for AgResearch but he is denying this by 
believing something else that for him, protects the reasons he has for doing science. 
  
Ackroyd and Thompson (1999) argue that all organisational misbehaviour is about 
workers asserting their autonomy. Assertion of autonomy could also be described as 
a boundary struggle over who or what has the right and power to reduce the choices 
available to a worker. Many of the examples I have already used fit Hodson’s third 
agenda of ‘defending autonomy’ (Hodson, 1995b: 94-97). In my paper ‘Sheep as 
object’ (Hunt, 2002b, Appendix C), I describe the way the four case study groups 
have used or not used the word ‘sheep’ to obtain funding for their research 
programmes in order to do what they regard as important research in science and 
agriculture, rather than follow company and Government policy. In this way each 
group defended its autonomy. At an individual level, autonomy was important to all 
the workers I interviewed.  
 
If scientists are compliant or if they embrace the company direction, it is at the cost 
of having power within the organisation to interpret the work they do. Management  
                                                 
250 The argument put forward by the MCG was that the molecular biology techniques used in the 
study of bacteria are different from those required for animals (MBU) and plants (Grasslands), and 
that they needed the facilities on site. This encouraged more separation of the identity and work of the 
MCG, rather than collaboration. It also indicates that the efficient use of resources in the interests of 
the company as a whole was not a consideration of the group. 
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interprets it for them. This can be seen in the organisation’s annual reports, for 
instance, which include the successes of scientists as corporate sees them, not as 
scientists. Corporate makes the selection, not scientific peers. At the same time 
scientists have other avenues (conferences and publications) in which to produce 
their own interpretation.  
 
The category of ‘craft control’ within Hodson’s ‘defending autonomy’ agenda, is 
particularly applicable to professional workers (Hodson, 1995b: 95) and is very  
much a concern in AgResearch. It is expressed in many ways at individual and group 
levels. Some scientists (e.g., Jim, Mark, Rae) voiced their concern to me about senior 
managers making scientific decisions they really had insufficient knowledge of, such 
as making promises about how long it would take to achieve something in the 
molecular biology area, and looking through research programmes for potential 
products. Earlier (Section 6.2.3) I wrote about patch protection. In AgResearch, some 
scientists will make sure the objectives in their publicly funded programmes are 
open-ended enough for them to “essentially do what they like”, as I heard two 
different scientists in one group say on different occasions.  
  
Len (scientist) was an interesting example of a scientist who managed not to be 
affected by corporate communications. He was well informed about what was 
happening at an organisational level but seemed to quietly go about his own work 
without any qualms. He told me he had never been happier. He had found a niche 
and just got on with doing what he saw as useful, productive work, choosing to 
pursue options arising in his work that were of scientific interest to him rather than 
ones which could lead to a profitable product for the company. He had discovered 
where he fits and he was extremely proud of belonging to AgResearch because he 
admired his colleagues so much. He was devoted to his science, but he also had 
leisure pursuits that were important to him. He told me of an occasion when one of 
these pursuits was important enough for him to choose it over attendance at a 
particular work-related meeting on another campus. The area of science practice, in 
which the expertise of the individual scientist is often superior to that of the science 
manager, means that scientists can exercise considerable discretion and autonomy 




There is a ‘battle’ going on in AgResearch as scientific workers try to maintain 
control of their labour by using the power of their personal knowledge (Crozier, 
1964) – something senior management cannot access without their cooperation. This 
may also explain why many scientists are reluctant to talk about their work in a wider 
arena than their own disciplinary one and particularly not in the public arena. Too 
many people would understand it and want a say in it and so challenge scientists’ 
area of expertise and control. 
 
Scientists in AgResearch have demonstrated an awareness of using their own 
knowledge, skill and autonomy to outflank senior management, suggesting their 
feeling that such qualities are not valued by management. This is ironic when some 
academic writing suggests that autonomous workers should be encouraged for the 
good of a work organisation. One perspective in LPT has emphasised the link 
between craft labour and theories such as flexible specialisation (Piore and Sabel, 
1984). Such theories argue that the new technological market conditions require 
intellectual participation from workers with upgraded skills and greater autonomy 
(Smith and Thompson, 1999: 206). May (1999: 5), however, describes this 
expectation of employers of innovation as the appropriation of “the ingenuity of the 
workforce”. 
 
The next subsections discuss other ways in which scientists defend their autonomy. 
First, I consider how scientists’ motivations remain their own and are not based on 
organisational values. Then I describe the ways in which scientists maintain control 
of their own networks with business clients and other scientists. Finally, I provide an 
example which, I believe, beautifully illustrates in a symbolic manner many of the 
key aspects of the appropriation of resources in order to protect an identity based on 
science. 
8.8.5.1 Appropriation of personal motivations  
Is being motivated to do something for reasons other than for ‘the good of the 
company” also misbehaviour? The adherence of some scientists to science (e.g., 
Wade and Bill) is like a religion.251 Science is the main thing in some scientists’ lives 
                                                 
251 There is a strong anti-religious feeling amongst some scientists and so they would dislike their 
adherence to science being seen as religious!  
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and if it disappeared there would be little left for them to live for. For Graham, work 
is what gets him out of bed in the mornings. If he did not have this work would he 
get out of bed? For Harry there was a time in his life when his work involved the 
whole family at weekends and in the evenings. For Bill, work is the main thing that 
he thinks about even while tramping the hills. For workers like these there are no 
boundaries between work and ‘not-work’. Knights and Willmott (1999: 83) feel that 
the search for “stable meaning” is more likely to occur by subordinating oneself to 
‘higher’ forms of identity, such as religion, art, literature, and science. (It is 
interesting to note that Knights and Willmott include ‘science’ in this list.)  
 
Henry did not look for the solution to ryegrass staggers so that he could produce a 
product which would make a lot of money for the company. He wanted to solve the 
problem and justify his theory as to the cause against those of others, and he was 
concerned for animal health. Todd did not want to find innovative ways of doing 
large numbers of pasture measurements in order to produce products, but in order to 
reduce the time he spent doing this mundane work, so that he could have more time 
doing what he was interested in. (It backfired because the faster he measured the 
greater the quantity of similar work he was given!) Miles wanted a solution to the 
problem of facial eczema to help farmers, not to help the company. Similarly, Craig 
was concerned about the survival of the sheep and wool industry, not about the 
survival of the company. Garth was fascinated by beetles. The Endophyte scientists 
were fascinated by endophyte, and so on. 
 
The compliance actions of workers, which protect their self-interest, do not equate 
with selfishness or a lack of altruism. These workers are frequently interested in 
using science to contribute to national or global interests which, in their eyes, will 
make for a better world. Mark is a fine example. He is concerned about the priorities 
in the use of research funding being dominated by the wealthy elite: 
We are not here to feed people … and this is why it is very hard in agriculture to 
get funding because funding comes from rich people. Rich people will be the 
last on this earth to run out of food. So food has never been their greatest fear. 
And therefore these people are not going to put any money into agriculture 
because they never die from hunger. But these people will die from other things 
… so that’s where they put it – medicine (Mark, scientist). 
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8.8.5.2 Protection of formal and informal networks 
Management attempted to control the number of conferences attended by workers by 
expressing a concern about whether it was necessary for several staff members to go 
to the same conference. Such attempts at control strike at the heart of scientists’ 
loyalty to their discipline/profession. Matt, a scientist, always makes sure that if he 
and his technician are going to the same conference then they have different reasons 
for going, and on days either side of the conference they will visit different people. 
Thus Matt defends his perceived rights to membership of his scientific community. 
 
Harry and others in the Endophyte Group have long-lasting relationships within the 
New Zealand seed industry. When it was announced that all company interactions 
with this industry would be managed by a ‘client manager’, Harry was delighted to 
hear the CEO of one of these companies say that he would still get in touch with 
Harry, as usual. This was Harry’s intention also. So the companies collude with 
AgResearch scientists to maintain their relationships. This gives scientists further 
material to use as illustrative of the ignorance and ahistoricism of management, given 
its lack of understanding of how client relationships have been built up over many 
years. 
 
Management discourages scientists from having individual contact with farmers. A 
user-pays system is supposed to operate. Ray now logs his phone calls to and from 
farmers, citing them as part of his work. In these examples, scientists are seen to 
resist by asserting their autonomy to stay with their definition of their work and the 
relationships it involves, not the company’s.252 As the responses of scientists to these 
incursions illustrate: “Management and employees … are engaged in a continual 
struggle to appropriate and reappropriate relevant material and symbolic resources” 
(Ackroyd and Thompson, 1999: 26). 
  
My study indicates that among AgResearch’s scientific workers, the scientists in 
particular are resisting the development of instrumental attitudes, and the attitudes of 
a society that places most value on economic relationships. They want their work to 
                                                 
252 Social capital is an interesting sideline here. It is a conceptual framework in which a person is 
valued not only for their capabilities but also for their networks and social skills. I feel unease with 
this attempt to ‘measure’ humans, but appreciate the concept. 
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be a place where they have autonomy to do what they feel work is about. Work is a 
place where they can realise their potential in an intellectual, not a social way. I use 
the word ‘intellectual’ quite deliberately, because these workers did not see work as a 
place where they felt it was important to realise their social skills. Work was about 
‘doing work’, not about learning to relate better to others and forming the appropriate 
personal networks, except for the realisation of their intellectual and work goals. This 
was indicated by the cynical attitudes shown towards, and lack of attendance by most 
workers at, the I2I courses and other organisational training courses. There were 
some who saw the relationships with clients and influential others as important, but 
friendships that arose from these relationships and from work relationships were a 
bonus, not an expectation. Scientists had a calculative attitude to this aspect of their 
work. Social relations exist in order for science to continue, not for their own sake. 
This point was conveyed to me when I attended the Endophyte Conference (8 
October, 1999). No-one talked to me, not even those I knew. Later one scientist told 
me that there were several people he had wanted to target in relation to his work. 
Much later in the history of this thesis, I realised that talking to me served no useful 
scientific purpose for him! 
8.8.5.3 Protecting identity by symbolic action: appropriating champagne  
When interviewing Walter (scientist) I was privy to a phone conversation he had 
with a colleague on another AgResearch campus about the launching of the Celentis 
brand that afternoon. This event was to be celebrated simultaneously on all 
campuses. In this conversation he referred to corporate management as the ‘police’. 
On other occasions I have heard the use of the words ‘thought police’ or ‘mind 
police’. These words can be taken as symbols of what scientists feel is happening to 
them. It is very strong language, but perhaps it is explained by the importance 
scientists place on the freedom to have their own thoughts and they see this as under 
challenge. It also demonstrates an awareness that normative control is at work. This 
type of control has been described as “engineering the soul” by “acting directly on 
employees’ subjectivity and emotions… in which alternative values and sources of 
resistance are marginalized or squeezed out” (Smith and Thompson, 1999: 214-5, 




What Walter said was: “You’ll have the police there. No police here. We’re going to 
use the free champagne to toast the future of science.” This comment wonderfully 
illustrates the symbolic appropriation of the champagne, especially labelled to 
celebrate an organisational achievement, for a radical purpose, to celebrate the future 
of science. The appropriation of a science identity by the organisational senior 
management is resisted! Many of the responses I have described have a symbolic 
value. This symbolism may be important just to the individual – an individual may 
be their own audience. Other acts may be directed towards the group as they remind 
members that the group culture is one of cynicism, for example. Myths and stories 
also keep a group together and maintain its spirits.  
8.8.6 Resisting alienation: model summary 
I drew together all these examples and reflections to produce the second model of the 
resistance process which describes the manner in which scientists resist alienation 
from the product of their work (Figure 8.3). Scientists in the groups studied practiced 
both direct resistance (e.g., through using various tactics to reduce the number of 
reports they had to write) and compliance. Appropriating work, resources and time in 
order to have autonomy over the work that has meaning for them would make them 
feel that their integrity was compromised, so they have to practise distancing 
techniques to protect themselves. They are able to assert this integrity by 
emphasising the values of the scientific community and by saying how the actions of 
corporate management look “silly” or “stupid” in their eyes. Scientists also play the 
funding game by emphasising it as a competitive ‘game’ in which they take on the 
identity of ‘player’, not their ‘real’ selves. They hope these techniques will leave 
them ‘free’ to get on with their science. This model follows a similar pattern to the 
estrangement model, but the substance of the distancing techniques is different. 
 
I have argued that scientific workers resist and protect themselves from the 
experiences of estrangement and alienation, and I have described how the distancing 
tactics they use enable them to appropriate resources and time in order to practise 
science and reinforce and maintain their identities in the process. These processes 
have enabled them to be ‘compliant-at-a-distance’ workers. I need to make the point 
again, however, that though these systems of compliance are working in that the 
work of the organisation goes on, many workers are not happy in their work. They 
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would rather not be in a position of compliance. The distancing tactics do not work 
sufficiently well for them to feel good about their actions. 
8.9 Conclusion 
Managerial control aims to reduce the possibilities of unintended consequences 
(May, 1999). I think the failure by workers in AgResearch to embrace the company 
goals was an unanticipated outcome of senior managerial strategy. It was thought 
that buy-in would occur because it was so obvious – the organisation had to respond 
to the external environment in this way to survive (Strategic Planning Presentation, 
21-8-00). All that was needed was for workers to be told. It did not require 
discussion. Senior management knew what was right - argument was not part of the 
senior management mindset though it was very much part of that of scientists! When 
there was resistance, workers showed no signs of realigning themselves and what 
they did to fit company strategy. Senior management then had to think of what action 
to take. The organisation was restructured to Platforms, and then a repositioning 
exercise was undertaken. HR incorporated ‘correct thinking’ into the performance 
appraisal process. These were structural adjustments to fit the strategy, but they have 
also come about because of workers’ responses to that initial strategy. Hence it is 
certainly not the case that “management acts and workers simply react” (Ackroyd 




Conclusion to Part C 
In Part C I have linked the sociology of work literature with the emerging themes 
from Part B and developed an interpretation about what has been happening in 
AgResearch. The response of this CRI’s senior management to its context has been 
to promote a system of corporate management to change workers so that they will 
identify with the organisational goals and culture, some things which senior 
management sees as necessary to survive. These goals and this culture have not 
matched with the goals and culture of the scientific workers and as a result these 
workers are experiencing estrangement and alienation. Most of these workers are 
resisting these experiences by complying in ways that give them alternative ways of 
making meaning: a sense of belonging, a sense of making a worthwhile contribution, 
and a way of reinforcing and maintaining their self-identity and autonomy. This 
compliance enables them to continue practising science, which to them is the most 
important way to make their lives meaningful. This resistance, I argue, was only 
partly successful because scientific workers continue to experience their work as 
very stressful and indicate that they are not happy. I considered why these workers 




PART D: CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
I close this thesis by summarising what I did in this research and why, what I found, 
and what I think may be its theoretical contribution. Then I will consider some recent 
reports on the New Zealand science scene, and draw together my findings and the 
recommendations from these reports to make some recommendations of my own for 
future science policy and organisational practice. I conclude by suggesting further 
research arising from the issues raised by this thesis. 
D.1 Summary of research 
At the beginning of this thesis I stated that I aimed to determine the impact of the 
Government’s restructuring of the public funding of science research on the everyday 
lives of scientific workers. Then I wanted to discover how scientific workers made 
their work meaningful through this period of change in order for them to survive in 
work and continue to practice science. From this I hoped to deduce ways in which a 
research organisation could assist scientists and related workers to practise science. 
A final aim was to further the theoretical understanding of ‘resistance’ and 
‘compliance’ in the workplace.  
 
These aims were achieved by conducting an organisational ethnography of 
AgResearch, an agricultural science research organisation, placing particular 
emphasis on case studies of four science groups in that organisation.  
 
At the beginning of this research I was aware that scientific workers spent a lot of 
time complaining about their work and at the same time it was obvious to me that 
they loved it. On a recent visit to one AgResearch campus (February, 2003), I was 
told how workers there spent half an hour at morning and afternoon tea time, and at 
lunch time grizzling about AgResearch. The scientist who told me this commented 
that it was a great waste of time and energy and managers, whether concerned about 
workers’ welfare or not, should surely be concerned about the loss of productivity 
from such behaviour. How has this come about? 
 
The Government created Crown Research Institutes as Government owned 
companies in a competitive system in the belief that this was the way to achieve 
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accountability to Government policy and efficiency in the use of public money. This 
in turn impacted on the way these organisations have structured themselves through 
corporatisation, and the management methods they have used to achieve their 
organisational goals. Hence, Government policy and its implementation through 
MoRST, FRST and the CRIs set up boundary struggles between these organisations. 
These boundary struggles were then carried into the organisations and challenged the 
very notions of who and what has the right to make meaning in workers’ everyday 
lives. Who should decide why people do the work they do? When the meaning of 
workers’ everyday lives is closely associated with the work itself, then the very self-
identity of a worker comes into question. The global environment in which values 
are dominated by measurements simplistically based on ‘money’ (market value) and 
administrative power, creates difficulty for those who make meaning of their 
everyday lives in more varied and complex ways.  
 
In the particular context I studied, scientific workers in AgResearch expressed a 
dominant concern to ‘do science’ and by so doing they wished to protect and 
reinforce their self-identities and the relationship these identities had with their work. 
Through such science practice, scientific workers are able to achieve some of their 
reasons for doing science: adding to scientific knowledge, helping the agricultural 
sector and protecting the sustainability of the environment. The organisation, through 
its use of a system of normative control, promoted the concept of a single 
organisational culture based on a life sciences company which was to make a profit 
through the production of global, knowledge-based, biotechnology products 
including intellectual property and processes. Scientists within this organisation have 
to obtain funding for their science through meeting the objectives of Government 
policy as formulated and implemented by FRST. These objectives aim for New 
Zealand to become a ‘knowledge economy’ operating in a global environment. Both 
the espoused organisational culture and Government policy clash with the way in 
which scientific workers see themselves. They have become very unhappy and find it 
very stressful working in such an environment.  
 
That AgResearch continues to exist and scientific workers continue to work there, in 
spite of their unhappiness, demonstrates that scientific workers have found ways of 
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complying such that they are able to do their work, to practice science without 
putting the organisation at risk. How have they managed to do this? 
  
I postulated that scientific workers are experiencing estrangement and in addition, 
that scientists are also experiencing alienation. I set up two models to demonstrate 
the ways in which these workers can resist these experiences (Figures 8.2 and 8.3) in 
order to survive in their work (see Section D.2 for a fuller description). These models 
combine the ideas of other writers into an integrated whole, in which it can be seen 
that in order to comply, workers have to protect themselves from being taken over by 
their work organisation. They do this by making their everyday working lives 
meaningful. They seek to belong to groups and work practices concordant with this 
meaning while simultaneously acting to take control of this ‘making meaning’ as 
autonomous individuals, not under the control of those who wish to do it on their 
behalf. Above all, I have demonstrated that scientific workers will use all the 
methods available to them, creative and ingenious, in order to do more science, i.e., 
to further their science practice.  
 
However, in seeking to ameliorate the symptoms - estrangement and alienation - of 
the impact of restructuring, scientific workers are not dealing with the cause.253 The 
structures set up by the organisation and the Government, which I have named the 
‘accountability culture’, have outflanked them by not allowing their participation in a 
full and power-sharing way. The ‘listening up’ culture reigns! It is not a culture in 
which scientific workers feel valued. It is not satisfying for scientists in particular, 
just to know that they have ticked all the boxes and completed their reports. This 
feedback does not provide any stimulation or challenge to further their work, in the 
way that their interaction with the scientific community or a contracted business 
partner does. An accountability culture has at its heart the assumption that people 
cannot be trusted, that people are only interested in personal financial gain and act 
calculatively to maximise this gain. Normative control implies that workers can be 
trusted if they believe in and are committed to the organisation, and that they will 
work harder. When workers cannot be trusted, then normative control requires the 
                                                 
253 This study is full of ironies, however. In this instance, many of the scientists I spoke to emphasised 
in their science practice the importance of finding the cause of an agricultural problem and solving it, 
not just dealing with the effects of that problem. 
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imposition of these values. When workers resist these values in order to protect their 
own, they may evolve into those very instrumentalists the accountability culture was 
set up to control. Scientific workers’ disengagement from a commitment to science, 
of course, has implications for the future of science in New Zealand.254 
 
Through the affirmation and general agreement this research has received from the 
three AgResearch campuses to which I have made presentations (February, 2003), 
which I take to be a loose ‘triangulation’ of the research endeavour, I am convinced 
that if I chose another four science groups to research in another four Science 
Platforms they might have some distinctive characteristics, yet have exactly the same 
concerns and responses as those I have studied here.255 
D.2 Theoretical contributions 
As my contribution to the theory on resistance and compliance in the workplace, I 
have developed the concept of ‘estrangement’ to describe workers sense of not 
belonging, of feeling that their contribution is no longer valued and the sense of 
insecurity inherent in such feelings. I have used the concept of ‘alienation’ to 
describe the loss of autonomous control over their work and the product of that work 
that scientists are experiencing. I have argued that both estrangement and alienation 
are resisted in everyday working lives. This may be implicit in the work of writers 
like Ackroyd and Thompsons who claim that all misbehaviour at work is related to 
workers’ claims for autonomy or control over who they are, and hence is related to 
alienation. 
 
I have demonstrated that the power of normative control is not absolute. Workers do 
resist it in various ways, some of which have been described by others and some  
which I describe in this thesis. I use Clegg’s notion of ‘outflanking’ to demonstrate 
that it is not only organisations that outflank workers (Clegg, 1994), but that workers  
                                                 
254 Thanks to Jeff Morton for the word ‘disengagement’. At my seminar at Otago University on 19-2-
03, he said that he had noticed an increasing ‘disengagement’ of scientists from their work. 
255 I have also received support for the findings of this research from a former scientist in another CRI 
(Institute of Geological and Nuclear Science, IGNS) who said he was going to send my paper (Hunt, 
2002a) to his former colleagues, a scientist in HortResearch, and a social scientist in Landcare. It has 
also received support from a former divisional manager in AgResearch. People working in the 
educational sector – secondary schools, universities and a polytechnic - have also strongly identitified 
with this research. 
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can outflank organisations. Ackroyd and Thompsons’ appropriation concept is 
employed to show that workers can appropriate work time and work resources to do 
more work rather than find ways of doing less. I have also illustrated that workers 
can be committed to work while not being committed to their employer,256 in 
contrast to Ackroyd and Thompsons’ linking of the two. 
 
By producing a model of the resistance process I have explained how scientific 
workers are resisting the feelings of estrangement which this imposed organisational 
culture has engendered. Workers counter this estrangement by asserting their 
membership of groups with alternative value systems in which they are accepted, 
experience a sense of belonging, and/or are able to contribute, and by making 
corporatisation invisible. These techniques enable them to distance themselves from 
organisational influences sufficiently to be able to accept the rewards and 
satisfactions from their science practice that reinforce their identities as worthwhile 
and valuable members of society. It also means, of course, that they continue to have 
paid employment. 
 
I also explain with a second model of resistance, how scientists (as distinct from 
technical workers) are resisting the experience of alienation that has come about as 
the organisational corporate management and FRST systems in which they work 
have tried to control what they produce and how it is to be used. They resist this 
alienation by trying to take control of their work in various ways, either directly or 
through methods of compliance. By directly challenging corporate management who 
request much report writing, some scientist-managers are able to make more time for 
science. Most scientists go about resisting more indirectly, by appropriating the work 
time and work resources paid for by their employer (and funding) in order to do the 
work of science that serves their purposes rather than those of the organisation and 
Government policy. They do this by valuing their membership of the science 
community and its alternative value system, and seeing themselves as ‘playing the 
game’ necessary to win funding for their work and to give them some security. This 
protects their autonomy, integrity (an essential quality for those who practise 
                                                 
256 This is the reverse of the instrumentalism of Goldthorpe et al. (1970), in which workers were 
committed to the employer (because of the high pay) but not to the work (assembly-line production). 
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science), and that part of their identity based on the practice of science. It keeps the 
‘playing the funding game’ separate from the ‘doing the science game’.  
 
This thesis demonstrates the usefulness of an ethnographical approach to the study of 
work. Through both observation and talking with those observed I have been able to 
include the meanings workers give to their work in order to understand better their 
responses to change. This was particularly important when I considered the purpose 
of workers’ resistance because it emphasised workers’ need to protect the things 
important to them and helped them survive in work they loved rather than attempting 
to change the system in a revolutionary and collective way. They perceived this as 
putting at risk their survival in work, given the limited options for employment as 
scientists in the New Zealand context.  
 
Workers’ voices have dominated the development of this theory rather than those of 
theoreticians or the researcher, emphasising the need for future research to also 
contain this dimension in order to be true to those researched.  
D.3 Implications for science policy and organisational practice 
Two main issues emerge from this thesis. The first is to do with science policy and 
the second is to do with the management of science organisations. In Section 4.2 I 
stated: “No assumption is made here that the outcome of the negotiated meanings of 
work is one that will succeed in the way intended by the actors or by Government”. 
From this thesis it is apparent that the response of scientific workers to Government 
policy and their working environment may allow them to survive in work but it has 
not maintained or improved their level of satisfaction, and indeed is making some 
less committed to their work. The scientific workers’ response has not made the 
work of science any more likely to continue into the future in a form that retains and 
transmits the present generation’s values and reasons for doing science to the next 
generation. The systems which FRST has introduced as a result of Government 
policy have not produced a more committed, happy, workforce of scientific workers. 
Surely Government did not intend these responses from its policy? Concern about 
some of these issues appears to have ‘trickled up’ to Government. The Minister of 
Research Science and Technology called on MoRST to produce a new strategy 
statement for RS&T by November 22, 2002. As a result, many interested parties 
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published their perspectives on this issue. In this section I will summarise three of the 
most recent reports in the areas pertaining to this thesis: the report, Transforming 
New Zealand through science: Concepts for a performance based science system, 
from the New Zealand Association of Crown Research Institutes (ACRI, 2002); the 
Council of the Royal Society of New Zealand’s open letter to the Minister of 
Research, Science and Technology (Council of RSNZ, 2002); and the McKinsey and 
Company report, (McKinsey, 2002), Making R&D a national priority prepared for 
the Knowledge Wave Trust. I then incorporate these points with those of my thesis to 
produce some recommendations for science policy. I suggest some recommendations 
for organisational practice because this in fact may be where change needs to start. 
Finally, in this section, I make some recommendations to science practitioners. 
D.3.1 Recent reports on science policy 
According to the Association of Crown Research Institutes (ACRI, 2002: 2), the 
science system should be developed by a “wide range of stakeholders” and “it should 
reflect the insight, experience and learning of those most closely connected to 
industry, science and global knowledge …” (ibid.: 5). All these stakeholders should 
be regarded as having equal value. 
 
Good science policy should value science and scientific workers (Council of RSNZ: 
2002: 3-4) by providing them with job stability and better financial rewards. This can 
be achieved by supporting more long-term research and recognition that research is 
dependent on the continual maintenance and building up of the capabilities of 
scientists (ACRI, 2002; McKinsey, 2002; Council of RSNZ, 2002). All reports place 
a high value on basic research and two, on the development of critical mass 
(McKinsey, 2002: 6; Council of RSNZ, 2002). Accountability should be judged by 
wider measures such as social and/or environmental return (ACRI, 2002: 2) and not 
judged just for economic return. Research should be considered as either producing a 
commercial return, or national benefit/public good from which no economic return is 
expected (ibid: 10). New Zealand is regarded as being too small a country for a 
competitive system (ACRI, 2002: 14; McKinsey, 2002: 6).  
 
Governments and these entities (ACRI, RSNZ, Knowledge Wave Trust) talk about 
changing the RS&T system as if this system will “produce” the required environment 
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in which certain goals will be achieved - ‘if the structure is right then the rest will 
follow’. There is a fallacy here. What my research is saying is that scientific workers 
will work around the structures when they do not suit them and that this may now be 
a habit. New structures will have to restore their trust to achieve buy-in by scientific 
workers. At the moment I cannot see the average scientific worker even being 
bothered to engage in the debate. They have no evidence from the past to suggest 
that they will have any influence. 
D.3.2 Recommendations for science policy and science funders 
1) Value science and science practitioners by: 







Implication: Funders need to consider the impact of their decisions on the 
practitioners/providers of scientific research.  
Accountability acting up and down the system. (Policy makers, funders and 
providers having a responsibility to demonstrate evidence of ‘listening up’ 
and ‘listening down’.) 
Placing a greater emphasis on longer-term research. 
Placing a greater emphasis on basic research compared with technology 
producing, commercially oriented, research. 
Having a better match between policy goals and the goals of science 
practitioners. 
Increasing remuneration of science practitioners. 
Raising the profile of science and science careers. 
2)  Provide clarity about whether research is to meet national or international goals.                            
3)  Value the contribution of science as well as business. 
Implication: Businesses are encouraged to participate in R&D rather than science 
practitioners penalised when businesses practitioners will not participate.  
4) Include all stakeholders on an equal basis in policy making. (Scientists can tell 
policy makers how the system is working for them.)  
5) Develop an awareness that scientific research is a social enterprise. It needs to 
have all sections of the community ‘on board’. Providers should be part of this 
dialogue – not just MoRST and FRST, i.e., scientific practitioners are encouraged 
to become more socially and politically active. 
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6)  Provide meaningful feedback to science providers and engage in their work with 
interest.  
D.3.3 Recommendations for organisational practice 
1) Value, encourage and celebrate science and scientific practitioners by: 
Managers acting as advocates for science and scientific practitioners in 








Managers working in partnership with Public Service Association (union to 
which majority of scientific practitioners belong) to improve the 
remuneration of scientific practitioners.  
Employing managers (including CEO) who live these values. 
Encouraging a partnership relationship between managers and scientific 
practitioners. 
Practicing listening down and listening up and listening sideways. 
Practicing accountability in all directions (as for listening). 
Evaluating scientific practitioners within the organisation according to the 
work of science, not according to managerial criteria, i.e., are they good at 
their work – not, do they meet organisational values? 
2) Encourage feedback through all levels of the organisation. 
D.3.4 Recommendations for science practitioners 
1) Be interested in the work of those you work with both in and outside your group. 
2) Give and seek feedback. 
3) Manage and/or demand work in a ‘project’ form so you have responsibility for a 
whole piece of work. 
4) Act as advocates of science in your communities. 
5) Seek greater advocacy from the Public Service Association. 
6) Act collectively. 
 
The first two sets of recommendations have been developed through the interaction I 
have had with those attending seminars I gave on the Grasslands and Lincoln 
campuses, and at the MBU in February 2003. I also had discussions with John 
Lancashire (science consultant) and John Hay (CEO of the CRI, Environmental 
Science Research) at this time. John Hay, in particular, felt that though CRIs do have 
to work within a tight framework imposed by Government, there are still ways in 
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which organisational management can improve the environment for science 
practitioners. However, naturally I take responsibility for the final form of these 
recommendations. 
D.4 Future research 
Because of the open-ended nature of this research, it raised questions which would 
be worth exploring further in a more focused fashion.  
 
1) The purpose of a research organisation and the impact of that on the motives of 
the people who work there, and consequently on the type of people who would 
choose to work there? For example, if profit is a motive for organisational 
management, who will benefit from research done in this organisation and what 
sort of people will wish to find jobs there? If management rather than FRST or 
scientists decide on what research is done, who benefits? What sort of research 
will be done? How will the culture and ethics change?  
 
2) What is the long-term impact of organisational communication on an environment 
in which science is practiced? If communication within a research organisation is 
mainly ‘downwards’ then what does that say about the research environment that 
is being fostered? If the CEO is only interested in strategy, then what implications 
does that have for the people who work there?  
 
3) What is the personal impact on scientific workers of working in an environment 
which encourages ‘game playing’? What are the risks to the knowledge 
generation and innovativeness of scientists who are no longer able to keep the 
‘funding game’ and the ‘doing science game’ separate?  
 
4) Are the findings of this research just applicable to AgResearch? If New Zealand is 
to become a society based more on ‘knowledge work’ then it is important to find 
out what is going on in other research organisations both public (CRIs and 
universities) and private, and see if there are any differences. Are there places 
where scientific workers are happy, and if so, why? This research has studied the 
impact of restructuring. Are these results applicable to other public sector 
organisations such as those in the health, welfare or education sectors? Is the 
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common factor restructuring or is it something else that is making workers 
dissatisfied? How much does ‘science’ have to do with the results of my study and 
how applicable are its results to non-science organisations?  
 
Future research in these areas should be necessary for Government to understand the 
impact of their policies, and to improve future policy-making.  
Coda 
The four year journey of this thesis has flown by. It has challenged me in ways I did 
not dream of. The emerging process of qualitative research in which this thesis has 
taken on a life of its own has been a challenge to my patience and ego as I set 
deadlines which I was not able to meet for the first time in my life. This process has 
meant also that I seemed often to be in a state of confusion; again, not a condition I 
was used to! At the same time it has been totally engaging and stimulating. The 
questions arising from this thesis are ones I will ponder for the rest of my life. It was 
only over the past few months as my lack of academic writing experience was tested 
to the utmost that I wondered if I had the persistence to continue to the end.  
 
This work adds to the tale of human beings’ search for liberation from the iron cage 
of irreversible rationality, not only endorsing Weber’s fear of this possibility but also 
providing evidence for resistance against it. I hope that it is a testament to the 
resilience of the human spirit as it catalogues the impact of the management of New 




Abercrombie, N., Hill, S., & Turner, B.S. (1988). Dictionary of sociology (2nd ed.). 
London: Penguin Books. 
Ackroyd, S., & Thompson, P. (1999). Organizational misbehaviour. London, 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
AgResearch. AgResearch Science No. 16. 
AgResearch (1997a). AgResearch Annual Report 1997. 
AgResearch (1997b). AgResearch Strategic Plan  
AgResearch (1998). AgResearch Annual Report 1998. 
AgResearch (1999a). AgResearch Annual Report 1999. 
AgResearch (1999b). AgResearch Strategic Plan  
AgResearch (2000a). AgResearch Annual Report 2000. 
AgResearch (2000b). Strategic Plan for 2000-2003. 
AgResearch (2001). AgResearch Annual Report 2001. 
AgResearch (2002). AgResearch Annual Report 2002. 
Akrich, M. (1992). The De-scription of technical objects. In W.E. Bijker & J. Law 
(eds), Shaping technology, building society: studies in sociotechnical change 
(pp. 205-224). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Akrich, M. (1995). User representations: Practices, methods and sociology. In A. 
Rip, T.J. Misa & J.E. Schot (eds), Managing technology in society: the 
approach of constructive technology assessment (pp. 167-184). London: 
Pinter Publishers. 
Allen, S. (1997). What is work for? The right to work and the right to be idle. In R.K. 
Brown (ed.), The changing shape of work (pp. 54-68). Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Analoui, F., & Kakabadse, A. (1993). Sabotage. London: Spokesman. 
Anderson, I. (1992). Laying siege to ivory towers. New Scientist, 136, 12-13. 
Andrews, P.H., & Herschel, R.T. (1996). Organizational communication: 
empowerment in a technological society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin 
Company. 
Arnold, E., Rush, H., Bessant, J., & Hobday, M. (1998). Strategic planning in 
research and technology institutes. R&D Management, 28(2), 89-100. 
 
281 
Aryee, S. (1992). Public and private sector professionals: A comparative study of 
their perceived work experience. Group & Organization Management, 17 (1), 
72-85. 
Ashforth, B.E., & Mael, F.A. (1998). The power of resistance: sustaining valued 
identities. In R.M. Kramer & M.A. Neale (eds), Power and influence in 
organizations (pp. 89-119). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Austrin, T. (1994). Positioning resistance and resisting position: human resource 
management and the politics of appraisal and grievance hearings. In J.M. 
Jermier, D. Knights & W. Nord (eds), Resistance and power in organizations 
(pp. 199-218). London and New York: Routledge. 
Baldry, C., Bain, P. & Taylor, P. (1998). ‘Bright satanic offices’: intensification, 
control and team Taylorism. In P. Thompson & C. Warhurst (eds), 
Workplaces of the future (pp. 163-183). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press.  
Barley, S. R., & Kunda, G. (1992). Design and devotion: surges in rational and 
normative ideologies of control in managerial discourse. Administrative 
Science Quarterly, 37(3), 363-399. Retrieved on 20-3-00, from Expanded 
Academic - via Lincoln University library’s Info-Trac. 
Barley, S. R. (1996). Technicians in the workplace: ethnographic evidence for 
bringing work into organization studies. Administrative Science Quarterly, 
41(3), 404-441. Retrieved on 20-3-00, from Expanded Academic - via 
Lincoln University library’s Info-Trac. 
Bate, P. (1998). Strategies for cultural change (1st pub. 1994). Oxford, U.K.: 
Butterworth-Heinemann. 
Bauman, Z. (1998). Globalization: the human consequences. New York: Columbia 
University Press. 
Beardsley, T. (1997). Eliciting science's best. Scientific American, June 1997, 119-
120. 
Beck, U. (2000). The brave new world of work (1st published in German, 1999). 
Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. 
Becker, H.S. (1971). Sociological work: method and substance (1st pub. 1970). 
London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press. 
Becker, H.S. (1998). Tricks of the trade: how to think about your research while 
you're doing it. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Bennis, W.G., Benne, K.D., Chin, R., & Corey, K.E. (1976). The planning of change 
(3rd ed.). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Benson, S.P. (1986). Counter cultures: saleswomen, managers, and customers in 
American department stores, 1890-1940. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. 
 
282 
Berger, P.L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: a treatise in 
the sociology of knowledge. Garden City, NY: Doubleday. 
Bezar, H. (1994). Food or famine? Agricultural Science, 7(6), 5. 
Blaikie, N. (1995). Approaches to social enquiry (1st pub. 1993). Cambridge: Polity 
Press. 
Blau, P.M. (1964). Exchange and power in social life. New York: John Wiley & 
Sons. 
Blauner, R. (1964). Alienation and freedom: the factory worker and his industry. 
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Bluck, J. (2001). Killing us softly: challenging the Kiwi culture of complaint. 
Christchurch, N.Z.: Shoal Bay Press. 
Blumer, H. (1967). Society as Symbolic Interaction. In J.G. Manis & B.N. Meltzer 
(eds), Symbolic Interaction: a reader in social psychology (pp. 139-148). 
Boston: Allyn and Bacon. 
Blumer, H. (1969). Symbolic Interactionism: perspective and method. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
Boston, J., & Dalziel, P. (eds) (1992). The decent society?: essays in response to 
National's economic and social policies. Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University 
Press. 
Boston, J., Martin, J., Pallot, J., & Walsh, P. (eds) (1991). Reshaping the State: New 
Zealand's bureaucratic revolution. Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press. 
Boston, J., Martin, J., Pallot, J., & Walsh, P. (1996). Public management: the New 
Zealand model. Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press. 
Boston, J., & Pallot, J. (1997). Linking strategy and performance: developments in 
the New Zealand public sector. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 
16(3), 382-404. 
Bowker, G.C., & Star, S.L. (1999). Sorting things out: classification and its 
consequences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Braverman, H. (1974). Labour and monopoly capital: The degradation of work in the 
twentieth century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Braverman, H. (1999). Technology and capitalist control (1st pub. 1974). In D. 
MacKenzie & J. Wajcman (eds), The social shaping of technology (2nd ed., 1st 
pub. 1985) (pp. 158-160). Buckingham: Open University Press. 





Britton, S., Le Heron, R., & Pawson, E. (1992). Changing places in New Zealand: a 
geography of restructuring. Christchurch, N.Z.: New Zealand Geographical 
Society. 
Brooking, T. (1996). Use it or lose it: unravelling the land debate in late nineteenth-
century New Zealand. New Zealand Journal of History, 30, 141-161. 
Bruhn, J.G. (2001). Being good and doing good: the culture of professionalism in the 
health professions. The Health Care Manager, 19(4), 47-58. Retrieved on 15-
3-02 from http://proquest.umi.com. 
Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing consent: changes in the labor process under 
monopoly capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Burawoy, M. (2001). Donald Roy - sociologist and working stiff. Contemporary 
Sociology, 30(5), 453-456. 
Burns, T. (1969). Industrial man: selected readings. Harmondsworth, England: 
Penguin Books. 
Burns, T. (1992). Erving Goffman. London: Routledge. 
Burns, T., & Stalker, G.M. (1966). The management of innovation (2nd ed., 1st pub. 
1961). London: Tavistock Publications. 
Burrows, D.J., & Lapides, F.R. (eds.) (1969). Alienation: a casebook. New York: 
Thomas Y. Crowell Company. 
Busch, L., & Lacy, W.B. (1983). Science, agriculture and the politics of research. 
Boulder CO: Westview Press. 
Campus, J.E., & Pradhan, S. (1997). Evaluating public expenditure management 
systems. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 16(3). 
Carson, R. (1962). Silent spring. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. 
Casey, C. (1995). Work, self and society: after industrialism. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Child, J. (1973). Organisational structure, environment and performance, the role of 
strategic choice. In G. Salaman & K. Thompson (eds), People and 
organizations (pp. 91-107). Harlow, England: Longman for Open University 
Press. 
Child, J. (1988). Organization: a guide to problems and practice (2nd ed., 1st pub. 
1984). London: Paul Chapman Publishing Ltd. 
Clegg, S.R. (1989). Frameworks of power. London: Sage. 




Clegg, S.R. (1994). Power relations and the constitution of the resistant subject. In 
J.M. Jermier, D. Knights & W. Nord (eds), Resistance and power in 
organizations (pp. 274-325). London and New York: Routledge. 
Clegg, S.R., & Dunkerley, D. (1980). Organization, class and control. London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Cockburn, C. (1999a). Caught in the wheels: the high cost of being a female cog in 
the male machinery of engineering. In D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman (eds), 
The social shaping of technology (pp. 126-133). Buckingham PA: Open 
University Press. 
Cockburn, C. (1999b). The material of male power. In D. MacKenzie & J. Wajcman 
(eds), The social shaping of technology (pp. 177-198). Buckingham PA: 
Open University Press. 
Cockburn, C. (1994). Play of power. In S. Wright (ed.), Anthropology of 
organizations (pp. 95-114). London: Routledge. 
Cohen, S., & Taylor, L. (1992). Escape attempts: the theory and practice of 
resistance to everyday life (2nd ed. 1st pub. 1976). London: Routledge. 
Collinson, D. (1994). Strategies of resistance: power, knowledge and subjectivity in 
the workplace. In J. M. Jermier, D. Knights & W. Nord (eds), Resistance and 
power in organizations (pp. 25-68). London and New York: Routledge. 
Collinson, D.L. (1992). Managing the shopfloor: subjectivity, masculinity and 
workplace culture. Berlin: William de Gruyter. 
Coser, L.A. (1974). Greedy institutions: patterns of undivided commitment. New 
York: The Free Press, Macmillan. 
Council of Royal Society of New Zealand (2002). Human capability issues in science 
and technology. Retrieved on 3-10-02 from 
www.rsnz.org.nz/news/humancapital/. 
Covey, S.R. (1989). The 7 habits of highly effective people: restoring the character 
ethic. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Crosby, P. (1984). Quality without tears: the art of hassle-free management. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Crozier, M. (1964). The bureaucratic phenomenon. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press. 
Davidson, J.O. (1994). The sources and limits of resistance in a privatised utility. In 
J.M. Jermier, D. Knights & W.R. Nord (eds), Resistance and power in 
organizations (pp. 69-101). London and New York: Routledge. 
de Bono, E. (1990). Edward de Bono's masterthinker's handbook: a guide to 
innovative thinking. London: Penguin. 
 
285 
Dent, E.B., & Goldberg, S.G. (1999). Challenging “resistance” to change. Journal of 
Applied Behavioral Science, 35(1), 25-41. 
Dent, M. (1991). Autonomy and the medical profession: medical audit and 
management control. In C. Smith, D. Knights & H. Willmott (eds), White-
collar work: the non-manual labour process (pp. 65-87). Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
Devine, S. (1995). Purchasing scientific research outputs within the new science 
structures. Public Sector, 18(4), 6-9. 
Drahos, P. with Braithwaite, J. (2002). Information feudalism: who owns the 
knowledge economy? London: Earthscan Publications. 
du Gay, P. (1996). Consumption and identity at work. London: Sage. 
Durkheim, D.E., & Solovay, S.A. (1966). The rules of sociological method (8th ed.). 
New York: Free Press. 
Easton, B. (1995). The rise of the generic manager. In S. Rees & G. Rodley (eds), 
The human costs of managerialism (pp. 39-48). Leichardt, NSW: Pluto Press. 
Easton, B. (1997). The commercialisation of New Zealand. Auckland, N.Z.: 
Auckland University Press. 
Easton, B. (1999). The whimpering of the State: policy after MMP. Auckland, N.Z.: 
Auckland University Press. 
Easton, B. (2000). The cult of the manager. Those who can, do: those who can’t, 
become managers. Listener, February 26 2000, 56. 
Easton, B. (2002). Super-fertile research: how farmers and scientists innovate. 
Listener, October 5 2002, 36. 
Eccles, R.G., & Nohria, N. (1992). Beyond the hype: rediscovering the essence of 
management. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Edmeades, D.C. (2000). Science Friction: the maxicrop case and the aftermath. 
Hamilton, N.Z.: Fertiliser Information Services Ltd. 
Edwards, P. (1986). Conflict at work: a materialist analysis of workplace relations. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Edwards, P. (1988). Patterns of conflict and accommodation. In D. Gallie (ed.), 
Employment in Britain . Oxford: Blackwell. 
Edwards, P., & Scullion, H. (1982). The social organisation of industrial conflict. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Edwards, R. (1979). Contested terrain: the transformation of the workplace in the 
twentieth century. London: Heinemann. 
 
286 
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1999). Strategy as strategic decision making. Sloan Management 
Review, 40(3), 65-72. 
Eisler, R. (1995). From domination to partnership: the hidden subtext for 
organization change. Training and Development, 49(2), 32-39. 
Erikson, K.T. (1979). In the wake of the flood. London: George Allen & Unwin. 
Etzioni, A. (1961). A comparative analysis of complex organizations. New York: 
Free Press. 
Etzioni, A. (1969) A basis for comparative analysis of complex organizations. In A. 
Etzioni (ed.), A sociological reader on complex organizations (2nd ed.) (pp. 
59-76). New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Evison, F. (1993). Good science and public good science. NZ Engineering, 48(3), 6-
7, 10. 
Falvey, L., Forno, D., & Srivastava, J. (1995). Agricultural knowledge systems: 
directions of change. Agricultural Science, 8(2), 41-44. 
Feynman, R.P. (1988). What do you care what other people think?' Further 
adventures of a curious character. London: Unwin Hyman. 
Fletcher, L.R., & Harvey, I.C. (1981). An association of a Lolium endophyte with 
ryegrass staggers. New Zealand Veterinary Journal, 29(10), 185-186. 
Flood, J. (1984). The advent of strategic management in CSIRO: A History of 
Change. Prometheus, 2(1), 38-72. 
Foner, N. (1993). Work culture in the nursing home: adaptation and resistance 
among nursing aides. Frontiers, 14(1), 44-67. Retrieved on 30-10-01 from 
Expanded Academic Database http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com. 
Foundation for Research Science and Technology (FRST) (2000). Investment 
approach for economic innovation and FRST investment change process, 
November 2000, retrieved on 29–6-01 from www.frst.govt.nz. 
 
Foundation for Research Science and Technology (FRST) (2000) Parliamentary 
Reports. Retrieved on 29-6-01 and 12-7-01 from 
www.frst.govt.nz/apps/database/researchreport. 
Fox, M.F. (1995). Women and scientific careers. In S. Jasanoff, J.C. Markle, J.C. 
Peterson & T.J. Pinch (eds), The handbook of science and technology studies 
(pp. 205-223). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Freidson, E. (1994). Professionalism reborn: theory, prophecy and policy. Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press. 




Fuller, S. (1993). Philosophy of science and its discontents. New York: Guildford 
Press. 
Fuller, S. (1997). Science. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Galbreath, R.A. (1998). DSIR : making science work for New Zealand : themes from 
the history of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, 1926-
1992 . Wellington, [N.Z.] : Victoria University Press in association with the 
Historical Branch, Dept. of Internal Affairs. 
Galloway, S.M., McNatty, K.P., Cambridge, L.M., Latinen, M.P., Juengel, J.L., 
Jokiranta, T.S., McLaren, R.J., Luiro, K., Dodds, K.G., Montgomery, G.W., 
Beattie, A.E., Davis, G.H., & Ritvos, O. (2000). Mutations in an oocyte-
derived growth factor gene (BMP15) cause increased ovulation rate and 
infertility in a dosage-sensitive manner. Nature Genetics, 25(3), 279-283. 
Gershon, H. (1993). Book Review of: Intensive care: medical ethics and the medical 
profession (1992) by Robert Zussman. Journal of Contemporary 
Ethnography, 22(2), 254-257. 
Giddens, A. (1989). The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration 
(1st pub. 1984). Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Giddens, A. (1991). Modernity and self-identity: self and society in the late modern 
age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gini, A. (2000). My job, my self: work and the creation of the modern individual. 
New York: Routledge. 
Giroux, H.A. (2001). Public spaces, private lives: beyond the culture of cynicism. 
Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. 
Gluckman, P. (2001). Competing on a shoestring won't work. The Dominion, 21 July 
2001: 29. 
Goffman, E. (1959). The presentation of self in everyday life. Harmondsworth, 
England: Penguin. 
Goffman, E. (1961a). Asylums: essays on the social situation of mental patients and 
other inmates. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 
Goffman, E. (1961b). Role distance. New York: Bobbs Merrill. 
Goldthorpe, J.H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F., & Platt, J. (1969). The affluent 
worker in the class structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Goldthorpe, J.H., Lockwood, D., Bechhofer, F., & Platt, J. (1970). The affluent 
worker: industrial attitudes and behaviour (1st pub. 1968). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Gouldner, A.W. (1954). Patterns of industrial bureaucracy. New York: Free Press. 
 
288 
Gouldner, A.W. (1965). Wildcat strike. New York: Free Press. 
Greenbaum, J. (1998). The times they are a’changing: dividing and recombining 
labour through computer systems. In P. Thompson & C. Warhurst (eds), 
Workplaces of the future (pp. 124-141). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
Grint, K. (1991). The sociology of work: an introduction. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Gustafson, L.T., & Reger, R.K. (1995). Using organizational identity to achieve 
stability and change in high velocity environments. Academy of Management 
Journal Special Issue: Best Papers Proceeding 1995. Emailed on 11-02-00 
from Proquest Database. 
Guston, D.H. (1996). A call for redirection. Science, 273, 1806-1807. 
Habermas, J. (1984). The theory of communicative action, Volume 1: Reason and the 
rationalization of society. Boston, MA: Beacon. 
Habermas, J. (1987). The theory of communicative action, Volume 2: Lifeworld and 
system: a critique of functionalist reason. Boston, MA: Beacon. 
Handy, C.B. (1985). Understanding organizations (3rd ed.). London: Penguin Books. 
Hannan, M.T., & Freeman, J. (1989). Organizational ecology. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Harding, S. (1992). How the women's movement benefits science: two views. In G. 
Kirkup & L.S. Keller (eds), Inventing women: science, technology and 
gender (pp. 57-72). Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. 
Harris, D. (1992). From class struggle to the politics of pleasure: the effects of 
Gramscianism on cultural studies. London: Routledge. 
Hassard, J., Holliday, R., & Willmott, H.E. (eds) (2000). Body and organization. 
London: Sage Publications. 
Hawke, G. (1992). Economic trends and economic policy. In G.W. Rice (ed.), The 
Oxford history of New Zealand (2nd ed., pp. 412-450). Auckland, N.Z.: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hill, R., & Gidlow, B. (1988). From hot metal to cold type: negotiating 
technological change in the New Zealand newspaper industry. Wellington, 
N.Z.: DSIR. 
Hill, S., & Turpin, T. (1994). Academic research cultures in collision. Science as 
culture, 4(3), 326-362. 
Hirschman, A.O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, 
organizations, and states. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Hochschild, A.R. (1983). The managed heart: commercialization of human feeling. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
 
289 
Hodgson, P. (2000a). The Government's vision for science and technology. Press 
Release/New Zealand Government 17-03-00. 
Hodgson, P. (2000b). Economic transformations. Speech notes: public meeting, 
Friday 26 May 2000, Centennial Convention Centre, Palmerston North. 
Retrieved on 27-5-00 from CEO’s Update, AgResearch Intranet. 
Hodgson, P. (2000c). Transforming the economy. Future Sectors Conference, Sky 
City, Auckland. Press Release New Zealand Government 20-06-00. Retrieved 
on 22-6-00 from AgResearch Intranet. 
Hodgson, P. (2000d). Transforming the NZ economy. Speech at the Capital Business 
Show, Westpac Stadium 23 August 2000. Retrieved on 25-8-00 from 
AgResearch Intranet. 
Hodgson, P. (2000e). Growth science: primary sector research and the knowledge 
economy. Press Release New Zealand Government 19-9-00. 
Hodgson, P., Howe, J., Saunders, R., & Winsley, P. (1998). Technological learning 
and knowledge application review: Report to FRST. Retrieved on 15-3-00 
from www.frst.govt.nz/public/thesource/techlearning/contents.htm. 
Hodson, R. (1991). The active worker: compliance and autonomy at the workplace. 
Journal of Contemporary Ethnography, 20(1): 47-78. 
Hodson, R. (1995a). Resistance and power in organizations: agency, subjectivity, and 
the labour process. Work and Occupations, 22(3), 364. Retrieved on 29-6-01 
from http://proquest.umi.com. 
Hodson, R. (1995b). Worker resistance: an underdeveloped concept in the sociology 
of work. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 16, 79-110. 
Hodson, R. (1997). Group relations at work: solidarity, conflict, and relations with 
management. Work and Occupations, 24(4): 426-452. 
Hofbauer, J. (2000). Bodies in a landscape: on office design and organization. In J. 
Hassard, R. Holliday & H. Willmott (eds), Body and organization (pp. 166-
191). London: Sage Publications. 
Homans, G.C. (1950). The human group. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Huber, G.P., & Glick, W.H. (eds) (1993). Organizational change and redesign: ideas 
and insights for improving performance. New York and Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Hunt, L.M. (1998). NSOF Dairy Programme 1997-98, AgResearch Internal Report 
2.4. Land-use change, grass grubs, DDT, production and the farmer: the 
arrival of agricultural chemicals in New Zealand. 
Hunt, L.M. (2000). Analysis of qualitative reponses to AgResearch staff survey 
(CERNO). AgResearch Internal Report, February 2000. 
 
290 
Hunt, L.M. (2001). The corporatisation of science practice in New Zealand: the 
impact of a strategic plan. R&D Management Conference 2001: Leveraging 
Research and Technology, February, 2001, Wellington, N.Z. 
 
Hunt, L.M. (2002a). Protecting science: working in a CRI. Presented at Sociological 
Association of Aotearoa New Zealand Conference, Social Science in the 21st 
Century: Challenges to Theory – Policy – Practice, 5-7December, 2002, 
Christchurch, N.Z.   Also found on SAANZ conference website 
(http://www.soci.canterbury.ac.nz/SAANZ2002) and CD of conference 
papers.   
Hunt, L.M. (2002b). Sheep as object: the meaning of sheep to different science 
groups. New Zealand Sociology, 17(2), 198-214. 
Hynes, H.P. (1989). The recurring silent spring. New York: Pergamon Press. 
Iso-Ahola, S.E. (1989). Motivation for leisure. In E. Jackson & T. Burton (eds), 
Understanding leisure and recreation (pp. 247-279). State College, PA: 
Venture Publishing. 
Jackall, R. (1978). Workers in a labyrinth: jobs and survival in a bank bureaucracy. 
Montclair, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun & Co. 
Jermier, J.M., Knights, D., & Nord, W.R. (eds) (1994). Resistance and power in 
organizations: agency, subjectivity, and the labour process. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Journeaux, P. (1998). The evolution of agricultural extension services in New 
Zealand. Primary Industry Management, 1(2), 4-10. 
Kanter, R.M. (1977). Men and women of the corporation. New York: Basic Books. 
Kanter, R.M. (1984). The change masters. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Kanter, R.M. (1999). Change is everyone's job: managing the extended enterprise in 
a globally connected world. Organizational Dynamics, 28(1), 7-23. 
Karlsson, J.C. (1995). The concept of work on the rack: critique and suggestions. In 
I.H. Simpson & R.L. Simpson (eds), Research in the sociology of work Vol.5: 
The meaning of work (pp. 1-14). Stamford CO: JAI Press Inc. 
Kaufmann, W. (1971). Introduction: the inevitability of alienation. In R. Schacht, 
Alienation (p. xiii-ivi). London: George Allen and Unwin. 
Keirsey, D., & Bates, M. (1986). Please understand me: character and temperament 
types. Delmar, CA: Gnosology Books Ltd. 




Keller, E.F. (1990). Gender and science. In J.M. Nielsen (ed.), Feminist research 
methods: exemplary readings in the social sciences (pp. 41-57). Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press. 
Keller, E.F. (1991). The wo/man scientist: issues of sex and gender in the pursuit of 
science. In H. Zuckerman, J.R. Cole & J.T. Bruer (eds), The outer circle: 
women in the scientific community (pp. 227-236). New York and London: 
W.W. Norton & Company. 
Keller, E.F. (1992). How gender matters, or, why it's so hard for us to count past two. 
In G. Kirkup & L.S. Keller (eds), Inventing women: science, technology and 
gender (pp. 42-56). Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. 
Keller, E.F. (1995). The origin, history, and politics of the subject called “gender and 
science”: a first person account. In S. Jasanoff, J.C. Markle, J.C. Peterson & 
T.J. Pinch (eds), The handbook of science and technology studies (pp. 80-94). 
Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications. 
Kelman, H.C. (1958). Compliance, identification and internalization: three processes 
of attitude change. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2, 51-60 . 
Kelsey, J. (1995). The New Zealand experiment: a world model for structural 
adjustment? Auckland, N.Z.: Auckland University Press and Bridget 
Williams Books. 
Kirkup, G., & Keller, L.S. (1992). Inventing women: science, technology and gender. 
Cambridge, U.K.: Polity Press. 
Kirton, A., Ross, C., & Mercer, G.J.K. (1995). New Zealand primary production 
scientists take stock of science reforms. Agricultural Science, 8(2), 33-36. 
Klein, D. (1976). Some notes on the dynamics of resistance to change: the defender 
role (1st pub. 1966). In W.G. Bennis, K.D. Benne, R. Chin & K.E. Corey 
(eds), The planning of change (3rd ed.) (pp. 117-124). New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston. 
Knights, D., & Collinson, D. (1987). Disciplining the shopfloor: a comparison of the 
disciplinary effects of managerial psychology and financial accounting. 
Accounting, Organizations and Society , 12(5), 457-477. 
Knights, D., & Morgan, G. (1991a). Corporate strategy, organizations, and 
subjectivity: a critique. Organisation Studies, 12(2), 251-273. 
Knights, D., & Morgan, G. (1991b). Selling oneself: subjectivity and the labour 
process in selling life insurance. In C. Smith, D. Knights & H. Willmott (eds), 
White-collar work: the non-manual labour process (pp. 217-240). 
Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Knights, D., & Vurdubakis, T. (1994). Foucault, power, resistance and all that. In 
J.M. Jermier, D. Knights & W.R. Nord (eds), Resistance and power in 
organizations (pp. 167-198). London and New York: Routledge. 
 
292 
Knights, D., & Willmott, H. (1989). Power and subjectivity at work: from 
degradation to subjugation in social relations. Sociology, 23, 535-558. 
Knights, D., & Willmott, H. (1999). Management lives: power and identity in work 
organizations. London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Knights, D., & Willmott, H. (eds) (2000). The reengineering revolution? critical 
studies of corporate change. London: Sage Publications. 
Knorr-Cetina, K., & Mulkay, M. (1983). Science observed: perspectives on the 
social study of science. London: Sage. 
Kondo, D.K. (1990). Crafting selves: power, gender and discourses of identity in a 
Japanese workplace. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kotter, J.P. (1995). Leading change: why transformation efforts fail. Harvard 
Business Review, March-April 1995, 59-67. 
Kramer, R.M., & Neale, M.A. (eds) (1998). Power and influence in organizations. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: Chicago 
University Press.  
Kunda, G. (1992). Engineering culture: control and commitment in a high-tech 
corporation. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Lancashire, J.A. (2001). The effectiveness of the New Zealand science system. 
Presented at RSNZ Conference ‘Bio-Science to Bio-Enterprise to Bio-
Business’ (B2B2B), Hamilton, N.Z. November, 2001. Copy from author. 
Lancashire, J.A. (2002). Achieving optimal science. Presented at Primary Resources 
Forum, ‘Preserving New Zealand's Wealth Generating Capacity’, 26 June 
2002, Massey University, Palmerston North. Copy from author. 
Larkin, T.J., & Larkin, S. (1996). Reaching and changing frontline employees. 
Harvard Business Review, May-June 1996, 95-104. 
Latour, B. (1987). Science in action: how to follow scientists and engineers through 
society. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Latour, B. (1999). Pandora's hope: essays on the reality of science studies. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Law, J. (1994). Organising modernity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Layne, L. (2000). The cultural fix: an anthropological contribution to science and 
technology studies. Science, Technology & Human Values, 25(4), 492-519. 
Le Heron, R., & Pawson, E. (1996). Changing places: New Zealand in the nineties. 
Auckland, N.Z.: Longman Paul. 
 
293 
Lemert, C., & Branaman A. (eds) (1997). The Goffman reader. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.  
Leonard, D. & Strauss, S. (1998). Putting your company’s whole brain to work (1st 
pub. 1997). In Harvard Business Review on knowledge management (pp. 
109-136). Boston: A Harvard Business Review Paperback. 
Littler, C.R. (1982a). Deskilling and changing structures of control. In S. Wood (ed.), 
The degradation of work? Skill, deskilling and the labour process (pp. 122-
145). London: Hutchinson. 
Littler, C.R. (1982b). The development of the labour process in capitalist societies. 
London: Heinemann. 
Littler, C.R., & Salaman, G. (1985). The design of jobs. In C.R. Littler (ed.), The 
experience of work (pp. 85-104). Aldershot, U.K.: Gower. 
Lockwood, D. (1958). The black-coated worker: a study in class consciousness. 
London: Allen & Unwin. 
Lofland, J., & Lofland, L.H. (1995). Analyzing social settings: a guide to qualitative 
observation and analysis (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing 
Company. 
Lovett, S. (1994). Rhetoric and reality: an evaluation of the New Zealand reforms to 
research and development. Agricultural Science, 7(6), 32-36. 
Lundgren, R. & Browner, C. (1990). Caring for the institutionalized mentally 
retarded: work culture and work-based social support. In E. Abel & M. 
Nelson (eds), Circles of care. Albany: SUNY Press. 
Lynch, M. (1985). Art and artifact in laboratory science: a study of shop work and 
shop talk in a research laboratory. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Lyotard, J.F. (1984). The postmodern condition: a report on knowledge. Manchester 
University. 
Macey, D. (1993). The lives of Michel Foucault. New York: Pantheon Books. 
MacLeod, A. (1993). Make it happen. The Quill, 81(3), 27-28. 
Maharey, S. (2000). A knowledge society of our own: the mission of research. 
Speech to Lincoln University Staff Council Forum, 8th August 2000. Press 
Release, New Zealand Government, 8-8-00. 
Makins. M. (ed.). (1994). Collins compact English dictionary (New Edition). 
Glasgow: Harper Collins. 
March, J.G., & Simon, H.A. (1958). Organizations. New York: Wiley. 
Mars, G. (1982). Cheats at work: an anthropology of workplace crime. London: 
George Allen & Unwin. 
 
294 
Martin, J. (1991). Ethos and ethics. In J. Boston, J. Martin, J. Pallot & P. Walsh (eds) 
Reshaping the state: New Zealand's bureaucratic revolution (pp. 367-387). 
Auckland, N.Z.: Oxford University Press. 
Marx, K. (1967). Capital: a critique of political economy (1st pub. 1867). New York: 
International Publishers. 
Maslow, A. (1943). A theory of human motivation. Psychological Review, 50, 370-
96. 
May, T. (1999). From banana time to just-in-time: power and resistance at work. 
Sociology, 33(4). Retrieved on 30-10-01 from Expanded Academic Database, 
http://web3.infotrac.galeygroup.com/itw/infomark. 
May, R. (2002). Science and politics: melding facts and values. Retrieved on 15-3-02 
from the Royal Society of New Zealand website, 
www.rsnz.org/news/talks/scisoc/scipol.ph. 
McKinsey and Company. (2002). Making R&D a national priority: Executive 
Summary. Released 19-9-02 by the Knowledge Wave Trust, Auckland, N.Z. 
Merton, R.K. (1968, enl. ed.). Social theory and social structure. Glencoe, IL: The 
Free Press. 
Merton, R.K. (1973). The sociology of science: Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigations. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
Miller, H. (1991). Academics and their labour process. In C. Smith, D. Knights & H. 
Willmott (eds), White-collar work: the non-manual labour process (pp. 109-
137). Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF). (2000). Agriculture and forestry in New 
Zealand: an overview. Wellington, N.Z..: MAF. 
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MORST) (2000). Making Crown 
Research Institutes into more effective drivers of socio-economic 
transformation. Retrieved on 23-3-02 from www.morst.govt.nz.  
Ministry of Research, Science and Technology (MORST) (2002). New Zealand 
research and development statistics 1999/2000. Wellington, N.Z.: Ministry of 
Research, Science and Technology. Retrieved on 5-7-02 from 
www.morst.govt.nz/whatsnew/index.html. 
Monette, D.R., Sullivan, T.J., & DeJong, C.R. (1994). Applied social research: tool 
for the human services (3rd ed.). Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt Brace.  
Moore, M., & Spector, H. (1995). Is resistance by another name different, more 
solvable? The Journal for Quality and Participation, 18(7). Retrieved on 27-
3-00 from Proquest Database, http://proquest.umi.com. 
 
295 
Munro, R. (1997). Introduction: ideas of difference: stability, social spaces and 
labour of division. In K. Hetherington & R. Munro Ideas of difference (pp. 3-
24). Oxford, U.K.: Blackwell Publishers. 
Murphy, D. (1991). Journalists and the labour process: white-collar production 
workers. In C. Smith, D. Knights & H. Willmott (eds), White-collar work: the 
non-manual labour process (pp. 139-161). Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Murray, A. (2000). I pay to be a scientist. Proceedings of a Conference, Planning 
New Zealand’s Science and Technology Infrastructure, sponsored by the 
Academy Council of the Royal Society of New Zealand. Royal Society of New 
Zealand, Miscellaneous Series 58, 45-49. 
Nagel, J.H. (1997). Editor's introduction: radically reinventing Government. Journal 
of Policy Analysis and Management, 16(3), 349-356. 
Nelkin, D., & Lindee, M.S. (1995). The DNA mystique: the gene as cultural icon. 
New York: W.H. Freeman and Company. 
New Zealand Association of Crown Research Institutes (Inc.) (ACRI). (2002). 
Transforming New Zealand through science: concepts for a performance 
based science system. Retrieved 3-10-02 from 
www.acri.cri.nz/views/statements.shtml. 
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1992). Statement of 
Corporate Intent 1993-1995.  
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1993). Statement of 
Corporate Intent 1993.  
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1994). Statement of 
Corporate Intent 1994-1996.  
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1995). Statement of 
Corporate Intent 1995-1999.  
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1996). Statement of 
Corporate Intent for the year ending 30 June 1997 and through to 30 June 
2001.  
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1997). Statement of 
Corporate Intent 1997/98. 
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1998). Statement of 
Corporate Intent 1998-1999.  
New Zealand Pastoral Agriculture Research Institute Limited (1999). Statement of 
Corporate Intent 1999-2000.  




Nilakant, V., & Ramnarayan, S. (1998). Managing organisational change. Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Response Books, Sage Publications. 
Nord, W.R., & Jermier, J.M. (1994). Overcoming resistance to resistance: insights 
from a study of the shadows. Public Administration Quarterly, 17(4). 
Retrieved on 29-6-01 from Proquest Database, http://proquest.umi.com.  
Offe, C. (1985). Disorganized capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Orbach, S. (1988). Fat is a feminist issue: how to lose weight permanently without 
dieting (1st pub. 1978). London: Arrow Books. 
O'Neill, O. (2002). Reith Lecture 3: Is trust failing? From 2002 Reith Lectures: A 
question of trust. Retrieved on 10-9-02 from BBC Radio 4 website, 
www.bbc.co.uk/radio4/reith2002/lecture3_text.shtml. 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (1994). OECD 
societies in transition: the future of work and leisure. Paris: OECD. 
Paine, M.S. (1997). Doing it together: technology as practice in the New Zealand 
dairy sector (Ph.D. Thesis). Wageningen: Wageningen Agricultural 
University. 
Palmer, C.M. (1994). The reform of the public science system in New Zealand: a 
history of the background to and the implementation of the restructuring of 
the science system: 1988 – 1993, Report No. 33, December 1994. Wellington, 
N.Z.: Ministry of Research, Science and Technology,Te Manatu Putaiao. 
Parker, M. (1997). Dividing organizations and multiplying identities. In K. 
Hetherington & R. Munro (eds), Ideas of difference (pp. 114-138). Oxford, 
U.K.: Blackwell Publishers. 
Peters, T.J., & Waterman, R.H. (1982). In search of excellence: lessons from 
America’s best-run companies. New York: Harper & Row. 
Peters, T.J., & Austin, N. (1985). A passion for excellence: the leadership difference. 
New York: Random House. 
Piore, M.J. & Sabel, C.F. (1984). The second industrial divide. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Pockley, P. (1995). Science restructuring raises serious issues. Public Sector, 15(1), 
18-20. 
Pollert, A. (1981). Girls, wives and factory lives. London: Macmillan. 




Quinn, J.B., Anderson, P., & Finkelstein, S. (1998). Managing professional intellect: 
making the most of the best (1st pub. 1996). In Harvard Business Review on 
knowledge management (pp. 181-206). Boston: A Harvard Business Review 
Paperback. 
Rabinow, P. (1994). The Foucault reader: an introduction to Foucault's thought. 
London: Penguin Books. 
Rabinow, P. (1996). Making PCR: a story of biotechnology. Chicago & London: The 
University of Chicago Press. 
Raelin, J.A. (1991). The clash of cultures: managers managing professionals (2nd 
ed., 1st pub. 1985). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
Randall, W.B.M. (2001). An initial survey of the biotechnology industry in New 
Zealand. Report commissioned by BIOTENZ from Industry New Zealand. 
Retrieved on 12-7-01 from www.biotenz.org.nz. 
Ransome, P. (1999). Sociology and the future of work: contemporary discourses and 
debates. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate. 
Rees, S., & Rodley, G. (eds) (1995). The human costs of managerialism: advocating 
the recovery of humanity. Leichhardt, NSW: Pluto Press. 
Richards, L. (1999). Using NVivo in qualitative research. Bundoora, Vic.: 
Qualitative Solutions and Research Pty. Ltd. 
Ricoeur, P. (trans. K. Blamey) (1994). Oneself as another. Chicago: Chicago 
University Press. 
Riesman, D. (1950). The lonely crowd: a study of the changing American character. 
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Rose, M. (1978). Industrial behaviour: theoretical development since Taylor (1st 
pub. 1975). Middlesex, England: Penguin Books. 
Rose, M. (1988). Industrial behaviour: research and control (2nd ed.). London: 
Penguin. 
Rose, N. (1987). Beyond the public/private division: law, power and the family. 
Journal of Law and Society, 14(1), 61-76. 
Roy, D.F. (1969). Making-out: a counter-system of workers’ control of work 
situation and relationships. In T. Burns (ed.) Industrial man: selected 
readings (1955 original ed., pp. 359-379). Harmondsworth, England: Penguin 
Books. 
Roy, D.F. (1973). Banana time: job satisfaction and informal interaction (1st pub. 
1960). In G. Salaman & K. Thompson (eds), People and organizations (pp. 
205-222). Harlow, England: Longman for Open University Press. 
 
298 
Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ) (2001). Royal Society Alert: 194. Email 
subscription. 
Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ) (2002). Royal Society Alert: 246. Email 
subscription. 
Sarewitz, D. (1997). Social change and science policy. Issues in Science and 
Technology, 13(4), 29-32. 
Sarewitz, D.R. (1996). Frontiers of illusion: science, technology and the politics of 
progress. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press. 
Schaef, A.W. (1985). Women's reality: an emerging female system in a white male 
society (1st pub. 1981). Minneapolis: Winston Press. 
Schein, E.H. (1992). Organizational culture and leadership (2nd ed.). San Francisco: 
Jossey-Bass Publishers. 
Schiebinger, L. (1989). The Mind Has No Sex? Women in the origins of modern 
science. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. 
Schiebinger, L. (1993). Nature's body: gender in the making of modern science. 
Boston: Beacon. 
Schiebinger, L. (1999). Has feminism changed science? Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Schoenberger, E. (1997). The cultural crisis of the firm. Cambridge, MA and Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers. 
Schrank, R. (ed.). (1983). Industrial democracy at sea. Cambridge MA: MIT Press. 
Science Priorities Review Panel (SPiR). (1995). Priorities for 2001, public good 
science investment: the report of the Science Priorities Review Panel (SPiR). 
Wellington, N.Z.: New Zealand Science Priorities Review Panel (SPiR). 
Scobie, D. (2001). Back off man, I'm a scientist. Proceedings Joint 
ANZCCART/NAEC Conference, Hamilton, N.Z. 28-29 June 2001, 82-89. 
Scott, J. (1986). Everyday forms of peasant resistance. Journal of Peasant Studies, 
13, 5-35. 
Seidman, S. (1994). Contested knowledge: social theory in the postmodern era. 
Cambridge MA, Oxford U.K.: Blackwell. 
Senge, P. (1990). The fifth discipline: the art & practice of the learning organisation. 
New York: Doubleday/Currency. 
Shaffir, W.B., & Stebbins, R.A. (1991). Experiencing fieldwork: an inside view of 
qualitative research. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications. 
 
299 
Shaw, R. (2000). Model without a cause: public choice and bureaucratic reform in 
New Zealand. New Zealand Sociology, 15(2), 251-283. 
Shumway, D.R. (1992). Michel Foucault (pbk ed.). Charlottesville: The University 
Press of Virginia. 
Simmel, G. (1896). Superiority and subordination as subject matter of sociology. 
American Journal of Sociology, 2: 167-189, 392-415. 
Simmel, G. (1950a). The metropolis and mental life. In K.H.Wolff (ed.) The 
sociology of Georg Simmel (pp. 409-424). New York: The Free Press. 
Simmel, G. (1950b). The stranger. In K.H. Wolff (ed.) The sociology of Georg 
Simmel (pp. 402-408). New York: The Free Press. 
Simmel, G. (1971). Individuality and social forms. Chicago: University Press. 
Simmel, G. (ed. & tr. by Tom Bottomore and David Frisby) (1990). The philosophy 
of money (2nd ed.). London and New York: Routledge. 
Simpson, B., & Craig, J. (1997). A policy for science innovation: the New Zealand 
experience. Science and Public Policy, 24(2), 70-78. 
Simpson, B., & Powell, M. (1999). Designing research organizations for science 
innovation. Long Range Planning, 32(4), 441-451. 
Skinner, B. (1953). Science and human behaviour. London: Macmillan. 
Smart, B. (1985). Michel Foucault. London: Routledge. 
Smith, C., Knights, D., & Willmott, H. (eds). (1991). White-collar work: the non-
manual labour process. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Smith, C., & Thompson, P. (1999). Reevaluating the labor process debate. In M. 
Wardell, T.L. Steiger & P. Meiksins (eds), Rethinking the labor process (pp. 
205-231). Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Smith, K.K. & Berg, D.N. (1987). Paradoxes of group life: understanding conflict, 
paralysis and movement of group dynamics. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Sommer, J. (2000). Year 2000 survey of scientists: report of results, December 2000. 
Charlotte, NC: The University of North Carolina at Charlotte. 
Sommer, J. (2001). Voices from the grassroots of science: tales of hope and woe. 
Key Note Address: R&D Management Conference, Wellington, Feb. 2001. 
Sommer, J., & Sommer, D. (1997). Profiles: a survey of New Zealand scientists and 
technologists. Wellington, New Zealand: The Royal Society of New Zealand. 





Statistics New Zealand (2001). Table 5: Exports of agricultural products from New 
Zealand for years ended 30 June. INFOS database, Statistics NZ. Retrieved 
on 22-8-01 from MAF website, www.maf.govt.nz. 
Strauss, A. (1978). Negotiations: varieties, contexts, processes, and social order. San 
Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 
Strebel, P. (1996). Why do employees resist change? Harvard Business Review, 
May-June 1996, 86-92. 
Sturdy, A., Knights, D., & Willmott, H. (1992a). Introduction: skill and consent in 
the labour process. In A. Sturdy, D. Knights & H. Willmott (eds), Skill and 
consent: contemporary studies in the labour process (pp. 1-23). London, New 
York: Routledge. 
Sturdy, A., Knights, D., & Willmott, H. (eds) (1992b). Skill and consent: 
contemporary studies in the labour process. London, New York: Routledge. 
Suchman, L. (1999). Working relations of technology production and use. In D. 
MacKenzie & J. Wajcman (eds), The social shaping of technology (2nd ed., 1st 
pub. 1994) (pp. 258-265). Buckingham, PA: Open University Press. 
Tausky, C. (1995). The meanings of work. . In I.H. Simpson & R.L. Simpson (eds), 
Research in the sociology of work Vol.5: The meaning of work (pp. 15-27). 
Stamford, CO: JAI Press Inc. 
Terez, T. (2001). When fear strikes the workplace. Workforce, 80(8), 24-26. 
Retrieved on 15-3-02 from http://proquest.umi.com. 
Therborn, G. (1986). Class analysis, history and defence. In U. Himmelstrand (ed.), 
Sociology from crises to science? Volume 1: The sociology of strucutre and 
action (pp. 96-132). London: Sage. 
Thompson, P. (1983). The nature of work: an introduction to the debates on the 
labour process. London: Macmillan. 
Thompson, P., & Warhurst, C. (eds) (1998). Workplaces of the future. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Business. 
Thornhill, A., Lewis, P., Millmore, M., & Saunders, M. (2000). Managing change: a 
human resource strategy approach. Harlow, England: Pearson Education 
Limited. 
Tichy, N. M., & Charan, R. (1995). The CEO as coach: an interview with Allied 
Signal's Lawrence A. Bossidy. Harvard Business Review, 73(2), 68-78. 
Tilly, C. (1978). From mobilization to revolution. Reading MA: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Company Inc. 
Turner, J.H., & Valentine, S.R. (2001). Cynicism as a fundamental dimension of 
moral decision-making: a scale development. Journal of Business Ethics, 34 
(2), 123-136. Retrieved on 15-3-02 from http://proquest.umi.com. 
 
301 
Turpin, T., & Deville, A. (1995). Occupational roles and expectations of research 
scientists and research managers in scientific research institutions. R&D 
Management, 25(2), 141-157. Retrieved on 9-7-99 from Expanded Academic 
Database, http://web3.infotrac.galeygroup.com/itw/infomark.  
Turpin, T., Garrett-Jones, S., & Rankin, N. (1996). Bricoleurs and boundary riders: 
managing basic research and innovation knowledge networks. R&D 
Management, 26(3), 267-282. 
Turpin, T., & Hill, S. (1995). Researchers, cultural boundaries, and organizational 
change . In I.H. Simpson & R.L. Simpson (eds), Research in the sociology of 
work Vol.5: The meaning of work (pp. 179-204). Stamford CO: JAI Press Inc. 
Upton, S. (1995). Contracting in the science sector: an overview. Public Sector, 
18(4), 2-5. 
Volkerling, M. (1995). Work and leisure in post-Fordist New Zealand. ANZALS 
Leisure Research Series 2: 137-161.  
Warhurst, C., & Thompson, P. (1998). Hands, hearts and minds: changing work and 
workers at the end of the century. In P. Thompson & C. Warhurst (eds), 
Workplaces of the Future (pp. 1-24). Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 
Waring, M. (1988). Counting for nothing: what men value and what women are 
worth. Wellington, N.Z.: Allen & Unwin/Port Nicholson Press. 
Wicks, D. (1998). Organizational structures as recursively constructed systems of 
agency and constraint: compliance and resistance in the context of structural 
conditions. The Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 35(3), 369-
390. Retrieved on 30-10-01 from Expanded Academic Database 
http://web3.infotrac.galegroup.com/itw/infomark.  
Wilkinson, A., Godfrey, G., & Marchington, M. (1997). Bouquets, brickbats and 
blinkers: total quality management and employee involvement in practice. 
Organization Studies, 18(5), 799-819. 
Willmott, H. (1993). Strength is ignorance; slavery is freedom: managing culture in 
modern organizations. Journal of Management Studies, 30(4), 515-552. 
Winsley, P., Gilbertson, D., Couchman, P. (2001). Managing innovation in New 
Zealand: case studies – volume III. Palmerston North, N.Z.: Dunmore Press. 
Woolgar, S. (1993). Science: the very idea (1st pub. 1988). London: Routledge. 
Yin, R.K. (1994). Case study research: design and methods (2nd ed.). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Ziman, J. (1991). Academic science as a system of markets. Higher Education 
Quarterly, 45(1), 41-61. 
Zuckerman, H., Cole, J.R., & Bruer, J.T. (1991). The outer circle: women in the 
scientific community. New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company. 
 
302 
Zussman, R. (1992). Intensive care: medical ethics and the medical profession. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
303 
Appendix A: Questionnaire 
Questions and points that need to be noted or paid attention to 
Identity 
• What do you call yourself? 
How has this changed over your time of employment in science/ag. science? 
• How do you describe your work/job to people outside AgR? 
How has this changed over your time of employment in science/ag. science? 
• How do you describe the organisation you work for? 
How has this changed over your time of employment in science/ag. science? 
 
Personal story/Work 
Tell me about how you came to work in science - from the beginning.  
• Who/what were the major influences (positive and negative) on you? How? 
Why? 
• Expectations on entering this work/dreams/hopes 
• Expectations and hopes now 
• What would you like to be remembered for when you are retired? Why? 
• What do you stand for? 
How do you think this has changed over your time in employment? Why? 
 
Work 
Tell me about your work. 
Describe a typical day. 
• Highlights/good times – describe a good day 
• Frustrations/bad times – describe a bad day 
• What makes you feel good about your work? What gives you satisfaction? 
• What do you value most about your work? What’s most important to you about 
your work? 
• How do you know that you’ve done a good job? 
How do you think this has changed over your time in employment? Why? 
• Who makes sure you do your job? Control – 1st, 2nd and 3rd level.  
How do you think this has changed over your time in employment? Why? 
 
Change 
Tell me a about a time of change in your work. 
• How has your work changed? – actual work (type of, topics/areas), organisational 
environment, technology, networks with people, publishing opportunities, career 
opportunities, way managed, time spent on work (allocation of time to 
paperwork, funding applications etc.) 
• How has this affected you? 
 
Value 
• How do you know when you are valued? 
• What makes you feel important? 
• How would you like to be noticed in the organisation? Who by? What for? 
• What do you value? What’s important to you? 
• What do you want from the people that you work with? 
• Who do you value? What qualities do they have that you value? 
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• How do you value others? How do you show them? 
• Who is important around here (locally and nationally)? Why? How do you 
know? 
• Tell me about belonging to AgR. What makes you feel as if you belong? 
• What’s important to you in your working environment? 
• How do you go about getting some of these things that you want? 
 
Meanings of science, ag. science, technology, agriculture 
• What is science?  
How has your understanding of this changed over the period of your career? 
• What is agriculture? 
How has your understanding of this changed over the period of your career? 
• What is agricultural science? 
How has your understanding of this changed over the period of your career? 
• Where is the boundary between science and technology/biotechnology?  
How has your understanding of this changed over the period of your career? 
 
Science practice 
• To you, what does it mean to be a scientist/scientific officer/research 
associate/technician as compared with a scientist/scientific officer/research 
associate/technician? 
• How do you distinguish between being an agricultural scientist or a scientist? 
• What are the results of your work? For what can you be held accountable? 
• Who do you serve? Why do you do this work? 
• How do you think a product is produced? What is the process? 
• Tell me about an example of innovation that you know of. 
• Tell me about an example of creativity that you know of. 
• What/who stimulates your work/ideas? 
• What stimulates your curiosity? 
• What sort of ‘problems’ do you come across in your work? 
• What encourages you to persist with something? What helps you when you come 
up against a ‘problem’ in your work? 
• How do you work your way through a ‘problem’? 
 
The research organisation 
Organisational culture 
Tell me about AgR. 
• How does it function? 
• How do you feel working for AgR? 
• Who/what does the organisation most value? 
• What do you want from this organisation? 
• What’s most important to you in an organisation you work for? 
• What’s going on around here? 
• Who do you think influences the direction AgResearch is going in? 
• Tell me about the winners and losers in AgR?   
• What do you have to do to get by (to belong) in this organisation? 
• What do you have to do to get on (be promoted) in this organisation? 




• What is an agricultural research organisation for? 
• What is an biological life sciences company for? 
 
Organisational change 
• What changes have you seen in the way an agricultural research organisation is 
run?  
Why do you think these changes have occurred? 
• How have you coped with these changes? 
• What have you done? 
• How have these changes affected your practice of science? 
• How have they affected you personally? 
 
Organisational Communication 
How do you learn about what’s going on around here? 
• Could you describe a typical organisational meeting to me? (May need to have 
both a group meeting and a Team Brief.) 
Then for each:  
• Have they changed over time?  
• Who is influential at them?  
• What do you feel about them?  
• What do you need to do to be heard? 
• What makes you go to them? What makes you stay away? Explore whole idea of 
the rewards they get for staying away, or going. 
 
AgResearch values 
• What do you think AgResearch wants of you? 
• What’s important to AgResearch? 
• What does AgResearch stand for? 
• What do you feel about these things? How does this contrast with former times in 
the DSIR/MAF Tech? 
• Who serves who in this organisation? 
 
The future 
• What do you see as the future for AgResearch? 
• How do you feel about that? 
• What do you see as the future for agricultural science? 
 
For line managers 
• How are you expected to manage your group? How do you know this is expected 
of you? 
• How do you like manage your group/s? Explain. 
• What role do accountants play in this organisation? What is their policy? E.g. 
accruals, correction of mistakes, accountability. Who decides their policy? 
 
For others 
• How are you managed? 
Version: 28 August 2000 
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Appendix B: Demographic breakdown of those interviewed 
 
Science Group  W&S E-Group MCG MBU Others Overall totals
Gender Male 6  (86%) 12  (86%) 9  (60%) 5  (38%) 6  (86%) 38  (68%)
  Female 1  (14%) 2  (14%) 6  (40%) 8  (62%) 1  (14%) 18  (32%)
  Totals 7 (100%) 14 (100%) 15 (100%) 13 (100%) 7 (100%) 56 (100%)
Age Group 20- 0   (0%) 0  (0%) 1   (7%) 5  (38%) 0   (0%) 6  (11%)
  30- 2  (29%) 1  (7%) 8  (53%) 4  (31%) 4  (57%) 19  (34%)
  40- 2  (29%) 5 (36%) 2  (13%) 1   (8%) 0   (0%) 10  (18%)
  50- 3  (43%) 7 (50%) 4  (27%) 3  (23%) 2  (29%) 19  (34%)
  60+ 0   (0%) 1  (7%) 0   (0%) 0   (0%) 1  (14%) 2   (4%)
  Totals 7 (100%) 14 (100%) 15 (100%) 13 (100%) 7 (100%) 56 (100%)
Background MAF 4  (57%) 0  (0%) 7  (47%) 3  (23%) 0   (0%) 14  (25%)
  DSIR 0   (0%) 11 (79%) 0   (0%) 0   (0%) 3  (43%) 14  (25%)
  Other 3  (43%) 3 (21%) 8  (53%) 10  (77%) 4  (57%) 28  (20%)
  Totals 7 (100%) 14 (100%) 15 (100%) 13 (100%) 7 (100%) 56 (100%)
Status Technician 0   (0%) 3 (21%) 1   (7%) 3  (23%) 0   (0%) 7  (13%)
  
Research 
Associate 4  (57%) 1  (7%) 5  (33%) 5  (38%) 0   (0%) 15  (27%)
  Scientist 1  (14%) 3 (21%) 1   (7%) 1   (8%) 2  (29%) 8  (14%)
  
Group 
Leader 2  (29%) 5 (36%) 5  (33%) 2  (15%) 2  (29%) 16  (29%)
  SPL 0   (0%) 1  (7%) 1   (7%) 1   (8%) 0   (0%) 3   (5%)
  PhD Student 0   (0%) 0  (0%) 1   (7%) 1   (8%) 0   (0%) 2   (4%)
  Other 0   (0%) 1  (7%) 1   (7%) 0   (0%) 3  (43%) 5   (9%)





Appendix C: Sheep as Object 
 
Sheep as Object: The Meaning of “Sheep” 
to Different Science Groups 
Abstract 
The meanings of sheep are used as a tool to examine how scientific 
researchers in a changing policy environment negotiate their work to 
maximise their chances of survival in employment, and their chances of 
continuing to do work they regard as important. 
 
Introduction 
This paper is about the ways in which four different science groups in a Crown 
Research Institute (CRI) negotiate the representations they make of their work in 
order to achieve funding for their research. The research work of all groups is 
directly or indirectly related to sheep. I wish to examine the socially constructed 
meanings sheep have for each group (the ethical sheep, the invisible sheep, the sheep 
as gene map, and the sheep as laboratory), the groups’ successes at gaining public 
funding, and the links to Government and organisational policy. 
My interest in ‘sheep’ arose as a sideline to an ethnographic study of these science 
groups conducted from 1999 to 2001 in which I examined the groups’ experiences of 
work in a changing environment, using extensive interviews of group members 
dispersed over five sites, and observations on four of those sites. In this larger study I 
interpret the ways individual science workers make their work meaningful using an 
understanding drawn from symbolic interactionism. Here I apply the same 
perspective257 to the meanings of sheep and the instrumental value of these meanings 
for each of the four science groups. 
 
The tool of symbolic interactionism 
Symbolic interactionist methodology examines the meanings bestowed by social 
actors on everyday objects. Blumer (1969) was the principal architect of this 
interpretive approach to understanding social action and interaction. The theoretical 
foundations of Blumer’s method rested on the work of Mead (Blumer, 1986, pp.61-
77). In essence, symbolic interactionism considers actions and objects to have no 
intrinsic meaning. Instead meanings are constructed and bestowed through social 
                                                 
257 Of course, there are many other perspectives that could be drawn upon in such an analysis. For 
example, a science studies framework (Latour, 1999) using the ideas of Actor Network Theory (ANT) 
(Latour, 1987), might emphasise how the word sheep is “translated” (Latour, 1999, p.311; Akrich and 
Latour, 1992, p.264; Callon, 1991, pp143-146) in order to fit, be understood, and serve the needs of 
the actors in the different arenas in which it is used, e.g., agriculture, science, Government policy, 
FRST. An example of such a work is Callon’s (1986) study of scallops and fishermen. Adopting a 
slightly different slant to ANT one migfht investigate how innovators construct different 
representations of the end user associated with their innovations, and work to meet those 
representations (Akrich, 1992, 1995). Social constructivism (following Scarce’s (2000) work on 




interactions and are negotiated by actors according to the specific social context. The 
constructs (notably language) come to “stand for” or “symbolise” the objects and 
activities, often in a “short hand” form (Blumer, 1967, 1986). The same word can 
often have different meanings, and therefore significance, to different communities. 
For example, “cool” means one thing to a weather forecaster, another to a teenage 
peer group. Meanings are neither fixed nor exclusive. Although, by common 
agreement, the word “sheep” symbolises the woolly, four-legged, grass-eating 
animal, the negotiable character of this meaning allows for both the possibility of 
other meanings (e.g., meat for some, clothing for others), and its tactical use in 
constructing action pathways perceived to facilitate desired ends. 
In keeping with symbolic interactionist principles, I will show that science actors 
construct different meanings of sheep in order to safeguard their livelihood. In effect, 
the relationship between Government policy, implemented through the funding 
structures of the Foundation for Science, Research and Technology (FRST or “the 
Foundation”), and the science groups as they manoeuvre to obtain the funding 
necessary for their survival, turns in large measure on the meanings science workers 
negotiate for sheep. In keeping with the sociology of human action and social 
structure (Giddens, 1984, p.12), no assumption is made here that the outcome of the 
negotiated meanings of sheep is one that will succeed in the way intended by the 
actors or by Government. 
 
Setting the scene 
Since the early 1980s there has been a strong message to the research community 
that agriculture is no longer central to Government thinking in the way it had been. 
At present the future of New Zealand’s economic well-being is seen to lie with the 
‘knowledge society’258 (Maharey, 2000). Except as a spin-off for biotechnology, 
agriculture is not regarded as an important contributor to this “society” (Hodgson, 
2000a, b, c, d). This is illustrated by an excerpt from a speech by the Minister of 
Research, Science and Technology: 
Transformation means moving New Zealand beyond its traditional dependence on 
the primary industries for the generation of wealth. We are extremely good at 
primary production and processing. It is a vital part of our future and we continue 
to post remarkable productivity increases. But it’s not enough … wealth is 
increasingly taking the form of knowledge rather than stuff. (Hodgson, 2000a, 
pp.1-2) 
 
Trends in the allocation of public research funding through the Foundation have 
followed this declining emphasis on traditionally defined agricultural products. The 
recent Investment Change Process November 2000 document (FRST, 2000) states: 
… the Foundation will progressively shift its research portfolios from mature areas 
of commodity cost-reduction activities towards RS&T that underpins high value-
added export industries (Section 1, p.2). 
Where research primarily underpins the achievement of efficiency gains in 
undifferentiated commodities … [it] will be targeted for disinvestment (Section 2, 
p.3). 
 
With the complete ‘disinvestment’ process expected to be completed over the next 
five years, the sheep industry, and the wool industry in particular, are conspicuously 
                                                 
258 The Labour Government uses these words interchangeably with those used by the previous 
National Government which focused on a knowledge ‘economy’. 
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threatened. Wool research is seen to be a very mature science in which knowledge 
about wool production is so advanced that any additional research is presumed to be 
incremental and unlikely to have a large impact on production processes, efficiency 
and intellectual property (IP), or obtain benefits that justify R&D costs, in an 
industry already producing a low value product. 
There is an obvious desire by Government to change the image of New Zealand as 
a country full of sheep and therefore associated with low value commodity 
production, to one focused on knowledge and innovation. Researchers have 
responded to this threat in a range of ways. Words like “commodity” and 
“production” have disappeared from research proposals as researchers attempt to 
distance their work from the discredited efficiency and primary production aims. To 
align itself with this trend, AgResearch, one of the CRIs formed in 1992 to service 
the primary sector during the restructuring of the public research funding system, no 
longer refers to itself as an agricultural research institute but as a “life sciences 
company” (AgResearch Strategic Plan 2000-2003). Ironically, these adjustments are 
considered necessary even though record overseas exchange earnings have just 
demonstrated the importance of the agricultural sector to New Zealand’s economic 
well-being for the year of 2000-2001 (INFOS Database, Statistics NZ).  
 
The issues and responses of the different science groups 
In 1999 the CRI under study was restructured into eleven Science Platforms 
replacing the former four Divisions. Each Science Platform consists of about fifty to 
seventy scientific workers organised into four or five different science groups, 
managed by a Science Platform Leader. The Platforms are organised under common 
research themes and it was hoped that with this restructuring the boundaries between 
the groups within each Platform would be broken down in sympathy with the 
Foundation’s explicit move to fund larger programmes and to encourage 
collaborative research. This diverse organisation has been held together by its 
interest in the particular area of the primary sector it was designated to serve on the 
formation of the CRIs. Also there is little else on offer in the way of employment for 
those scientific workers employed in this CRI who wish to remain in New Zealand 
and perform full-time research, but not work in a university.  
Forty-five percent of the revenue of the CRI in the year ended 30 June 2001 
came from FRST funded programmes. The rest came from commercial contracts, 
contracts with other CRIs and from the CRI’s subsidiary companies. This was the 
first year so-called “commercial” revenue has outstripped that from FRST in the 
history of this CRI (2001 Annual Report).  
 
Wool and Skin Biology Group (W&S Group) 
After the internal restructuring in 1999, the W&S Group’s was placed in the 
AgSystems Platform despite its seven members preferring to be in the Animal 
Genomics Platform. Its leader made many submissions to this effect but did not feel 
he was listened too. Officially the move was to avoid further dilution of the 
molecular genetics capability of the Animal Genomics Platform but it may well have 
been that they were placed in this Platform to even up the numbers. The AgSystems 
Platform consists of very diverse groups ranging across farm systems, to modelling, 
to social science, and its focus is work in the food product supply chain. This work 
requires searches for funding from industry sources. The W&S Group with its focus 
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on non-food by-products, was adversely affected by reductions in Government 
funding and found little R&D investment in a “sunset industry”. 
The W&S Group’s members see it as ironic now that their research proposals in 
1999 were used internally as exemplars to other groups of the shift the organisation 
wished to make in order to demonstrate to FRST how it had aligned itself to 
Government policy. This was to be done by focusing on quality and adding value, 
rather than commodity production. Now the requirement is for “new and novel 
products that will add wealth to the primary sector” (from the abstract for the ‘Low 
Chemical Systems and Associated Branded Products’ FRST programme 2001).  
The Group has an applied science orientation as members want their work to be 
useful to the farming industry. They are not in science just for the sake of adding to 
scientific knowledge. In the course of an interview, Grant259, a scientist in the Group, 
epitomised these attitudes when he said, “I love sheep”.260 Others in the Group also 
chose their work because of their agricultural interests, as indicated by Bert and 
Colin’s comments: 
I always had a fascination with agriculture and particularly when I got on to my 
teen years. I enjoyed yeah, going on holidays to relation-type farms. And I got a lot 
of personal satisfaction out of being outside working with animals - stuff like that. 
(Bert) 
 
... everything we did was for the good of the New Zealand farmer. (Colin) 
 
The members of this group actually like, if not necessarily love, sheep. They like 
working with them and they are concerned for their welfare and for the welfare of 
sheep farmers. This has strong implications for the orientations of the group. It wants 
to save the sheep industry or, to put it more moderately, to help the sheep industry, 
and (particularly for Grant) the wool industry, survive. This has led the group to 
consider animal welfare issues because it believes such issues could be a major factor 
in future marketing of NZ sheep products overseas. For example, some practices to 
reduce the impact of flystrike in the sheep industry add to the costs and work of 
farmers, involve the use of chemicals, or may involve short but painful procedures to 
sheep, in order to prevent the slow death that flystrike can cause. In this context, 
Grant came up with the concept of “the ethical sheep”, a wool-producing sheep with 
a bare bottom and head, and bare legs. This is in the process of development through 
traditional breeding methods. Initially money for this research came out of other 
budgets and, as Grant popularised the idea, it was first funded through a wool 
programme and now is funded within a programme on low chemical use. Three years 
down the track the whole research policy focus of the Foundation has changed and 
this Foundation funding is unlikely to be continued261 (Scobie, 2001). The Group’s 
present focus is to apply for Meat and Wool Board funding but these entities are in 
disarray and the Group’s future is uncertain. 
In its attempts to survive, the Group has also encountered difficulties within the 
CRI. After trialling titles for the ethical sheep programme proposal incorporating 
sheep welfare, flystrike and sheep breeding, a suitably unrelated title was accepted at 
the third attempt and it was fitted into the Low Chemical Systems Programme. This 
                                                 
259 Pseudonyms are used throughout.  
260 All members of the group were interested in sheep but three in particular could be said to be 
particularly fond of them. 
261 Some of the hard won funding of this research group has also been redirected internally, by the 
Science Strategic Manager, to the FRST programme “Control of Human and Animal Hair Growth and 
Characteristics” i.e. it has been redirected to study baldness!  
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is a deft reference to organics without using the word and all its complicated 
referents. The content of the proposal had not changed. It was surmised that the 
AgSystems Platform does not research any issues to do with animal welfare, or 
animal breeding. To do so would be seen to step on someone else’s “patch”. Another 
survival tactic has been to diversify into research on leather and particularly deer 
leather. The Group has also looked for work with other fibre and meat related 
industries but as these are very small there is little money available for research. One 
member brings in some alternative income by auditing and registering farmers for 
two meat companies under contracts to the CRI. Two of the Group members were 
made redundant in the repositioning round carried out in 2000. 
This group has not been quiet about its plight. It is continually presenting ideas to 
its Science Platform Leader. It works hard to maintain links with the meat and wool 
industries. The group leaders have made presentations on their work to the Board of 
the CRI on its trips around the different campuses and farms. From its inception, 
however, the platform structure of the organisation has impacted negatively on the 
group, giving it a strong message about how it does not fit. 
To the W&S Group then, “sheep” mean “sheep” as commonly understood. But 
sheep are also a symbol of the survival of a certain group of farmers. With this in 
mind this group has devised a particular way of addressing these two concerns by 
focusing on animal welfare issues, but because for Government policy “sheep” mean 
“commodity” and therefore are associated with production and efficiency rather than 
“new and novel” products, applications for public research funding are not being 
supported. Reasonably enough perhaps, the Government sees the sheep industry as 
being able to support this research itself.262 
 
Molecular Biology Unit (MBU) 
The MBU is in the Animal Genomics Platform and is made up of thirteen or more 
scientific workers who do the molecular biology components of the research for their 
five different science groups. In the past sheep have been the flagship for all the 
MBU’s research. The group is working hard to reduce its dependence on sheep and 
wants to move away from work on product traits, such as identification of the genes 
that affect fleece-weight, fibre diameter, or leanness of sheep, to applications of 
DNA tracing such as a saleable product that identifies a sample of DNA back to its 
source. The prime focus of the MBU has been on gathering DNA information to 
form the Sheep Gene Map. This sounds, and is, a clinical interest, but for some 
members of the group this clinical interest is underpinned by more human interests. 
Eric, a member of the MBU tells his story: 
… right now what would make me feel good would be if I could find a gene for 
facial eczema. The first case of facial eczema was in about 1887. Now its 2000. 
We’ve had that problem for 120 years. We are putting up with it. Other countries 
don’t have that problem because the fungus that causes it is not found there … and 
our company and our Government are saying that since it’s only a NZ problem, if 
we had a great discovery, it doesn’t generate money for [the CRI] or NZ, because 
you can’t sell it overseas … I would have so much satisfaction if I can do 
something which the farmers have been putting up with [for so long]. So that is 
more on the sentimental side because I know the historical aspect of it … when we 
first discovered a … gene could be involved in it, we tried to patent it. The lawyer 
                                                 
262 Business expenditure on R&D (BERD) as a percentage of GDP was 0.31% in 1999/2000 compared 
with the OECD average of 1.53%. This is actually a slight drop from 0.32% in 1997/1998 though its 
actual value increased by 3.7% (MoRST, 2002). 
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said, is it worth it? $15,000 a year for the patent and how much can we generate 
from the patent? We come up with no profit, you see… 
 
The MBU’s recent work on the Inverdale gene responsible for multiple births and 
sterility in sheep (Galloway et al., 2000) has been publicised nationally and was 
published in Nature Genetics, the journal with the most status in the molecular 
biology field. Another group in the MBU is working on the Booroola gene which 
also affects fertility, and others are working on leanness as a genetic trait, and the 
genetic resistance of sheep to internal parasites. 
How does this group continue to obtain funding in the present environment? It 
focuses on how the sheep genetic map is very closely related to the human gene map. 
It is argued that the sheep map is much closer than the “mouse map” and most people 
looking at human health issues use mice. This link to human health issues and human 
reproduction is emphasised in projects. For example, the way in which facial eczema 
damages the liver is of interest in human medicine. 
The science groups that make up the MBU have no funding problems but are 
aware that they are riding the wave of interest on the part of biotechnology industries 
in genomics, and the belief that this is one of the areas of research that distinguishes 
a knowledge society from others (Hodgson, 2000d). As Frank, a scientist in the 
MBU, said, 
… at the moment the molecular stuff seems to be the winner, but that’s just the 
flavour of the month. I mean, I know the sustainable people think that they’re not 
flavour of the month, but a few more Greens in Parliament and they’ll all be the 
flavour of the month. I just realise now that even from the Government down, it’s 
in-words that are the flavour of the month. 
 
To the scientists in the MBU sheep are the means by which its members can 
contribute to answering the question that so fascinates humankind – our genetic 
make-up and its implications for our health (Nelkin and Lindee, 1995) - while still 
helping farmers. The work of molecular biology is the focus of the technical staff. 
 
Microbial Control Group (MCG) 
The Microbial Control Group of fourteen members at the time of interviewing, has 
had a long interest in grass grub and has been established through the drive of one 
person, an entomologist, and a self confessed atheist, who told me, “God must love 
beetles because he made so many of them”. Like the fungus that causes facial 
eczema, grass grubs are endemic to New Zealand. Grass grubs affect the production 
of ryegrass by eating away at the roots. Sheep eat ryegrass. But does one ever hear 
sheep being mentioned by any members of this group? No. Their work has been 
positioned in the area of the biological control of pests and the protection of the 
environment (FRST programme title: Pest Management Technologies for Enhanced 
Environmental and Product Quality). The programme description mentions that: 
… the research will assist New Zealand’s primary industries in realising their 
increasing economic potential. Management systems will be based on beneficial 
organisms and related gene products; the latter will provide the foundation for 




This group has been very successful at acquiring funding and it has not found it 
necessary to make a link to sheep. A formulation chemist263 in the MCG is 
developing innovative methods for placing a bacterial biological control agent in soil 
to control grass grub. His work has implications far beyond grass grub because 
pharmaceutical companies all around the world are interested in finding better ways 
of storing bacteria.264 The MCG also has internal CRI funding for this formulation 
work because of its potential for intellectual property (IP), and potential for profit 
from licensing and making products of interest to the biotechnology industry. This 
aspect of the Group’s work is well supported by the CRI’s Strategic Plan for 2000-
2003. The Group has also moved into using molecular biology for the study of 
pathogenic bacteria in soil, hence making the most of the present international focus 
on such DNA technology. Biosecurity is playing an increasingly greater part in the 
Group’s work. This area is of great strategic concern to New Zealand as it tries to 
protect New Zealand’s isolation from such things as foot and mouth disease and 
potential insect pests. 
To scientists in the MCG sheep, are completely invisible, as demonstrated by the 
above description of their work, despite the fact that the work on grass grub is 
directly relevant to New Zealand’s pastoral sector. The MCG is just not interested in 
sheep. The leader of the Platform in which this group is located, reflected the views 
of the Group when he told me, “I’m not an agriculturalist. I don’t like farms much.” 
Another scientist in the Group said that farms “are places of unspeakable filth and 
cruelty”. The scientists in this Group are quite clear that their interest lies in science 
not agriculture. 
 
Endophyte Group (E-group) 
My final case study, also very much concerned with sheep, is the Endophyte Group 
(E-Group). This is a true multidisciplinary group informally drawn together by 
interest in endophyte265, a fungus in ryegrass, which causes ryegrass staggers and 
heat stress in animals, and also confers some insect protection on the grass. 
Endophyte, as the cause of ryegrass staggers, was discovered by one of the 
researchers in this Group through his observations of sheep in an unrelated 
experiment. For the E-Group, sheep are experimental units used to test different 
strains of endophyte. 
The E-Group has developed techniques for the inoculation and storage of grass 
seed containing different endophytes and this has produced many saleable (and 
patentable) technology products for both the New Zealand and overseas markets. 
Endophyte affects the efficiency of the production of meat, wool, and dairy products. 
This Group does not have to be so concerned about the risk of interpreting sheep as a 
commodity, because of its commercial relationships with seed companies, both 
internationally and locally. The Group also promotes the impact of endophyte on 
                                                 
263 A formulation chemist works on ways of making a saleable product from a scientific product. This 
product has to have a reasonable shelf life, be able to be produced to a consistent standard in large 
quantities at a price the user can afford, and be able to be applied in a form that is practical to the user.  
264 This offshoot was completely unanticipated. The patent attorney thought of it. The MCG had 5 
patents pending in early 2001. 
265Because of this informal nature it is difficult to say how many staff are in this group. I interviewed 
thirteen but only about three of these could be considered to be working full-time on endophyte. Three 
of those interviewed actually worked with sheep. The rest were in laboratory (biochemists, 
entomologists, mycologists) or plant-based research (agronomists, plant breeders).  
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animal health, and endophyte’s potential as a “non-tariff barrier to market access” 
(FRST Proposal 2001: Forage and Symbiont Genomes). 
To further the exploration on other properties of endophyte, the E-Group is also 
using the tools of molecular biology, hoping to exploit the interest in this area. This 
aspect of its work, which does not need to mention sheep, is successful in receiving 
public funding and also involves collaboration with a university (FRST Programme: 
Genomics of Plant-fungal Relationships). Such collaborations are a requested part of 
Government science policy. 
The E-Group is discovering that it enjoys its relationships with commercial clients 
because it is able to negotiate with them in a satisfying and rewarding way and 
demonstrate the skills and potential its members have to contribute something useful 
to those clients. As Fred said: 
I get satisfaction from working more recently – you know, the discussions we are 
having with private companies that are funding aspects of our work - working out 
what they want, hearing them say what they want and developing a programme that 
meets their needs and fits within our parameters. 
 
This two-way accountability is more satisfying to E-Group members than the one 
way, report-writing, accountability experienced in their relationships with the 
Foundation, and the continual policy changes associated with Government funding. 
The profits generated by the E-Group could fund its future work: maintaining the 
endophyte research, improving present products, and studying all the many other 
aspects of the endophyte-plant-animal interaction yet to be explored, which, 
incidentally, may be a rich source of future products. But the E-Group feels there are 
signals from corporate office that it may wish to use the profits for other research of 
a higher organisational priority. This makes group members feel insecure and 
indicates that even though the E-Group is in harmony with the organisational 
strategic direction, that is no guarantee of organisational support in the future. 
To members of the E-Group, sheep are part of the way they can study something 
that fascinates them – a fungus that is part of an animal-plant interaction. Almost 
incidentally this subject has become a way in which they can produce IP and 
products for both local and international markets. They have discovered they enjoy 
the relationships this brings and by increasing their commercial contracts they hope 
to make themselves more independent of organisational and Government policies. 
 
Discussion 
All the groups studied have something to do with sheep in one way or another. Only 
in the case of the W&S Group, however, is the meaning given them attached to the 
animals we see on our farmland. The W&S Group is interested in sheep as animals 
with rights, and also as a symbol of the survival of a particular group of farmers and 
a way of life in New Zealand. Hence this group has no room for negotiation except 
by moving into other areas of research that do not elicit the same motivations of its 
members. The present organisational and political structures have been particularly 
difficult for them to negotiate and they are suspended in the vacuum created when 
Government looks to industry to pick up funding on efficiency and commodity 
production. As industry dithers, this group is losing people with skills and expertise 
in these areas of research. 
The MBU is exploiting as much as possible the close relationship between the 
human and sheep DNA maps. In the case of this group, the meaning of sheep as a 
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gene map has placed its members at the forefront of this global interest and enabled 
them to gain international contracts against global competition: 
I’m very proud of the fact that we’ve managed to take – have you heard of 
the [American] Beta Company? We’ve taken business away from them, and 
we’ve just recently taken business away from GammaCo – you know, that 
company in Auckland.266 (Bert) 
 
This image of the organisation as able to compete with well-known biotechnology 
companies is very important to the CRI. 
Work on the sheep gene map has implications for research on human health, 
which can be used to take the emphasis away from agriculture. This emphasis is not 
to the liking of at least one scientist in the MBU who said: 
We are not here to feed people … and this is why it is very hard in agriculture to 
get funding because funding comes from rich people. Rich people will be the last 
on this earth to run out of food. So food has never been their greatest fear. And 
therefore these people are not going to put any money into agriculture because they 
never die from hunger. But these people will die from other things … so that’s 
where they put it – medicine – 
 
This respondent was observing that as people become concerned about living 
healthier and longer lives, so research is increasingly focused on human health. 
Products like nutraceuticals which could come from sheep, are indicators of New 
Zealand entering a knowledge economy and society (Hodgson, 2000d). 
The MCG gives no indication that its research programme has anything 
whatsoever to do with sheep. For this Group, sheep are invisible. This Group knows 
the climate of the Foundation well and is aware that this climate is always going to 
shift. Its tactic of keeping its research as wide open as possible, thus allowing it to 
adjust to trends, has paid off in the past. Formulation work by the MCG is being 
exploited because it has produced some potentially profitable patents, demonstrating 
to the Government and the organisation that this group is contributing to the 
“knowledge society”. 
For the E-Group sheep are experimental units on which it can test its science and 
its potentially saleable products, but when one of its members says he also has an 
interest in “making life better for animals”, then in this sense the E-Group is similar 
to the W&S Group in its concerns. One of the E-Group’s products, licensed to an 
overseas company, has the potential to bring in millions of dollars annually, but the 
E-Group still feels the insecurity of the present political and organisational 
environment, and the lack of assurance that the research of the group as a whole will 
be able to be maintained. This has encouraged the E-Group to seek more of its 
funding in commercial areas which would make it more independent of Government 
policy and less exposed to possible organisational interference. 
The present interest and fascination in gene technology has been a common way 
for all the groups, except the W&S Group, to present themselves as in tune with 
current funding priorities. (The W&S Group may have been able to exploit this more 
if it had been placed in another Platform at the time of restructuring.) 
The CRI places importance on acquiring patents which all of the groups, except 
the W&S Group, have succeeded in acquiring so far. It is not possible to patent the 
sort of knowledge the W&S Group is producing. Hence all groups, except the W&S 
Group, are able to compete in the international market for IP. 
                                                 





All the science groups studied exhibit a strong wish to continue to work in their 
chosen area of scientific research and show a strong commitment to it. I have used 
the different meanings sheep have to each group to illustrate some of the strategies 
they have used to make this wish a reality. In the case of two groups (MBU, MCG) 
their success in doing so has given them greater power to negotiate within the 
internal organisational environment. The E-Group is seeking to make itself less 
dependent on Government funding and organisational support by increasing its 
commercial funding. In the case of the W&S Group, the combined impact of 
Government policy and its perceptions of sheep as commodities, and the maturity of 
their science, has been too strong, putting their survival at risk. 
Returning briefly to Akrich’s (1992, 1995) works on “representations”, my 
example of “sheep as object” suggests that scientists construct different 
representations of sheep in their research programmes in order to meet their ideas of 
what FRST requires. In other words their research has become focused on what the 
funder wants, rather than the needs and requirements of the end users of their 
research. This illustrates an inherent weakness of a funding system that supports 
Government’s interest in international markets at the expense of the local. It also 
illustrates further the fragile nature of such directed research, as Government policy 
is open to continual change. As Frank, one of my respondents, reminds us, it would 
only take a shift in power towards the Greens for the whole research agenda to 
change.267 
While the emphasis in this paper is on the role of “agency”, the data shows that 
actors are coming to terms with, rather than challenging, structures. All groups 
demonstrate that changing the funding structures is perceived to be beyond their 
control. Each group has to negotiate the structures – find a way through and/or 
around them. As Harry said, “We pander to deafened ears basically, whether it’s a 
politician or a CEO.” There is the understanding from past experience that structures 
are going to change because Government policy is always changing, but such change 
will not be the result of input from science groups (or the CRI). 
According to Giddens, “structure is not to be equated with constraint but is always 
both constraining and enabling” (1984, p.25). Without public funding, none of these 
groups would exist. However, the way in which the Foundation and the CRI 
implement Government policy constrains the ways in which these groups interpret 
and communicate the work they do, and the choices they make about the directions 
of their work. At the same time, three of the science groups studied (and the fourth to 
a lesser extent), indicate they have sufficient confidence in their own autonomy to 
find ways of maximising their control over the work they do in their belief that they 
can make a difference. The structures resulting from Government policy may have 
influenced the way the groups represent and understand what they do, but the variety 
of responses indicates the structures have not completely dictated their actions. There 
has been some space for covert negotiation. 
Thus, my observations illustrate that when structures are put in place, people 
negotiate them in their different ways, consciously or unconsciously, in order to 
satisfy their own objectives. Much of life, like much of science, is a subversive 
activity. Scientific research is a long-term enterprise (Hill and Turpin, 1994), poorly 
                                                 
267 Ironically, I have recently been told that research may be swinging back to sheep with the 
realisation of the importance of the agricultural sector to New Zealand’s economic well-being. 
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adapted to cope with quixotic shifts in Government policy or corporate strategies. 
The present environment jeopardises research programmes aiming to solve problems 
considered by scientists and/or the agricultural sector to be important for farming, 
science and New Zealand. Scientists, quite naturally, seek ways of sustaining the 
projects which they consider important, personally interesting, challenging, and vital 
to their survival for at least another funding round. 
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Appendix D: Signs and symbols of status 
Indicators of hierarchy 
 
• Physical set up of space. “I’ve always shared an office” (Brent, technical 
worker). This is an interesting contradiction on hierarchy and perception because 
I found that when I was sharing an office it actually cost more per person because 
the rent was paid for floor space area and we actually had more per person than if 
we’d been in individual offices. 
• A “plan driven approach” by the CEO (Dave, scientist). 
• “Clayton’s consultation” (Dave, scientist). 
• Resistance – indicates feeling that things are imposed.  
• Responsibilities for others. 
• Financial accountability – spending limits etc. 
• Hierarchy of ‘listening up’ and ‘communication’. 
• Want recognition and value to come from people further up in hierarchy. 
  
Indicators of low hierarchical position within the organisation: 
• Passivity – doing rather than thinking. 
• Do more repetitious work. 
• Always available. 
• Spend a lot of time listening. 
 
Indicators of high hierarchical position within the organisation: 
• Get overseas more often. 
• Spend more time at a desk. 
• Spend more time in planes. 
• If in corporate wear a tie (and/or suit) or for women – more likely into power 
dressing (suit), but if high in science hierarchy go out of the way to look like 
everyone else? In Grasslands the higher you were in the science hierarchy the 
more likely you were to favour the “dark shirt” look mainly with no tie if it was a 
long sleeved skivvy type. 
• Have more women running around after you – PAs, other support staff. 
• Have an office of your own (after all spend more time in it! – rational 
explanation) – exception MCG. 
• Perceived by others to: 
Always be busy. 
Have lots of pressure. 
Have lots of responsibilities (Fred, technical staff). 
• Inaccessibility. Have such a full diary that can only find time for a meeting (in 
the next month) when request comes from someone higher in hierarchy 
• Speak at campus meetings. Impact: 1) gives ‘flavour’ to the site identity as 
perceived by outsiders; 2) indicates to those lower in the hierarchy what the 
“acceptable” viewpoint is. 





• Job labels – part of employment/pay scale system (wage worker, technician, 
research associate, scientist). 
• Talk of those “up there” or “high scientists”. 
• Do more “pure’ science – e.g., have successful Marsden Fund applications, proud 
to be called a “dinosaur”? 
• Publish in refereed journals (preferably overseas ones) rather than make 
conference presentations rather than make presentations to sector groups or at 
field days. 
• Hierarchy of credibility – “know” more of what’s worth knowing the further up 
you are in science. E.g., do you “take notice of” Ray (no PhD) or Matt (PhD)? 
(Fits the science hierarchy rather than the management hierarchy. Those at top of 
science hierarchy – as scientists, presumably know more about something 
because the flow of information is to them. However, in the management 
hierarchy – which can be within science - the managers are perhaps seen to know 
more about some things because of the information to hand, but they are not seen 
as knowing more about the things that are important to science staff.  
• Hierarchy of responsibility for funding, dissemination etc. 
• Hierarchy of intelligence – “I ask him anything and he’s just got an 
encyclopaedic knowledge of it” (Brent, technical worker). 
• If you have an untidy office the higher up the hierarchy you are the less people 
will make rude comments about it. 
• And balancing this – an emphasis on tidiness indicates lower in hierarchy – 
seems to be related to technician background (though W&S group all seem to be 
tidy). 
• “I believe a technician is beavering away in the background” (Brent, technical 
worker). 
• “I’m a do-er” (Brent, technical worker). Doing rather than thinking. 
• Physically demanding. 
• Physically dangerous (risks outdoors – sampling etc; risks indoors in labs – 
radioactive materials etc) e.g., Brent, technical worker. 
• Sometimes physically repulsive (sampling animal faeces, animal rumens, rotting 
grass). 
• Manual labour involved. 
• More time spent outdoors – field work. 
• Wage workers don’t have names. 
• Those lower down may see themselves as a “responder”. “I tend to respond at a 
very local level to my immediate managers and trust that they are doing the 
things that are higher up that will keep the whole thing sustaining” (Grant, 
technical worker). 
• The best policy is to “keep your head down and your nose clean”. 
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Name: Individual Staff 
 
Position:       Group Level 
 
Location:       Business Units 
 

















          AgResearch 
 
           Better life science… better lives 
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SECTION A – Planning and Review agreed and completed by staff member and team leader  
[Note that this section covers 2 pages in the ‘real’ document.] 
1. At the beginning of the planning year agree on the key areas of focus and weight their 
importance. The weightings need to add up to a total of 100%. 
2. Agree and list objectives for the coming year – these should be directly related to your science 
platform or support group or commercial groups annual plan. 
3. Objectives should be SMART – Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Results oriented, Time-bound. 
4. At 6 month review note progress and areas needing attention. 
5. At 12 months complete full review of years performance. 
 
Objectives 6 month review   12 month review  
comments  comments 
1.                      
2.   


















1.                      
2.   


















1.                      
2.   


















1.                      
2.   


















1.                      
2.   























SECTION B – Behaviours and Competencies 
1. The following competencies are implicit in AgResearch’s Vision and Values. They reflect the 
way we go about our business. Using the examples consider actual behaviour demonstrated over 
the past 12 months and agree the most appropriate descriptor. N – Novice; D – Developer; C – 
Competent; P – Proficient; E – Exceptional 























• Committed to company strategy Comment 
• Demonstrates company values 
• Positively influences others to 
 reach organisational roles [sic] 
• Consistently strives for excellence 
• Views change as positive and  
 as an opportunity 
• Takes responsibility for own  







 N       D      C      P      E 
Novice                Exceptional 
 
Communication 
• Listens actively and checks for Comment 
understanding 
• Contributes own ideas freely 
• Communicates clearly and  
sensitively to both individuals 
and groups 
• Keeps others well informed of 
work progress 
• Presents well researched and  






 N       D      C      P      E 






















• Ensures own goals are in line Comment 
with team objectives 
• Readily supports colleagues 
• Treats others with honesty and  
integrity. Builds good working 
relationships  
• Encourages others to meet and  
exceed their objectives 
• Eagerly shares information and  







N    D   C   P   E 
Novice        Exceptional 
Smart Work Practices 
• Sets clear goals and high  Comment 
standards for delivery  
• Actively promotes “continuous  
improvement” and readily shares  
new ideas and suggestions 
• Utilises technology to best 
advantage 
• Uses time well and meets  
deadlines 
• Understands and follows 





 N       D      C      P      E 
Novice                Exceptional 
 
  
SECTION C – Science Capabilities 
1. Update science capability register and record new capabilities to be developed in the next 12 
months. 
2. New capabilities developed in current year. __________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Capability register updated ٱ 































What can AgResearch do to assist you? Indicate specific positions you are interested in 
gaining experience in, and whether you are able 
to shift location. 
 
SECTION D2 – Training and Development agreed and completed by staff member and team leader 
Discuss individuals potential to achieve their career aspirations. Identify training and development 
needs to achieve annual objectives and enhance career opportunities. Detail what is to be done by 
whom and by when. Consider internal training programmes, external programmes, one on one 















What and How      Who       When 
 
    
 
1-3 Years 
What and How      Who     When 
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Signed _________________________________________  Date___________________ 
 
 













Signed _________________________________________  Date___________________ 
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Appendix F: Copy of letter to AgResearch on completion of 
thesis 




Chief Executive Officer 
AgResearch Ltd 
Ruakura Research Centre 
East Street, Private Bag 3115 
Hamilton 
 
25 July 2003 
 
Dear Dr Steele, 
 
I wish to thank AgResearch for the support it gave me to carry out my PhD study, 
which is now successfully completed.  Without the award of an AgResearch PhD 
scholarship from the years 1998 to 2001, I would never have started.  I thank Dr John 
Lancashire, then General Manager of the Sustainable Production Division, for his 
advocacy on my behalf in this regard.  As an employee on study leave from 1999 to 
2000, I was provided with the resources and privileges of an ordinary employee, and 
access to AgResearch staff for my study.  Dr Mark Paine, then of the Social Science 
Group, gave me a small amount of clerical support, and acted as mentor and 
adviser/supervisor. 
 
As my proposed research changed from being a component in a proposed FRST 
funded programme on the impact of dairying in the South Island to a study of 
scientists and scientific technical workers, Dr John Hay gave it his support.  He 
dutifully read my quarterly reports and commented on them.  Later this task fell to 
Dr Gavin Sheath.  I thank Dr Stephen Goldson as the then leader of the Lincoln 
campus, and Drs Andy Bray and Trevor Jackson for approval to interview the staff of 
the Wool and Skin Biology Group and the Microbial Control Group, respectively.  I 
thank Dr John Hay for approval to interview those staff working on Endophyte, and 
Dr Alan Crawford, as a Science Platform Leader, for allowing me to interview staff 
working in the Molecular Biology Unit at the University of Otago.  Such approvals 
did not mean staff had to be part of my work.  Individual permission was also gained 
from all participants.  I also received permission on a case by case basis for 
observations of organisational or group meetings.  I wish to thank all staff I came 
across in the period of my research who were curious and interested in it and 
supported me.  
 
In the first year of my AgResearch Scholarship I was required by Lincoln University 
to fulfil a course of study as a prerequisite to PhD study.  Two further years of 
AgResearch support followed.  On the termination of this I was awarded a Lincoln 
University scholarship for a year and had the support of postgraduate funding within 
the Environment, Society and Design Division. Another year of study followed and 
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the thesis was completed on 10 March 2003 and examined and passed on 4 July 2003 
at an oral.  Copies of the thesis will be placed in the Lincoln University library. 
 
I hope that my thesis, titled ‘Compliance at work: Protecting identity and science 
practice under corporatisation’, contributes to an understanding of scientific workers 
and the practice of science in this period of New Zealand’s history.  A copy of the 
thesis is enclosed for AgResearch.  I thank AgResearch for the opportunity it 
provided for me to gain this qualification and pursue this interest in how people 





Lesley M. Hunt       
 
 
